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Summary of the Study
This thesis is the outcome of a research carried out 
in Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom between 1978 and 
1980. It is a study of the post-colonial employment 
policies and practices in Sierra Leone with references 
drawn from other African states with similar colonial 
experience from 1955 to 1978.
The significance of the two dates as the start-off 
and cut-off points of the study lies in the fact that 
1955 marked the end of the first decade after World 
War II during ^ich nationalism and constitutional 
development in colonial Africa started, and it was 
essentially a reaction against the enployment policy 
of the colonial government. It was also during this 
period that actual economic expansion and development 
in colonial Africa took shape with the introduction 
of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1945)»
The late seventies provided an opportunity to review 
and evaluate the success of Africanisation policies 
vdiich had been pursued.
As a process. Africanisation has had different 
labels and taken different forms. For certain countries, ' 
the term Africanisation was not the most desirable term. 
Instead, localisation, indigenisation or Sierra Leonisa- 
tion, Nigerianisation, etc. has been preferred. In such 
cases, these terms might be substituted for Africanisation,
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In this study they have been used synonymously to describe 
the policies which respective African states have pursued 
in order to increase the employment opportunities and 
advancement of their nationals in the public and private 
sectors of their countries. The choice of policies 
depended on the political orientation and the state of 
the economy of individual countries. In Sierra Leone, 
the Africanisation of the public sector took precedence 
over the private sector. It was much easier to achieve 
than the private sector where the pressure for Africani­
sation did not gain momentum until well after independence. 
However, \^en the pressure for private sector Africanisa­
tion did come, two policies were pursued: the first was
the immigration control designed to restrict the employment 
of non-nationals in activities where Sierra Leonean 
nationals can equally perform, aimed at a quantitative 
control of expatriate employment in the private sector; 
the second was the fiscal policy designed to increase the 
relative costs of expatriate employment to the employer 
and thus restrict their employment.
For both sectors, the motivation for Africanisation 
was political, economic and social, but in the absence of 
trained and qualified local manpower these goals could not 
be realized. At the attainment of independence, educational 
facilities were expanded and improved. It was hoped that 
this expansion and improvement would increase the supply 
of trained and qualified local manpower and thus reduce 
the country's dependence on foreign skills.
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But neither the Africanisation policies nor the 
expansion and improvement in educational facilities had 
succeeded in reducing the number of expatriates employed 
in both sectors which stood at 2,500 in 1978 against 
1,807 in 1964.
Two reasons were identified to be broadly responsible 
for this apparent failure of the Africanisation policies 
to reduce the number of expatriates employed in the - 
economy of Sierra Leone. The first was attributed to the 
failure of the education system (expanded and improved 
after independence)to produce the right skill mix required 
by employers. The second was a hybrid of several factors 
which expatriate employers used as excuses for their 
unwillingness to Africanisé high-level positions in their 
respective enterprises. Particularly, the government's 
lip service to Africanisation policies and its retrograde 
examples of de-Africanisation on certain state enterprises 
served private sector expatriate employers very well.
The area of greatest weakness in the study lies in 
the absence of sufficient statistical data necessary for 
an adequate analysis of the problems of Africanisation 
as a dynamic process. The statistics used have normally 
been drawn either from the publications listed or from 
the digest of statistics which governments published 
periodically. It is difficult to guarantee a high standard 
of accuracy in every case because of the limitations 
imposed by the scarcity of up-to-date data, and even
XVI
thbse that are in the majority of instances rather crude 
estimates and invariably do not make explicitly clear as 
to how expatriate personnel are deployed in both the public 
and private sectors of the economy. While all this connotes 
caution in the use of such data, it does not spell 
despair. Fortunately, statistical surveys, however 
important they may be, do not bring into relief all that 
is important in the life of a people. As Cuber and Kenkel 
pointed out in their work on social stratification;
Historical data, personal observation and 
illustrative cases are all empirical and 
highly useful in this and many other fields, 
even though they yield no coefficient of 
correlations or chi squares.
It is in this tradition that the writer wants this 
study to be viewed, and it is his hope that it will 
provide the basic guideposts for a fuller understanding 
of the dynamics of Africanisation and will serve as a 
necessary background for further studies on the contemporary 
scene.
— 1 —
Africanisation and Manpower Requirements: A Study of Post-




In the last two decades, Africanisation had become a 
matter of such urgency and importance that it was apt to be 
thought of as a wholly post-colonial issue. This is not so. 
Africanisation as a policy was conceived in the nineteenth 
century and was pursued with some success throughout the first 
half of that century. That it then suffered eclipse for 
generations was a tragedy for Africa, the extent of which be­
came evident with the passing of^the colonial era.^
Among the major administrative problems which attended 
the advance of colonial territories to self-government and 
the final attainment of independence in the 1960s was the 
manning of the public service during and immediately follow­
ing the transition period.
In the past, colonial territories had all in varying 
degrees been administered by personnel recruited from the 
home countries of the colonial powers, and they came to rely 
in their political and economic development on the existence 
of a public service containing a substantial proportion of 
expatriate officials trained in modem administrative and _ 
technical methods. Although the majority of the colonial 
public servants had at all times been locally recruited, and 
the overseas officers had been a relatively small minority, 
they occupied most of the high-level administrative and pro­
fessional posts in the public services. For example, in 
Sierra Leone in 1950 there were 4?1 posts in the senior ser­
vice of the public service and of these only 54 posts were
2held by Sierra Leonean nationals.
In the private sector, the position was no different.
The employment policies of foreign-owned firms excluded Africans 
from high-level employment in these firms. Africans were
3employed not above the level of clerks, bookkeepers, etc.
This situation was illustrated in the Ivory Coast where the 
Minister of Technical Education and Information commented:
Existing industrial activities have contributed very 
unevenly to the increase in per capita income of the 
various population groups in the Ivory Coast. Almost 
all industrial enterprises are controlled by Euro­
peans, and the principal staffs are also Europeans.^ 
Similarly in the Republic of Guinea:
The training of Africans for technical and economic 
staff positions was practically non-existent, and 
employment opportunities for the very few who did 
receive training were limited not only by the country's 
low level of economic development but also by the
preference given to Europeans in employment.
The policies of private sector employers and the colon­
ial administration frequently created dual wage structures 
which, (when the Africanisation of both sectors finally was 
achieved), remained and thus aggravated the difficulties and 
expense for the government and private sector employers.^
As Africans gradually entered the civil service and the man­
agerial positions in the large foreign-owned firms, they 
assumed the basic salaries attached to the posts; so far, 
the principle of equal pay between Africans and expatriates 
for equal posts had "generally been maintained. In consequence.
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Africanisation brought about a huge gap between the incomes 
of high-level manpower (the African elites and sub-elites) 
and the incomes of not only unskilled labour but also between 
semi-skilled and skilled. Thus, a wage structure had devel­
oped with major disparities of scale of income between skill
ogroups. Although workers might have little capacity to take 
effective industrial action they did have considerable direct
9political influence. For these reasons governments in trop­
ical Africa were easily induced to steadily raise wages either 
through increases in legal minimum wages or by being major 
employers of labour and acting as wage leaders. These drives 
greatly complicated the Africanisation process, particularly 
in the private sector, and have augmented costs markedly and 
perhaps prohibitively if the new African industry is to be 
competitive within Africa and the world market generally.
In addition, these dual wages structures have also affected 
the supply of various categories of manpower from the educa­
tional system.
The educational system vdiich developed alongside the
economic structure during most of the period was more or less
adequate, however, to meet the need for increased agricultural
productivity, the development of industry, and the promotion
of basic welfare programmes which arose after 1945 and espec-
11ially after independence. In order to appreciate this, 
the colonial system of education as it developed up to,1945 
may be examined from three eifferent points of view - the 
intention, the content of the teaching, and the extent to 
which facilities were available.
“ 5-
The intentions of the schools was quite simple. They
were established in order to produce the type of manpower
needed by a colonial economy and administration. This was
true whether the schools were established by missionaries
or by the governments themselves. The need was a limited
one. Africans could not usually expect to reach the highest
level of employment in administration or business, and
the demand was mainly for clerks, bookeepers, custom
12clerks and primary school teachers. As one prominent
Nigerian politician has written*
In many parts of the world at that time,
the elites of the society were pastors, cate-
chista, teachers, clerks, and interpreters.
They were respected, admired and adored.
The sumnum bonum of a Christian parent's
ambition was that his sons._should after leaving
13school be like one of them.
Almost all the important policy-making and managerial 
positions were in the hands of Europeans. Even the more 
advanced levels of education* were mainly staffed by Euro­
pean teachers.Moreover, the number of people employed 
at these higher levels of responsibility was relatively 
small. Professor Harbison has estimated that in Nigeria 
shortly after independence (1962) some 30,000 people, one- 
third of them still expatriate, were carrying the entire
burden of top-level policy decisions and administrative
»
responsibility.^^ The Ghana draft plan made a similar
-6-
point when.it declared*
The profile of employment in I960 showed a 
particularly small proportion of employment 
in managerial, technician, craftsman and 
supervisory grades. These are specially 
the elements in the total labour force on ' 
which the economy depends, most for its 
productive efficiency and its ability to 
grow.
The system of education in operation throughout most of the 
colonial period therefore tended to produce Africans 
trained only to take subordinate positions. Institutions 
like Fourah Bay College in Freetown, Ibadan University 
College in Nigeria and AchimCLta College in Ghana could 
have produced enough advanced students to fill any high- 
level position open to Africans. Even though the last 
decade of colonial rule saw ^n attempt to provide more 
advanced education - the opening of University Colleges in 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast - at independence, there were 
not enough trained people to staff a modern administrative 
structure and at the same time pursue any ambitious plans 
for economic development.
Moreover, many of those who had received an advanced 
education had had training unsuited for the tasks which lay 
ahead. Since one of the few careers open without restric­
- 7-
tion to the able African had been law, many had sought a 
legal training. To become a barrister was associated in 
a young man's mind with success. Accustomed to see 
expatriates hold all senior technical posts, he was much 
less likely to think of becoming an engineer or agricultural 
expert.
Not only the intention of colonial education but its 
content predisposed Africans to think this way. Designed 
mainly to produce clerks, it was literary rather than 
practical or vocational. It may have provided Africans, as 
Guy Hunter has argued, with the entry to the heritage of 
political and religious experience of mankind, but it 
also gave rise to two attitudes towards education which 
boded ill for the needs of the new states after independence. 
First of all, people tended to believe that the only 
genuine education was a literary one, and that any form of 
education which included practical training was inferior. 
Secondly, manual labour was often felt to be undignified 
for the educated. A school certificate was the passport to 
the town and the life of the white-collar worker, an escape 
from the drudgery of the farm. Such attitudes might be 
understandable in the colonial situation, but they con­
stituted a serious problem for the newly’independent states. 
As a Senegalese publication has put it*
At the moment that our country became inde­
pendent, it was necessary to launch an appeal 
to all educators, and more particularly to
—8 —
the Masters of our primary schools . , .to
teach our youths the value of efforts and
show them that what must be honoured even
more than the diploma is work. The road
of national construction and true independence
passes through the training of cadres without
which the life of the country cannot be assured
18nor its independence guaranteed.
One final feature of West African education in the 
colonial period must be noted - its extent.
To get any education at all in the colonial period 
was a privilege. All over West Africa most people in all 
but the most privileged areas were illiterate when colonial 
rule entered its last decade. Despite increased attempts 
to open schools and start programmes of adult education in 
these last ten years, the great majority was still illiterate 
and the manpower problem remained.
As each colonial territory progressed toward self- 
government and independence» the demand for greater indi­
genous participation in both the public and private sectors 
of the economy continued. In Nigeria, on the eve of its 
independence in 1959» the report of the Parliamentary 
Committee on the Nigerianisation of the Federal Public 
Service had this to say;
One of the fundamental rights of a self- 
governing country is that it must have 
control of its public service. No outside
- 9-
authority must be in a position to determine,_ 
even in the last instance what appointment, 
promotions and disciplinary actions are taken 
in respect of the civil service.
In Sierra Leone, the report of Cox-George on the 
African participation in the commerce of Sierra Leone 
recommended that as a condition of doing business, prospec­
tive foreign investors would be required to employ Sierra
Leoneans as deputy-general managers, as well as branch 
20managers. But in each case, the capacity to do so was
limited by the availability of locally qualified manpower
which, in fact, was lacking, although in varying degree in
each territory. Any Africanisation policy that can
necessitate or can only be maintained by external contract/
recruitment is not only self-defeating in the sense of
failing to accomplish its basic purpose, but also in being
21wasteful of available resources.
To some people, the obvious course of action might seem 
to be to delay the process of Africanisation until the newly 
independent states had trained and recruited from their own 
sources all or nearly all the staff they required. The 
withdrawal of overseas officers could then be carried out 
in sin orderly manner. Some of the earlier post-war reports 
on the Africanisation of the public service in West Africa 
showed signs that their authors envisaged some such 
leisurely process, or at least that they assumed that the 
transfer of power could be so timed as to ensure that there 
would be no disturbance of the smooth course of administra^ 
tion and not even a temporary loss of efficiency.
— 10-
Political ajid economic expectations could not, however, 
be made to wait upon administrative convenience in this way; 
the pressures for Africanisation continued. At the time of 
independence measures designed to speed up the process of 
Africanisation were adopted. Educational and training 
facilities were improved and expanded. It was hoped that 
this would increase the supply of trained and qualified 
local manpower. In Sierra Leone, the output of manpower 
from the post-primary educational institutions more than 
doubled (see Chapter 5) between 1961 and 1978. The number 
of secondary school leavers with General Certificate of 
Education at 'O' and 'A' levels increased from 483 per annum 
in 1961 to 1,240 per annum in 1978 (see tables 5*18 a&b);the 
number of graduates from the University of Sierra, Leone 
increased from 19 per annum in i960 to 353 per annum in 1978 
(see Table 5*19)* There were also corresponding increases 
from the technical and vocational and teacher training 
institutions.
At the same time, in order to ensure maximum utilisa­
tion of local manpower, administrative and legislative 
measures designed to restrict the employment of non­
nationals by private sector employers were put into effect. 
Administrative machinery for the control of expatriate 
employment such as the Immigration Department, Immigration 
Control Committee, Expatriate Quota Committees, etc. were 
set up. Legislative measures such as the Non-Citizen Trade 
Amendments of I968 and 1970 were enacted. In addition.
— 11-
fiscal measures, such as the expatriate levy tax of £200 on 
expatriate payroll, were all aimed at preventing the 
employment of non-Sierra Leonean nationals in jobs for which 
there were available Sierra Leoneans with comparable qualifi­
cations and job experience.
Nonetheless, neither the expansion and improvement in 
the educational and training facilities, nor the adminis­
trative, legislative and fiscal policies were able to 
achieve the desired objective of Africanisation. The 
employment of expatriate personnel of all categories in the 
private Sector and to some extent in the public sector 
continued. The 1965 Brown Report on the manpower situation 
in Sierra Leone indicated that there were a total of 1,804 
expatriate personnel in the economy of Sierra Leone in 1965» 
In 1978 a brochure prepared by the Sierra Leone External 
Telecommunications Ltd. puts the number of expatriates in 
the economy of Sierra Leone at 2,500; "these were mainly 
British nationals.”
. Four inferences may be drawn from this:
First, the demand for trained and qualified manpower 
of all skills had outstripped supply owing to increased 
economic and social activities in the country.
Second, the post-independent expansion and improvement 
in the educational and training facilities had not produced 
the types of skills which private sector employers required.
-12-
Third, the machinery set up to implement the adminis­
trative, legislative and fiscal policies was either 
inadequate or incompetent and therefore ineffective.
Fourth, or a combination of two or more of the above.
Each of these inferences will be fully discussed in 
the appropriate chapters (4 and 5) below.
1. The objectives of the study.
In most African states, owing to the poverty of
statistical information, the size and level of expatriate
employment has not been fully stated in numerical terms.
There are, however, crude estimates with regards to
the size of the problem. Bernard Schaffer put the figures
of colonial civil servants in Africa south of the Sahara in
221958 at 100,000. He did not, however, state how many were 
employed in the private sector. But "The Economist” in 
i960 put it at 1,000,000.^^ Both sources did not state how 
these expatriates were deployed in terms of public or 
private sectors. There has not been any adequate informa­
tion with regard to resources and availability of indigenous 
manpower, the recruitment and employment policies of the 
private sector employers; and the reactions of both their 
African employees and the government have not also been 
fully discussed. Nor has there been any careful analysis 
of the socio-psychological barriers to speedy Africanisa­
tion particularly in the private sector. This study 
attempts to fill these gaps. Its main objectives are
- 13-
essentially to seek to explore and provide some factual 
information on the process and progress of Africanisation 
of both the public and private sector employment, the size 
and levels of expatriate employment, and their share of the 
wage bills, and the policies pursued by the Sierra i*eone 
Government from 1955-1978.
2. Scone of the study.
Since little attention to date has been accorded to 
the analysis of the policy of Africanisation in ex-colonial 
Africa, the present study is intended to be wide in scope, 
covering nearly all aspects of Africanisation, for it is 
felt that it is essential to examine the entire framework 
within which interesting areas could be identified.
One such area is the recruitment and employment 
practices of both the colonial and national governments and 
the private sector employers. A second area is to be found 
in the existence of a dual wage structure between expatriate 
personnel and their African counterparts in both the public 
and private sectors; a third area is to be found in the 
field of labour relations within the framework of a pre­
dominantly foreign-owned and directed private sector, and 
the responses of the media, public and the government; and 
finally, a fourth area is to be found in the expansion of 
the education system designed to meet the manpower demands 
of the Africanisation policy.
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3. Structure of the study.
The study is broadly divided into three parts. The 
division reflects a logical sequence of the government's 
policy priorities in the area of Africanisation. However, 
the division does not make individual parts to be mutually 
exclusive of each other. On the contrary, they are inter­
related.
Part I is divided into two chapters. Chapter 1 
provides background information on the setting of the 
study - Sierra Leone - its people, geography, history, 
and constitutional development, the economic and social 
infrastructures, and the employment and recruitment policies 
of the colonial government. Reference is also made to the 
size and levels of colonial expatriate employment in both 
Sierra Leone and other colonial African countries. The 
analysis in this chapter is mainly historical. The inten­
tion is to provide background information against which the 
moods of African politicians towards Africanisation can be 
judged.
Chapter 2 provides a survey of the process and progress 
of Africanisation of the public service. It examines 
the economic and political motivation behind the nationalist 
pressures for the Afric^isation of the public service from 
19.50 to 1978' It also examines the socio-political problems 
arising in a multi-tribal society and the reactions of 
various interest groups.
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Part II is concerned with the Africanisation of the 
private sector from 19&1 to 1978. It starts with the 
identification of the various types of indigenisation of the 
private sector. Three types of indigenisation are 
identified - ownership, control and manpower. This part is 
also divided into two chapters.
Chapter 3 starts with a review of the size and level of 
expatriate employment in the private sector in Sierra Leone, 
at the time of independence and its share of the wage bill. 
In the main, this chapter looks at the whole spectrum of the 
employment practices of foreign-owned firms operating in 
Sierra Leone. The analysis of such practices is based on 
Perlmutter's universal classification of the employment 
policies of multi-national corporations (MNC). Also 
included in this chapter is the description of a dual labour 
market situation created by the wages differentials between 
the expatriate personnel and their African counterparts.
The rest of the chapter is essentially a report on the field 
work undertaken by the researcher during his five month 
study tour of Sierra Leone between September 1978 and 
February 1979»
Chapter 4 describes the reaction of organized labour 
against the employment policies of expatriate-owned firms 
and the government's response towards such reaction.
Implicit in the government's responses are the socio­
economic motives such as the effect of Africanisation on the 
country's balance of payments, the income spread among
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its nationals, etc. The rest of this chapter discussed the 
various policies adopted by the government to restrict the 
employment of non-nationals in the private sector of Sierra 
Leone and the effectiveness of such policies.
Part III is concerned with the manpower supply side of 
the Africanisation question. It begins by giving an intro­
ductory background to the manpower supply problem.
Chapter 5 also begins with a review of the relevant 
literature on manpower supply-requirement analysis. Then 
a detailed analysis of the Sierra Leone manpower situation 
is carried out in this chapter. Also discussed are some of 
the policy implications affecting the supply of manpower.
The concluding Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings 
of the study and some of the proposals made by the 
respondents during the field study. Some policy alterna­
tives are then outlined.
Methodology.
The literature on Africanisation is marked by two 
features. First, it is considerable at the primary levels 
of reports, proposals, slogans, legislation# statements and 
programmes; second, it has remained scanty at the level of 
critical interpretation. Kirk-Green recorded that not more 
than half a dozen academic studies had been undertaken.
It was against this background of paucity of published 
materials that the research for this study was undertaken.
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For the purpose of information and data collection for 
this study, two main approaches were adopted.
The first was the archival approach. This involved a 
review of the available relevant literature on Africanisa­
tion and manpower. This information was obtained by visiting 
various institutions of learning, archives, public records 
offices, etc. The first of such visits started with the 
Centre for West African Studies in Birmingham University, 
(January, 1978) where the researcher had a long discussion 
on the suitability of the topic as a subject for academic 
enquiry with the Deputy Director of the Centre, Douglas 
Rimmer. Mr. Rimmer considered the topic to be interesting 
for academic work, but pointed out the problems involved in 
obtaining published materials since not much academic work 
had been done on the subject. He suggested, however, that 
much of the work would need to be done by way of field work, 
particularly in the private sector. However, at the request 
of the researcher, Mr. Rimmer suggested the following 
publications which he felt would provide background 
reading material for the study: Africa in Social Change,
The New Elites of Tropical Africa by P.C. Lloyd; Indigeni­
sation of Industry (in Nigeria) by Gaston Rimlinger (in the 
Quarterly Journal of Administration (1973)» The Policy of 
Indigenisation (in Nigeria); an Overall View by Paul 
Collins (in Quarterly Journal of Administration (1975)» 
Nigerian Expatriate Management Relationships by the 
Nigerian Institute of Management, 1971' These, amongst
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many others formed the starting point of the literature. In 
Birmingham, the City Library was visited and useful 
information was collected.
Subsequently, similar visits were made to: The Royal
Geographical Society Library at Kessington Gore, London; 
the Commonwealth Institute Library, Kensington High Street, 
London; the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Library, Lon­
don University, The Institute of Education Library, London 
University; the School of Oriental and African Studies 
Library, London University; the Rhodes Library, Oxford 
University; the Commonwealth and Foreign Office Library, 
London, Public Records Offices, London; the Bristol 
University Library, the Institute of Development Studies 
Library at Sussex University, Brighton.
In Sierra Leone the following libraries and institu­
tions were visited: Fourah Bay College library, Njala
University College, the Bank of Sierra Leone library, the 
Ministries of Education, Labour and Development and Economic 
Planning libraries were visited; the United States Informa­
tion Service (USIS) library was also visited.
The second approach was empirical. This included the
field work and data collection. It was carried out between
September 1978 and February 1979 in Sierra Leone. The field
work endeavoured'basically to exploit three streams of
evidence. The most important source of information was
interviews with key employers and retired public servants.
In all, 50 interviews were held covering firms employing 
4
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six or more employees. Such interviews usually lasted 
between one hour and quite often over two hours (see 
Appendix II). The second source, the annual employers' 
returns to the government such as the employment returns to 
the Ministry of Labour by companies employing six or more 
people; the salary and wages annual returns to the Depart­
ment of Income Tax, Ministry of Finance, and other official 
documents kept by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, etc.
The third source, less reliable though, was the information 
obtained in informal contacts and interviews with junior 
employees. This was necessitated by private sector employers 
refusal in some cases to disclose the salaries of their 
expatriate personnel, particularly the expatriation 
allowance, under the cloak of confidentiality. But on 
several occasions account clerks in wage offices were most 
willing to sneak out of offices lists of expatriate employees 
and their salaries.
In their order of importance and reliability, the 
information and data obtained from the two approaches can 
be classified as follows; the field work constitutes the 
primary sources; official documents constitute the second 
source; and the third source of information is published 
materials in books and professional journals.
In a study of this nature, particularly where infor­
mation was provided in the strictest confidence during the 
field work, detailed references are impossible, but the 
books, articles, journals and government publications
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which the writer has found most useful appear in the 
bibliographies. These have been attached to individual 
chapters to enable the reader who is interested in a 
particular idea to pursue it further.
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PART I THE AFRICANISATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
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CHAPTER 1 THE SETTING AND THE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES OF THE 
COLONIAL GOVERNMENT.
1.1 The Setting - Sierra Leone.
Sierra Leone, a small country of 28,000 square miles, 
is situated on the West Coast of Africa. It lies between 
latitudes ? degrees and 10 degrees North and longitude 10.50 
degrees and 13.18 degrees West. It has a sea coast line of 
210 miles along the Western front which is bounded by the 
Atlantic Ocean. On the North and East, it is bounded by the 
Republic of Guinea (French-speaking) and on the Southeast by 
the Republic of Liberia (the oldest republic in Africa, 
1847).!
The country consists of a peninsula, a couple of off­
shore islands and a flat, low-lying coastal strip backed by 
extensive mangrove swamps, rolling wooded country and hills 
in the West and South and an upland plateau of 1,500 feet in 
the North and East. West of the upland plateau rises the 
Sula and the Kangari hills reaching a height of over 2,000 
feet. Near the border with Guinea on the Northwest lie the 
two highest peaks in the country - the Bintumani (6,400 
feet) and the Sankerbriwa (6,000 feet). The country is well 
watered by a network of fast-flowing rivers and streams 
which makes inland navigation difficult, a factor respon­
sible for the relative remoteness of the African continent 
as a whole. It lacks navigable rivers for ocean-going 
vessels. However, smaller boats and canoes ply up and down 
most of the country's inland waterways.
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The climate is a tropical one with a mean temperature 
of about SO^F. all year round but with rain and relative 
humidity increasing as one moves inland from the coast. 
Rainfall, which averages about 100 inches, is heaviest on 
the coastal belt. There are two distinct seasons in Sierra 
Leone: the "dry season" which starts roughly from November
to April and the "rainy season" from May to October. Their 
periods vary as one moves inland.
The population of Sierra Leone, according to the 1974
census, is 3 million compared to the 1963 figure of 2.2
million, representing an annual growth rate of 2 per cent.
However, there have been doubts as to the validity of the
1963 figures which have generally been thought to be a gross
under-enumeration of the real figures. Even the director of
the 1974 census admitted that the census contains a probably
margin of error of + 10%.^ Also, a post-enumeration survey
in a sample of 16O enumeration areas designed to check the
accuracy of the census revealed that about 3% of the
4population was not accounted for.
The population density varies considerably - the 
greatest concentration is around the Western Area Peninsula 
where the population density is up to 7OO persons per square 
mile, against II7 people per square mile in the rest of the 
country.This sharply contrasts the situation in some of 
the northern districts of the country, where the population 
density per square mile averages only about 30* The main 
urban centres and the administrative and commercial capital
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is Freetown, which is situated on the northern tip of the 
Western Area Peninsula. The greater Freetown area contained 
according to the 1974 census, a total population of 276,000. 
As the seat of government and the centre of trade, commerce 
and industry, all activities radiate from Freetown, and it is 
connected to the outside world by one of the biggest natural 
harbours in the world and an international airport at 
Lungi; and to the rest of the country by a bitumenized all- 
weather road, supplemented by inland waterways for small 
engine-powered boats and launches. Other important urban 
centres in the country are Bo (35,000), situated l47 miles 
from Freetown in the Southern Province; Kenema, with a 
population of 31,000 in the Eastern Province; Makeni, 26,000, 
the administrative headquarters of the Northern Province. A 
number of other towns have grown and developed along the 
diamond mining operations in the Eastern Province, eg.
Sefadu, with a population of 76,000.
About 15 per cent of the population lives permanently 
in an urban environment in Freetown and the various pro­
vincial towns. The rest of the population live in rural
areas and engage in subsistence farming as well as small-
scale cash-crop production for both domestic and export 
markets. On the whole, the population is rather sedentary, 
with hardly any seasonal or periodic migration taking place 
except between the diamond and non-diamond mining
areas. There is, of course, a gradual drift from the rural 
areas to the urban centres, but such a drift is on a
—26-
permanent basis rather than a seasonal basis.^ Unfortu­
nately, this rural-urban drift has tended to give rise to 
the twin problems of under-employment in some areas and 
unemployment in others.
The population of Sierra Leone comprises at least 13 
different tribes, each having its own language. The two 
main tribes are the Temnes and the Mendes which constitute 
648,931 and 672,831» respectively, accounting for over a 
third of the population (see Table 2.10). The Temnes
live in the Northeast and were the principal inhabitants of 
the Western Area Peninsula when Freetown, the capital, was 
founded in 1787. The Mendes live in the South and South­
eastern parts of the country. Scattered throughout the 
West of the country are Limbas, Konos, Korankos, Susus, 
Yelinkas and the Fullas who are found living along the whole 
of West Africa. There are also communities of Kissis,
Vais, and Krus, who originate from neighbouring Guinea and 
Liberia. Possibly, the most distinctive and influential 
people in Sierra Leone are the Creoles of Freetown and its 
neighbourhood (41,783)» The Creoles are the descendants of 
slaves from all over West Africa's coast who were repatria­
ted between 1787 and I870 and settled with assistance from 
the British Government on the land bought from the Temne 
King, Naimbawa.^ Cut off from their own traditions, the 
Creoles acquired the cultural ideals of the British and 
aided by missions gained substantial education and profes­
sional advantages over the majority of the people of the
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hinterland and indeed over most West Africans. The Creoles' 
consciousness of their own superiority and disrespect for 
the indigenous people's tribal culture created 
hostility and deep mistrust between them and the rest of the 
people, particularly the educated provincial people.
Even today, when the Creoles form less than two per cent of 
the population of the country, traditional rivalry between 
the settlers' descendants and the people from the 'up 
country', still has a significant, if declining, influence 
in the country's politics. In addition, there are other 
minority non-African groups in Sierra Leone. The biggest 
group is the Lebanese; the 1974 census put them at about 
10,000, followed by the Indians at about 3,000. These two
groups constitute the entrepreneurial class. All engage in
y 
9
8commerce and industr . European expatriates were estimated
to be 2,500 in 1979»
Following the diamond boom of the 1950s and the early 
1960s, immigrants from neighbouring African countries, 
particularly the Republic of Guinea, swelled the population 
of the diamond mining areas, engaged not only in illicit 
mining activities and smuggling but also in diverse trading 
activities. Mainly as a result of the loss of revenue due 
to diamond smuggling, the government has adopted a stricter 
attitude towards this category of immigrants over the last 
20 years. By the Non-Citizen Residence Act of 1965, 
"strangers" were required to have a residence permit in 
order to be able to stay in the Kono diamond area, and
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permits were only granted to those engaged in legitimate 
trade, and business associated with the development of the 
country. Since the legislation was enacted, it was reported 
that more than 2,000 African immigrants have been deported 
on the grounds of being illegal residents in the country.
1.2 History and Constitutional Development.
The name Sierra Leone derives from the Portuguese 
'Sierra Lyoa' or Lion Mountains, so called by the 15th 
century explorer Pedro da Cintra. Little was known about 
the country prior to this period. Slave traders, merchants, 
and adventurers visited the coast during the next three 
hundred years, but no permanent settlements resulted until 
the end of the l8th century when a project headed by Gren­
ville Sharp was begun to settle freed slaves from England on 
Freetown Peninsula. Four hundred freed slaves were sent out 
in 1787 to found the settlement of Freetown. Three years 
later the project was taken over by the Sierra Leone Company 
and more settlers of African origin were sent from Britain, 
Nova Scotia in Canada, and Jamaica.
In 1808 the settlement was declared a Crown Colony and 
became the main base in West Africa for enforcing the I807 
Act outlawing the slave trade. During the 19th century, 
many thousands of liberated slaves settled in Freetown 
Peninsula. British influence was gradually extended into 
the interior eind in 1862 a large tract of coastal land, 
including Sherbro Island, was added to the colony. In the
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following years treaties of friendship were made with the 
neighbouring paramount chiefs to protect the colony's trade 
with the hinterland. A Protectorate was declared over the 
hinterland in I896, and this was administered separately 
from the colony until 1924.^^
Until 1863, the government of the colony of Sierra 
Leone consisted of a Governor and an advisory council 
comprising ex-officio, and one or two appointed, members.
In 1863, executive and legislative councils were created, 
and in 1866 Sierra Leone was joined with the Gambia, the 
Gold Coast, and the colony of Lagos to form the West African 
settlements with a governor-general in Freetown as the seat 
of g o v ernment.In 1874, Lagos and the Gold Coast became 
separate colonies, and in I885 the Gambia was also estab­
lished as a separate colony.
Although the hinterland was declared a British Protec­
torate in 1896, following the agreement on the boundary with 
French Guinea between the British and the French governments 
the previous year, it was not until 1924 that a new consti­
tution extended the jurisdiction of the colony's legislative 
council to cover the Protectorate's interest in the law 
making body through the nomination of literate paramount 
chiefs. In 1943, for the first time, two Africans were 
nominated as unofficial members of the executive council 
which was the official advisory body to the Governor. In 
1947 this number was increased to three.
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A new constitution which came into being in 1951
greatly enlarged the legislative council to 32 members,
including the first set of directly elected members from 
l4the colony; the Protectorate members include nominated 
Paramount chiefs and other members nominated from among 
representatives of the Protectorate Assembly, a quasi­
legislative assembly which dealt with the internal affairs 
of the Protectorate.^^ By this time, organised political 
parties had emerged, and the 1951 limited election was 
fought on a party basis, although the deciding factor was 
the old cleavage between the colony and the Protectorate 
people,rather than political party ideology. It was 
more of a power struggle between the "backward" majority 
Protectorate people and the more advanced, westernised 
Creoles of the colony.
The Creoles offered several objections to this 
arrangement: that the chiefs were too closely tied to the
Protectorate administration; that the chiefs did not neces­
sarily represent their people, being nominated as they were, 
and in view of the current strained relations between chiefs 
and people owing to alleged misuse of p o w e r ; a n d  it would 
be illegal for British-protected persons and aliens under 
the 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act to legislate for British 
subjects. In fact, they were afraid of the ultimate des­
truction of Creole ascendency in the Legislative Council 
and the public service.
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In 19531 a ministerial system was introduced, and in 
1954 the title of Chief Minister was accorded to the leader 
of the majority party in the new Legislative Council. A 
new constitution in 1956 replaced the Legislative Council 
by a House of Representatives with a speaker, four ex­
officio members appointed by the Governor, and 51 elected 
members. At the same time, the franchise was extended to 
most adult taxpayers in the Protectorate and property owners 
in the colony. The constitution was altered in 1958 follow­
ing the 1957 May General Elections which gave the Sierra 
Leone Peoples Party (S.L.P.P.) a majority in the new House 
of Representatives. By the exclusion of the four ex­
officio members from the Executive Council and the House of 
Representatives a new Executive Council was formed. This 
included eleven Ministers appointed from among the elected 
members of the House of Representatives at the advice of 
the Chief Minister, now Premier, the leader of the majority 
party; the late Dr. Sir Milton Margai, the first Protec­
torate b o m  to qualify as a medical doctor.
On the 27th April, 196I Sierra Leone became an 
independent state with the Queen as Head of State (repre­
sented by a Governor-General), became a member of the 
Commonwealth, and was admitted as both member of the United 
Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The 
Creoles realised that their future role in an independent 
Sierra Leone lay not with the politics of the country but 
with their stronghold in the public service where they
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stand to benefit from the earày period of Africanisation.
In addition, in order to allay their fear of possible 
discrimination against them by a Protectorate-led govern­
ment at independence, a Creole was appointed Governor-
General; and in a cabinet of 17 ministers in 1962, no less
1 8than five were Creoles.
The first elections after independence in 1962 were 
fought between the Sierra Leone Peoples Party under the 
leadership of Sir Milton Margai and the All Peoples Con­
gress led by Siaka Stevens. The S.L.P.P. won the election 
with 42 out of 67 popularly elected seats, and Sir Milton 
Margai was appointed Prime Minister. On his death in 1964 
he was succeeded by his younger brother, Albert Margai,
The succession of Albert Margai as Prime Minister and
subsequently elected life leader of the S.L.P.P. increased 
the fear of Mende domination by the Northern tribes headed 
by the Temnes. The opposition party, the All Peoples Con­
gress (APC) led by a Northerner exploited this fear by
19preaching tribalism.  ̂ This was aggravated by Sir Albert 
Margai*s appointment of Mendes in key positions in the 
public service* the Secretary to the Prime Minister (head 
of the Civil Service), the Establishment Secretary and the 
Secretary Recruitment and Training. These appointments also 
created fear among the Creoles whose stronghold in the 
public service felt threatened. The obvious course of
action open to them was to lend support, overt or covert,
to the opposition party. This they did.
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Sir Albert Margai saw his declining popularity and 
support in the Western Area and the Northern Province. In 
November, 1963, a private member's motion calling for the 
introduction of a "democratic one-party state" was unani­
mously passed in an S.L.P.P. dominated parliament. The 
reason behind this move was clear. Sir Albert Margai 
wanted to safeguard himself and his supporters and remain 
in power for life, having been elected life leader of his 
party. This move was strongly resisted by the people of 
Sierra Leone and when his political mentor. President Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana was overthrown Sir Albert Margai suspended 
the one party idea. In January, 196?, Sir Albert Margai 
made a move to introduce a republican constitution with a 
ceremonial president. This was unani­
mously passed in Parliament. This was interpreted by the 
opposition party as another attempt by the government to 
bring back the one party issue "through the back door." On 
March 17, 19&7, Sir Albert Margai called a general election 
with the one party and republican issues fresh in the minds 
of the electorate.
This was the second election after independence. They 
were hard fought by the two parties. Each party regarded 
the 1967 election to be the last free election to be held 
in Sierra Leone. Later events proved this to be so. 
Tremendous efforts were made to return the S.L.P.P. into 
power but the forces against Sir Albert Margai among the 
Creole community were too strong. The election resulted in
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a narrow victory for the A.P.O. winning 32 seats, the S.L.P.P 
28, and 6 independent candidates. Siaka Stevens, the A.P.O. 
leader was appointed Prime Minister by the Governor General 
(a Creole), but the military commander Brigadier David 
Lansana, a Mende by tribe, with a small body of troops 
declared a martial law and arrested both the newly sworn-in 
Prime Minister, Siaka Stevens, and the Governor-General 
saying that Sir Henry Lightfoot Boston's action was uncon­
stitutional. However, Lansana*s personal relationship with
Sir Albert Margai was too close to permit his motives to
20stand above suspicion. Two days later, a counter-coup by 
a number of senior army officers who were not prepared to 
allow Lansana to use the army to keep Sir Albert Margai in 
power arrested Lansana, together with both Margai and 
Stevens, and set up as government a National Reformation 
Council (NRG) consisting of eight officers under the chair­
manship of Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier) Andrew 
21Juxon Smith. However, discontent with the N.R.C. became 
apparent when it made no move to return the country to 
civilian rule and in April 17» 1968, one year after its 
installation, the N.R.C. was overthrown by an uprising of 
private soldiers and N.C.O.s who formed the Anti-Corruption 
Revolutionary Council Movement with the declared aim of 
immediate restoration of a civilian rule.
A National Interim Council was set up under the chair­
manship of the late Brigadier John Bangura to determine how 
this might be achieved and it consulted all successful
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csLndidates of the 196? general elections. Shortly after­
wards, a National Government was formed with Siaka Stevens
22as Prime Minister, on April 24, 1968. Political insta­
bility continued, however, and a state of emergency was 
declared in November 1968. In September 1970, following the 
resignation of two cabinet ministers, another state of 
emergency was declared. Their resignations led to the 
formation of a new political party under the leadership of 
a prominent Northerner, Dr. John Kar.efa-Smart. This was the 
culmination of discontent among the young educated 
Northerners who felt that the Creoles had taken all the jobs 
in the public service as well as the para-statal corpora­
tions. The Mendes were more bitter against the Creoles 
vdiom they held as scape goats for the downfall of Sir 
Albert Margai and their subsequent replacement by Creoles 
in all the key positions they held during the Albert Margai 
era. So the new party, the United Democratic Party, was 
an alliance of provincial people forged from the A.P.C. and
S.L.P.P. members. The Creoles once more felt threatened.
The Prime Minister also felt insecure with the new party.
In October, 8, 1970, the new party was banned and subse­
quently its leaders were arrested and detained for three 
years without trial. On April 19» 1971» Sierra Leone was 
declared a republic with Siaka Stevens as its first Executive 
President. A virtually continuous state of emergency was
in force up to the May 1973 general election which, as the 
opposition parties were either banned or boycotted, resulted
— 36-
in the establishment of a de facto one-party state under 
President Siaka Stevens’ A . P . C . S t e p s  were taken to 
legalise the de facto one-party state which has been in 
effect since 1973; and in August 1975 (like the earlier 
attempt made by Sir Albert Margai) a private member’s 
motion calling for the introduction of a one party system 
of government, subject to the approval of the people via a 
referendum, was unanimously approved by Parliament. In 
June 1978 the country was consulted in a referendum regard­
ing the introduction of a one party constitution. President 
Stevens, in his appeal for the support of the one party 
constitution, said that it was necessary if the country was 
not to be disintegrated into tribal factions. Accordingly, 
2,152,454 votes were cast in favour of the one party 
constitution, only 63,132 were against, out of a total 
population of three million! Thus, Sierra Leone became a 
de jure one party state in June 1978 with Siaka Stevens as
President for a new term of office of seven years subject
24to re-election in 1985 when he will be 80.
In summary, two important things need to be noted 
insofar as they are closely linked with the process of 
Africanisation. First, constitutional development and the 
Africanisation of the public service are inseparable - the 
latter complements the former. As one Sierra Leone Member 
of the House of Representatives put it in I960:
Independence will not be real to the Sierra 
Leonean nationals and would indeed appear 
to be a sham if after independence the new
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b o m  Sierra Leonean nationals would have 
African Ministers and African Members of 
Parliament but with expatriate permanent 
Secretaries and principal advisers.
Second, political support in Sierra Leone and elsewhere 
in Black Africa is motivated not by any ideological con­
viction but by tribal or sectional loyalty and for personal 
gains. Political influence in Africa is always closely 
involved with the power of economic patronage. The power to 
allocate benefits to faithful party supporters and the tribe 
in the forms of lucrative employment such as directors of 
public corporations, accelerated promotions in the public 
service, appointments as ambassadors, etc. are largely 
vested in the party leadership. Hence, President Stevens' 
appeal for the support of the one party state (notwithstand­
ing his strong opposition in 1966 when he was opposition 
leader) was overwhelmingly received by the Northern Province 
where he claimed to have come f r o m . I t  is very unlikely 
that this situation will change for many years to come.
Even with the introduction of the one party state, appoint­
ment in the public sector employment will still be influenced 
by tribal or sectional consideration rather than party 
loyalty alone, or indeed on a serious determination of 
individual capability and qualification.
1.3 The Economy.
Although the post-independence period in Sierra Leone 
witnessed various conscious efforts and attempts to
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diversify the economy, the growth rate of the economy did
not gain sufficient momentum and was mainly influenced by
27external market forces. '
The monetised sector of the economy has continued to 
be characterised by extreme dependence on external factors, 
acting primarily through the demand by the developed 
countries for raw materials which include agricultural 
products and minerals.
Despite the efforts of the government at indigenisation, 
the greater part of the modern sector of the economy has 
remained under foreign control and ownership. The mining 
sector (with the exception of DIMINCO), the modern manufac­
turing sector and the organised ratil and wholesale trade 
sectors are all predominantly foreign owned.
The major development efforts pursued since indepen­
dence have been in industrialisation (through import-substi- 
tution), in mining, in the provision of physical infra­
structure facilities, and in the rapid expansion of 
educational facilities. The i960 Development Ordinance Act 
which granted considerable tax benefits to some 30 industrial 
companies has fallen short of expectations. Although 
industrial output and employment expanded until 1968, the 
process was not sustained and recent growth has been slow. 
Emphasis was placed on import-substitution industrialisa­
tion. The new industries have been largely characterised 
by capital-intensive methods, low employment generation.
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limited re-investment of profits, low-linkage effects with 
the domestic economy and over-dependence on imported raw 
materials. A nucleus of modern manufacturing establishments 
has been created, which provide the basis for future 
expansion into agro-based and export-oriented industrial 
development.
1.4 The Structure of the Economy.
Data on Sierra Leone's gross domestic product (G.D.P.) 
and other national account aggregates are available only for 
the period 1964/65 through 1976/77. In 1977» the national 
income estimates were revised in the light of available new 
data and information on particular sectors of the economy.
In particular, estimates of income generated in the agricul­
tural sector were substantially revised on the basis of the 
result of household expenditure survey of 1970/71» Similarly, 
the contribution of transport and communications were 
revised in the light of available survey information from ' 
the High Way investment programme in 1970. Data relating 
to other sectors of the economy also underwent some revision. 
G.D.P. at current prices for 1972/73 to 1974/75» agriculture 
accounted on average for 32 per cent, mining for 17 per 
cent, transport, trade, public administration and other 
services for 42 per cent and manufacturing, building and 
public utilities for the remaining 9 per cent. Over one- 
fifth of the G.D.P. estimate represents the imputed value 
of subsistence output, almost wholly in agriculture. The
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G.D.P. for 1974/75 was put at Le533«8 million at current 
29factor cost.
The sectoral composition of the G.D.P. was changed 
considerably between 1973/74 and 1976/77» The share of the 
mining and quarrying fell from 18.3 to 8.8 per cent, while 
that of agriculture, forestry, fishing rose by a parallel 
margin to nearly 40 per cent of G.D.P. Trade and tourism,
transport and communications accounted for about 12 or 13
u. 30 per cent.^
Agriculture, the largest sector in Sierra Leone's 
economy, provides for the livelihood of about 80 per cent 
of the papulation and represents 54 per cent of the total 
value of the exports (See the table in Appendix 3). 
Production of the principal export crops of coffee, cacao, 
and palm kernel has been stimulated by higher producer 
prices offered by the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board 
(S.L.P.M.B.). In 1976/77 the producer price for coffee was 
more than doubled and that for cacao was raised by about 80 
per cent.^^ This led to a large increase in deliveries of 
commodities to the Board and to near doubling of receipts 
from agricultural exports even though the Board held back 
about 40 per cent of its 1976/77 purchases of coffee for 
export sales during the 1977/78 fiscal year.^^
Rice, the staple food crop in Sierra Leone, constituted 
about 40 per cent of the total value added in the agricul­
ture sector. The output of rice, which expanded at an 
average rate of about 8 per cent during 1974/75-1975/76,
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increased further by some 2 per cent to 560,000 tons in 
1976/7 7. The increase in rice production was stimulated by 
increase in the producer price (from Le3*2 per bushel in 
1973 to Le6.00 in 1976/77)»^^ However, in spite of this 
reported increase in rice production, Sierra Leone still 
imports 50 per cent of its rice requirements. In fact, at 
present, the country is experiencing an acute shortage of 
rice owing to lack of foreign exchange.
Mining - the total contribution of mining to the total
export receipts fell from 80 per cent in 1976/77» The
production of diamonds is carried out by the National
34Diamond Mining Company (N.D.M.C.)^ or Diminco for short, 
and by the private operators licensed under the Alluvial 
Diamond Mining Scheme (A.D.M.S.) In addition, illicit 
miners produced a substantial amount of diamonds. Between 
1970 and 1976, total diamonds output declined by 4?.3 per 
cent or from 1.94 million to 1.08 million carats with the 
greater part of the contraction occuring during 1976-77- 
1977/78 period. Preliminary figures indicated a further 
decline during 1979 » The drop in recorded output resulted 
in part from depletion of the more accessible alluvial 
mining deposits. However, owing to an increase in the unit 
value of diamond exports which had dropped from Le74.6 mil­
lion in 1974 to Le67»3 million in 1975* rose again in 1976 
to Le74.8 million. The chairman of the company declared in 
November 1975 that illicit miming had seriously curtailed 
the economic life of the enterprise which was "not expected
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to be viable for very much longer." Estimates of the 
remaining life are five years or less but the government 
is said not to accept them. The company is apparently 
unwilling to prospect further in its concession because it 
does not believe that the government could protect new 
workings from illicit diggers, some of whom are believed to 
be sponsored by cabinet ministers. There has lately been 
some suggestion that Kimberlite Mining in the Kono area 
may be feasible; at present all mining is alluvial.
Iron ore had been mined by the Sierra Leone Development 
Company (Delco) at Marampa, from where the concentrates 
were carried by a company railway to Pepel for shipment.
The mine was working below capacity in the mid-1960s, but 
a long-term contract with Japanese steel mills, signed in 
1968, revitalized the industry and led to heavy investment 
in improving port facilities at Pepel. But output of iron 
ore dropped from 2,512,000 to 1,982,000 metric tons between 
1972 and 1974, the mine became unprofitable, and in October 
1975 Delco went into voluntary liquidation without a 
successor having been found to operate the mine.
Exports of bauxite by the Sierra Leone Ores and Metal 
Company (Sieromco) began in 1964 and had risen by 1975 from 
127,000 to 672,000 tons, the latter figure realizing a value 
of Le 2 .3 millions. Exploitation of further bauxite deposits 
at Port Loko District appears likely following the conclu­
sion in 1978 of an agreement between the Government and 
Alusuisse; the company may invest in a local alumina plant.
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Another mineral under exploitation is rutile. Its 
exportation from Shebro Minerals Alluvial Mine near Bon the 
began in 196? but in 1971 the company became bankrupt. A 
new company, Sierra Rutile (owned chiefly by Bethlehem 
Steel, U.S.A.), took over exploitation of the deposits in 
1976; it has invested some Le50 million and began produc­
tion in early 1979* Annual output may reach 100,000 tons.
In December 19&9 the government announced its intention 
of acquiring compulsorily a 51 per cent holding in the 
share-capital of each of the four mining companies then 
operating in the country. Agreement with the Sierra Leone 
Selection Trust (S.L.S.T.) was reached in September 1970» 
but the decision was not implemented with the Delco. (The 
government was, however, represented on the board of Delco 
by two directors from 1974 until October 1975 when it went 
into liquidation.
During the field work for this study, the last general 
manager of Delco (now managing director of Sierra Rutile) 
was interviewed and asked why he thought Delco had closed.
In his view there were two main factors involved in the 
decision to close the mine. One was the government attempt 
to nationalise the company in 1975* This attempt, he said, 
discouraged the parent company, William Baird of Scotland, 
from investing further in Delco, particularly as the easily 
accessible ore had been exhausted. The second factor was 
the government's attempt to impose on the management of 
Delco its policy of Africanisation. The interviewee's
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opinion was that Africanisation should he evolutionary and 
not revolutionary.
But one wonders whether the nationalisation attempt was 
not the result of the failure of the evolutionary process of 
Africanisation, more so when Delco had been in operation 
for 45 years in 1975» still with expatriate dominated
o ̂management. It is important to note that before the
closure of Delco in 1975» the mining companies accounted for
about 30 per cent of the expatriate personnel employed in
the private sector (see Table 3.4, Chapter 3)* Of these,
about 90 per cent were employed in middle-level technical 
37grades.
The manufacturing sector accounts for about five to 
six per cent of Gross Domestic Product at current prices. 
About 60 per cent of the manufacturing in Sierra Leone is 
conducted in establishments employing fewer than six workers 
Those employing more than six workers (with the exception 
of the Palm Kernel Oil Mill owned by the S.L.P.M.B.) are 
expatriate owned. Manufacturing output in 1975/?6, the 
latest year for which information is available, was valued 
at Le39'6 million. Available data on output in physical 
terms show that in 1977 output in a number of industries 
increased significantly. Production of cigarettes increased 
by 35 per cent over 1976 and the production of alcoholic 
beverages increased by 31 per cent. However, the output of 
motor fuel declined by 9 per cent to 60 million gallons in 
1976. This is the result of the continuing rise in oil 
prices which started in 1973» Imported crude oil is refined 
at Kissy near Freetown, by the Sierra Leone Refining Company
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Limited, in which the government has a 50 per cent holding. 
Because of rises in oil prices over the last seven years, 
and the lack of sufficient foreign exchange, refining
is being operated at half of its productive capacity.
Since independence, the aim of industrial policy has 
been to promote import-substitution through the selective 
granting of development Certificates by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry under the terms of the Development 
Ordinance i960. Development Certificates have been issued 
to about 30 companies manufacturing various products. Only 
two certificates have been issued since 1975» The actual 
concession granted varies from case to case but principally 
involved exceptions from duty on imported capital goods and 
raw materials and income tax concessions. The criteria on 
which these certificates have been granted were not rigid, 
but generally there was a requirement that the goods to be 
produced were not already being made in Sierra Leone. Some 
companies were given tariff protections, but this was not 
often very effective, partly because of the relative ease 
with which goods can be smuggled into Sierra Leone. Some 
firms, including those manufacturing cosmetics, metal and 
wood furniture, candles, tiles and mineral waters, and 
suitcases have been established without receiving development 
certificates, as enterprises may qualify for certain tax 
and import duty concessions but not development certificates.
The government's industrial policy is under review by 
a committee, which was established because of a general
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disenchantment with the efficacy of the policy outlined 
above. It was felt that the relatively small effects 
on income and employment generated by such policies did not 
justify the government's loss of revenue as a result of the 
various concessions offered to foreign investors. Moreover, 
the relatively small size of the Sierra Leone market has 
been a constraint on large-scale industrial development, 
particularly that of the relatively capital-intensive and 
large industries that the Development Ordinance envisaged.
In recent years, there has been a shift in emphasis 
from general industrial policies into agro-based industries, 
which it was envisaged will be labour intensive and would 
use local raw materials. There has been some success in 
achieving these objectives as demonstrated in the Palm 
Kernel Oil Mill, tobacco industry and the use of palm oil 
in the newly established soap factories. The construction 
of sugar cane refinery mill is near completion. It is 
hoped that by 1981 it will be in production. Last year, 
the fruit canning factory was opened at Mabole. Consideration 
has also been given to the establishment of rice mills, a 
cacao processing factory, and plywood factory. The apparent 
effect of these industrial policies (whether factory based 
or agro-based) on Africanisation was an increase in the 
employment of expatriate personnel (see Tables 3.6), mainly 
in technical supervisory grades.
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In commerce, at the wholesale level, the trade in
import goods is very largely in the hands of a small
number of European firms with substantial participation by
3 0Lebanese and Indian merchants.  ̂ The Lebanese are also
prominent in retail trading from fixed premises.Market
and itinerant trade is carried on by Africans. Between
1963 and 1969 a series of legislative measures was passed
(though not always enforced and sometimes repealed) to
curtail foreign participation in retail trade and also in
specified services and small-scale manufacturing activities.
New government ventures include a National Trading
Company in the import trade formed in 1971» a National
Shipping Company, a publicly owned commercial bank commenced
in 1973*^^ The Budget Statement of 1976 was highly critical
of the performance of the public corporations, most of which
43were said to be barely able to stand on their own feet.  ̂
Subsequently, the Ports Authority lost its autonomous
status, and a new contract management was appointed in its
, 4 4place.
Transport and communications account for about 9 
to 10 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product of Sierra 
Leone. Following a report by Itaconsult, which was commis­
sioned by the United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.) 
in 1966, the government decided to move towards the complete 
replacement of railways by roads for domestic transporta­
tion. The main line owned and operated by the government 
as a department was a narrow gauge (2j feet) single-track
41
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system. The main line was originally 310 miles long,
stretching eastwards from Freetown to Pendembu; and a
branch line started from Bauya to Makeni, the provincial
headquarters of the Northern Province. Both main and
branch lines acted as economic arteries and veins along
which manufactured goods from the "colonial central work-
4 ̂shops in the U.K." ^ are distributed to various parts of 
the country, and the raw materials were channelled to the 
coast and then by sea to the central workshop. However, 
at the attainment of independence, the railway system 
proved to be inadequate and most unprofitable, with an 
increasing government subsidy estimated at Lei million in 
1970 p r i c e s . I n  addition, there was also a private 
railway owned by the Sierra Leone Development Company, 
linking the mines at Marampa and its port at Pepel. Like 
the government-owned railway, it acted as a conduit line 
through which the iron ore of Marampa mines was exported to 
the outside world. It became redundant with the closure of 
the mines in October, 1975»^^
The country is currently engaged in a heavy programme 
of road building, the strategy of which is the construction 
of various arterial roads with a back-up network of feeder 
roads. The system is based on two principal routes between 
Freetown and the Eastern part of the country. The more 
southerly route extends through Tiama and Bo to Kenema and 
the other through Luusar, Makeni to Safadu. A direct road 
link between Freetown and Monrovia, shortening the road
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distance between the capitals by over 300 miles, is included 
and is associated with a formal commitment made in 1970 
toward eventual economic union of Sierra Leone and Liberia
which in fact became a reality in 1973 under the Mano River
one 
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hoUnion. In all. Sierra Le  has 4,445 miles of road of
which 900 miles are tarred.
There is an international airport at Lungi, 
north of Freetown, recently modernized (because of the OAU 
conference), and domestic air services are provided by a 
national airline in which the government is a majority 
shareholder. A major quay extension at Freetown harbour 
was opened in 1970» Towards the end of 1977» the government 
intimated its intention of building a new international 
airport, possibly at Newton in the Western Area, partly with 
a view to encouraging tourism, but a firm decision has not 
yet been made. Contact with the outside world is maintained 
through postal services, the cable and wireless system 
(introduced in the early years of colonial period), suid 
through the Sierra Leone External Telecommunications with 
the aid of an earth satellite.
Among some of the reasons advanced hy African leaders 
in defence of Africanisation policies is the effect of 
employing a large contingent of expatriate personnel in a 
developing country on the country's Balance of Payment and 
Trade (Chapters 2.2 & 4.3) Starting from only some Lel4 
million in 1950, Sierra Leone's exports had probably 
doubled in value by 1954 and reached a level of around Le 60.
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million by the end of the decade (with allowances made for
diamond smuggling, which is believed to have been at a
level of Le20-30 million per annum in the late 1950s
The volume of diamond smuggling probably fell in the early
1960s and in 196O-67 total recorded or legal exports
51averaged Le 60 million per annum.
The balance of trade, with allowance made for smuggled 
diamonds, seems to have become adverse in 196I and to have 
continued so until 1968. Recorded exports and imports 
show a deficit of around Le 7* million per annum in 1965-67# 
and the deficit in the current balance of payments has been 
estimated at Le.20.0 million per annum in the same period.
By the end of 1966 the official foreign exchange reserves 
had been reduced to about Lell.O million (from Le30 million 
in 1964), while external debts totalling over Le 50*0 million 
with a large medium-term element had been accumulated. In 
the late 1960s charges on the external debt were running at 
around LeB million per annum.
Improvement of this external position was largely the 
result of favourable movements in Sierra Leone's commodity 
terms of trade. It was checked in 1973 by steep increases 
in import prices, especially of petroleum and rice, and 
substantial deficits re-appeared in current payments 
averaging Le44 million per year in 1974-75»^^ In November 
1975» it was deemed necessary to institute administrative 
control of foreign exchange expenditures: most imports
were made subject to specific import licenses, and specific
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authority from the central bank was required to effect 
payment for all imports. These measures are in all respects 
similar to those applied on the employment of foreign 
nationals in Sierra Leone through the immigration control 
mechanism (Chapter 4). However, with respect to import 
restriction measures, they constituted a departure from past 
policy and from the assumption that external transactions 
could not in practice be controlled which underlay it.
Between 1977 and 1978 exports rose because of price
improvements from Lel47 to Lel87 million, but imports
increased from Le206 to Le280 million. Foreign exchange
reserves at mid-1978 stood at Le44 million, of which half
was blocked by irrevocable commitment to suppliers' credits;
by the end of the year current external liabilities exceeded
assets by Lel6 million. Commitments to commercial creditors
in West Germany, the United Kingdom and other countries were
re-scheduled in 1978 so that the bulk of the debt relief was
worth Lel6 million. The leone was devalued against sterling
by about 5 per cent in November 1978, but pressure by the
I.M.F. for further devaluation early in 1979 was strongly
54resisted by the Sierra Leone government.̂
Of the average annual value of lelll.5 million in 
recorded exports of domestic products in the three years 
from 1973 to 1975# 71 per cent was in minerals (including 
diamonds 57 per cent, iron ore 11.2 per cent), and most of 
the remainder in agricultural produce (notably cacao 5*9» 
coffee 5*8 per cent, palm kernel 5 per cent). Since then
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there have been changes in the composition of exports with 
the disappearance of iron ore, a reduction in the relative 
importance of diamonds, and an increase in coffee. In 1974 
and 1975 food, beverages and tobacco accounted for an 
average of about 22 per cent of total imports, machinery for 
20 per cent, mineral fuels for 10.9 per cent, and chemicals 
for 6 .5 per cent; the residue consisted mainly of manufac­
tured consumer goods, particularly textiles, clothing and 
footwear. In the same years, 62 per cent of recorded 
domestic exports went to the United Kingdom (including 
diamond sales through the Central Selling Organisation in 
London), 15 per cent to the Netherlands, 3 .8 per cent to 
Japan and 6 per cent to the U.S.A. The main sources of 
imports were the U.K. (23 per cent), Japan and the U.S.A.
(9 per cent each), the Netherlands (4.5 per cent), and in 
1975 Nigeria (8 per cent) and the Peoples Republic of China 
(6 per cent. ) .-̂ ^
Planning for economic and social development did not 
start in Sierra Leone until after the last world war when 
in 1948 a senior colonial expatriate civil servant^^ (Child) was 
appointed by the governor to examine the economic system of 
Sierra Leone, and to recommend measures which would improve 
the economic well-being of Sierra Leonean population. The 
report, published in 1949» stated that the purpose of the 
proposed plan was "to indicate measures and requirements 
necessary to achieve a substantial increase in economic 
production, and therefore the prosperity and welfare of the
-53-
people of Sierra Leone during the next four or five
years".However, the Child Plan limited itself to the
agricultural sector and attempted to give operational
meaning to the phrase "substantial increase in economic
production." Child explicitly stated that "the aim in
regard to agricultural produce, is to double output.
In order to achieve this stated goal. Child recommended
59five specific projects:*"̂
1. Improvement of the government railways (£1,250*000).
2. Extension of the road system and construction of 
bridges (£800,000).
3 . Improvement of inland waterways (£20,000).
4. Development of regional communications, transpor­
tation and agriculture by grants to the district 
councils (£325*000).
5. Development of the oil palm industry (£529*000) 
through
(a) distribution of free improved oil palm 
varieties to local producers;
(b) introduction of mechanical processing 
including fifty pioneer oil mills; and
(c) development of a pilot oil palm plantation.
It is apparent from the nature of these projects that
the modus operandi of the Childs Plan consisted primarily 
of indirect stimuli. The decision to rely upon indirect 
measures was based on three considerations:
1. Child's belief that the crucial bottlenecks
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confronting the agricultural sector were the 
existing market facilities.
2. The apparent success of the Department of 
Agriculture in developing improved varieties of 
oil palms, and
3 . The belief that stabilization of producers prices
thr through the operation of S.L.P.M.B. would stimulate
production.
Childs recognized that his estimates were "open to objection, 
that imponderable factors, such as those relating to demand 
and to price and to incentive, can quickly make nonsense of 
the best of calculations," but he twice reiterated his 
belief that it is "better to aim and miss than not to aim 
at all."62
By 1955, almost all the projects advocated by Child 
had been completed; however, target production was achieved 
for only coffee and piassava (neither of which was then 
controlled by S.L.P.M.B.), while the export tonnage of palm 
kernels, palm oil, kola nut, etc. fell. The absolute 
decline in the exportation of these commodities was in no 
way attributable to Child's Plan but must be related to 
"imponderables", eg. the increase in the illicit diamond 
mining activities and the pricing policies of SLPMB.
However, even if the ceteris paribus assumptions under which 
Childs was working had not been violated, it is not clear 
that the agricultural production targets could have been 
attained. In other words, it was
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not known whether the targets were feasible. What was 
needed was information concerning production relationships 
and constraints confronting the agricultural sector, such 
as the availability of skilled manpower (Chapter 5) and the 
fertility of the soil. Once such knowledge had been 
obtained, targets could have been established and a set of 
instruments designed which might have allowed target 
fulfillment. The Childs proposals were devoid of opera­
tional significance since they bore no known relationship 
to agricultural production.
Sierra Leone's second effort at national planning,
which resulted in the implementation of the Ten-Year Plan
of Economic and Social Development 1962/63-1971/72, was
undertaken shortly after independence in April I96I. The
major objectives of the Ten-Year Plan included the
strengthening of the Sierra Leone economy, and the
acceleration of its rate of growth through a programme of
public and private investments. Public sector investments
expenditure under the plan was estimated at Le 250 million.
Of this amount, 39 per cent was to be spent on social
services, including education and health, 21 per cent on
transport and communications, 12 per cent on manufacturing,
8 per cent on agriculture, and the remainder on the other
63sectors of the economy.  ̂ For the private sector. Le 50 
million was estimated as investment expenditure over the 
first five years of the plan period; for the second five- 
year period no estimates of private sector investment were 
made in the Plan.
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In its implementations several technical and organisa­
tional problems beset the plan, including a lack of well- 
prepared projects, deficiencies in managerial and technical 
skills, and inadequate co-ordination among the executing 
authorities in economic decision making. Owing to these 
difficulties, the Plan was abandoned. However, development 
expenditure has taken place in the context of the annual 
development budget.
In 1974, Sierra Leone made its third attempt at 
planning for economic and social development. A Third 
National Development Plan (TNDP) for the years 1974/5-1978/79 
was introduced. His Excellency President Siaka Stevens 
described it as "a blueprint for the future"^^ and the then 
Honourable Minister of Development and Economic Planning,
S.A.J. Pratt, described it as "a milestone in the country's 
progress towards economic self-reliance." It is very 
difficult to discern any major departure from the first two 
plans discussed earlier. However, in the main, the follow­
ing are the objectives of the Blue Print 1974/75-1978/79* 
an accelerated rate of economic growth, increased benefits 
of economic development'for the rural population and more 
balanced regional development (Child's Plan 1949). The Plan 
projected that real GDP would grow at a compound annual 
rate of 6.2 per cent, and that per capita real income would 
increase at a rate of 3 .6 per cent a year. High priority 
was assigned to agricultural sector (Childs Plan 1949) with 
the objectives of increasing exports, achieving self-
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sufficiency in food and accelerating the annual growth rate 
of the sector to 4.6 per cent during the planned period.
The mining and manufacturing sectors were projected to grow 
at 10.6 and 4.8 per cent respectively while other important 
priorities included road improvement (Childs Plan 1949) and 
hydro-electric projects. Total investment was projected 
at Le 623.1 million or about Le 125 million annually.
The first progress report indicates that 
over the first three years of the plan, real growth rate 
may have been less than the target. The low level of the 
average annual growth rate for GDP of about 1.9 (6.2) per 
cent a year resulted mainly from decline in the growth rate 
of the mining and manufacturing sectors. The annual plan 
for 1977/78 calls for investment expenditure of le 134.4 
million, an increase of 33 per cent from the 1976/77 level 
of le 101 million. Agriculture is to get the largest share 
of the total 18.6 per cent of planned investment. In 
1978/7 9» the final year of the planned period, the plan was 
extended to 1982.
The failure of the Plan to reach its targets within 
the planned period is partly due to Sierra Leone's fiscal 
situation which deteriorated sharply in 1974/75 (the first 
yearof the plan) and subsequently remained weak. In fiscal 
years 1974/75 and 1975/76, government revenues grew at an 
annual rate of less than 4 per cent, primarily because of 
slow-down in economic activities and exports which the Plan 
was designed to "accelerate". The proportion of total
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revenue to nominal GDP declined from 19.2 per cent in 
1973/74 to 15*6 per cent in 1974/75 while total expenditures 
expressed as a proportion of GDP rose from 23.6 per cent in 
1973/74 to 27.5 per cent in 1974/75 and fell to 24.4 per 
cent of GDP in 1975/76.
Revenue as a proportion of GDP has been in the range 
of 16-19 per cent in recent years. Since 1974/75* revenue 
has been adversely affected by the closure of Delco and the 
declining contribution of diamonds which fell from 3.6 per 
cent of GDP in 1973/74 to 1.2 per cent in 1976/77 * Current 
expenditure rose by a yearly average of 19 per cent in 
1973/74-1976/77 though with wide year-to-year variations. 
Outlays on wages and salaries averaged 46 per cent of current 
expenditure in the period while subsidies and transfer, 
payment averaged 11 per cent. Interest payment rose to 
l4 per cent of current expenditure in 1975/76, reflecting 
payment on large short-term foreign debts contracted in the 
previous years.
During 1976/77, with the upturn in economic 
activity and incomes, the rate of increases in money 
supply, which had been 2.4 per cent in 1974/75 and 13.2 per 
cent in 1975/76, accelerated to 29 per cent, much • 
more than the two preceding years.
The banking system in Sierra Leone comprises the 
Central Bank of Sierra Leone established in 1964 to replace 
its forerunner, the West African Currency Board, three 
commercial banks, one of which is indigenously owned - the
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Commercial Bank - and the other two are foreign-owned with 
indigenous participation, Barclays Bank, D.C.O., and the 
Standard Bank - all British owned.
The Central Bank is the major source of bank credit to 
the government in the year which ended in June 1977; it 
accounted for more than 60 per cent of the annual increase 
in the banking system net claims on government which rose 
by slightly more than Le23»0 million in 1975/76 and also 
in 1976/77.
This section provides a summarised economic background 
information for the study of the process and progress of 
Africanisation in Sierra Leone upon which subsequent analysis 
can be made. However, references will also be made to other 
African countries, particularly Ghana and Nigeria, with 
similar colonial experience vdien such reference is relevant.
1 .5  The Employment Policies of the Colonial Governments.
"A traveller to the British settlement on 
the West Coast of Africa in about I87O might 
have transacted his business with the Govern­
ment almost entirely with African senior 
officials. The Collector of Customs, the 
Colonial Secretary, the Medical Officer, the 
Director of Education and District Commissioner 
could all have been blacks. Thirty years later 
probably all would have been white.
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Among the colonial policies which educated African 
elites hated most was the employment policy of the Colonial 
Government which they saw as apparent discrimination against 
them in favour of their colonial expatriate counterparts.
In the public service racial discrimination was thought to 
be the basis of selection and advancement rather than 
educational ability. Even the few Africans who were 
employed above the grades of clerks were not given treatment 
equal to their European counterparts.
The analysis in this section is mainly historical. Its 
significance to this study is that it provides factual 
information on the employment policies of the Colonial 
Government from which the validity of the claims of 
educated African elites can be judged. The section also 
seeks to provide the reader with an insight into the pro­
blems that were likely to confront the African leaders at 
independence.
Three phases can be distinguished in the development 
of the public services in British West Africa. First, from 
about 1830 to 1898, Africans and men of African descent 
were frequently employed in responsible positions; second, 
from 1898 to 1946, they were seldom employed in senior 
posts; third, the final phase, from 1946 until the various 
territories became independent, there was a policy of 
progressive Africanisation.
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In 1808, when the British Government needed a naval 
base in West Africa it took over Sierra Leone from the company 
as a crown colony. Under the company, schools were 
established in Freetown and it was from these that the British 
Government was to find staff not only for the colony but 
for the Gold Coast settlements for which it acquired direct 
responsibility in 1843 and later for Lagos (see Section 1.2 
above).
While the Sierra Leone venture was enthusiastically 
supported by the evangelists in England, the expenses and 
the heavy death rate among troops and British officials 
stationed in Freetown made it unpopular in the British 
Parliament. In the course of a debate in the House of 
Commons in I83O, therefore. Sir George Murray, the Secretary 
of State for the colonies announced his intention:
As far as possible to fill all the civil 
offices of Sierra Leone with people of colour 
who were not likely to suffer in their health.
He hoped finally to make Sierra Leone a free
69African .colony.
This policy was first carried out through the appoint­
ment of people of West Indian descent as government offi­
cials. Thus, John Carr, Trinidadian, who had been called 
to the English Bar was sent out as Queens advocate, became 
chief justice in l84l and acted as governor. Dr. William 
Fergusson, an Afro-West Indian with a British medical 
degree, served as a government doctor in Freetown from 1815»
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and eventually was appointed governor of Sierra Leone in 
1844; his son became a colonial secretary in 1848. Robert 
Dougan, another Afro-West Indian, acted as governor in 
1854 after spending 33 years in Freetown, first in business 
and then as Queens advocate. In 1854, however, the 
Secretary of State for the colonies received a petition 
from Africans in Sierra Leone protesting against Afro-West 
Indians being given senior posts and ruled that no more 
should be sent out.
By this time. Creoles, as men b o m  in Sierra Leone 
came to be called, were beginning to be appointed to senior 
posts, and such appointments continued until 1895» George 
Nicol, of mixed British and African descent and educated in 
England, became Colonial Secretary in 1854. Thomas Lawson, 
a Creole of the second generation to be educated in England, 
became Chief Inspector of Police in I856; his son was sent 
on a government scholarship to England to be trained as an 
engineer and returned as Assistant Colonial Engineer in 
1867. Three other scholarships to Britain were provided to 
train Africans as doctors, who were posted as staff assis­
tant surgeons in the army on their return in 1859* The 
posts of Secretary for Native Affairs and Queens Advocate 
were normally held by Creoles in the second half of the 
19th century.
Between about 1893 and 1905» there was a sharp change 
of policy on the West Coast, and most senior posts* were 
placed in British hands. In I898 the Governor of Sierra
-63-
Leone ruled that not only all heads of departments but also 
their principal assistants must be Europeans. The only two 
African officers in the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) 
were pensioned off in 1902. In the same year, the colonial 
office in London decided that African doctors might not be 
members of the New West African Medical Service. Henceforth 
the most senior African doctor was junior to the most 
recently arrived European, and the African, Dr. Renner, who 
had often acted as head of the Sierra Leone Medical depart­
ment, never did so again in his remaining 11 years of 
service. In 1892, Africans held 18 out of 40 senior posts 
in the public service; by 1912, out of 92 posts, they held
only 15» and of these five were abolished in the next few 
70years.
The new policy of Europeanisation in Africa can largely 
be attributed to several factors. Some are political and 
social, the others are medical and racial. First, the 
political factors: in I898 a Temne Paramount Chief in the
Karene District led his people in a rebellion against the 
introduction of the Hut Tax^^ in the Protectorate. This 
Hut Tax War, as it became known later, was fought on the 
same principles which led the thirteen American colonies to 
revolt against "the Mother Country - Britain" in 1776 - "no 
taxation without representation." For Bai Bureh, the Chief 
of the Temne people,why should his people pay taxes for 
their huts which the white man did not build for them, was 
the question. Ihe war was fought very bitterly. Bai
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Bureh was captured and deported to the Gold Coast. The
colonial government felt threatened. They held the Creoles,
trading among the Temnes, responsible. They were discre- 
72dited.' They were no longer to be trusted as protectors 
of the British interests.
In 1919» the railway workers struck for a delayed 
payment of promised war bonuses and the subsequent stoppage 
by the daily paid public works staff, and in 1926 the 
general railway workers strikes, the Creole elites were all 
blamed for having instigated them.
A second factor is no doubt due to Ross' discovery of 
the means of transmission of Malaria. The insistence of 
Parliament and of the Colonial Office on Africanisation had 
been mainly due to the very heavy mortality rate among the 
Europeans on the West Coast, particularly Sierra Leone, which 
gained the infamous name of "the Whiteman's Grave", in one 
year alone, 1859* half the European population of Freetown 
had died.^^ In 1897, Ross in India proved that Malaria was 
mosquito b o m  and in 1900 the American Army Medical Depart­
ment showed yellow fever also to be transmitted by mosqui­
toes. Ross and his collaborators visited Freetown. On their 
advice not only was spraying carried out but the European 
population was moved up the hill. More Europeans now came 
out to West Africa; they conducted more business, demanded 
better and more comprehensive government services and lived 
in segregated areas - Hill Station, Cline Town and in the 
provinces in Reservations.*^^
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Once it was decided to retain the West African 
dependencies, there was an insistence in the British 
Parliament that they should pay their way. Chamberlain's 
determination to "develop our West African Estates" 
required a more intensive administration in which there was 
insistence on more formal qualification. Thus, the District 
Commissioners were now required to be barristers_or solicitors, 
but Africans with these qualifications preferred the 
higher earnings of the Bar. Some of the earlier African 
administrators had also been traders, but such a combination 
of functions became impossible as civil service procedures 
tightened up.
The decision on the replacement of doctors was the
â
most clearly documented. Ripon, as Colonial Secretary in 
1893, instructed the Sierra Leone Government that one-third 
of their doctors should be A f r i c a n s . T h e  Colonial Office, 
in 1901, set up a committee on the amalgamation of the West 
African Medical Services, consisting of the Principal 
Medical Officer of the Gold Coast, Northern Nigeria and 
Southern Nigeria, together with two Colonial Office offi­
cials. Their report concluded:
The Committee are strongly of the opinion 
that it is in general inadvisable to employ 
natives of West Africa as medical officers 
in the government service . . . They do not 
believe either that in professional capabi­
lities, West African natives doctors are
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at a par, except in very rare instances with
European doctors or that they possess the
confidence of European patients on the Coast.
Social conditions, particularly in Southern
Nigeria where European officers live together
and have their meals under the "mess" system
and in the Northern Nigeria where a large
proportion of the European staff consists of
officers of the regular army makes it extremely
undesirable to introduce native medical officers
into these Protectorates.^^
The Committee was not in favour either of a proposal to
employ Indian doctors in West Africa, but they gave no
reason for this; Chamberlain minuted on the report that it
was "pretty clear to men of ordinary sense that British
officers could not have confidence in Indian or native 
77doctors.
Another contributory factor to the new policy was a
long series of scandals in which African administrators had
been involved. In Sierra Leone in 1895, the Post Master of
the colony, a Creole, was twice acquitted by juries of a
charge of embezzlement. Governor Cardew changed the law in
78order to have him retired and committed without jury. The 
distrust which the colonial government had of Africans 
holding responsible posts was aggravated by the conviction, 
in 1919, of the mayor of Freetown and some of his officials 
on a charge of conspiracy to defraud the Municipality of
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Freetown. However, the
special commissioner. Sir Charles O'Brien, in his report on
Freetown City Council (1924) did not consider that the blame
for the failure of the council can fairly be placed upon the
shoulders of the Africans alone.
" . . .the institution," he said, "was forced
fully-fledged upon a people who were not ripe
for the experience."
But the change of mood in London was also important.
Even when the West Coast colonies were still regarded as an
encumbrance, Kimberly, as Secretary of State, had minuted in
1893 in light of the Gold Coast scandals*
"I fear except in quite subordinate positions
79we cannot safely employ natives."'^
Hemming, who was head of the African Department at the 
Colonial Office, minuted in 18861
The educated native is the curse of the West 
Coast, and that "all natives are incorrigible 
liars.
The Creoles felt disappointed, and betrayed. Their 
position at the end of the 19th century has been poignantly 
described by their historian*-
"Hated and despised as they often were, they 
were yet indispensable, the unrecognized 
vehicle by which not only British rule but 
trade, education and Christianity were con­
veyed to West Africa. In the churches and
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schools which most have closed without their 
ministrations, in mercantile houses and 
government offices, dependent on their sub­
ordinate toil, these gentle pioneers, bringing 
a European culture which Europeans resented 
their possessing, could well look round them 
to see in whatever good Britain brought West 
Africa . in the 19th century a plant which 
could never have taken roots without their
O 1slightest labour.
1.6 The Recruitment Policy.
Chamberlain was the first businessman to arrive at the 
Colonial Office. He was keenly interested in efficiency in 
government and he instructed Lord Selbome, his Parliamen­
tary Undersecretary, to find out how many colonial officers 
there were and how they had been appointed. In the course 
of this survey, the possibility was examined of creating a 
unified service whose officers could be transferred between 
territories. The proposal was dropped because service in 
West Africa was so unpopular that it was felt that the 
possibility of being transferred to West Africa would 
adversely affect recruitment for other territories. As 
Chamberlain noted;
We take inferior men for West Africa and
Opthey are not good enough for other colonies.
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The indifferent quality of the European civil servants 
in African colonies who were appointed by the patronage of 
the Secretary of State, emerged from Selbome's inquiry; 
this led to the suggestion that civil servants for the 
African territories should be recruited by competitive 
examination, as was done for the Indian Civil Service. But 
it was concluded that the unpopularity of the West African 
service would make it impossible to find sufficient candi­
dates for the examinations. Moreover, it was believed that 
a man's health would stand up better to the climate of the 
tropics if he did not go out until he was 25» but only men 
who had failed in other professions were likely to be 
candidates for an examination held between the ages of 25 
and 3 0. So until the end, entry to the administrative 
service of the African colonies was obtained by appointment 
on interview. "Patronage ruled the day in Downing Street," 
wrote Casely Hayford in 1903,^^ contrasting the quality of 
the British officers in West Africa unfavourably with those 
who entered the Indian Civil Service by competition. As Sir 
Ralph Purse of the Colonial Office later developed and 
described it, "the patronage became systematically orgsinized, 
with a secret list of Oxford and Cambridge tutors in order 
of reliability of their reports on under-graduates, and a 
close connection with the headmasters of public schools - 
we learnt to eschew publicity and to rely on personal con­
tacts in the most fruitful quarters . . .our methods were 
mole-like, quite persistent and indirect." Purse believed
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that selection by interview to be a better method than 
competitive written examinations and succeeded ultimately 
in obtaining control of selection of overseas candidates.
This was not a method of recruitment which tended to 
obtain the intellectual type of British civil servant as 
did the Indian Civil Service examination. It was widely 
believed that a man with a first class degree would have 
been regarded by Purse and his colleagues as dangerous. It 
is interesting to speculate how far the difference between 
the Indian Civil Service types influenced the Indian and 
African administrators who succeeded them. The Nigerian and 
Ghanaian governments when they became independent announced 
that they would recruit their administrative services by 
written examinations as soon as there were sufficient 
candidates.
Despite Chamberlain's investigation, each continued to 
employ its own officials on different salary and pension 
scales; an American writer observed that officers in the 
Gold Coast considered themselves superior to those in Sierra 
Leone, while those in Nigeria considered themselves superior 
to those in the Gold Coast and that the Northern Nigerian 
service was rated highest of all because the officers were 
required to keep horses and play polo. In the 1920s, 
another vigorous colonial secretary, L.S. Amery, again took 
up the question of a unified colonial service. As a result 
not only a colonial administrative service, but also a 
colonial medical, forestry, agriculture and other professional
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services were established. Little consideration was given 
to, the effects which this step would have on the recruitment 
of local people to the government service. Although local 
candidates might be eligible to occupy posts normally held 
by members of the unified service, they found themselves in 
competition with British officers who might be transferred 
from other territories.
Amery's reforms opened recruitment in the services to 
Canadians and Australians.. But this did not extend to the 
non-white dominions. Until 1942, candidates for the colonial
administrative service were required to be "pure European
86descent." In the 20th century, unlike the 19th, Africans 
from one territory did not do service in another. This was 
in marked contrast to French practice by which Senegelese 
and Dahomeyans were employed throughout West Africa and as 
well as Equatorial Africa and the West Indies.
The period between I898 and 1940 was one of administra­
tive consolidation in British West Africa. It became the 
established policy that Africans should not be recruited 
into the administrative service. The latter was regarded 
as a temporary scaffolding round growing structures of the 
native administration. To build Africans into such scaffolding, 
it was argued, would be to create a vested interest which 
would make its demolition difficult.
In fact the great expansion of the role of the central 
government in economic and social development brought about 
by the post war Labour Government's Colonial Development and
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Welfare Act, meant that more administrative officers with 
wider duties would be required after independence, for which 
West African governments would have been much better pre­
pared had they recruited African administrative officers 
before 1942. But in the late thirties, as Dr. Perham has 
observed in respect of Nigeria, "there was an atmosphere of 
almost unlimited time to complete the tasks regarded then 
as hardly begun, of building a new Nigeria from bottom to
top."88
In the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone, it was never for­
gotten, as the "Gold Coast Independent" stated in 1919* that 
every office from that of the governorship downwards has 
been held by a black or coloured man . . .  no amount of 
disparaging their descendants will obliterate the fact 
The system of government was not only more complex than 
that of the 19th century, but the hierarchies were now more 
rigid. They had come to be modelled on the sharp differen­
tiation between the administrative and clerical services 
which existed in the British Civil Service of the time. The 
African, however bright, was now confined to a "Native Sub­
ordinate Service" with no chance for occasional distinction 
such as had existed in the looser arrangements of the 19th 
century.
All services of the governments were not equally rigid. 
Sir Hugh Clifford, for example, who was Governor of the Gold 
Coast from 1913-1919» was surprised by the small attempts 
made to use local people in senior posts throughout the
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service by comparison with Ceylon where he had previously 
served and he appointed some Africans as legal officers.
But the first overall plan for Africanisation of the service 
in any British territory was formulated by his successor,
Sir Gordon Guggisberg, in 1925.
Guggisberg saw and publicly stated that it was a mis­
guided policy to expect a colony to finance its development 
from its own revenues. This, he said, was to put the cart 
before the horse, for the amount of a colony's revenue 
depends entirely on the development of its natural resources. 
He drew up a 10-year development plan but realized that the 
government could not afford to expand its expatriate staff 
sufficiently to implement it. He therefore produced a 
scheme in 1925 for progressive Africanisation of the 
services under which in twenty years time 231 out of 550 
senior posts were to be filled by Africans who in 1925 held 
only 27 such p o s t s . A t  the same time, he founded Achimota 
College, one of whose principal objectives was to educate 
Africans for government service.
The plan was not carried out. Guggisberg*s successors 
were unenthusiastic. Where he had been prepared to employ 
Africans even with the risk of a slight loss of efficiency, 
they insisted that 'standards' could not be reduced and did 
not insist on departmental training schemes. The output of 
Achimota students dropped when its budget was reduced during 
the depression of 1929-32 and some of those Africans who had 
been appointed to government posts were retrenched together
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with the expatriates during that period of stringency. In 
1946 there were only 89 Africans in senior posts instead of 
the 231 anticipated.^^
The Guggisberg Plan thus proved to be a 'false start'. 
Effective overall Africanisation programmes only commenced 
in British Colonial West Africa after the Second World War.
1.7 The Size and Level of Expatriate Employment in the
Public Service.
In sections I .5 and 1.6 above, historical background 
information on the employment and recruitment policies of 
the colonial government has been provided. The argument for 
and against the exclusion of educated Africans from the 
territorial civil services has also been presented. In the 
light of the available evidence it is clear that colonial 
employment policy discriminated against educated 
uneducated Africans in favour of the colonial expatriates, 
and that the basis of such discrimination was racial rather 
than on ability* Even if it is accepted that the charges of 
corruption made against the first generation of African 
administrators are valid, by themselves these charges were 
not sufficient reasons for excluding Africans in positions 
of the colonial administration because the history of 
colonial administration, particularly in India, w£s"‘-fraught■ 
with such practice - hence the impeachment of Warren 
Hastings in the l8th century.
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This section considers the size and level of employment 
in colonial Africa in general, and Sierra Leone in parti­
cular, and the problems which confronted the leaders of the 
new African states as they progressed towards nationhood.
Benveniste and Morari^^ estimated the number of colonial 
expatriate civil servants working in Africa in 1958 to I960 
to be about 6 5»240 European government administrators, 
technical experts and educators to serve the colonial and 
commonwealth administration of France, England, Portugal and 
Belgium (see Table 1.1 below). In addition, there were 
thousands of foreign personnel serving in the Spanish . 
territories and independent government such as Morocco, 
Tunisia, Ghana, Liberia and Ethiopia, either under direct 
recruitment or special arrangements with ex-colonial powers 
or other sources., This does not include technical assis­
tance from the United States or United Nations, or the
health and education work done by the thousands of mission- 
94a n  es 
TABLE 1.1 EUROPEAN CIVIL SERVANTS IN AFRICA.&
British Territories^ French Territoriesc
Country/Region Number Country/Region Number
East Africa 2,900 Central African
Gambia 100 Republic 1,500
Kenya 3,400 Chad 1,000Nigeria 4,000 Congo 2 , 000Nyassaland 800 Dahomey 500
Northern Rhodesia 1,300 Gabon 500Sierra Leone 430 Ivory Coast 3,000Somaliland 170 Madagascar 1,000Tanganyika 2,800 Niger 3 ,000^Uganda 1,800 Senegal-Sudan 6 ,500'*Zanzibar 140 Tunisia-Morocco —Others 600 Upper Volta 1,800Sub-total 18,440 Sub-total 22,800








Total British, French, Belgian, Portuguese 65*240 
Others 34,760.
Total European Civil Servants in Africa 100,000
Source: Handbook of African Economic Development, Table 6,
Page 6l.
In Anglo-phone West Africa, it is suggested that the break­
down in 1958 was:
TABLE 1.2 NUMBER OF EXPATRIATES IN WEST AFRICA.
Number Vacancy
Nigerian Federal Government 1,752 300Northern Nigeria 1.396 500
Western Nigeria 587 626Eastern Nigeria , 265 402Sub-total 4,000 1,828
Ghana 880 n/a
The Gambia 100 —
Sierra Leone 430 192
Grand Total 5.410 2,020
Sources: For Ghana and Nigeria, Kenneth Younger: Public
Service in New States, pages 53» 10?, 108, 109 and 
110, i960. For Sierra Leone - P.S.C. Report, 1959* 
For the Gambia - see Table 1.1 above.
In numerical terms, the figure of 5»410 European civil 
servants in British West Africa is small, and as a per centage 
of the total for Africa (5*4 per cent) is not significant. But 
in terms of the positions they occupied in the public services 
of these countries and the rewards associated with them, the 
number is highly significant.
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In Sierra Leone, for example, the Annual Report of the 
Public Service Commission for the year 1959 revealed the 
following positions;
TABLE 1.3 NUMBER OF EXPATRIATES IN DIFFERENT JOB CATEGORIES
Post-Category Total Expatriates Africans Vacancies
A 360 228 71 61
B 179 125 29 25
c 158 - J i  _ jJi:
TOTAL 697 412 185 100
Source; Annual Report of the Public Service Commission 1955*
In the above table out of 36O posts classified as A 
posts for which the normal basic qualification is a univer­
sity degree, usually with honours, or a recognized profes­
sional qualification as the minimun entry for such posts,
228 of them were occupied by expatriate pensionable officers, 
71 of them were occupied by Africans with 6l unfilled. In 
manpower terms these Class A posts constitute the high-level 
manpower cadres who occupied the most crucial decision­
making echelons in the public service. Of the Class B posts, 
for which the basic qualification is the satisfactory com­
pletion of a long and hard apprenticeship training involving 
manual and skilled labour followed by passing written 
examinations etc., out of total of 179 posts, 125 were held 
by expatriates, 29 by Sierra Leoneans and 25 were vacant. 
These posts constitute the middle manpower grades. From the 
table. Sierra Leone was most deficient in the provision of 
this category of manpower and still is today (table 5*17); 
and in Class C posts, those for which the necessary
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experience and knowledge can be obtained during the course 
of ordinary employment in the department concerned plus in 
some but not all cases, a special course of instruction. It 
is in this class of jobs that the Africans formed the bulk 
of the workers - 85 out of 159 with the expatriates taking 
59 of the posts and the rest unfilled.
When the above figures are broken down into individual 
departments of the public service, it can be 
seen that expatriates were most predominant in the 
administrative service and those departments with either 
professional or technical orientation with the exception of 
the medical and the judicial departments.
TABLE 1.4 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPATRIATES AS OF
APRIL 19sK Total
Department Posts Exp. Afr. Filled Vac.
Administrative Service 76 59 10 69 7Accountant-General 6 2 4 6 —
Agricultural 45 33 4 37 8Audit 7 5 1 6 1Co-operatives 4 4 - 4 -
Customs 6 2 4 6 ■ -
Civil Aviation 8 6 2 8 -  ■
Commerce and Industry 13 4 6 10 3Education 64 34 18 52 12Electricity 20 13 7 20 -Forestry 21 19 1 20 1Geological Survey 11 8 - 8 3Income Tax 7 3 3 6 1Judicial 13 4 9 13 -  .Labour 7 2 4 6 1Legal 6 2 3 5 1Meteorological 2 2 - 2Mines 2 1 1 2 -Medical 99 33 51 84 15Police 30 20 6 26 4




Department Posts Exp. _ Afr. Filled Vac.
Prisons 6 1 4 5 1Public Relations 3 — 2 2 1Public Works 116 76 14 90 26
Railways 67 47 18 65 2Road Transport 10 8 - 8 2
Social Welfare 2 1 1 2 -
Surveys and Lands 10 5 3 8 2Veterinary 4 4 4 -
TOTALS 697 412 184 596 100
Source: Staff list for 1955-1957 •
The pattern of expatriate employment indicated in the 
above table complicates the prospect for future Africanisa­
tion. As it has been stated earlier, the majority of the . 
pensionable expatriates are employed in professional and 
technical departments such as the Public Works, 76 out of 
116, the Railways, 47 out of 67, Road Transport, 8 out of 
10, Agriculture, 33 out of 45» Education, 34 out of 64, 
Forestry, 19 out of 21, etc., and in the Administrative 
Service where the expatriates account for 59 out of the 76 
posts. In the main, these are the public sector departments 
directly or indirectly responsible for the overall develop­
ment of the country. This means Sierra Leone would not only 
have to produce sufficient manpower to meet the growing 
demand for technical and professional skills as the country 
progresses toward independence, but also for replacing the 
412 expatriates already employed in the public service (see 
Table 1.4). This problem is compounded by the colonial 
employment policies which put the responsibility to the
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Secretary of State for the Colonies for the initial selec­
tion of new recruits, the section of higher posts in the 
colonies. He could transfer on promotion British members 
of the Colonial Service from one colony to another. He was 
also responsible for seeing that the conditions offered to 
recruits during selections were subsequently observed by the 
employing government - Sierra Leone Government Officers 
recruited by him could not be dismissed or receive dis­
ciplinary punishment without his sanction. He was, in fact, 
the ultimate authority for appointment, discipline and the 
general conditions of service.
A consequence of this remote control mechanism was 
to increase the pressure for Africanisation. The colonial 
expatriates themselves were equally uneasy about their 
positions. As Proudfoot and Wilson reported:
The advent of self-government for Ghana and 
the prospect of self-government for other 
African colonies and eventual independence 
has not seriously disturbed the colonial 
expatriates who served in the colonies.
Since there were no settlers among them, they 
were not concerned with handing over political 
or social privileges. They were transient and 
knew it. What had perturbed them, however, 
was the official policy of Africanisation - 
that is the systematic replacement of Europeans 
in senior posts by local Africans as they 
become eligible.
—8l—
Though confident of their superiority in technical
posts, at least, Europeans felt insecure and resented
appointments made from confessedly nationalist motives.
Moreover, it was Africanisation rather than independence
9 7which threatened their traditional social life.'
To allay their feelings of insecurity and loss of employ­
ment as a result of any Africanisation, the British 
Government entered into "redundancy" agreements with the 
governments of each of the colonial territories as they 
progressed towards independence. The terms of the agreement
were couched in a White Paper known as Her Majesty's Over-
98 'seas Civil Service^.. The White Paper stipulated that in the 
event of self-government and independence, the following 
conditions would be observed, which expatriate officers
99were entitled to expect, by each territorial government 
First, that their terms of service would not be made less 
favourable; second, their pensions and other benefits would 
continue to be paid by the territorial government; third, 
they would continue to be considered eligible for transfer 
or promotion to other territories; fourth, the territorial 
government would not unreasonably refuse to transfer or 
promote such officers; fifth, they would be given adequate 
notice of termination of employment due to constitutional 
changes and Her Majesty's Government would endeavour to find 
alternative employment; and finally, sixth, they would 
receive compensation from the territorial government in the 
event of premature retirement resulting from Africanisation
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policy or constitutional progress. With some modifications 
in another White Paper in 1956^^^ the terms of agreement 
became part of the negotiating terms for the granting of 
independence to all the African colonies.
It was clear from the above arrangement that
the main preoccupation of Her Majesty's Government was to
shift the burden of financial compensation for the would-be
'redundant colonial expatriate civil servants' to the
colonies. It was under these conditions among many others
that Sierra Leone, like Ghana and Nigeria, was granted her
independence in April 27, 196I, with a public service
102dominated by overseas pensionable officers. The course of 
events which followed was largely influenced by the employ­
ment policies of the colonial government.
1.8 Summary.
This chapter has outlined information on the setting 
of the study of Sierra Leone to do with its
geography and people, its history and constitutional develop­
ment, its economy and structure and above all, the employ­
ment policies of the colonial governments and the size and 
level of expatriate employment in Black Africa in general 
and Sierra Leone in particular. Each of these might exert 
influence on the course of politics and the policy of 
Africanisation.
First, its people: the division of the population into
tribes, and of the country into administrative regions on
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tribal lines, eg. the Northern Province inhabited mainly by 
Temnes (30# of the total population), the South and East by 
Mendes (30.5#)» constituted tribal interests and regional 
pressure groups. Both constitute an obstacle to progressive 
Africanisation. Because promotion and appointment to senior 
positions of the public service are no longer based on 
merit and ability , but on tribal and regional considera­
tions, support for political parties would not be based on 
ideological convictions but on tribal or regional sentiment 
and for personal economic expectations - employment. The 
net effect of this is a lowering of standards and the 
efficiency of the public service and a yearning passion for 
the goodies of the old colonial days when discipline was 
the order of the day and when seniority, merit, and not whom 
you know or knows you rules the. day.
Second, the history and constitutional development was 
summarised. This also has its influence on the functioning 
of the local institutions in a variety of ways. The 
establishment of Sierra Leone as a colony for freed slaves, 
repatriated first from Britain and subsequently from America, 
Canada, and the West Indies, had a tremendous effect on the 
educational and the constitutional development of the 
country. The supremacy of the Creoles over the tribal 
peoples of the provinces was the result of their early 
exposure to Western education and ways of life, but this 
Creole supremacy was challenged by the provincial people as 
a result of the constitutional development of the country.
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Constitutional development gave rise to party politics in 
Sierra Leone, and this has changed the power structure in the 
country in favour of the "country people". All these 
changes have their effect on the policies and process of 
Africanisation.
The third is the economy and its structure. Of course. 
Africanisation is about employment in both the public and 
private sectors of the economy which is essentially rural 
and subsistence. About 90 per cent of the one million 
people who are economically active are employed in agricul­
ture. Less than 100,000 are employed by the government and 
by the private firms employing six or more w o r k e r s S i n c e  
independence, it has been the policies of successive govern­
ments in Sierra Leone to diversify the economy by the use 
of generous economic policies designed to attract foreign 
investors. In addition, development plans were adopted, all 
aimed at increasing the Gross Domestic Product; again, the 
funding of such plans largely depends on foreign capital 
which in one way or the other effects any vigorous African­
isation policy, particularly in the private sector which 
accounts for more than 90 per cent of expatriate employment 
in Sierra Leone.
Fourth, the employment policies of the Colonial Govern­
ment from 1895 to 1946 alienated the educated African 
elites - the Creoles, and later the 'natives'. In fact, it 
can be argued that the post-World War II
African nationalism was reaction against this employment
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discrimination. African leaders sought political powers 
because, through them, they could redress what they per­
ceived to be unjust. As the former President of Ghana put 
it:
"Seek ye first the political Kingdom and 
everything else shall be added unto it."^^^
The first thing to be added unto the new "political kingdom"
was the Africanisation of the public service and then the
private sector.
Finally, the size and level of expatriate employment in 
the public service - both the number and the types of
positions held by expatriates affect the progress of
Africanisation because the speed of Africanisation depended 
on the ease with which an expatriate could be replaced by an 
African. Since the majority of expatriates were employed in 
"key" and technical posts (see Table I.3), it meant the rate 
of Africanisation would be determined by the availability of 
local personnel with such competence.
The dilemma that faced the leaders of newly independent 
African states was how to reconcile these conflicting 
demands. This is where the problems of Africanisation lay.
The next chapter will consider the process of,
the motivation and pressures for Africanisation of 
the public service in Sierra Leone.
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CHAPTER 2. THE AFRICANISATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE.
2.1 Introduction.
The position of the Public Service in colonial Africa 
left a two-fold legacy for the people of Africa and Sierra 
Leone in particular. Because access to positions of 
responsibility in the colonial administration was restricted 
to Europeans, Sierra Leone, like other Africain states began 
its existence as an independent state with a shortage of 
skilled and experienced civil servants. Thus, the country 
lacked important resources to enable its administrative 
system to act efficiently and effectively. An obvious 
solution to the problem of having too few citizens with the 
qualifications and experience needed to fill certain civil 
service positions was to hire expatriates with the required 
experience and skills. Such a policy, however, ran counter 
to political demands and expectations set in motion in the 
nationalist movement.
It was the elitist character of the colonial civil 
service that helped to bestow on the civil service of 
independent African states an image of high status and 
political authority. Thus, a revolutionary goal of the 
nationalist movement was to replace expatriate incumbents of 
civil service positions with local citizens. However, it is 
not the mere substition of one category of individuals -for 
another that is important here but the adoption of recruit*- 
ment policies fundamental to an efficient
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civil service. The policy of recruiting African citizens 
to fill positions in the public sector that were formerly 
either filled by or reserved for expatriates is referred 
to as "Africanisation".
Originally, the Africanisation of the public service 
was thought of as referring only to staffing of the public 
service of the state with African nationals in substitution 
for expatriates. In practice, the term through common usage 
quickly came to mean the eventual reduction and ultimately 
ending of expatriate predominance in the public service.
But in the context of the condition which was widely pre­
vailing in many of the new independent states, even a 
broadened definition proved too limited to describe the 
scope of staffing change-over implicit in the assumption of 
self-government, and independence. In fact in some countries 
like Guinea and Mali, Africanisation was interpreted to mean 
the outright nationalisation of all foreign-owned enter­
prises, and the recruitment and introduction of progressive 
staff and syllabi reflecting the manpower needs and 
aspirations of the local people.^ For President Sekou Toure 
of the Republic of Guinea, Africanisation is analogous to 
"decolonization";
"When we say decolonization, we mean to destroy 
the habits, conception and ways of conduct of 
colonialism. We are determined to replace 
them with forces that are Guinean forces, 
conceived by the people of Guinea, adapted to 
the conditions, the means, to the aspiration 
.of Guinea."^
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In the main, politically. Africanisation was seen in 
the movement of more and more African nationals into posi­
tions of leadership. Economically, it has meant more local 
control of the economic resources of the country - though 
this has been most difficult to effect. Socially and demo- 
graphically, it was seen as the elimination of the non­
nationals from key positions of employment in both the 
public and private sectors of the economy. And 
culturally, it involved an institutional change to meet 
local needs.
In specific countries. Africanisation was pursued 
under the cloak of nationalism, e.g. in Sierra Leone it was 
called Sierra Leoneanisation, in Nigeria, it was called 
Nigerianisation, in Kenya, it was called Kenyanisation and 
Zambianisation in Zambia. In East and Central Africa, a 
policy of localisation had sometimes been advocated. This 
was because of the multi-racial nature of the society in 
these areas, and it was intended that the public service 
should reflect the racial complexion of the state or vhat 
President Nyerere called "to give it a local outlook".^ On 
the other hand, there was a racial imbalance in the public 
services of "these states in that the minori"ty racial 
communities occupied the majority of the posts in the senior 
grades. A policy of Africanisation rather than localisation 
came to be adopted in these states owing to "the need to 
achieve a "proper balance between the races, reflecting as 
nearly as practicable the racial composition of the
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population. In any case, it must be expected that any 
non-African who assumes citizenship of the state of his 
adoption, e.g. the Asians in Kenya, becomes African in the 
continental sense and the use of the term Africanisation 
should apply to him so long as it is just and equitable to 
all minority groups. As applied to the private sector, it 
may be called indigenisation. Again, indigenisation here 
means the people of the country regardless of their race, 
colour or nationality. From now on, it is intended to use 
the three terms interchangeably.
2.2 Motivation for Africanisation.
Africanisation as a policy was.generally accepted by all 
African states as necessary and popular, because it results 
were'easily seen'in so much as Africans can be seen in 
positions previously occupied by European expatriates; it is 
therefore important to examine some of the motivation 
implicit in the policy. A.L. Adu broadly divided the 
motivation into two categories* the first is political, and 
the second is economic.^
The first and most burning issue is one of politics. It 
was natural that political urge for independence should 
be reflected also in the urge to create a national public 
service. Political independence not matched by an adminis­
tration which was African in complexion would naturally 
result in disharmony. As Fred G. Burk and Peter L. French 
pointed out:
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The replacement of former colonial officials 
with nationals is needed to insure public 
awareness of the transfer of the loci of
power and to help construct the basis for
support and legitimacy for new independent 
government.^
In similar terms, the final report of the Parliamentary 
Committee on the Africanisation of the Federal Public 
Service of Nigeria stated that. Africanisation, politically, 
must demonstrate in no uncertain terms, a clear break from
the colonial regime and reflect the dawn of era of
nindependence and independent states.' The report ended by 
adding that the Nigerian independence would not be real to 
the Nigerian nationals if, after independence, there were 
Nigerian Ministries and Nigerian Members of Parliament but 
with "^expatriate permanent secretaries and principal advisers.
African ministers inevitably realized that they would 
prefer to work with Africans in policy advising and direct­
ing positions even though this might result in some measures 
of loss of experience in these positions. Any expatriate 
officers retained for a time after independence in these 
sensitive positions should be regarded as a temporary 
expedient until Africans were ready arid available to take 
over from them.
Furthermore, there were some posts’which were really 
sensitive from the national security point of view and key 
posts such as those in the police, armed forces, in the
..8
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Ministry of Defence, External Affairs and the Interior 
should be taken over by Africans as soon as they can be 
trained or are adequate to fill them. It became increasingly 
uncomfortable politically when an independent state was 
represented in negotiation with representatives of foreign 
states by non-nationals.
If as happens quite often in all new states, trade 
agreements are being negotiated with say, Germany, there is 
always the suspicion that the British or the French 
official, acting for the government, might not sincerely 
represent the interests of the host country, or if he is an 
adviser that he will not advise against the interest of his 
country of nationality. In any case, the other side might 
not be willing to confide their business intention to a
Qperson whose own country might have rival interests.
However, experience in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Black
Africa .had shown that the so-called key posts were the
10last to be Africanised. As for the armed forces, the
African leaders were rather wary on the Africanisation of
11the officer corps. In Sierra Leone, the then Prime 
Minister, Sir Milton Margai was most reluctant to Africanisé 
the post of force commander, then held by a British ex­
patriate Brigadier Blackie for well over five years after 
independence. The reasons why the 'key posts' were the 
last to be Africanised were due partly to the government 
policy of gradualism. As the Prime Minister stated in the 
Sierra Leone's Legislative Council debate in 1959:-
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I would not if I have a European at the 
head of the Public Service, and he was 
doing his level best for the country, 
replace him merely because there was a 
qualified Sierra Leonean. The European 
would serve his normal term and the 
African steps in afterwards.
And also the colonial policy that Africanisation must start 
from below in order that the future incumbent would be 
allowed to gain experience for the more senior and respon­
sible positions in the public service. Secondly, it was due 
partly to the tribal nature of the African states. A 
minister from one tribe would prefer having as his permanent 
secretary a man from his own tribe. Where there was no 
tribesman readily available the solution was to retain the 
servicesof the expatriate who had no tribal allegiance. In 
Nigeria, for example, the case of personal secretary to the 
then Prime Minister of the Federation was most revealing.
The Prime Minister was a Hausa from the North where there 
were very few Western-educated men. He sought to retain the 
services of a British officer in this key position, but in 
the end had to bow to a sustained vituperative campaign by 
many segments of the Nigerian society, including some who 
were otherwise well disposed to the Prime Minister. ” Nigeriani- 
sation", they claimed, "required that the incumbent of this 
and similar posts be a Nigerian.
Although political interest and tribal interrelation­
ships are the impetus behind
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the application of an accelerated programme of Africanisa­
tion, the more important and, to many, the real justifica­
tion for Africanisation is economic. It is obviously 
cheaper to employ local rather than expatriate personnel. 
The markets from which these two sets of people derived are 
different, and the expatriate market is invariably more 
expensive than local African ones. Apart from the higher 
basic salary cost for expatriates, it is necessary to 
provide them with additional inducements in cash and in 
kind since otherwise it would not be worth his while 
leaving his home. For example, in 1957 in Sierra Leone, in 
addition to basic pay of an expatriate, the following 
expatriation allowances were awarded:
Basic Salary P.A. Expatriation Allowance
£ 865 and below £182 per annum
£  866 - £ 1,159 £232 "
£1,160 - £1,399 £282 "
£1,400 - £1,449 £300 "
£1,450 - upwards £350 "
Sources: Report of the Commission on the
Civil Service of Sierra Leone, 1957» Para.
135-136.
Over and above expatriation allowances officers with 
families are granted the following: either a free return
passage for not more than two children with no minimum 
residential requirements, or allowances at the rate of £25 
a year in respect of each child who is maintained by him 
outside Sierra Leone for the
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whole of his tour of office, the allowance being paid in 
arrears at the end of the officer's tour of service. In 
either case the concession is limited to children below the 
age of 19 y e a r s . I n  some African countries, the British 
Government, under the Overseas Service Aid, the Voluntary 
Service Organisation (V.S.O.) schemes, meets the overseas 
elements of the salaries of those expatriate officers 
recruited through their agencies. In addition to the V.S.O. 
there is the British Expatriate Supplementation Scheme 
(BESS).^^ This is a considerable help since it enables 
young African countries to have the time in which to train 
their own personnel while still having access to experience 
and expertise from overseas without the extra heavy cost of 
purchase.
Even.so, employment of expatriate personnel is still 
not as cheap as having Africans. Whatever one might say,
the fact that overseas officers are working side by side 
with African staff does have a distorting effect on local 
salary levels. The Sierra Leone government sets up 
commissions to devise salary structures which are related to 
what the local economy would be capable of sustaining and 
which would reduce the gap between the lowest paid civil 
servants and the highest paid.^^ These commissions can only
have limited success so long as there is a
large element of expatriate staff in the senior ranks. One
of the reasons for this is that, to begin with, Africans in 
the senior grades were initially in a minority and they
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spent their normal social life with expatriate officers with
18whom they worked at the Hill Station Club, Cline Club, etc. 
This is all the more so since in the early stages most of 
these Africans were themselves trained in Europe and the 
United States of America where they acquired the pattern and 
standard of life of these materially more advanced countries. 
It is unrealistic therefore to attempt to pitch their salary 
levels too much below those enjoyed by their expatriate 
counterparts. In equity, all salary commissions and govern­
ments must take this factor into account. It does mean, 
however, that in terras of the proportionate real value of 
services provided by these local officers to the economy of 
the country far too big a slice of the national resources is 
applied to the emolument of what might be called a 
"privileged few".
Moreover, it is normal to guarantee housing for staff 
recruited from overseas. Each government has had to build 
and manage large housing estates throughout the country for 
its expatriate staff. In addition, the government has had 
to lease additional housing or to pay substantial housing 
allowances. African officers have come to expect, as stated 
earlier, that they are also entitled to housing privileges 
and this is one of the most intractable problems relating to 
conditions of service there is in the public service adminis­
tration. The government states that it accepts no 
responsibility, in principle, for the housing of local staff, 
but this principle is usually observed in the breach rather
iû3 '
than in its application. However, the government appears 
at last to have broken with the past and decided to charge 
economic rental for all houses occupied by local staff. It 
is too soon, however, to judge how effective this policy is. 
As an indication of how costly this factor can be, in 1978/79 
the Sierra Leone government was spending no less than 
Le 1,000,000 per annum on housing allowances and rent sub­
sidies.^^
Africanisation was also justified by the fact that it 
ensured stability in the staffing of government services. 
Employment of staff from overseas can be regarded as a short­
term expedient in any case, but the period after independence 
is particularly difficult in maintaining stable expatriate 
staff structure. The incidence of the inevitable compensa­
tion schemes becomes a most unsettling element in all 
staffing programmes (1.7)* Replacement by recruitment from
overseas on contract terms is a useful but not the permanent
21answer to the problem and it is self-defeating. To ensure 
stability, the answer is to build up a local cadre of
officers whose careers and fortunes are tied up with those 
of the state and who are bound to their jobs by ties of 
responsibility and natural loyalty. If the main core of the 
staff is African, then such reinforcements in experience and 
expertise as may be necessary from overseas can be applied 
with economy and good sense. On the other hand, it is 
equally arguable that, in tribally segmented countries of 
Africa south of the Sahara, Africanisation does not
necessarily ensure national loyalty. As it has been pointed 
out earlier (1.2), in countries such as Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone loyalty to the tribe and the ethnic group is much 
stronger than to the nation. An expatriate civil servant 
might, in fact, prove more loyal to the government of the 
day (regardless of the tribe of the leader) than an 
African civil servant.
Another factor was the'drain of mbnèy^oût of 'the countî y 
caused by the employment of expatriate officers. This might 
not be a very large sum compared with other factors in the 
balance of payments position of a state but it was neverthe­
less significant. A high proportion of the salaries paid to 
expatriate officers was spent in the country,but it was 
natural that savings should be remitted to their home 
countries overseas. Later, when they retire to their home 
.countries, gratuities and pensions are paid to them over­
seas. Obvio.uS'iy it was ■ in the country's interest to reduce 
this cost to the absolute minimum necessary to ensure 
efficiency by employing local staff to the optimum extent that 
could be managed by a progressive Africanisation policy.
Perhaps a more important, though less easily observable, 
economic benefit of Africanisation aro.se from the different 
consumption patterns of local and foreign personnel.
Foreigners tended to-bring with them the tastes and consump­
tion habits developed in their countries of origin; this not 
only exerts a direct effect on the demand for imports (which 
is probably small); but, more importantly, introduced the
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local population to new tastes and habits which could only 
be satisfied by imports. If, as often happened, a consider­
able proportion of the "opinion leaders" in the domestic
economy come to adopt these tastes, this "demonstration
22effect" as Nurkse has called it, might prove very 
difficult for the government to control and at the same 
time might seriously weaken the country's balance of 
payments position. This could prove critical to countries 
which find it necessary to employ considerable numbers of 
expatriate staff, even when these are provided 'free' under 
technical assistance programmes; and especially so, if at 
the same time, they were trying to accelerate their rate of 
economic growth by stepping up the level of investment, 
which inevitably entails increased imports of capital 
goods.
Under these circumstances, personnel Africanisation 
became just as important a part of the development pro­
gramme as raising the level of domestic savings, but may
well prove more difficult to effect. The nature of these
\
difficulties will be examined, but even when the Africani­
sation policy is well advanced, there will be a considerable 
time lag before the "demonstration effect" can be overcome.
Ultimately, the real justification for Africanisation 
was the natural and understandable desire of every country 
to manage its own internal affairs. Such independence is, to 
most people, meaningless unless it is matched by the ability of
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the people, to actually run their own public service. 
Moreover, until industry and commerce become large employers 
(Chapter 3)» the opportunities for service through state 
employment was the best means for inculcating qualities of 
integrity, hard work and esprit de corps which are vital 
ingredients in the character of any nation. It was there­
fore not an unworthy ambition for any state to wish to 
accelerate the process of Africanisation in its services.
2.3 Pressures for Africanisation.
The relatively high salaries of civil servants in 
developing countries and the status and authority that 
accompany civil service positions made employment in the 
public service very desirable and thus contributed to the 
internal pressures for Africanisation. A positive response 
to these pressures is a policy of rapid if not immediate 
Africanisation of the entire public service. However, if 
the goal of rapid economic development is to be attained, 
then an adequate supply of expertise is essential and 
Africanisation can only proceed as fast as skilled African 
manpower becomes available.
The lesson of history is that any social transformation 
by itself or as part of a larger objective must be 
orchestrated within the overall political and economic 
objectives of the country's ruling elites, and more speci­
fically, the country's educational and training programmes. 
Failure to recognize
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this point or having recognized it, to take account of it, 
presents the greatest threat to achieving the objectives of 
Africanisation. Such failures may be induced by pressures 
from below, from African nationalists anxious to fill the 
desirable public service jobs of the expatriates; or it may 
be induced by doctrinaire consideration or party politics
phcommunicated from above to the African population generally.
In the first place, pressures from below, the question 
becomes for the most part one of the strength and determina­
tion of the government. Where the government is strong and 
determined, Africanisation is likely to proceed more or less 
systematically with intensified and accelerated educational 
and training programmes, and a rapid expansion of facilities 
needed. But in the case where the government was not strong 
or determined enough to resist the pressures from party 
members, there was the possibility of submitting to popular 
pressures for jobs or to xenophobia.
The Africanisation of the public service became a 
paramount objective of the African states as they progressed 
toward independence. One of the things which the nationalist 
forces most resented in the colonial period was their 
exclusion from the higher and middle categories of the 
territorial civil service employment which they regarded to 
be the traits of independence most sought. This point was 
clearly illustrated by the demand made by the Tanzanian 
Union of Public Employees, reported by the London Times, 
that:
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The government should embark on à full-blooded 
policy to fill the senior posts of the 
civil service with Africans.
The letter said that the new government had been in power 
for one month, but so far no changes had been made in the 
civil service. "We therefore demand that the opportunities 
we have been refused should now be given to us," said the 
Union; "certainly a great number of posts held by expatriate 
officers can be taken by us."̂ -̂
The Tanzanian incident illustrates how easily the pace 
and scope of Africanisation can become an internal political 
issue. In Sierra Leone, a leading member of one of the 
opposition parties, the Sierra Leone Peoples National Party, 
P.N.P. for short, was reported saying that %
the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) 
was importing redundant whitemen into the 
country; and said, "the P.N.P. pledges 
itself to end the practice and will embark 
on a complete Africanisation of branches of 
the public service - the African must be
26given first preference in his own country. "
Here, the ability to Africanisé in the sense of developing 
qualified cadres of Africans not only to replace expatriates 
but also to take up new jobs engendered by independence 
and economic growth wou2d.have been seriously compromised. The 
experience of an African state, Sudan, which became 
independent seven years before Sierra Leone has some 
relevance here.
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In the two years immediately before independence, the 
Sudanization committee established and operating under the 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement, granting full internal self- 
government to the Sudan, reduced the British cadre in the 
public service from about 1,200 to just over 150. The 
technical services suffered most. The administrative, 
policy influencing, and defence services apparently fared 
better. However, it was believed that the serious revolt 
in the Southern Sudan shortly before independence in August
1955.
"had as one of its contributing causes the
hasty replacements of British officials in
the South by Northerners who knew neither
27the area nor its language." '
By 1958» the Sudan was again employing a large number of 
British personnel primarily in the technical services and 
for teaching posts. The Sudan had also in 1958 started to 
employ British advisers in important posts. The conclusion 
of Kenneth Younger on the Sudanese experience was that the 
"Sudanese themselves would probably not now recommend to
others a policy as drastic as the one which their excep-
28tionally tense political situation led them to pursue."
Not even Robert Mugabe who during a B.B.C. Radio 4 interview
indicated that the priorities in the agenda for both
political and economic decolonisation was first the
Africanisation of the public service, second the military
29and last but not least, the economy. ^
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Another example of an extreme nature and greater magni­
tude worth mentioning here is the experience of the Congolese 
people, immediately after independence in I96O. The Belgian 
Congo (now Zaire) became independent in mid-April i960 with 
only 109 trainees who were to take their place in the senior
service. Notwithstanding this manpower handicap, the
30Congolese government of Patrice Lumumba, hastily and
almost hysterically embarked on a policy of Africanisation,
providing African cadres for every important Ministry.
College graduates became permanent secretaries. In the
army, corporals were made colonels and sergeants were made
generals on the assumption that somehow the change in title
and rank would magically confer on the new battalion or
divisional army leaders the ability to lead troops, plan
and execute logistical and combat operations, and give
military advice to the civilian government l e a d e r s . T h e
inevitable result of this was chaos, the collapse of the
entire administration of the country, strife and violence
32ensued, and eventually civil war. The Congolese 
experience reflected in its most acute form the situation 
obtaining in one degree or another in many parts of Africa. 
The process of Africanisation must be thought of, then, as 
embracing for most of Africa not only the replacement of 
foreign personnel in the public service, but also the 
political training and experience for Africans to operate 
their new political structures.
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In Sierra Leone, the restrained views put forward by
the deputy leader of the P.N.P. probably best represented
the party's stand on the issue of Africanisation. Mr. Stevens
said that expatriates were necessary because of the skills
they possessed, but the Sierra Leoneans must be master in
his own house. ". . .we must be given the opportunity of
deciding the number, quality and calibre of the people who
should come to us, and what is more important, to negotiate
with such outsiders on a basis of equality the conditions
under which their services would be made available to us.
Our policy therefore would be to invite and give every
encouragement to expatriates who have specific contributions
to make - the P.N.P. will have no place for the know-all
33type of paternalistic expatriate.
The ability of the governments of the new African 
states to transform the cadre of the public service by 
developing qualified Africans to replace Europeans significantly 
involves political patronage ,tactics and ideological drives. 
Political parties in Africa are subject to as much if not 
more pressures for jobs by the tribesmen and party faithful 
as is the case in other countries. This is more so in 
countries with a one party state system of government; the 
leaders of such parties have used their monopoly over 
access to the public service to reward their loyal party 
supporters. In fact, party membership and loyalty may over­
ride other considerations such as technical qualification, 
training and experience in appointment to more senior posts
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34in the public service.^ The probability is that enthusiasm 
and devotion to party activities are more important factors 
than technical, academic and professional qualifications.
In addition, it must again be noted that the membership of 
the party per se is not enough to guarantee one's appoint­
ment to certain jobs. There are other factors which tend 
to over-ride party loyalty and enthusiasm. Such factors as 
personal loyalty to the leadership of the party, tribal and 
ethnic consideration, and perhaps regional, or in the case 
of Sierra Leone, district. All these have tended to influ­
ence the appointments of certain individuals to politically 
strategic and sensitive posts such as the Secretary to the 
President (Head of the Civil Service), the Financial 
Secretary, Establishment Secretary, etc.
Finally, even where a strong government was in n 
position to resist pressures from below, it might for tactical 
political reasons decide to submit as a way to enhance its 
mass following or intensify its mass support. For example, 
in Tanzania, President Nyerere, responding to his party 
pressure for rapid Africanisation, spelt out his party 
policy as follows:
First, it will remain the policy of the govern­
ment that every vacancy arising in the public 
service of Tanzania should be if possible filled 
by an appointment made locally and that recourse 
should only be had to recruitment from outside 
East Africa if no suitable candidate (of any 
race) can be found locally; second, within this
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policy, in the case of new appointments to the 
service, it is government's intention that 
African candidates of Tanzania should have 
prior claims to consideration; and thirdly, 
only if no suitable, qualified Tanzanian African 
candidate is available should other candidates
'iCbe considered.
In Franco-phone Africa, from the available literature, 
the pressure for Africanisation of the public service seemed 
to come from a b o v e . W i t h  22,000 French expatriate civil 
servants out of a total of 100,000 (vide Table l.l) working 
in French Colonial Africa, one would have expected that the 
pressure for Africanisation in these countries should have 
been greater, and come from below, than the English-speaking 
countries. But this was not the case. The reasons might 
be attributed to the French Colonial policy of assimilation 
whereby Africans with a certain level of education, pre­
ferably with a university education in France, would be 
assimilated and automatically become French citizens. They 
could be elected as deputies to the French Assembly- of 
Deputies and thus become Cabinet Ministers as well. . This 
policy of assimilation stood in opposition to the British 
colonial policy of self-determination whereby the colonial 
subjects were trained not to become British, but to become 
self-reliant and independent. Self-government and indepen­
dence for the West African British territories became 
settled policy for the United Kingdom much earlier than it 
did for France.
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The pressure for Africanisation in French West Africa
was started after 1948, when a Senegalese socialist
leader, Lamyne Gueye, succeeded in having incorporated in
French law, the principle: 'a’ travail egal salaire égal'
in the loi Lamyue Gueye de 1948 sur "l'harmonisation des
traitment de salaire et de travail," the basis was laid for
equal pay for equal work in the public service which over
38time was extended to the private sector. This was an 
important turning point in French West Africa. However, in 
the absence of an existing cadre of trained Africans, 
insistence on equal pay for equal work was counter-produc­
tive. It meant that there was little incentive to employ 
and train inexperienced Africans because they would have to 
be paid the same wage as their more experienced European 
counterparts. It also meant, no Africanisation of existing 
categories of jobs into several separate jobs, each with 
some limited functions and scaling of salaries accordingly 
so that Africans can proceed up on the employment ladder to 
increasingly responsible positions. Finally, since it 
meant no lowering of standards and qualifications it 
militated against possible replacement of Europeans as a 
realistic matter for sometime to come.
In fact, it was only with the loi cadre of June 23»
1956, which introduced important advances in African self-
government, that the Africanisation of the public service
received for the first time recognition and serious
39consideration in French West Africa. Under the loi cadre.
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the practice of reserving a percentage of positions in the 
civil service for Africans was introduced with the objective 
of facilitating the promotion of Africans to all levels of 
the civil service. A further step in Africanisation was 
taken when the Ecole Nationale de la France d'outre Mer, 
which trained French men to become overseas officers in the 
French African Colonial Service (similar to Her Majesty's 
Overseas Civil Service in Britain, see 1.6), was transformed 
in early 1959» as part of the Gaulist decolonization thrust, 
into an Institute des Hautes Etudes d'outre Mer. The 
Institute was dedicated to training Africans from Franco-phone 
Africa and other states of l'expression Français on friendly 
terms with France for senior levels of the public service.
Thus, in all the colonial territories of Black Africa, 
irrespective of the pattern and starting point, the colonial 
governments came to appreciate that the Africanisation of the 
public service was an indispensable step toward African self- 
government and independence.
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2.4 The Machinery for Africanisation.
The Africanisation of the public service can be seen 
in terms of an emergency staffing policy. Once the period 
of emergency is over, when all top positions in the public 
service are filled by Africans and there is a flow of suit­
able candidates to meet the requirements of the public 
service, the whole operation becomes one of staff develop­
ment.^^ In this way Africanisation was an emergency 
response to staffing shortages in the public service which 
involves progressive staff development.
Normal bureaucratic institutions for staff development 
were, however, not adequate in Sierra Leone to give emphasis 
and impetus to the Africanisation programme, because they 
were geared to the requirements of a normal stable situation. 
It required the adoption of extra-ordinary measures for the 
mobilization of the manpower resources available for the 
public service and the development of these resources so 
that they could provide efficiency of operation whilst 
getting the maximum number of Africans into posts to replace 
the colonial expatriates. It meant a complete review of the 
structure of staff in departments, and the qualifications 
required for the grades of posts within the reformed 
structure so that they could be related to those essential 
for the provision of adequate services and standards (see 
Tables I.3 and 1.4 above), and not necessarily those suited
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both to the purposes of the former colonial power and to 
its special labour market. New instructions, shaped to fit 
the requirements of an emergency situation, were therefore 
necessary. Their force and scope would naturally vary, 
according to the situation in each department.
The first essential step in each situation was to 
formulate an operational policy, that is, to translate 
Africanisation policy of the government into a plan of 
operations. If an adequately staffed office responsible 
for Africanisation was available, it could itself prepare 
this operational plan. In Sierra Leone, like other African 
countries, it had been found necessary to appoint ad hoc 
commissions on Africanisation which had been charged with 
the responsibility for formulating policy to be followed in 
preparing a blueprint for action and for establishing, to 
the extent that a forecast of availability of manpower and 
qualities could be made, a time-table for implementing the 
Africanisation plan.^^ In very few cases, however, had it 
been possible to prepare a comprehensive time-table, the 
manpower availability was too uncertain, and there were a 
number of other imponderable factors too which made it 
impracticable to prepare a reliable step-by-step plan. The 
most that it had been possible to achieve, therefore, was 
the establishment of working machinery for prepairing and 
executing programmes of action on the basis of what could be 
predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty.
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For this purpose, some governments had preferred 
setting up standing Africanisation commissions with execu­
tive responsibility for action in the field of Africanisa­
tion. Such bodies would review the situation in each 
department of government and determine the training pro­
gramme necessary for accelerating the pace of Africanisation 
in the departments. It would also review the claims of all 
Africans in the department for advancement to more respon­
sible positions and decide when and at what pace notices 
should be given to non-nationals to make room for nationals. 
The standing commissions were and are at present normally 
headed by non-officials or even politicians and therefore 
their actions were likely to be influenced by the day to day 
political situation and pressures.
If a commission of this nature had the staff which 
could and would carry out a proper investigation into the 
situation in each department and which would present facts 
upon which a realistic programme of Africanisation could be
formulated, then it would work. But the Africanisation*
situation in all new countries was such that the right 
calibre of staff very often did not exist. In any case, it 
was politically expedient in African countries to show 
quick results and the temptation to take short cuts in the 
acceleration of Africanisation was very great and was not 
often resisted. But the main objection to a standing 
commission in Sierra Leone was that it interfered with the 
functions of the Public Service Commission (P.S.C.). The
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Public Service Commission was given advisory 
responsibilities over all appointments and promotions. ^
In carrying out its responsibilities, it adopted a judicial 
and impartial approach to the consideration of the claims 
of all candidates within the framework of the policies, 
especially the Africanisation policy laid down by the 
government.If, then, another commission had already 
determined who should fill a particular post, either the 
Public Service Commission became a mere rubber stamp or else 
situations of conflict arose between the two commissions. 
Such conflicts would not be in the interest of the public 
service as a whole and could not be conducive to the 
efficiency of the public service.
For that reason it was thought better to set up 
official machinery which was capable of action consistent 
with government policy whilst at the same time working in 
close co-operation with the public service commission with­
out interfering in its statutory functions. In Sierra 
Leone the Office of Secretary for Recruitment and Training 
was established as an arm of the Colonial Secretary's 
Office (now the Establishment Secretary’s O f f i c e ) T h e  
Office of Recruitment and Training had overall responsibi­
lity for Africanisation and was intended to fulfill this 
responsibility by controlling the pattern of appointments 
together with staff development through training programmes. 
This long term objective was to improve the general supply 
of skilled public servants so that Africanisation would not
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require special machinery to assure an efficient and effec­
tive public service.
2 .5  Procedures and Progress of Africanisation.
Whatever the machinery set up to give impetus to
Africanisation, there were certain methods of operation
necessary to meet each local situation. Some of these will
be discussed below. A programme of Africanisation implied
preferences for African citizens over all others who might
be equally or better qualified. Where the policy was one
of localisation, the programme would give preference to all
citizens over non-citizens in the service. If then, to
discuss only Africanisation in this context - an African
citizen has adequate experience and qualifications to do
a job, even though there are others better qualified or
with greater experience, the policy laid down should be such
46as to give preference to the African.
The first obvious method for promoting Africanisation 
was to ensure that Africans were recruited or promoted to 
fill posts as they occurred. In the initial stage, there 
might not be sufficient numbers of qualified or otherwise 
suitable candidates even for this limited method of approach, 
For example, the first progress report of the Public Service 
Commission on Africanisation showed that:
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1953 i?54
Posts provided in estimates 646 695
Posts held by expatriates 407 411
Posts held by Africans 159 184
Posts vacant 80 100
These figures have already been given in greater detail in 
the last chapter, Table 1.4 above. The Public Service 
Commission noted that it was noir possible to fill every 
vacancy in a staff of this size on the day it occurred and 
some vacancies were purely temporary. In a great many other 
cases, however, it was found impossible to recruit men, 
v^ether Africans or expatriates, for posts for which a pro­
fessional qualification was a basic necessity. This was 
particularly a problem with doctors and engineers (Grade A 
posts, see Table 1.3).
But as the process of manpower development (discussed 
in Chapter 5) gathered momentum, it was found that this 
approach was too slow and would certainly not match the 
accelerated programme laid down by the government. Another 
drawback to this approach was that Africans would normally 
enter the Civil Service at the bottom of the particular 
grades of posts (see Table 1.3) and would be unable to rise 
to the top within a reasonable period of time because of 
lack of vacancies. It was an approach, therefore, which was 
unlikely to prove acceptable beyond the first short period 
of the Africanisation programme. If, however, as happened, 
the rate of departure of expatriate officers on compensation 
was fast, then this approach might
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be forced on the system since there would be far more 
vacancies than there were local available candidates to
hrp
fill them. In such circumstances expatriate recruitment 
had to be continued if efficiency was to be maintained.
At some stage in the progress of Africanisation, how­
ever, there would be a need for a more drastic 
approach and one such method was to adopt a policy of 
displacing non-nationals to make room for suitably qualified 
Africans. In Sierra Leone (notwithstanding the then Prime 
Minister's stand on the Africanisation) the government 
introduced a scheme of limited retirement benefits for non- 
Sierra Leonean African pensionable officers, so that 
whenever Sierra Leonean Africans were available to fill 
posts occupied by non-Sierra Leonean Africans the latter 
could be retired with limited compensation. This compen­
sation had taken the form of increased pension terms, as 
if the post had been abolished, with the right to commute 
a part of the pension for lump sum: based on actuarially 
calculated higher commutation factors. The terms of agree­
ment for payments of compensation to pensionable expatriate 
officers of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Servants, desig­
nated by the British Government on the taking over of the 
Civil Service by the territorial government, contained 
usually a provision for compulsory retirement of any 
designated officers if this was found necessary to provide 
vacancies for qualified Africans. If, of course, the 
officers to be displaced were on contract terms, then the
-123-
usual notice clause could be invoked. This scheme of
compulsory retirement of non-Africans in the interest of
Africanisation could cause hardship to the retiring officers
and at the same time lowered the morale of expatriate
serving officers. But in situations such as existed in
East Africa, with a large block of Asians staff intervening
between Africans and the senior posts, it was inevitable
that this scheme had to be applied extensively for a few 
49years. ^
Another technique used was one of skill dilution. For 
instance, when expatriate recruitment to the Administrative 
Service ceased in 1959» there were not enough graduates 
available to fill all the vacancies. A number of the posts 
of Assistant District Commissioners in the field and 
Assistant Secretaries in the Secretariat were down-graded 
to those of senior Executive Officers. These were then 
filled by the promotion of senior clerical staff with 
ability and experience. They took over the routine, 
although still responsible, jobs formerly performed by 
administrative officers, leaving policy decisions and the 
higher responsibilities to the reduced number of administra­
tive officers. In some other cases, it was possible also to 
split jobs so that they could be filled by Africans. For 
example, where previously a works superintendent was 
required to supervise staff for a whole building operation, 
it might be possible to split the job so that Africans with
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experience in either masonry or carpentry could be appointed 
foremen instead to supervise either section.
Another method that had been applied was promotion on trial 
In considering a candidate's suitability for promotion, it 
was considered necessary in the then circumstances to pay 
less attention to educational certificates, diplomas or 
degrees, and more attention to the candidate's experience 
since leaving school, his general intelligence level, and 
his capacity to leam. The practice of measuring qualifica­
tions by reference to educational certificates was adminis­
tratively a very convenient formula which the colonial 
administration used to exclude Africans from the adminis­
trative service. This practice might have been acceptable 
in situations in which there was a ready and abundant supply 
of suitable candidates, but not in Sierra Leone where the 
annual output of graduates from its University College was 
not exceeding eight. Even these eight were defiled employ­
ment in the administrative service on the grounds that they 
did not hold honours degrees.
Another method of accelerating the progress of 
Africanisation was the creation of posts in special 'Trainee' 
grades. Candidates were appointed or promoted and then 
given training, either institutional or by direct exper­
ience on the job, to qualify them for advancement to higher 
posts. This scheme was very widely used especially in the 
executive and technical classes of p o s t s . F o r  instance, 
there are posts of Trainee Accountant, Trainee Inspector of
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Income Tax, Trainee Tax Officer, Trainee Statisticians, etc. 
This scheme was essentially, however, short-term until the 
staff and salary structure of the service were such as to 
ensure a flow of ability from the lower grades upwards 
without the necessity for the creation of special incentive 
, training grade posts. For instance, if the accounting 
service provided a structure which enables an officer to 
join from secondary school as, say, junior Accounting 
Assistant, and to progress by stages to the grade of 
Accountant, there would be no need to select younger persons 
from school and put them straight into Trainee Accountant 
posts.
In some of the African states, particularly in East 
and Central Africa, Africanisation at the top was imprac­
ticable unless there was some dilution of the standards of 
experience normally expected. . Before
independence in Sierra Leone, an officer could not expect 
to attain the status of Permanent Secretary or head of a 
department until he had experience over many years, perhaps 
as much as twenty years.Obviously, twenty years would 
be too long to w a i t , b u t  the process had been shortened 
to as little as ten years or less, in Sierra L e o n e . A t  
present in Sierra Leone between 70-80 per cent of the 
senior posts in the administrative service are held by 
officers below the age of 40.^^ Ninety per cent of them 
entered the civil service in the mid-1960s and the 1970s.
It can be thought that these officers may block the
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promotion of juniors for a considerable period.
This is particularly so when the retiring age of 
public service officers had been raised from 45 to 55 years; 
and the age difference between these officers and their 
juniors who would likely succeed them, in most cases, is 
less than 10.̂ "̂  However, the comforting recourse for the 
junior officer in Sierra Leone is, at the moment, that 
promotion in the public service is not based on the
traditional bureaucratic criterion of seniority but on
_  58 merit.
However, in the early stage of Africanisation promotion 
by dilution of experience and standards involved some 
elements of risk which would be acceptable if there was a 
strong supporting staff, but this was not often the case. In 
such circumstances it was thought necessary to retain the 
services of some experienced expatriates as advisors to 
their successors. In some cases, the government considered 
it necessary to seek, under technical aid from the United 
Kingdom, consultant staff with the necessary experience to 
do development thinking and to carry out examination of the 
facts bearing on issues requiring policy decisions, thus 
providing the African staff with the materials on which to 
take or recommend wise decisions. This they were fully 
capable of doing. Consultant staff were sought to reinforce 
experience in Civil Service Administration recruitment and 
training. Treasury control and, in some other departments 
and ministries requiring technical expertise.
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The interesting thing to note about this method of 
accelerating Africanisation is that whichever way it was done,
retaining the services of a retired expatriate as an
adviser or seeking the services of an expatriate through 
technical aid, would only change the nature of his job from 
a colonial civil servant to an adviser, perhaps with better 
pay. This might lead to resentment of the expatriate 
adviser, particularly the retired civil servant cum adviser, 
from his successor; having their predecessors in office 
breathing down their necks. It was considered better to
delay the promotion of the Africans until they were able to
take over full responsibilities of their work.
It was comparatively easy to make rapid progress in 
Africanisation of posts which were in the administrative, 
executive and non-technical categories. In technical, 
professional and scientific departments, however, the 
standards laid down were usually international and there was 
no shortcut in the training process to qualify Africans to 
fill them. This was generally recognized by the government 
and even by the general public. They knew that doctors, 
engineers, research officers and technical officers of all 
kinds should be qualified up to certain recognized standards, 
and they accepted with reasonable patience the prospect of 
having to wait a long time to produce Africans with these 
qualifications. Public sentiment, however, expected that 
Africans should, as early as practicable, be in charge of 
departments employing these types of professional personnel.
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Here was a situation in which selective Africanisation was 
feasible. Africans with the basic qualifications, and 
after an approved minimum period of experience, could be 
considered for accelerated advancement to top policy and 
directing posts. In any case, the posts in these categories 
were the last to be Africanised.
2.6 The Progress and Rate of Africanisation.
In order to determine the rate at which the process of 
Africanisation had been progressing over the years under 
review, it is necessary to design criteria for measuring 
the rate at which Africans were being employed in the public 
service. Two criteria can be distinguished. One is what 
may be called a 'general employment index'. This is simply 
a ratio of the number of Africans employed in the public 
service (N̂ ) to the number of expatriates employed (Ng).
That is, the African Participation Index or the Replacement 
Ratio - API = N^/Ng.-^^ The other index is a modified 
version of this 'general employment index *. In Sierra 
Leone, like many other African countries, the preoccupation 
was only in top-level employment, therefore instead of a 
'general employment index', a top-level or high-level 
employment index may be used. Thus, if N^H and NgH repre­
sent Africans and Expatriates employees respectively in 
high-level employment in the Civil Service, then the API = 
N^H/NgH. In this respect, it is assumed that all expatriates 
employed in the public service were in top or high-level
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posts, defined as those posts carrying salaries in super­
scales; in Scales M, A, B, and L T . T h e y  are in fact the 
most responsible, important and most highly paid in the 
service, and they provide the acid test of progress towards 
real Africanisation.
Between 1953 and 1959» the number of Africans in the 
senior service of Sierra Leone increased from l66 to 381, 
but the number of expatriate personnel did not decrease 
correspondingly. On the contrary, there was an increase if 
officers on contract as well as those who were pensionable 
are included. Table 2.1 below illustrates the point.
TABLE 2.1
PensionableExpatriates 316 316 293 293 298 296 297 241
ExpatriateContracts 91 95 114 117 126 142 179 195
Sub-Total 407 411 407 410 424 438 476 436
African Officers 166 184 211 245 267 332 381 652
Grand Total 573 595 618 655 691 770 857 1088
Percentage of 
Afro/Ex. 30.0 31.0 34.1 37.4 38.6 43.0 44.0 59 .9
Replacement Ratio (API) 0.40 0.44 0.51 0.60 0.63 0 .76 0.80 1 .5
Sources: Computed from Graph 'A* of Government Statement 
on Africanisation, Sessional Paper No. 4, 1959» 
G.P. Freetown 17» vacancies and teachers not 
included.
Table 2.1 above denotes the overall progress of 
Africanisation of the public service from 1953 to 1959» two 
years to Sierra Leone independence. At the aggregate level, 
the progress had been impressive. The African share of the
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pensionable senior posts in the public service had increased 
from 27 per cent, with a replacement ratio of O .38 in 1953»
to 4 4 .5 per cent, with a replacement ratio of 0.80 in 1959 *̂ ^
This was commendable not only in the sense that there was a
remarkable increase in the number of Africans in the senior
p o s t s , b u t  also that the educational institutions and the 
government training programmes had started to pay off.
However, the figures as they stand do not tell what 
layers of the public service had been fully or partly 
Africanised. There is even more to it when the official defini­
tion of what constitutes a senior service post was so vague(see 
note 52, p. 188)The Public Service Commission stated that 
the acid test of rapid Africanisation was the number of 
administrative and professional posts that have been 
effectively Africanised. Accordingly to reveal the position 
in this respect the figures in Table 2.1 need to be disag­
gregated on a departmental basis.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below show the breakdown department 
by department of the number of officers actually serving in
senior posts between 1954 and 1959 in the following
\
categories: expatriate pensionable officers, expatriate
contract officers, and the pensionable senior African 
officers, and the number of vacancies, because under normal 
situations the Africanisation "law of replacement" requires 
that for any colonial expatriate laid off from the civil 
service, there must be an African ready to take his place; 
table 2 .3 shows the percentage changes in each
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group's share of the posts in the same period. The reason 
is, there might be an overall increase of expatriate 
employment in one department from 195^ to 1959» but their 
per centage share of the posts in that department has 
fallen..
Table 2.2 shows how uneven as between departments 
Africanisation had been. In the administrative service,
which represented- the real target of the nationalist pres- 
sures for Africanisation, not much had been done. Although 
there was an increase in the number of Africans in this 
sector of the public service, from 10 in 1954 to 23 in 1959» 
an increase of 13» there was also a small increase in
the number of expatriates employed in this layer of the 
public service from 59 in 1954 to 6l in 1959» the number of 
vacancies had also increased from 7 to 11. Also, in this 
sector, the number of expatriate pensionable officers fell 
from 59 to 47» but this fall was off-set by the new element 
of expatriate employment on contract terms with the Sierra 
Leone government; they numbered l4, again giving an overall 
expatriate majority in the administrative service.
In per centage terms (Table 2.3), the African share of 
the administrative posts had risen from 13.6 per cent in 
1954 to 24.2 per cent in 1959, while that of the expatriate 
declined from 77.6 per cent to 64.2 in the same period. The 
annual rate of Africanisation is expressed as a percentage 
change in the number of Africans holding senior posts in 
the administrative and other public service departments.
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divided by the number of years. In the case of the 
administrative service, (24.2-13.16)?^,to give a 2.2 per 
cent annual increase; compared to the annual rate of ex^ 
patfiation of (64.2-7?. 6)i-5 = -2 .65 showed a negative
increase. In both cases, the only difficulty for the 
Sierra Leone government was that there were more experienced 
expatriates leaving the administrative service than there 
were Sierra Leoneans to replace them.
In the Department of Agriculture and its allied fields, 
the progress of Africanisation was very slow. The reason 
might be that it took a longer time to train an agricul­
turist than an administrative officer and also that, as the 
government itself acknowledged the situation; "It is not
every youth with a sound secondary education who is willing
63to train for outdoor jobs if he can get an indoor one."  ̂This 
situation was reflected in the department of agricul­
ture's Africanisation record. Between 1954 and 1959» the 
number of senior posts provided in the estimate increased 
from 45 to 81, an increase of 3 6. Of these, only 67 were 
filled, and 14 left vacant. The expatriates' share of the
filled posts had increased from 33 in 1954 to 56 in 1959 and 
that of the Africans also showed an increase from 4 in 1954
to 11 in 1959' But the increase in the Africans holding senior
postsmight not be the result of replacement of expatriates whose 
number showed a corresponding increase, but filling the new 
posts provided in the estimates. Here, not unlike the 
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of expatriates holding senior posts in agriculture had 
decreased from 94 per cent in 1954 to 83 per cent in 1959» 
while that of the Africans was increased from 10 per cent 
in 1954 to 16 per cent in 1959» an increase of 6 per cent. 
The increase here is more remarkable as compared to the 
administrative service. The annual rate of Africanisation 
in this sector was 1 .2 per cent, while the rate at which 
the expatriates were being employed in the department had 
declined by -2.2 per cent per annum. In fact, without the 
new policy of contract employment which stood at 29 in the 
department, the number of expatriates should have been 2?» 
leaving the number of unfilled posts at 43.
With the exception of the law, medicine and accountancy 
departments where Africanisation had made rapid strides, the 
situation of slow progress of Africanisation in the 
Department of Agriculture and the administrative service 
seemed to persist right across the spectrum of the public 
service. The employment of expatriates continued side by 
side with the growing number of unfilled posts. Between 
1954 and 1959 the number of expatriates employed in the 
public service had increased from 4li in 1954 to 4?6 in 
1959' Similarly, the number of vacant posts had also 
increased from 100 in 1954 to 182 in 1959' Another 
phenomenon, perhaps of temporary nature, was the growing 
number of expatriates employed on contract terms. Their 
share of the public service senior posts had increased from 
95 in 1954 to 179 in 1959 (Table 2.1).
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Two possible reasons might be given. First, the 
demand for rapid Africanisation had not been matched by 
rapid manpower development which is an integral part of 
Africanisation. This is reflected in the manpower 
output from the education institutions (see Table 2.4 
below). The annual reports of the Public Service Commission 
for the period 1953-1958 revealed the following manpower 
situation in the country.
TABLE 2.4 THE MANPOWER OUTPUT FROM THE EDUCATION SYSTEM.
Year No . Sat No. Passed % Passes Total
1953 18 13 721954 24 9 37
1955 2 2 1001956 12 6 50
1957 26 11 421958 37 _15 48
TOTALS 119 56 58
B. School Certificates.
1953 177 84 471954 210 108 51
1955 217 119 54.81956 196 109 55*8
1957 281 152 54.81958 380 14% 3 9 .2
TOTALS 1.461 721 50.36
C. (Degrees) Graduates.
B.A. B.Sc.
Year General Education Total
1953 4 — 41954 4 2 6
1955 4 1 51956 1 2 3
1957 1 _8
TOTALS 18 8 26
Source: P.S.C. Annual Reports
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The reports went further to- say that even if all the 
school certificate holders were to go into the employment market 
immediately, " . . .  the present number would fall far below 
the demands of the public service and of other private 
sector employers, the report concluded. But in fact the 
majority of them went to some kind of higher education on 
government sponsorship as part of its Africanisation 
programme.
The second reason is a by-product of the first. It 
was the instructions of the Public Service Commission to 
all heads of government departments and permanent secretaries.
It requested among otherthings that in making recommendations 
for first appointments to the public service, it shall be 
guided by the principle that no consideration should be 
given to non-Sierra Leonean candidates unless and until it 
had reviewed the claims of Sierra Leoneans candidates, and 
be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that no qualified and 
suitable Sierra Leonean was available. And that where no 
such candidate was available, the principle should be that 
the post should if possible be filled by an expatriate for 
a limited period of contract. And where it appeared that 
this principle could not be put into practice, the Commis­
sion should after consultation with the Permanent Secretary 
to the ministry concerned, through the Establishment 
Secretary, should recommend whether the post be filled by 
an expatriate on pensionable terms or having regards to 
training schemes, be held in abeyance.
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This latter policy of holding posts in abeyance was largely 
responsible for the growing number of unfilled posts. The 
implication of such policy that the existence of unfilled 
posts in a department or ministry might cause frustration 
to serving officers who considered themselves to be eligible 
for promotion but yet could not be considered.
In summary, if the pace of Africanisation during the 
last years of colonial rule is to be judged from Tables 2.2,
2 .3 and 2.4 above, and what the Public Service Commission 
considered to be the acid test, i.e. the degree to which the 
administrative and professional posts had been Africanised, 
one can state categorically that the progress of Africanisa­
tion in Sierra Leone had not kept pace with the constitu­
tional development of the country (Chapter 1.2). On the 
other hand, it can be equally argued that the number of 
pensionable expatriate officers had declined from 316 to 
24l within a six year period (Table 2.1), and that the 195 
expatriate officers on contract employment were those the 
country needed for its economic development projects which 
the country could not possibly do without in the shorts 
term. The only doubt about these expatriates on contract 
employment was that they often renewed their contract 
periods making it difficult to draw the line between 
pensionable and non-pensienable expatriate officers.
Moreover, contract recruitment was not only self-defeating, 
but also very costly and can give rise to trouble if the 
salary rates offered were pushed too far beyond those
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Off ered for permanent engagement. For example, Sierra 
Leone was offering an enhancement of 25 per cent on basic 
salary for contract appointment, to the professional 
engineer grades, together with a gratuity of £37-10-Od for 
every three months' service.
Nonetheless it is.important to note that the progress of 
Africanisation depends on the availability of qualified and 
experienced manpower which was not available to fill all 
existing vacancies in the.public service (see Table 2.4). 
However, the policy of cautious Africanisation continued to 
be pursued until the country became independent on April 27,
1961.
2 .7  Post.Independence Period.
fiRKen Post has compared the level of expatriate 
employment in Sierra Leone at independence with those of 
Ghana and Nigeria. He suggests that the number of 
pensionable expatriate officers in former British territor­
ies was:
TABLE 2 .5 NUMBER OF EXPATRIATES EMPLOYED 1961-1962. 
Territory At Independence In Mid-1962
Nigeria: '
Federal Government 87O (196O) 555
North 900 640
Eastern Region 105 90
Western Region 135 110
Sub-Total 2,010 1,395
Ghana 580 (1957) 30Sierra Leone 250 (I96I) 114
Grand Total______________2,84o__________________1, 540
Source: Ken Post: The New States of West Africa, p. 137»
Table VI.
For Sierra Leoni: P.S.C. Report, I96I., pp. 5-6.
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What Mr. Post did not include in his figures was the 
level of expatriates on contract employment, which stood at 
170, and which seemed to replace the employment policies of 
the old colonial order. For Sierra Leone, the 250 
expatriate pensionable officers at independence did not 
represent a marked fall from the 1959 pre-independence 
figures of 297 (Table 2.2). It meant that between 1959 and 
1961, only 47 expatriate posts in the pensionable grades 
had been Africanised or rendered vacant. However, the year 
immediately after independence saw the most dramatic 
progress in Africanisation. Nearly 54 per cent of all 
pensionable posts held by expatriates were either African­
ised or rendered vacant by pre-mature retirement (see 
Table 2.5) or otherwise. In retrospect, the main reason was 
due to premature retirement induced by the pre-independence 
redundancy agreement (Chapter 1.6), transfer to other depen­
dent territories or for attitudinal reasons. For example, 
some of the expatriate officers found it very hard to receive 
orders from or work under an African head of a department. 
Others would have liked to stay'but the euphoric slogans of 
independence - "Africa for the Africans", and the attitudes 
of some Africans towards the colonial expatriates made this 
impossible.
A case in point was that of an expatriate teacher. This 
man was one of the best and most capable teachers which the 
school had ever had. He was teaching English language up to 
Form V, English literature up to Form VI, French and Latin 
up to Form VI as well, until 196I. A 3rd Class graduate of
— 14l—
Fourah Bay College was recruited to the academic staff of the 
school where he had in fact been a pupil. He was asked to 
teach English language and literature in the junior forms.
He felt slighted in favour of "the Whiteman". He started 
inciting the boys against the man on the use of text-books 
the man recommended. His behaviour towards the expatriate 
became insulting, and at the end of the year the expatriate 
found it intolerable. He was transferred to Aden, another 
British dependent territory. Another example of a 
political nature was the case of John Hatch (now Lord 
Hatch). He was the Head of the Extra-Mural Department at 
Fourah Bay College. In 1962 he was deported from Sierra 
Leone for publishing an article about women's circumcision 
in Sierra Leone, in a British weekly, "The New Statesman".
However, the post-independent development programmes 
seemed to put a brake on the country's drive towards the 
goal of full Africanisation. The demand for both high and 
intermediate skilled manpower had increased. This increased 
demand for manpower with technical qualifications could only 
be met by the employment of non-Sierra Leonean nationals.
In 1964, three years after independence, Sierra Leone had 
employed 586 expatriates in its public sector. This was
69revealed by the manpower survey conducted by Robert Brown^ 
for the Sierra Leone government. The report classified the 
level of expatriates employed under the following occupa­
tional divisions;
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in the public sector of Sierra Leone, 1964, classified by
0 • C • E •E. 70
Group Occupation Expat. Afr.
0 Professional, technical and 
related workers. 504 5,579
1 Administrative, executive and 
managerial 50 639
2 Clerical workers 16 1,631
3 Sales workers - - ■
4 Farmers and farm managers - -
5 Miners and quarrymen - -
6 Transport workers & commercial op. 16 225
7 Service, sports & section workers - 23
TOTAL 586 8,097






There are a few things which need to be noted about
the above table (2.6). Between I962 and 1964, the number
of expatriates employed by the Sierra Leone government had
more than trebled. It increased from II5 in I962 to 586 in
1964, an increase of 4?1 in two years. The main increase\
occurred in the professional, technical and related workers, 
accounting for 5^4 out of 586'. This reflects the growing 
demand for both professional and technical manpower generated 
by the post-independent expansion in economic and social 
activities. In the administrative, executive and managerial 
grades, the share of expatriates of these posts had consider­
ably reduced as contrasted with those in the professional 
grades. There were two feasible explanations why Africanisa­
tion had proceeded faster in the administrative service, 
clerical,
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and to a lesser extent managerial levels than the pro­
fessional and technical. An obvious reason is that where 
there is a shortage of skilled manpower that shortage will 
be more severe in areas where a degree of specialization 
and additional years of formal education are required 
than where a more general training is needed. Since 
administrative positions require less specialization than 
technical positions, it appears more justifiable to place 
someone without special skills or training in an adminis­
trative job than a technical one.
The desire to secure African control over the newly 
independent government provides another rationale for 
rapidly Africanizing the administrative service. Given the 
acceptance of the colonial model in which generalist 
administrators are to direct and co-ordinate the activities 
of technical specialists and in which the administrator is 
the basic point of contact between government and the 
people, it was politically necessary after independence to 
Africanize the administrative service. The most visibleI
positions in the public service are permanent secretaries,
- - - • - . n  *provincial and district commissioners.'
In relative terms, the number of expatriates in the 
public service as compared to their African counterparts 
was small: ven at the professional and technical category,
504 against 5»579 Africans. That represents an Africanisa­
tion index or a replacement ratio of II.O69 (compare this 
to those in Table 2.1 above). In the managerial, adminis-
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trative and executive categories, the index is 12.78. In 
both cases. Africanisation in terms of numbers ceased to be 
a problem. But if it is possible to break down these 
figures into high- and middle-level categories in each 
occupational grouping, one would realize that even though 
the expatriates are in the minority numerically, they 
occupied the majority of the high-level positions while 
the Africans occupied the intermediate positions.
However, what the Brown Report failed to reveal is 
the composition of expatriates, eg. the number on pen­
sionable grades and those on contract terns. According 
to Ken Post, at independence there were 250 pensionable 
overseas officers in the Sierra Leone Public Service, some 
12 months later, this number was reduced to 115 (see Table 
2 .5)' By 1964 the picture had further changed and of the 
504 expatriates employed in the public service as pro­
fessional, technical and related workers, only 46 were on 
pensionable grades and 458 were on contract terms. Of the 
50 employed in the administrative, executive and managerial 
grades, 15 of them were still in the pensionable establish­
ment and the rest (35) on contract terms. Thus in 1964^ 
three years after independence, there were 491 expatriate 
civil servants employed on contract terms and 6l expatriate 
officers on the pensionable establishment.
1964 may be regarded as the watershed of the African­
isation policy. It marked the end of Sir Milton Margai's 
cautious approach to the problem. He died in April, 1964
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and he was succeeded as Prime Minister by a more dynamic 
man known to be committed to the Africanisation of the 
public service.Within two years of his appointment as 
Prime Minister, Sir Albert Margai intensified the Africani­
sation programmes. A new university - the Njala University 
College - was opened, the number of faculties at Fourah Bay
College were increased, more government scholarships for
73overseas training were awarded, etc. In 1970, the 
government appointed a Commission of Inquiry on the Civil 
Service of Sierra Leone. The chairman, H u ^  Clarke, was a 
retired Permanent Secretary. In its findings on the 
employment of expatriates in the public service it revealed 
that out of a total of 12,262 civil servants, there were 
now only 73 non-Sierra Leoneans employed on contract in the 
following departments/ministries.^^
From Table 2.7 it can be seen that expatriates were 
mostly employed in selective areas of the Civil Service 
such as the legal, engineering, technical, medical, agri­
cultural, mines, geological, audit and the Civil Av ation 
Department. (Compare this list to Table 2.2 above.) Not 
all these expatriates were employed at a policy-making 
level. Nevertheless, they were all employed in the impor­
tant areas of development and provided the expertise, 
professionalism and experience so sadly lacking in the 
country.
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Ministry of Works 16
Law Officers 5
Ministry of Health 18
Ministry of Housing 1
Ministry of Agriculture 5
Ministry of Mines 4
Governor-General's Office 1
Ministry of Education 1
Civil Aviation 4





Source; Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the
Civil Service of Sierra Leone, 1970, Table 33,
pp. 96-9 8.
Closer analysis of the list shows that there were ten 
expatriates in the judicial and legal service, eighteen in 
the dental and medical fields, 22 in the various engineering 
positions including four in the Civil Aviation, etc. Leaving
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aside the judicial personnel, all these revealed gaps in 
the armoury of expertise in the public service, and it 
should rationally be government policy to fill in these 
gaps as part of the Africanisation. But in the absence of 
a more scientific and technological manpower policy, these 
figures reflected the dimension of immediate need in the 
public service which should have been given the highest 
priority. In this respect, if the aim of Africanisation 
was to produce competent and efficient local replacements 
for expatriates rather than replacing them by contract 
employment, as it has been the practice in the years 
immediately after independence, then the government must 
increase its efforts on its manpower programme.
The post-independent expansion in the public sector 
which necessitated the employment of foreign skilled man­
power ended with the 1 9 6 0 s . T h e  1970s saw the decline in 
the public sector activities. The closure of the railways 
which used to be one of the biggest employers of foreign skills, 
the government building and construction programme has been 
removed from the Ministry of Works and given to foreign 
contractors mainly to the funding countries; for example, 
the contract for the extension of Queen Elizabeth II Quay, 
with a loan from France, was given to a French construction 
company; the government road construction programme was 
largely financed by the Federal Government of West Germany, 
etc. In addition, some government departments which used 
to be major employers of expatriates were made into
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corporations - the Electricity, Ports and Marine, Road 
Transport, Forest Industries Departments became corporations 
respectively.*^^ With the exception of the Ministry of 
Education which continues to employ a large number of non­
nationals, the net effect of these was a tremendous fall in 
the number of expatriates employed in the civil service.
In 1978 there were 29 British nationals in the civil 
service of Sierra Leone under the British Expatriates 
Supplementation Scheme (BESS) employed in the following 
fields: 17 in the Ministry of Education as teachers in
secondary schools and the University of Sierra Leone, 3 in 
the Electricity Corporation as engineers and technicians, 4 
in the Ministry of Works, etc.
Besides,the Planning Unit of the Ministry of Education
indicated that there were in the Sierra Leone teaching
service 485 non-Sierra Leonean teachers at the end of
1977/78 school year, distributed as follows:
TABLE 2.8 NUMBER OF NON-SIERRA LEONEAN TEACHERS IN 
THE 1977/78 SCHOOL YEAR.
Institution M F Total
1. Secondary school:
Volunteers 67 49 116Contract 90 289
Sub-Total 139 4Ü5
2. Higher Education:
Fourah Bay College 35 5 40Njala University College 12 5 17Teachers Colleges 22 10
4 #Sub-Total 69 20
Grand Total ___3_35.. 159 485
Source: Collected from the Planning Division of the
Ministry of Education, Freetown, 1978.
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These pockets of expatriates employment in various 
sectors of the public service, either as volunteers, 
contract employees, or as technical assistants, became a 
characteristic feature in the new independent African 
states. It reflects the inadequacy of the education system 
developed during the colonial period, notwithstanding its 
expansion and improvement in the early years of indepen­
dence. With the primary objective of replacing the colonial 
administrator,^^ the reliance on foreign skills for certain 
categories of employment will continue for some time to 
come, because even if a condition exists where a country is 
capable of meeting its own manpower requirements, it is 
highly unlikely that it will attain a 100 per cent indigen- 
isation, except perhaps within the countries of the Iron 
Curtain. There is always the need for foreign skills which 
are either not adequately produced or cannot possibly be 
produced locally to fill in the gaps in the manpower balance 
sheet.
In addition, in a developing economy like that of 
Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa, the continuance of a 
small expatriate element in both* the public and the private 
sectors has other advantages than that of bringing in new 
techniques and teaching them to national counterparts. 
Expatriates with the appropriate background can act as the 
carriers of new ideas in the administration and management 
of the public service that will permeate the whole organi­
zation. Employed on contract of limited duration, they
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bring flexibility into staff structure, enabling nationals 
to be trained overseas or their promotion deferred until 
their experience is fully rounded. These are important 
factors in an effective programme of Africanisation and 
staff development.
Like all other progress in the process of nation- 
building, Africanisation has had its setbacks in the state 
enterprises. In recent years in Sierra Leone, and perhaps 
in other African countries, there has been (regretfully) 
a policy of de-Africanisation adopted by the government.
The Road Transport Corporation, the Sierra Leone Electricity 
Corporation and the Sierra Leone Port Authority were 
established in 1964 as quasi-autonomous bodies. In 197i» 
the Road Transport Corporation became bankrupt owing to 
reported financial mismanagement by its 100 per cent African 
management. In the same year, the government dissolved its 
Board of Directors and dismissed its management. German 
experts were invited to study the financial viability of 
the corp)oration. The government acted on the report of the 
experts' study, appointed a new Board of Directors, and 
contracted the management of the corporation to a German 
management team, which comprised the general manager, works 
manager, financial controller and traffic manager.
The next candidate in the process of de-Africanisation 
was the Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation. This was 
formerly a government department under the Ministry of 
Works. It became a corporation in 1964 with a 100 per cent
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African management. But like the Road Transport 
Corporation, the management of the corporation became inept 
and was under constant pressure from its employees, the 
public and the press. The main allegations were of mis­
management of the corporation's affairs, corruption charges 
against the general manager and engineer-in-chief, constant 
power failures, undue delay in paying the work force, etc. 
The government responded to an appeal by the Electricity 
Workers Union to dismiss the management of the corporation. 
In 1972, the government dissolved the Board of Directors, 
sacked the entire management and again invited a German 
management team to take over the corporation. The German 
management team comprised as at l4 November 1978 the 
following: the general manager, financial controller,
chief engineer (generation), chief engineer (distribution), 
work shop superintendent, and the senior maintenance
engineer. This team has been in the country since 1973, it 
79was reported.'^
The third and most recent case in the government's 
response to de-Africanisation is that of the Sierra 
Leone Port Authority. In 1976, the Port's management 
became the subject of constant attack from the press for 
reckless financial mismanagement, corruption and fraudulent 
activities which resulted in the Port's losing port dues, 
etc. Following these allegations, the government appointed 
a committee of inquiry into the management of the Port 
Authority. In its report, the committee recommended, among
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Other things, the dissolution of the Board of Directors and 
the dismissal of the whole of the management team. The 
government accepted these recommendations and appointed a 
new board of directors, and the management of the ports 
was contracted to an international management team - 
Werportman International. At the time of the visit in 
November 1978, the management of the Ports Authority 
comprised the following*
Position Nationalitv
Chief Executive ExpatriateGeneral Manager It
Deputy General Manager II
Ports Security Manager It




5 Marine Officers II
Chief Marine Engineer II
5 Pilots II
Civil Engineer Sierra Leonean
Assistant Civil Engineer It
Secretary to the Board It
Source* Prepared by the Personnel Department of the 
Ports at the request of the writer.
However, it is important tô  note that Sierra Leone is
not unique in this retrograde policy of de-Africanisation of 
its state enterprises. In Nigeria, two cases of de- 
Africanisation of state enterprises were reported. In 1978 
the Federal Government contracted the management of the 
Nigerian Railway Corporation to an Indian management team -
Oqthe "Rail India Technical and Economic Services", and the
management of the Nigerian Airways to the Dutch airline -
K.L.M.
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The reasons for all these actions in Nigeria are not 
different from the Sierra Leone experiences cited in the 
three cases. They are all indicative of some degree of 
overt failures of Africanisation policy which would 
influence the progress of Africanisation in the private 
sector (Part II). The question arises whether these 
apparent failures in the management of the state enterprises 
were the result of putting "square pegs in round holes" 
because of such factors as political patronage, tribal 
connection or ethnic affinity. The next section will 
consider this.
2 .8 Tribalism and Africanisation.
In terms of numbers, the Africanisation of the public 
service in Sierra Leone has ceased to be a political issue 
since i960 as Table 2.1 shows. The number of expatriates 
in pensionable employment in the public service constituted
22.7 per cent of the total senior posts. They numbered 241 
against 652 Africans in senior service posts. However, in 
a multi-tribal society like Sierra Leone, the success and 
progress of Africanisation of the public service cannot be 
measured only in terms of the proportion of Sierra Leoneans 
to expatriates but also on the pattern of recruitment from 
the social and political groups within the country. A fear 
that pervades African politicians and Sierra Leoneans in 
particular is that Africanisation policy might develop to 
a pattern of recruitment, appointment.
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promotion and even transfers favouring nationals from 
certain provinces, districts, chiefdoms or linguistic- 
ethnic groups and disadvantaging others.
The replacement of expatriates with Africans in the 
public service in the post-colonial period raised the 
important question about the criteria used in appointing 
Africans to senior positions in the Civil Service. The 
answer to this question both affects and is affected by the 
course of political development. As a political variable, 
the composition of the Civil Service can reflect the efforts 
of a culturally or ethnically distinct group to establish 
and institutionalise its control over all aspects of 
society. In the absence of sufficient evidence, an index 
may be provided of egalitarianism in the political process 
or of the inability of any single group to attain a position 
of dominance. As an independent variable, the Civil 
Service can have an impact on the nature of political order 
in that civil servants perceive and act in the common 
interest that they have as civil servants. In other words, 
the authority, status and wealth that civil servants enjoy 
may form the basis for the formation of an important 
segment of a politically active socio-economic class.
The dimension of cleavage most critical to an under­
standing of post-colonial politics in Sierra Leone has been 
that which divides Sierra Leoneans according totheir 
ethnic-linguistic-regional identity. The possibility that 
any given ethno-regional group might achieve a position of
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dominance and then disadvantage others has been a matter 
of major concern in post-colonial politics of Sierra Leone. 
Although no systematic data has been collected on the exact 
nature of this apprehension among the various ethnic groups, 
the charges that the Sierra Leone Civil Service has been 
dominated by the Creoles, the Mendes or the Temnes, depend­
ing on which political party is in power, were made. When 
the Sierra Leone Peoples Party was in power, particularly 
during Sir Albert Margai's period of ascendency into power 
as Prime Minister between 1964 and 196?» it was often
charged that he gave all the key Civil Service posts to his 
82tribesmen. In October, 1965» an article appeared in the
opposition newspaper entitled "Tribalism in the Public
Service, Who is Encouraging It?". The article argued;
There are 15 tribes in Sierra Leone and
their interest must be balanced. But
look at the arrangement; the Prime 
Minister, Secretary to the Prime 
Minister, the Establishment Secretary, 
the Secretary for Recruitment and 
Training, and the Chairman Public 
Seiyice Commission all belong to one 
tribe - the Mendes.^
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The reactions of other ethnic or tribal groupings to 
such allegations were obvious. The Creoles, in particular, 
who by virtue of their educational supremacy over any single 
ethnic group, considered themselves the de facto , 
successors to the departing colonial expatriates, felt that 
their position was threatened. The Temnes, the second 
biggest tribe to the Mendes, felt that the latter were 
trying to dominate the employment in the public service.
This fear was made worse by two things: First, the posting
practices of the government whereby the Mende-speaking 
administrative officers were posted as district officers in 
the non-Mende tribal district of the Northern Province.
The second was the arrest and detention in February 196? of 
the Deputy Force Commander with four other officers (all 
Temnes) for an allegedly attempted coup to overthrow the 
government of Sir Albert Mar^i. Both the Tern es and
the Creoles formed an informal alliance under the political 
banner of the All Peoples Congress with Siaka Stevens as 
leader against the Sierra Leone Peoples Party which came to 
be regarded as a Mende party with Sir Albert Margai as 
leader. The following general elections on 1? March 196? 
were fought on these lines. The Sierra Leone Peoples Party 
lost the elections by 28 seats to 32 with six independent 
elected candidates. However, the Force Commander, a Mende 
by tribe, intervened and declared a Martial Law. Four days 
later he himself was removed by another Mende-dominated 
group of Army officers. Military rule of Sierra Leone
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continued for one year, then in April 1968, after a counter­
military coup, the All Peoples Congress with Mr. Siaka 
Stevens as Prime Minister, was restored in power.
The effect of this on the Civil Service employment, 
particularly the administrative service, was a reversal of 
order. The Creoles became the beneficiaries of the change 
in government. All the key posts which were previously 
held by Mendes passed into the hands of Creoles. The posts 
of Secretary to the Prime Minister (later President and head 
of the Civil Service), the Establishment Secretary, the 
Secretary to the Cabinet, Secretary Recruitment and Train­
ing, the Chairman, Public Service Commission, and the 
Financial Secretary all went to the Creoles,®*^ and nearly 
all the professional leadership with the exception of the 
Chief Agricultural Officer, were held by Creoles. The 
position up to 1973 is shown in Table 2.9 below.
TABLE 2.9 SENIOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS.
A. Permanent Secretaries and Equivalent by Province 
of Origin. (Professional heads.)
 Origin________ Jan. 1963 Jan. 1968 Sept. 1973
Foreign 7 0 0
Western Area 7 6 l6
Northern Province 0 3 1
Eastern Province 1 1 4
Southern Province 0 0 1
TOTAL 15 10 22
The list includes all permanent secretaries. Secretary to 
the Prime Minister or President, the Establishment Secretary, 
provincial secretaries, and Secretary to the Cabinet, with
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their equivalent under the N.R.C. For the purpose of this 
study, the figures for the Western Area represent the 
Creoles only unless otherwise stated, notwithstanding the 
fact that there are non-Creole residents in the Western 
Area towns. But most of them being from the provinces, they 
are classified by their province of origin.
B. Senior Assistant Secretaries and Above by Province 
of Origin. (Adminstrative and professional heads.)
Foreign 9 2 0Western Area 17 24 37Northern Province 0 5 4Eastern Province 1 2 9Southern Province 1 4 8
TOTAL 28 37 58
This list includes all permanent secretaries, deputy 
secretaries, senior assistant secretaries and other officials 
of equivalent ranks.
Source: Taken from "Liberia and Sierra Leone: An Essay In
Comparative Politics.
The above table shows the regional distribution of 
senior civil service posts above the grade of assistant 
secretary in three respective dates - 1963i 1968 and 1973»
It is clear that in 1963i after the colonial expatriates, 
the Western Area had the highest number of posts in the 
upper segment of the Civil Service. From a position of 
parity with the colonial expatriates in 1963 (Table 2.9-A) 
to a position of leadership in 1968 and 1973 holding 24 out 
of 37 and 37 out of 58 respectively, of all posts of
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permanent secretaries and above. What the table does not 
tell is the exact nature of tribal and ethnic allocation of 
the posts. But from both a geographical and administrative 
distribution of the population of Sierra Leone point of 
view, it is deemed that the Creoles in terms of job alloca­
tions represent the Western Area; the Mendes, Southern and
part of the Eastern Provinces; the Temn'es, the Northern
89Province. In this view the claims that the Mendes were 
dominating the Civil Service of Sierra Leone is not supported 
by evidence shown in the table, except perhaps that the 
table does not show positions in the intervening years 
between 1963 and 1968. However, from the table, both the 
Eastern and the Southern Provinces, the home of the Mendes, 
were under-represented in all categories of civil service 
posts, each holding 1 out of 28 in 1963, 2 and 4 out of 37 
in 1968, and 9 and 8 out of 58 posts in 1973- The Northern 
Province, the home of the Tbmnes and the Limbas, etc. seemed 
to have done well during the military rule in 1968. They 
held 5 out of 37 posts and relapsed in 1973 holding 4 out 
of 58 posts when the party of the North was in power. The 
Northerners, especially the Temnes, felt that the government 
had let them down. The Mendes exploited these feelings and 
sought the alliance of the young educated and dissatisfied 
Temnes against the Creoles' domination of the Civil Service 
posts. The Creoles were aware of it, but their ability to 
communicate easily and manipulate situations through their 
exclusive Freemasonry Lodges, in which they succeeded in
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recruiting as members the President and some key members 
of his cabinet, remained as the dominant group in all public 
service posts until 1977 when the opportunity for the 
provincial people to strike came in the 1977 May General 
Elections.
In Sierra Leone, it seems to be that general elections 
are always followed by an unforeseen change in the composi­
tion of the Civil Service, especially the administrative 
posts. The most vulnerable posts are those of the Secretary 
to the President, the Establishment Secretary, Recruitment 
and Training Secretary and Financial Secretary. The first 
three went to the Temnes. The Mendes formed the core of 
provincial administration. The Creoles once again felt 
threatened in what they considered to be their last strong­
hold in the country - the Civil Service - by this new spirit 
of provincialism. In the early 1950s, they lost their 
political powers to the Protectorate people, in the commer­
cial life of the country they lost their early leadership 
to the Lebanese, and now the Indians and perhaps the 
Provincial people. The Creoles are not farmers. Moreover, 
the land tenure system in Sierra Leone forbids the purchase 
of land outside the Western Area.^^ Their only means of 
livelihood is from paid employment. Their resentment of 
this provincial threat was reflected in an article written 
by an anonymous correspondent. Part of the article reads:
No country or government can successfully 
implement its plans without an efficient
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Civil Service. In Sierra Leone today, 
tribalism and not efficiency is the sine 
qua non in the Civil Service. A number of 
Creole civil servants of proven ability, 
efficiency and experience have been sent 
on enforced leave prior to premature retire­
ment and replaced by Provincials of inferior 
qualifications, experience and ability. It 
is any wonder that Sierra Leone suffers 
from a continuous brain drain.
This article raises two important points which need to 
be examined on the basis of available evidence before 
considering the official and individual responses it aroused 
First, the question of enforced leave prior to premature 
retirement. In Sierra Leone, the public service regulations 
contained in the General Order (G.O.) requires and entitles 
every employee of the public service to an annual leave.
The length of the leave varied from 14 days to 35 days 
depending on the grade of the individual in the service.
But for some reasons top civil servants do not always wish 
to go on leave year after year. The usual explanation is 
the pressure of work. This is true of both the adminis­
trative and the professional sectors of the Civil Service. 
This might be convenient from an administrative viewpoint. 
But from a manpower development point of view, it could 
mean, by implication, to deny the subordinates the opportu­
nity to gain experience by acting as heads of departments or
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permanent secretaries while the substantive head is on 
leave. For example, in December of 1978, in the adminis­
trative service, there were 8 officers above the rank of
deputy secretary who were asked to go on accumulated leave
92ranging from six months to 11 months.^ This means these 
officers had not been on leave for the past 5 to 10 years. 
From the names of officers listed, it seems to be that all 
of them were Creoles from the Western Area. As regards the 
question of premature retirement, in Sierra Leone a public 
service employee has the option to ask for retirement at the 
age of 40, by medical recommendation at any age, or the 
government's retiring age of 55 years. The oldest among 
the eight officers who were on leave was b o m  in 1925, the 
next in 1927, 1928, 1930 and 1932.
The second point raised by the correspondent was the 
qualification and experience of the provincial people as 
compared to their Creole counterparts. In the first place, 
since independence, in the administrative service, academic 
qualification has never been the main criterion for pro­
motion to the upper echelon of the service^ Of the first 
four African heads of the Civil Service (secretaries to the 
Prime Minister or President) before 1978, only one had a
University degree (M.A.), and he was a Mende; the rest inclu-
93ding two Creoles were without degrees.^ The present incum­
bent is also without a university degree. For the post of 
Establishment Secretary, four Africans have held the post 
since independence - three provincials (two Mendes and one
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Temne) and one Western Area (Creole). Of these four, only 
the Creole was without a university degree. Similarly, for 
the post of Financial Secretary, four Sierra Leoneans have 
held the post, two provincials and two Creoles. All but 
one held university degrees in economics and that one was a 
Creole.
Finally, it is important to note that in the past, in 
most cases, when tribal domination was charged, the accusa­
tion is that a certain ethno-regional group receives 
preferential treatment when appointments and promotions are 
made. The evidence given to support such claims is that the 
proportion of people in a given position who are from the 
allegedly favoured group is higher than the proportion of 
the total population that group represents. For instance, 
the Creoles represent 1.9 per cent of the population but 
hold 57 per cent of the top posts (see Table 2.10 below).
The accusation does not always carry with it a charge, as 
the above article did, that unqualified people are in 
certain posts and that qualified persons from less favoured 
ethno-regional groups are available to fill these posts. 
Tribalism can mean that when other factors are equal members 
of one ethnic group are consistently treated better than 
those from others. It is also important to remember that 
it is an ethno-regional group's percentage of the total 
population which is important in calculating the represen­
tative nature of the Civil Service. Ethnic break-downs of 
qualified personnel available, applicants for civil jobs,
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school leavers, graduates or some other groupings more 
relevant than the total population are not used by those 
alleging the existence of tribalism.
However, both individual and official responses to the 
above article chose to follow the former - ethnic distribu­
tion. The first response came from a former Financial . 
Secretary now living in Maryland, U.S.A. In his reply to 
the above allegation of tribalism in the Civil Service, the 
former Financial Secretary cited a similar allegation in the 
past when the Sierra Leone Peoples Party government was 
accused of "Menderization" of the Civil Service. This 
accusation, he said, became the subject of Parliamentary 
debate and it was led by no less a person than the late
I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson - one of the pioneers of nationalism 
in West Africa. . And the former Financial Secretary went on 
to give a detail of the former late Prime Minister (Sir 
Milton Margai) as head of the Civil Service, that contrary 
to the allegation, the statistics proved abundantly clear 
that the S.L.P.P. appointed Creoles as the first Africans 
to these posts: Governor-General, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Chief Justice, President of the Appeal 
Court, Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Director of 
Public Works, Director of Education, Commissioner of Police, 
Engineer-in-Chief of the Electricity Department, etc. "Over 
75 per cent of permanent secretaries and directors of 
departments (Civil Service) and corporations were Creoles," 
the letter added. "And yet, the S.L.P.P. was accused of
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Menderization of the Civil Service. This time, the All 
Peoples Congress Government is accused of victimisation of 
the Creoles," ended the letter.
The next response to the allegation of tribalism in 
the public service of Sierra Leone came from the government 
- the State House. It came in the form of a release from 
the State House and it reads as follows:
In view of many anonymous letters addressed 
to the President, Dr. Siaka Stevens, and 
published in foieign journals alleging that 
promotions and appointments in the Civil 
Service are made on tribal and ethnic con­
siderations rather than merit and ability, 
a list of top administrative and professional 
posts in the Civil Service has been released
by the President's Office.^
The list revealed that Creoles dominate top administrative
and professional posts with 52 officers, followed by the
Mendes with 21 and the Temnes with 11. The release from
the State House also indicated that Konos, Sherbroes, Susus
and Fullahs shared six top posts.^ One week later, the
list was published with the following addenda:
the State House Release has catalogued the
list of top administrative and professional
posts in the Civil Service to "disprove"
allegations that appointments and promotions
in the Civil Service were being made on
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ethnic and tribal considerations rather than 
on merits and ability.
TABLE 2.10 TRIBAL BREAKDOWN OF SENIOR EMPLOYMENTS IN THE
Tribe/Ethnic
PUBLIC SERVICE AS AT 10/9/79. 
Number % Admin. Prof. Total %Total
Mendes 672,831 30 .9 16 5 21 23.07Temnes 648,931 29.8 10 1 11 12.08
Limbas 183,496 8.4 - - - —
Konos 104,573 4.8 2 - 2 2.19Korankos 80,732 3 .7 — — — —Sherbro/Bullin 74,674 3 .4 1 - 1 1.09Susus 67,288 3 .1 1 - 1 1.09Fullahs 66,824 3 .1 - 1 1 1.09Lokos 64,459 3 .0 - - - —Mandigos 51,074 2 .3 - - - —Kissis 48,954 2.2 - - —Creoles 41,783 1 .9 27 25 52 57.14Jellimkas 15,005 0 .7 - - - —
TOTAL 3,000,000 100.0 58 33 91 100.00
Sources: Population figures are taken from the 1974 census.
and the top posts from the State House list. 1979.
From Table 2.10 above, it can clearly be seen that the 
Creoles are most preponderant in the top administrative and 
professional posts, holding 57»l4 per cent of the posts, 
followed by the Mendes and the Temnes with 23 and 12 per 
cent each respectively. If appointments and promotion to 
such posts are to be made on a quota basis, reflecting the 
numerical strength of each tribe, the Creoles should have 
held only 1.9 per cent of the 91 top posts. But, on the 
contrary, this was not the philosophy of Africanisation 
policy. It may be recalled that the Public Service Commis­
sion Instructions to all heads of departments stated inter 
alia that:
—i6y
In making recommendations for promotions 
of persons in the public service, the Public 
Service Commission shall be guided by the 
principles of merit and ability, as well as 
seniority and experience and official
Q 8qualifications.^
It is not the intention of the writer to argue the 
case for the government, nor to enter into the debate of 
the post-colonial scramble for the spoils of the employment 
in the public service beyond the academic requirement of 
this study. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that 
neither the former Financial Secretary's recollection nor 
the Release from the State House had refuted the allegation 
of the correspondent. The contention of the correspondent 
was that in Sierra Leone in 1979, "Provincial people with 
inferior qualifications and experience and ability are pro­
moted in preference to the Creoles with proven ability . . ." 
Since ability and merit are criteria that cannot easily be 
assessed and determined without some elements of subjecti­
vity, what the State House could have done in addition to 
the list of top posts, was to add the qualifications and 
years of experience of all officers concerned as an alter­
native. That would, in fact, have shown whether some of the 
Creoles in both sectors of the public service were not 
appointed on the same ethnic ticket which they now condemned. 
Or, since the accusation was about recent appointments and 
promotions, the State House should have prepared a list of
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the candidates for the said appointments and promotions 
with their qualifications and years of experience, as the 
second alternative; thus demonstrating the allegation as 
unfounded.
The impact of tribal affiliation as a possible factor 
in appointing and promoting personnel in the public service 
can be felt on a horizontal as well as a vertical dimension. 
That is, certain ministries and departments may appear to be 
the preserve of a certain ethno-regional group. The 
evidence and the "folklore" indicate that such a phenomenon 
exists in Sierra Leone. Since independence, the Judiciary 
and the Law Officers Departments have been and still are 
predominantly Creole strongholds. Before 1977, the 
Establishment Secretary’s office was also dominated by 
Creoles - the Establishment Secretary was a Creole, his 
two deputies were Creoles, and even the two senior 
Establishment Officers were all C r e o l e s . I n  the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry, it is the Mendes that are 
predominant. For the past ten years, successive Chief 
Agricultural Officers have all been Mendes, the Chief 
Forest Conservator is also a Mende.
It may, of course, be accidental that when the bulk of 
the most significant and visible positions in a single 
ministry/department, or the government as a whole are filled 
by the members of one ethnic group. The motive of an 
individual seeking transfer to a ministry or department 
where members of his ethno-regional group are in the 
majority may be related to the type of work done in that
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ministry or to personalities. These motives may have no 
relevance to tribal considerations.
Ethno-regional predominance in the Sierra Leone public 
service as a whole or in part is not so overwhelming as to 
rule out the possibility of merit and ability being the 
actual operating criteria for recruitment and promotion.
With regard to tribal differences in academic achievement, 
there is no sound evidence to support the view that members 
of one ethnic group are inherently more apt in either 
academic or mechanical skills than any other. University 
examination results do not show that one ethnic group 
produces better scientists, whilst another provides more 
brilliant arts graduates. Any irregularities in the distri­
bution of talent can usually be attributed to the different 
quality of secondary schools and to the vagaries of the 
selection processes. On the other hand, some parts of the 
country, in general the Western Area, have enjoyed Western 
education for a much longer period than others; and the 
tendency has been for this part to maintain their earlier 
advantages so that at the present time they produce more
secondary school and university-educated persons in propor-
101tion to heir total population. They even appear to
102dominate certain fields of employment.
2.9 Discipline
A dysfunctional by-product of Africanisation and 
tribalism is the decline in discipline in the Civil Service. 
This is often expressed by the older generation of civil 
servants. This may simply be nostalgia on their part. 
However, an indicator of the degree to which institutional­
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isation or organisational integrity exists in the Sierra 
Leone public service is the extent to which personnel 
conform with the "rules of the game" as set forth in the 
normal rules and regulations governing their ethical 
b e h a v i o u r . T h e s e  rules and regulations are basic and 
general, and they apply to all civil servants regardless of 
their particular assignment in the public service. To some 
extent then, the existence or non-existence of discipline 
is a measure of the most elementary institutionalisation of 
rules and norms in a civil service. The rules and regula­
tions of the Sierra Leone Civil Service are common to those 
found in Ghana and Nigerian public s e r v i c e s . T h e y  cover 
a range of behaviour from reporting for duty on time to 
abstaining from committing an act of treason against the 
state.
Complaints of indiscipline in the Sierra Leone public 
service were made by just about all civil servants and 
politicians who were interviewed during the study tour in 
Sierra Leone. The cry often expressed by the older civil 
servants is the return to the "Colonial days when discipline 
was the order of the day." To find Out how widely held such 
views were, a decision to interview at random some retired 
senior civil servants, present civil servants who were in 
the service before independence, and some who entered the 
Civil Service after independence who, in fact, constitute 
the majority of active civil servants, was made by the 
researcher. A total of 45 were interviewed.
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When asked if they believed that there was more lack 
of discipline in the Civil Service since independence than 
before, 59.8 per cent of the respondents replied affirma­
tively. The breakdown of those providing this answer is 
interesting. 77*5 per cent of those who had been in the 
Civil Service before independence and presumably were in the 
best position to answer the question believed that there had 
been an increase in indiscipline, whereas only 31»5 per cent 
of those who joined the Civil Service after independence 
felt this way. To put it another way, 75*6 per cent of 
those who agreed that there had been an increase in lack of 
discipline became members of the public service prior to 
independence. When asked what they considered to be acts of 
indiscipline in the Civil Service, their answers varied from 
reporting to work late to total non-observance of the Civil 
Service Code of Conduct. For example, the Civil Service 
Code of Conduct normally lays down rules of conduct in 
respect of the following matters: obligation to discharge
duties assigned, absence from duty or from the country, 
insubordination, engagement in trade, private business and 
private employment, financial interest in local business, 
pecuniary embarrassment, private agency, receipt of valuable 
presents, official secrets, custody and disbursement of 
public funds, etc. None of these the respondents noted is 
observed nowadays, particularly acts of insubordination, 
absence from work without permission, refusal to go on 
transfer to other parts of the country, receipt of valuable
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presents, are the most blatantly violated rules of conduct 
in the public service. All the respondents were unanimous 
in identifying them.^^^
When asked further what they considered to be the main 
causes for such breakdown in discipline in the public 
service, their answers varied from politics, tribalism, 
nepotism, to corruption in high places, etc. Seventy-five 
per cent of the respondents attributed the lack of disci­
pline in the public service to politics and corruption.
The rest attributed it to tribalism and nepotism.
As one can imagine, although the complaints of
indiscipline in the Civil Service are readily apparent, it
is difficult to collect data measuring what the incidence
of indiscipline actually is. The Public Service Commission
is charged with the responsibility to enforce Civil Service
regulations and with the processing of formal reports of
civil servants who have violated some of these rules.
Table 2.11 below presents a summary of the disciplinary
actions taken by the Public Service Commission.
TABLE 2.11 NUMBER OF DISCIPLINARY CASES 1971-74.
Action Taken
Dismissals 51 56 70 75Terminations 5 4 1 9Stoppage of Increment - - - -
Probation period extended 2 7 14 16Reduction in rank 2 1 4 4Reprimands - - 1 4Increment withheld - 2 4 1
Suspension - - 1 1
TOTALS 60 70 94 110
Source: Annual Report of the Public Service Commission.
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From the data presented in Table 2.11 one could conclude 
that indiscipline in the public service was on the increase. 
In a four year period (1971-1974), the number of discipli­
nary measures taken by the Public Service Commission had 
nearly doubled - from 60 in 1971 to 110 in 1974. Of course, 
it could mean that the P.S.C. was tightening up standards 
rather than a change in behaviour. But since the P.S.C. 
only acted on cases reported to it by various heads of 
departments through the Establishment Secretary's office; 
it also means that there could have been more cases of 
indiscipline but not sanctioned by the P.S.C. or reported 
to the P.S.C.
A major difficulty already indicated is the charge by 
senior civil servants that junior officers who are sanctioned 
can have their punishment nullified by obtaining the support 
of government ministers, more so when the country is now 
under a one party state system of government. All the 
people interviewed had indicated that they had actually 
experienced political intervention in disciplinary matters. 
The fear that party officials can and will prevent individual 
civil servants, particularly party activists, being 
sanctioned and may even put those initiating disciplinary 
action in disfavour with the government by branding them as 
anti-A.P.C. government or an enemies of the state, is great 
and this could cause them not to discipline.
However, the President, Dr. Siaka Stevens, was not 
unaware of the state of indiscipline in the Civil Service,
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and the difficulties senior officers were facing in their 
endeavour to maintain discipline. In an address to a 
delegation of senior civil servants in the State House, the 
President admitted that the Civil Service had been going 
through a very difficult period in which the new and 
undisciplined had wished to take advantage of the political 
climate engendered by independence and subsequently the 
introduction of the one-party state; but the President went 
on, he could not accept this as a valid excuse for senior 
officers to lie down and relinquish their responsibilities 
to enforce legitimate discipline. He ended by saying:
"I would frankly like to see some officers 
with the courage of their convictions confront 
these people who want to get away with indis­
cipline because only such confrontation will 
prove whether or not my government condones 
indiscipline; such officers have my whole­
hearted support.
Political interferance, and to a lesser extent the%
weakness of senior civil servants, is claimed as the root 
cause of indiscipline in the Civil Service. But like the 
interaction theory of leadership, a good leader must also be 
a good follower.Similarly, in disciplinary terms, a 
good disciplinarian must himself be disciplined. To find 
out the truth of this in the Sierra Leone Civil Service, a 
representative sample of junior civil servants, 50 in all, 
were i n t e r v i e w e d . W h e n asked about the state of 
discipline in the Civil
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Service, they all accepted that as compared to the colonial 
period, discipline has considerably declined. But they 
attributed this mainly to the lack of discipline among 
senior officers who succeeded the "Whiteman". One respon­
dent went further to say, "We are often reminded of the 
discipline in the colonial days. We accept the fact that 
there was strict discipline in the colonial days, but the 
colonial expatriate was a disciplined man; a fair man. He 
recommended his junior officers for promotion without being 
bribed. But today, in order to be considered for promotion, 
you have to bribe and even with that you are not sure that 
you will be considered. How can we be disciplined?" he 
asked. "If I have to force my promotion through the help 
of a politician, I would have no choice but to seek the help 
of that politician," he ended.
Another respondent retorted: "How can these so-called
senior civil servants maintain discipline when they them­
selves are not disciplined? They come to work late - 10 
o'clock instead of 8.30 - leave offices before 12 o'clock 
for lunch and will not come back until 2 o'clock, ready to 
break off at 3*45 p.m." He ended by saying that the Code of 
Conduct in the Civil Service does not draw a distinction 
between junior and senior civil servants when it comes to 
its observations. One staff superintendent intimated that 
the senior officers made it very difficult for him to main­
tain discipline in the ministry. He said, "How can I main­
tain discipline, particularly among our female personnel.
—176—
when they return late after lunch and I ask them to explain, 
they will say, I went to lunch with the Minister, the 
deputy Minister, the "Perm. Sec.", the deputy Secretary, 
etc. and at the end of the day, they turn around and blame 
us for not maintaining discipline in the Ministry," he 
ended. And finally, two old messengers who claimed to have 
worked under, five different Provincial Commissioners during 
the last 15 years of the colonial rule each said: "My son,
I have worked under Commissioner Fenton, Commissioner 
MeRobert, and Commissioner Beatie, none of them has insulted 
me; but these small boys "bom yesterday" have no respect 
for old people like us." He ended by adding that the 
Whiteman had left gaps in the country. The second, who 
claimed to have been to Burma, simply said: "The White
Master knew no tribe. If you worked very hard, you will be 
rewarded; but now, it is not hard work that counts but who 
knows you," he ended. And finally, a Higher Executive 
Officer in the Ministry in answering the same question of 
discipline has this to say: "Discipline cannot be main­
tained where people are not equally treated for what they 
are. Here is a case in point. Two of us were employed as 
Executive Officers-In-Training three years ago. We 
finished our training period which coincided with our three 
year probationary period. When both of us were promoted as 
Executive Officers, we were put on Scale CE2-4. They 
started my colleague at a higher point on the scale. When 
I protested to the Establishment Secretary, I was told that
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I had no right to question discretion of the Establishment 
Secretary. Technically, my colleague is senior to me now. 
Tell me, brother, how can you maintain discipline under this 
iniquitous situation?" he asked. "The problem is, in Sierra 
Leone today, as the saying goes - it is not what you know 
but who you know that is the order of the day." Such are 
the views expressed by the two sides of the public service - 
senior and junior members of the Sierra Leone Civil Service. 
The senior civil servants claimed that the lack of discipline 
in the public service was due to political interference in 
their endeavour to enforce disciplinary measures. They were 
constrained to do so because of political intervention. On 
the other hand, the junior civil servants interviewed claimed 
that political intervention per se in the administration of 
disciplinary measures is not wholly responsible for the 
decline in discipline in the public service. There are 
other factors, such as corruption, nepotism, tribalism and 
the lack of self-discipline among senior civil servants 
themselves, which the junior civil servants considered to 
be largely responsible for the decline in discipline in the 
Civil Service.
One thing that is clear from the debate on the decline 
of discipline in the public service. Both sides of the 
service accepted the existence of the state of indiscipline 
in the public service of Sierra Leone, since independence.
On what causes the existence of such a state, they disagreed. 
However, like many other problems of such a nature in post-
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colonial Africa, any failure to tackle such problems is 
always attributed to "our ex-colonial masters." The failure 
to maintain discipline in the post-colonial public service 
of Sierra Leone is often attributed to the pre-independent 
policy of Africanisation which had resulted in the promotion 
of Africans to senior positions for which they neither had 
the academic qualifications nor the training and experience 
which such positions required, notwithstanding the 
Nationalist pressures for Africanisation of the public 
service (see Chapter 2.3 above).
2.10 Summary and Conclusion.
In the proceeding chapter attempts have been made to 
discuss the various aspects of the Africanisation of the 
public service of Sierra Leone with references to other 
African states. First, a working definition of the term 
Africanisation was provided (Chapter 2.1). It implies the 
process of replacing expatriate civil servants by nationals. 
This interpretation was emphasized in the early years of 
independence when European colonial officers occupied most 
upper-level civil service posts. However, it soon became 
apparent that mere replacement of whites with black faces 
would not necessarily transform the public service into an 
African one. A second and more encompassing definition 
evolved. According to this. Africanisation was contrived 
as a process of transforming a colonial type civil service 
into a national one. In addition to changes in citizenship
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and perhaps the race of personnel, the process was also 
envisaged to include training and development of this 
personnel, structural changes of the public service, and a 
change in the spirit of service in accordance with the 
policies of new government.
Second, the motivation and justification for the 
Africanisation of the public service was discussed (see 
Chapter 2.2 above). Politically, the attainment of 
independence would have to be matched with an African 
administration for reasons of nationalistic honour, pride 
and legitimacy. The struggle against colonial rule was in 
a sense an expression of the desire of the people to manage 
their own affairs. It was also in part an expression of the 
desire to build a more responsible or honourable public 
service to the wider national constituency in contrast to 
the narrow cover of the colonial civil service.
Equally discussed was the economic aspect of Africani­
sation. Expatriate manpower consisting of old colonial 
expatriates commanded high salaries. Even when they 
possessed similar educational qualifications with nationals, 
expatriate personnel received invariably higher salaries, 
and the gap between the two groups widened further by 
several inducements including transport costs, child 
allowances, ample loan facilities, highly subsidised housing 
and contract remuneration available to the latter group. In 
addition, expatriate salaries were a considerable drain on 
the country's foreign exchange reserves. The presence of
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expatriate personnel was also discussed as a cost-push 
factor in that Africans with comparable qualifications 
demand for equal salaries and fringe benefits (see Chapter 
2.2 above).
Closely related to political and economic concerns 
considered were the socio-cultural ones. The colonial 
civil servant stood aloof from the society he served.
He came from an alien culture and often with racial 
prejudices. At independence there was a natural desire to 
make the civil servant more aware of the socio-cultural 
setting of the country. African officials could be expected 
to be in tune with local psychology and attitudes of the 
people as a whole. And finally, there was the issue of 
national security. Some sensitive departments, including 
the police, the army, foreign affairs and intelligence units 
needed loyal and nationalistic personnel. It became 
increasingly difficult to confide official business to 
foreign officials whose parent countries might have rival 
interests. In these departments and units. Africanisation 
became a matter of national security (see Chapter 2.2).
The pressure for Africanisation of the public service 
was the culmination of the motivational forces summarised 
above. It was induced by the employment policies of the 
colonial government which excluded educated Africans to 
high-level employment in the public service, particularly 
in the administrative service. Two pressures were identi­
fied. The first came from above and the second from below 
(see Chapter 2.3 above).
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In discussing the process of Africanisation, three 
stages or periods were distinguished. The first stage was 
the pre-independent stage. In this, appointments and pro­
motions in the senior service were based purely on merit,
110seniority, ability and qualifications. This period
lasted up to 1964. Also included in this period was the 
practice of contract employment of overseas officers (see 
Table 2.1). The second period, the post-independence 
period, started with the ascendency of Sir Albert Margai 
as Prime Minister after the death of his elder brother.
Sir Milton Margai in 1964. It was during this period that 
the Africanisation of the public service started to degen­
erate into tribal and ethno-regional policy. The period 
from 1964 to 1977 can, in retrospect, be regarded as the 
country's worst period in terms of tribal and ethno- 
regional politics, bitterness, rivalries in employment (see 
Chapter 1.2, pp. 6-18). National issues were blurred by 
these negative social forces, and appointments and pro­
motions in the public service and state enterprises were 
judged in terms of tribal and ethnic labels rather than the 
qualifications and the ability of the individual. The 
third phase of Africanisation of the public service took 
place between 1977 and 1978. The politicalisation of the 
administrative service occurred. In this period, appointments 
and promotions to certain positions in the public service,
particularly the top echelons of the administrative, largely
111depended on membership of the "recognized party". It was
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hoped that the politicalisation of the public sector 
employment would guarantee equal treatment to all people 
regardless of tribe, origin, and ethnic identity. But this 
does not seem to be the case. As late as 1979, allegations 
that people "with inferior qualifications and work experi­
ence" of provincial origin were being promoted and appointed 
to positions of greater responsibilities in preference to 
people of "proven ability and superior qualifications" 
were still made.
Africanisation of the public service is thus multi­
faceted. Choice must be made in the face of conflicting 
demands for the rapid replacement of expatriates in the 
public service auid for providing the manpower (Part III) 
needed for rapid economic development in the country. Part 
of the legacy of colonial rule for Sierra Leone was the 
shortage of skilled and experienced citizens to staff the 
public service that aims to play a vital role in promoting 
economic development. In response to these demands to 
establish an independent identity and to develop the 
economy, the Sierra Leone government had placed its citizens 
in the most visible administrative posts while at the same 
time relying on external sources for technical and pro­
fessional personnel.
In the process of Africanisation of the public service, 
successive governments have failed to convince the people 
that all Sierra Leoneans with the necessary qualifications 
have equal career prospects in the public service regardless
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of ethno-regional identity. While the Civil Service is 
considered to be not the preserve of any ethno-tribal group 
in Sierra Leone, there is evidence which at least partially 
supports the charges of those who perceive prejudice in 
appointments and promotions (see Table 2.10).
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INTRQDUCTIQN
The last two chapters in Part I were concerned with the 
Africanisation of the public service. Chapter one provided 
background information on the setting of the study, the 
employment policies of the Colonial Government and the size 
and level of expatriate employment in Colonial Africa, and 
Sierra Leone in particular; and Chapter Two looked at the 
motivation, the government policies and the progress of 
Africanisation of the public service and its related pro­
blems.
The next two chapters in Part II will consider the 
Africanisation of the private sector. In the order of 
precedence, the Africanisation of the private sector came 
second. It was based on the recognition by an increasing 
number of developing countries that political independence was 
meaningless unless accompanied by some measure of econo­
mic independence. But such economic independence could but 
be relative rather than absolute, because complete economic 
independence in a rapidly increasingly inter-dependent 
economy could be seriously contemplated by any government.
Since independence, there hgd. been two broad nation- 
building movements sweeping over Black Africa. The first was 
primarily political and aimed at replacing all the,colonial 
expatriate personnel by African nationals; it was an aspect 
of national sovereignty and self-determination. This was 
achieved by the majority of African countries by the mid-
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1960s; in Sierra Leone the Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry on the Civil Service of Sierra Leone indicated that 
there were in 1970 only 73 expatriate personnel employed in 
selective government departments on contract terms.^ The 
second movement which was an essential- complement to the 
first, aimed at economic independence, had as its primary 
objective national control over the development and manage­
ment of the country's economic resources.
Almost inevitably, the movement for economic indepen­
dence could not commence until after the achievement of 
political independence and the Africanisation of the public 
service. In general, it was not until the second half of 
the 1960s that African countries developed systematic 
policies aimed at gaining effective control over their 
economic destinies. Among these policies, indigenisation 
of the private sector played, .a major role. The indigenisa­
tion of the private sector took., three formsi the first was 
concerned with ownership and aimed at giving the nationals of 
the country either individually or collectively an ownership 
stake in the economic establishments in their country. Such 
indigenisation of ownership could be accomplished either 
through public or private ownership or through a combination 
of the two.- Indigenisation of public ownership could be 
brought about by the government either through total or 
partial nationalisation of enterprise , i.e. the acquisition 
of all the assets of enterprises or purchase of some of the 
shares of enterprises. Control of the diamond mining company was by
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a wholly British owned company before 1970 when it was 
acquired by the Sierra Leone Government with 51 per cent 
controlling shares and changed its name from Sierra Leone 
Selection Trust to the National Diamond Mining Company 
(NDMC). In the second case, indigenisation by private 
ownership, this could be achieved by government legislation, 
eg. the commercial and industrial activities of non­
nationals might be restricted.In Ghana, the Ghanaian 
Business Promotion Act, No. 334, which became effective on 
August 1970 had not only reserved certain sectors of the 
economy for its nationals, but also stipulated which 
categories of enterprises were exclusively reserved for 
them.^ In Nigeria, the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion 
Decrees, February 1972 and 1977, both sought to promote indigenisa­
tion by reserving certain industries exclusively for
Nigerian ownership and by limiting the role of foreign
4enterprises in others. In Sierra Leone, the Non-Citizens 
(Restriction of Trade or Business) Act No. 30 of 19&5 
stipulated the areas of industrial and commercial activities 
where non-nationals are not allowed to operate. For 
example, section 5(c) of the Act specified the following 
areas as indigenous reserves t the manufacture of 
concrete blocks for sale, the supply of granite, stone or 
sand, the provision of commercial transport by road, sea, 
or river whether for his own business or otherwise, etc.^
In the third case, the government exercises control over 
the activities of foreign enterprises by nominating
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nationals to sit on the Boards of Directors of foreign 
enterprises. Such nominees were intended to be watchdogs 
protecting the interest of the country. However, experience 
in Sierra Leone had shown that these Board members them­
selves became absorbed into the activities of these foreign 
enterprises as if they represented the interest of share­
holders of that enterprise and not the interest of their 
country which they deemed to represent. A case in point is 
that of the former Sierra Leone Development Company. This 
was a subsidiary of William Bairds group of companies based 
in Glasgow, which had mined iron ore in Sierra Leone since 
1935' On its Board there were two Sierra Leonean nationals. 
One was the Resident Director nominated by the Government 
(since 1964), and the other was nominated by the local 
authority of the Chiefdom where the mines were located.
Every year, these directors attended Board Meetings in the 
United Kingdom where important policies affecting the 
company were discussed and formulated. In 1975» without 
giving due notice to the Sierra Leone Government, the com­
pany went into voluntary liquidation on the grounds that the 
mines were not making profit.^ The Government became panic- 
stricken and rushed legislation in the Parliament with 
retroactive powers in order to protect the interest of 
local creditors and the employees of the company. The 
question is, did the local director have any advance know­
ledge of this closure? If they had, why did they not 
inform the government which nominated them to represent the
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interest of the country. The evidence available suggests 
that they knew. It was no wonder that a Paramount Chief 
Member of Parliament from the area, during the debate on 
that legislation, advocated the immediate arrest and 
imprisonment of the two directors for a betrayal of the 
trust reposed upon them by the country.^
Thirdly,.there was manpower indigenisation, otherwise 
known as Africanisation or localisation. This was the first 
form of indigenisation policy discussed in Part I, the Public 
Service. As far as the private sector was concerned, it 
aimed at developing indigenous competence in modern indus­
trial and commercial operations and management. Experience 
in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Black Africa has demon­
strated that without a strong government intervention to try 
to reconcile the interest of foreign private investment with 
national goals and aspirations, the economy could continue to 
grow and expand without any visible sign of development 
among its people.^ It was in this light that indigenous 
participation in the economic life of the nation ŵ .s seen as 
essential for the acquisition of skills and experience 
needed to run the economy. As Professor W. Arthur Lewis 
rightly put it:
If no one will employ the local people above 
the level of clerks, they cannot learn how 
to manage industrial businesses for them­
selves, their economic affairs will then always 
be dominated by foreigners and economic growth
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will be retarded by the costs and shortages 
involved in dependence upon foreign enterprises.
This is one reason why most countries as soon 
as they become independent pass legislation 
or take other steps to compel foreign firms 
to open up managerial positions to local 
people.
In Sierra Leone, the Africanisation of the private sector
became a national policy in 1952 (see 4.4(1)). With the rapid
post-war increase in economic activities throughout the
country, it was thought necessary that opportunities created
by such development should be made available to increasing
numbers of Sierra Leoneans to participate in the ownership,
control, and management of the economic resources of the
nation. These categories of indigenisation are by no means
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, a country could at a
particular stage in its development pursue one or the other
of the types of indigenisation or a combination of two or
more. This section of the study is concerned with the last
11two - control and manpower indigenisation. Its main 
objectives are to review Sierra Leonean Africanisation 
policy of the private sector since independence and examine 
the progress made during the period.
Since the employment practices and procedures are the 
vehicles through which Africans can and do get recruited 
into the employment of expatriate firms in the private 
sector of the economy, these practices and procedures are
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inevitably interlaced with the government policy of 
Africanisation. Indeed, this is the vehicle through which 
Sierra Leonean nationals can enter the managerial, profes­
sional and technical grades in the private sector. It is 
therefore necessary to examine first the employment policies 
of expatriate firms in Sierra Leone. Chapter three looks at 
this.
The data used for the statistical analysis in this chap­
ter were derived mainly from the Sierra Leone Central 
Statistics Office, industrial surveys, the annual returns of 
private sector employers to the Income Tax Department, 
Ministry of Labour, and by personal visit to individual 
employers, etc. Although the C.S.O. surveys constitute the 
most authentic and comprehensive sources of information on 
the Sierra Leone industrial sector, they are marked by 
imperfections. The most serious of the defects, as far as 
the present analysis is concerned, is that the surveys cover 
only establishments with six or more employees. Establish­
ments with fewer than six employees, which are quite numerous 
and are estimated to account for at least as much employment
as the larger establishments, can thus not be brought
12directly into our analysis. -
There is, however, nothing magical or special about the
number six. One could as easily take 10, 15» 20 or 40 as
the number of employees forming the dividing line between
12^small- and large-scale establishments. If any consistent 
pattern is found to exist between the size of establishment
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and the level of wages using establishments with six or more 
employees as the dividing line, a plausible inference can 
then be drawn about such differentials as between expatriates 
and their African counterparts employed in particular. 
Moreover, because the number of family businesses employing 
less than six people is greater, we can deduce the nature of 
the bias with the omission of this group of enterprises.
Thus, despite the lack of relevant data for establishments 
with fewer than six employees, it is felt that reasonably 
reliable conclusions about the size of expatriate employment 
and the wages differentials between them and their African 
counterparts can still be drawn from the analysis.
Another defect of the surveys is the non-uniformity of 
their year to year coverage. While the number of industries 
included in the surveys has been rising over the years, the 
geographical coverage of all surveys was more concentrated 
in the Western Area with the provincial and district head­
quarters only. This limits the comparability of public and 
private sector wages structure to some extent and reduces 
its usefulness for time series analysis. The present 
chapter, however, is a basically cross-sectional one and 
hence no serious bias is expected to be imparted into the 
results by this imperfection.
—  201 —
CHAPTER 3. THE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES OF FOREIGN FIRMS.
3.1 Introduction.
During the last years of colonial rule and in the years 
immediately after independence, the picture of employment 
in the private sector of the economy of Sierra Leone showed 
a broad base of unskilled workers composed almost entirely 
of Africans, a middle section of technicians and other 
skilled workers composed mainly of Europeans and a sprink­
ling of Africans. There was then a small top group of 
managers and professional workers composed largely of Euro­
peans, Indians and Lebanese, depending on whether the enter­
prise was European, Lebanese or Indian controlled.
The Report of the Manpower Survey conducted by Robert 
Brown, in 1964, indicated that there were 1,221 expatriate 
personnel in the private sector of Sierra Leone, against 
2,666 Africans, the majority of whom were employed as clerks 
and in sub-professional categories (see Table 3» 1 below).
The occupational distribution of these employees (Table 3*1) 
also shows that the expatriates were most preponderant in 
the higher echelonè^s of the administrative, managerial, 
executive and selected workers groups - 125 Africans as 
against 291 expatriates. In the professional, technical 
and related workers, the Africans appeared to have a lead 
over the expatriates, 791 against 655» but if the top cream 
of this group is syphoned, the expatriates were most prepon­




EMPLOYED IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS AT 1964.
Exp.Classification Total Afr.
0 Professional, technical & related 1,446 791 655
1 Administrative and managerial 4l6 125 291
2 Clerical workers 1 f 546 1,390 156
3 Sales workers 300 228 724 Farmers & related workers 5 5 -
5 Miners & quarry workers Not included
6 Transport & comm, workers 162 118 44
7/8 Craftsmen & prodc. workers Not included
9 Service, sports, etc. workers 12 9 3
AllGroups TOTAL 3,887 2,666 1,221
Source: Occupational summary of Robert Brown Report on the
manpower situation in Sierra Leone, 1964.
TABLE ,3.1b TECHNICAL AND RELATED WORKERS.
Group Classification Total Afr. Exp.
0-01 Architects 5 1 4
0-0102 Civil Engineers 41 4 37
0-02 Electrical Engineers 15 5 10
0-02 Mechanical Engineers 31 1 30
0-02 Mining Engineers 54 3 510-274 Engineers (others) 30 3 270—2.8 Surgeons 41 9 32
All
Groups TOTAL 217 26 191
Source: Table III of the Brown Report, 1964.
In addition, the employment policy of private sector 
foreign employers created wages structure which differenti­
ated between their European employees and . their African 
counterparts. The average wage gap between the expatriate 
personnel and their African employees was tremendous (see 
Table 3.2 below). It was claimed to reflect the high
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inducement wage necessary to attract skilled labour from 
13abroad.
TABLE 3.2 ANNUAL AVERAGE SALARY AND WAGES OF PRIVATE
SECTOR EMPLOYEES IN SIERRA LEONE - 1954-1961.
Year
£ M £ M Average Annual Wage
Afri. Euro. Afri. Euro.
1954 24.73 £2.93 £36 £1,008.
1955 5 .59 3.26 39 1,067
1956 6 .56 3.80 41 1,145
1957 7 .22 4.22 45 1,181
1958 8.04 4.71 50 1,1921959 8 .56 4.87 54 1,242i960 8.67 4 .92 57 1,269
1961 . 8 .75 5.02 60 1,289
Source t Central Statistics Office, Freetown.
From the above table, the pace of increase in African 
earnings in the private sector, however, exceeded that for 
Europeans. Thus, total wages and salaries payment to 
Africans were some 185 per cent greater in 196I than in 
1954 and average earnings were approximately 167 per cent 
higher in the terminal than in the initial year. The 
corresponding index for their European counterparts 
registered 173 and 128 respectively. The extreme absolute 
difference between African and European average annual earn­
ings, however, showed up Sierra Leone's historical socio­
economic structure which manifested limited African access 
to schooling and skills acquisition and restricted African 
entrance into high-level employment positions. To close 
these gaps was the corner-stone of Africanisation policies. 
In effect, the pictures of the employment pattern^ and the
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wage structure in the private sector demonstrated by 
Tables 3.1a, b and 3*3 reflect the existence of a dual 
labour market structure.
3.2 The Dual Labour Market.
One feature of developing countries which has received 
considerable attention in economic literature is the dual- 
istic structure of their economies. Very often the dualism 
is specified in terms of a modern urban wage sector and a 
traditional non-wage sector, and much of the disF cutktVK. 
centred on the allocation of labour between the two sectors 
and on the determinations of their relative earnings. Of 
increasing significance in most developing countries is 
another type of dualism - that between the earnings of 
expatriate personnel of foreign-owned companies on the one 
hand, and their African counterparts on the other. The co­
existence of these two wage-structures in the private sector 
is intriguing and raises some interesting questions. How 
large are the wage differentials between expatriate employees 
and their African counterparts in the private sector, and 
what are the determinants of these differentials? These two 
questions are examined in the context of the Sierra Leone 
experience. In providing an explanatory hypothesis for the 
differentials an attempt will be made to evaluate the 
relative importance of economic and institutional forces.
In recent years, the conditions of the working poor, 
particularly among minority groups in North America, had
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stimulated a large volume of research centred on the 
functioning of labour markets. It has been suggested that 
labour market segmentation, where significant differences in 
wages and working conditions of employment co-exist in 
different parts of the labour market, had not been elimina­
ted by market forces and hence has become a major contribu­
tor to existing employment and income distribution problems. 
While some scholars have sought to explain the historical 
evolution of labour segmentation,^^ others have been less 
ambitious and have simply examined the numerous facets of 
the duality of the labour market and enumerated various 
aspects of the ôbserved income differentials.^^
In less developed countries, the recent emphasis has 
been placed on problems of income distribution which have 
been aggravated and made more visible by the rapid increase 
in the number of expatriates employed in the economy, while 
at the same time, there are increasing signs of visible 
unemployment and under-employment among educated Africans. 
According to this line of reasoning;
(1) social and institutional factors have helped to 
preserve income differentials between workers of different 
educational backgrounds and between expatriate and local 
employees;■'> 1 ' . ■ -
(2) management systems protect the
employment conditions of European workers from encroachment 
by the local personnel;
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(3) different industrial relations systems helped/to 
maintain wide income differences between expatriate per­
sonnel and their African counterparts on the one hand, and 
between foreign-owned firms and the public sector on the 
other.
Combining these factors, the extent of the labour mar­
ket segmentation can be seen as a major determinant of 
both the existing distribution of income and the extent of 
the constraints and barriers to be overcome if the African­
isation of the private sector is to result in an equitable 
distribution of income.
In the first part of this section a brief survey of 
some of the theoretical work that has been done on labour 
market segmentation will be reviewed. The second part 
develops in some detail a standard method used for measuring 
the extent of market segmentation in the light of the 
available evidence on the existence of dual labour market 
in Sierra Leone; this is analysed and discussed.
3 .2.1 Theories of Labour Market Segmentation.
According to Reich, Gordon and Edwards, labour market
segmentation is a historical process which divides the
labour market into sub-markets, each with identifiable
1Rcharacteristics and behavioural rules. They go on to 
argue that labour markets have becpme segmented because of 
the growth of monopoly capitalist enterprises in Western 
countries. Faced with an increasing homogeneous work force
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which was hostile to the growth of corporate power, the 
capitalists made conscious efforts to "divide and conquer" 
by creating "internal labour market" which separated the 
experiences of different workers and undermined their 
common opposition to their employers. The creation of job 
ladders with entry level qualifications and set patterns of 
promotion, which were different for white and blue-collar 
workers, was one of dividing the work force.
Meanwhile, the growth of giant multi-national corpora­
tions added systematic forces that reinforced segmentation.
A dualistic industrial structure evolved where large, 
capital-intensive firms with market power and high rates of 
profit and growth shared their earnings with their more 
stabilised work force. The smaller, more competitive 
labour-intensive firms lived in a world of instability and 
low pay.
An alternative theory of labour market segmentation 
argues that key aspects of the economy function quite
20differently than postulated in a neo-classical model. The 
stability of equilibrium in the neo-classical labour market 
is based on the interaction of relative prices for the 
output of the firm. However, in situations where the static 
neo-classical view does not hold, labour market segmentation 
may occur. If, because of some random disturbance, the 
price of labour available to a certain activity rises, 
capital-embodied technical change may occur where capital is 
substituted for labour. If the product market of this
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activity is characterised by oligopoly, then the increased 
productivity of the labour employed will be shared by the 
capital and labour employed in the form of dividend pay­
ments and higher wage settlements, rather than with society 
at large in the form of lower prices. The whole process 
typically is irreversible. The reduced demand for labour 
in this activity increases the supply of labour available 
to other activities. As a result, the need to obtain 
labour-saving innovations in these alternative activities 
is reduced; these activities tend to become technologically 
stagnant, labour productivity increases their lag behind 
that of the first activity, and a wage disparity among the 
two types of activities emerges.
This tendency for wage disparity is reinforced by 
increased labour skill requirements typically associated 
with the labour-saving technological change in the first 
activity. The rise in average skills strengthens the bar­
gaining power of the labour force employed there. The 
higher wages paid motivate and finance self-investment in 
skills by the employees and induces a firm to invest in its 
work force. There is not a comparable need for skilled 
labour in the alternative activities so there is neither 
the motivation nor the available means to invest in the 
upgrading of labour skills.
A theory of labour market segmentation which incor­
porates some elements of both models discussed above and
which is more amenable to empirical testing, has been pre-
21sented by Wachtel and Betsey. Concentrating initially on
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the demand side of the labour market, the structure of an 
industry or region can be examined to determine its impact 
on the wage of the employees within the market. With one 
homogeneous labour supply function and two segmented 
industries or regions with differing labour demand func­
tions - perhaps because of differing techniques of produc­
tion, capital labour ratios or^market structure conditions - 
the wage differential of̂  W ^“W^in Figure 1 below would be 
a measure of the degree of labour market segmentation.
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
7 .
Alternatively, Figure 2 portrays one industry or region 
which employs individuals with varying amounts of human 
capital, reflecting differences in formal education, on-the- 
job training, cultural background, etc. Again, W^-W^ 
measures the degree of labour market segmentation. If the 
supply function in Figure 2 are written in the form S=a+bW, 
then the two shift parameters, a^ and a ,̂ capture the
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differences in the reservation price of workers which is
related to the differences in the stock of human capital
embodied in the two groups of workers.
A synthesis of these two models, as suggested by the
earlier work of Bluestone, is represented in Figure 3 
2?below.
FIGURE 3
Here segmentation is shown to exist on both sides of the 
labour market. The structure of .the different industries 
and regions is indicated by and while the variations 
in human capital among workers is depicted by and Hg* 
Now, it could be discerned that persons with similar human 
capital, perhaps working in similar classified occupations, 
receiving different wages because they are of different 
nationality, or they are employed in different industries 
or regions. The resulting wage differential is shown as
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W3-W1. Alternatively, the extent to which wages vary 
within an industry or a firm, depending on the different 
amount of human capital of its employees, is measured as
W 2 - W 3 .
The extent of wage differentials between foreign- and
locally-owned firms, and between expatriate personnel and
their local counterparts, vary widely from industry to
industry, from employer to employer and from country to
country, depending on the status of the enterprise. However,
with regards to multi-national companies, a number of
reasons have been suggested as to why they might set
different wages levels than local employers. The most
frequently mentioned is that to some degree the ability to
pay of these firms is superior to that of local employers.
In part, this is associated with the sectors in which the
direct investments by multinationals is made. For multi-
23nationals in the extractive industries such as mining, 
production labour costs are rarely a significant element in 
total costs, and the surplus available for distribution can
piibe quite large. In manufacturing, multinationals -are 
mainly located in the sectors less subject to competition 
and frequently predominate where advanced technology and 
large-scale, capital-intensive production is involved.
Even in industry where there are both foreign and locally- 
owned firms using the same kinds of production techniques, 
multi-nationals may still possess some competitive advan­
tage due to product differentiation, greater efficiency in
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operation or economies of scale at the enterprise level.
The competitive conditions in which many foreign-owned firms 
operate can make it possible for higher wages to be absorbed 
by low profit or passed along in the form of higher
prices. Although these conditions are likely to vary 
greatly between industries and countries as indicated 
earlier, it would appear likely that the competitive 
advantages of multi-nationals vis-a-vis local employers will 
be greatest in capital intensive or monopoly industries in 
developing countries.
While the competitive environment in which multi­
nationals operate may create the potential for paying higher 
wages, whether these firms actually do so will be influenced 
by a variety of other factors. One of these is the 
characteristics of the industrial relations in the host 
country. In countries where collective bargaining is 
extensively practised, and both foreign and locally-owned 
firms are organised, the pressure for parity in wage levels 
may be strong. As a rule, this would be particularly true 
where industry-wide bargaining takes place (or with trade 
group bargaining-as in Sierra Leone)'and has a major impact on 
the wages actually paid at the enterprise l e v e l . O n  the 
other hand, if collective bargaining is not well established 
and trade unions have little bargaining power, the possibi­
lity of large differentials between the two types of firms 
exists. This would also be the case if, for example, the 
sectors where foreign-owned firms operate are organised, or
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the one of greatest trade union strength. The prevailing 
pattern of union organisation in a number of developing 
countries would suggest that wage structure disparities 
between foreign- and locally-owned firms might be larger 
than elsewhere. In some cases, the wages policy of foreign 
firms might be greatly influenced by the industrial 
relations practices in the home country.
Other explanations have been given to support why 
foreign-owned firms, particularly when operating in develop­
ing countries, might pay comparatively higher wages. Foreign 
owned firms with a large number of expatriate personnel have 
to pay them at least as much as they would earn in their 
home country, if not more. There is always a large differ­
ence between their earnings and those of the locally 
recruited workers. The extent of this wage differential 
between expatriate personnel and their locally recruited 
counterparts constitutes a dual wage structure in Sierra 
Leone. It can be a source of considerable discontent.(4.2, p. 310)
The personnel director of Dunlop realised their pro­
blems when he said that the problem arising out of paying 
salaries to expatriate employees varied greatly from country 
to country and that they were affected by the size of the 
company and the scope of its operations. "There are how­
ever certain problems" he said, "that are common to all 
expatriate-employing companies." The main one, he added 
was the problem of adopting either a United Kingdom based 
salary structure or a locally based one. He went; further.
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"recognising the transferable work of an expatriate 
employee had adopted a salary structure founded on a U.K. 
basic salary which is also the pensionable salary.
Implicit in the above was the acceptance of the co­
existence of two salary structures - one for its expatriate 
personnel based on the United Kingdom salary level while 
their locally recruited employees were rewarded on the basis 
of local salary levels. On similar terms, Shell Inter­
national claimed that all its international operations were 
conducted within the national framework of the host country 
which influences general policy on wages and conditions of 
work (for its locally recruited work force). The only 
exception to this rule lay. in the employment of inter­
national or expatriate staff "whose general conditions of 
service seek to take into account the special burdens of 
separation from their countries, and to establish a degree
f) Oof parity between expatriates working in different countries",
One would expect that if,- European expatriate^ worki' in an 
African country where the cost of living is relatively 
lower than the home country,salaries of such expatriates 
should be based on the host country's cost of living index 
plus any expatriation allowances.
However, this does not seem to be the practice, 
particularly in countries like Sierra Leone where salaries 
are relatively lower. Peter Lloyd, writing on the West 
African situation (though on an earlier.period), commented among 
other things, that wages in West Africa are low while the salaries 
of expatriate
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staff in government and commercial firms were related to 
those obtaining in the metropolitan countries - with added 
perquisites to compensate for the "discomfort of tropical 
life" and perhaps the necessity of maintaining two homes. 
The wages of African workers were related to the income of 
subsistence farmers and to the belief that all African 
workers were migrants who did not have to maintain their 
families in towns".
The central problem is the expatriation extras. No 
one questions the validity of paying extra inducement to 
expatriate employees working in an alien environment. But 
when these inducements were seen by the local people as'a 
racial distinction between the European expatriate worker 
and his African counterpart, then a potential source of 
conflict arose ; particularly so in a situation
where the expatriation allowances seem to widen the wage 
gap between expatriates and their African counterparts. In 
Sierra Leone, for instance, the findings of the National 
Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry 
(defunct since 1973)^^ in its Interim' Report to the 
Ministry of Finance, indicated that although all the com­
panies they investigated pointed out to them that there was 
no discrimination in salaries between African employees and 
non-Africans in comparable positions except with the 
expatriation elements in their pay. But this was not 
reflected in the information available to the committee. 
Among the multi-national companies investigated were the
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sierra Leone Development Company, the Standard Bank Sierra 
Leone Ltd., the Barclays Bank D.C.O. Sierra Leone Ltd., the 
Sierra Leone Selection Trust, the oil companies, etc. In 
each of these firms, the committee was convinced that the 
wage gap between their expatriate employees and their 
African counterparts was substantial to be explained in 
terms of expatriation allowances alone. However, in its 
final report it commented on the salary structure of foreign- 
owned firms *
The Committee is also disturbed that 
there are wide discrepancies between the salaries 
and earnings of expatriate and inpatriate staff 
even within the post-categories and even taking 
into account their qualifications and experience.
For example, in one insurance company, the committee noted 
that the average salary of expatriates stood at £3»095 per 
annum (1973) basic, whereas the expatriation allowance 
worked out £3,850 which gave an average total income to the
expatriate of £6,9^5 compared with the average salary to
' 32senior Africans of £1,950 or £2,350 including alio wane e s.
Five years later (1978) the situation has hardly 
changed. The extent of wage-differentials between expatr­
iate and African personnel in foreign-owned companies 
remained proportionally unchanged. The following data 
collected during the field work of this study show the 
extent of salary differentials between expatriate sind 
African workers in comparable p o s t s . T a b l e  3*3 shows the 
salaries of expatriates and their African counterparts in 
three main industries of the private sector.
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TABLE 3.3 Inter-industry wages comparison between 
expatriate and African personnel.
TABLE 3.3A BANKING SECTOR.
Position Held Expat.




Chairman 35,125 20,750 14,375Managing Directors 25,575 15,800 9,775General Managers 20,400 12,320 8,080
District Managers 15,000 10,100 4,900
Branch Managers 13,820 7,180 6,640
Accountants 12,400 6,680 5,720
Administrative Managers 12,000 5,500 6,500
Staff Manager 10,500 4,500 6,000
Signator A 8,400 3,900 4,500
Signator B 7,000 3,500 3,500
Source:
Note
Annual company returns to the Income Tax Depart­
ment, Ministry of Finance,1978.
Salary differentials in this table for the posts of 
Chairman, Managing Director and General Manager, 
etc. can occur either when the post is Africanised 
or, as for the others, when both incumbents are . 
still working.
TABLE 3.3B THE MINING SECTOR.
Positions 
Grade 1 Posts - Senior Expat.
Salary (in £) 
Afric. Differ­entials
•1 9.588 4,848 4,740I 8.340 4,470 4,870
8,304 4,080 4,224I 7,440 3,810 3,630I 6,840 3,840 3,000I 6,512 3,390 3,162I 6,420 3,480 3,072
6,300 3,030 3,270I 6,330 2,820 3,5106,300 2,700 3 ,600
— 2l8—
TABLE 3»3B - continued
Positions Expat.




Grade 2 Posts 5,832 2,340 3,492» 4 ,968 2,520 2,448It 5,460 2,400 3,060I 4,830 2,700 2,130I 5,394 2,700 2,694I 4,800 2,130 2,670
Grade 3 Posts 3,375 2,425 950I 4,250 3,050 1,200I 3,425 2,325 1,100I 3,605 2,275 1,330I 3,750 2,125 1,575I 3,425 2,225 1,200I 3 ,725 2,475 1,300I 3,400 2,325 1,075I 3,425 2,255 1,170I 3,650 2,175 1,425
Source: from the company payrolls, annual returns to the
Income Tax Department for the year 197^/79•
TABLE 3.3C THE OIL COMPANIES.
Salary (in £)
Differ-Positions Expat. Afric. entials
Chairman 15,000 10,000 5,000Managing Director 10,320 7,125 2,875General Manager 8,000 5,000 3,000
District Manager 7,943 4,500 3,443Sales Manager 7,620 4,800 2,820
Chief Accountant 9,325 5,670 3,655Internal Auditor 8,120 5,700 2,420
Personnel Manager 6,020 4,900 1,120
District Engineer 6,180 4,900 1,280
Operations Manager 6,120 5,000 1,120
Source: Compiled from the Annual Returns of companies to
the Income Tax Department of the Ministry of 
Finance, 1978/79.
The data in Tables 3 »3A, B and C are meant to support 
the earlier hypothesis that the extent of wage differentials 
in the private sector between expatriates and their African 
counterparts varies widely from industry to industry, from 
employer to employer and even within the same industry and
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employer. This has tended to create a wage structure which 
demarcates the work force into two segments not in line 
with the theories of labour market segmentation discussed 
above - between white and blue collar workers or on occupa­
tional lines - but between expatriate and local employees.
In the banking sector (Table 3*3A) an expatriate 
chairman of a bank earns £14,375 per annum, more than an 
African chairman who succeeds him in the same bank or 
another bsink. An expatriate managing director earns 
£25»575 per annum while an African employed in the same 
capacity in the same bank or another bank receives £15,800 
per annum, £9,775 less than the expatriate counterpart.
The pattern continues right to the l^OL^senior employee in 
the banking industry.
In both mining and oil industries, although they pay 
lower salaries and wages than the banking industry, the 
expatriates' earnings superiority over their African counter­
parts is also apparent. Even if allowances for expatriation 
pay are ignored, the income disparity between an African 
employee and his European counterpart is rather disturbingly 
wide. For example, the expatriation allowances for the oil 
companies in Sierra Leone is reported to be 15 per cent of 
basic pay. Using the information contained in Table 3«30 
above, if the 15 per cent expatriation allowance is removed, 
an annual salary of £13,043 is left for an expatriate 
chairman, i.e. he is still earning £3,043 more than his 
local counterpart or his successor. The situation is worse
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in the hanking sector where the writer was informed that the 
expatriation allowance is 20 per cent of basic pay and is 
not taxable. For the expatriate chairman of one of the 
expatriate-owned banks, if the 20 per cent expatriation 
allowance is removed (£5,854) he would still be receiving 
£29,270 per annum while his African successor would be 
receiving £8,570 less per annum.
The position becomes more apparent if the analysis is 
reduced to a single firm situation. The extent of wage 
differentials between two groups of employees classified as 
expatriate and senior African employees is more marked over 
a period of 12 years. To give an overall picture of wage 
distribution in this company, a second group of African 
workers classified as Intermediate and Daily rated is 
included (see Table 3.4 below). The first conclusion to be 
drawn from Table 3*4 is that the average salary of expatriates 
has more than doubled between 1964 and 1975» by II7 per 
cent, representing an annual increase of 7 .3 per cent, 
while the average salary of a senior African employee has only 
increased by 73 per cent over the same period, representing 
an annual increase of 5*1 per cent (all in money terms).
In groups 3 and 4 together, the average annual wages of all 
African workers put together for the years 1964, 1970 and 
1975 will be £537*38, £732.33 and £960.60 against expatriate 
average annual earnings for the same period of £3,196,
£4,182. and £6,949 respectively.
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The second conclusion is that there was no reduction 
in the ratio of expatriate earnings to local earnings. In 
money terms the average salary of an expatriate for the same 
years (1964, 1970 and 1975) is 2.78, 2.60 and 3.49 times 
more than the average salary of a senior African employee, 
respectively. Again, if Groups 3 and 4 are included, the 
average salary of an expatriate will be 10 times more than 
Groups 3 (Intermediate) and 21.3 times more than Group 4
r
(Daily Rated) in 1964; in 1970 11 and 19*27 times more than* t >
Group 3 and 4; and in 1975» 12.63 and 20.43 times more than 
the intermediate and daily rated African workers in the 
company.
An expatriate Personnel Director of this company 
might accept the fact that his company pays its expatriate 
personnel three times, 11 times and 20 times more than their 
senior African counterparts, intermediate staff and the 
daily rated workers respectively. He would then point out 
from the same Table 3*4 that there is also an income 
disparity between the senior African employee and his 
intermediate compatriot in the same proportion as the gap 
between him and his expatriate counterpart (see Table 3*4). 
The questions will then arise, what are the causes of the 
labour market segmentation and in what line?
From the available evidence so far discussed, the 
causes of the labour market segmentation in the private 
sector enumerated above come from the demand side of the 
labour market. On the supply side, the major emphasis on
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formal educational qualifications as prerequisites for 
employment, together with the general dearth of high-level 
manpower available in less developed countries, can 
contribute to the size of inter-occupational income 
differentials but cannot be the cause of it. And the line 
in which it is segmented is neither on tribal nor on 
occupational terms, but between expatriate and local 
employees. The fact is, the whole question of the existence 
of a dual salary structure, dual labour market in the 
private sector, rests on the demand side of the market - 
the employment practices of foreign-owned firms which give 
preference to employing their own nationals in positions of 
higher responsibilities than the local people.^
3 .3  The Employment Practices of Multinationals.
Tables 3^la and b and subsequent analysis in the last two 
sections indicated . that the picture of employment in the 
private sector showed an expatriate preponderance in all 
high-level positions with high remuneration which set them 
apart from their African counterparts. However, it is 
important to note that such practice varied from firm to 
firm depending on the home country of the employer. For 
example, in the survey referred to earlier, European con­
trolled firms have done better in employing Africans in 
senior positions than the Indian and Lebanese controlled 
firms. Even among the European based firms, there were 
variations among them; depending on the employment prac-
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tices of individual firms. Such variation in employment 
procedures of foreign-based multi-national corporations can 
best be discussed under Perlmutter's conceptual classifica­
tions of the employment policies of the multi-national
3 5corporation in developing countries.
Basing his classification on the recruitment pattern 
of the multinational corporations, Perlmutter identified 
three behaviour characteristics of foreign-owned firms.
First, the Ethnocentric multi-national corporations - 
these generally wholly own overseas subsidiaries which are 
managed by individuals of the country in which the corpora­
tion is based. They are in effect a cultural, as well as 
an economic extension of the parent corporation.
The second, Polycentric multi-nationals - these often 
have local participation in the capital ownership of their 
subsidiaries which are managed by citizens of the host 
countries. The cultural pattern of management is pre­
dominantly local (see the introduction).
The third. Geocentric multi-nationals, are inter­
national in their management structure. Staff are appointed 
purely on the basis of the best man for the job, irrespective 
of nationality. The cultural climate of the corporation 
is like an international agency of the United Nations 
divorced entirely from the pursuit of the national interest 
of any ethnic group or nation state.
There are in fact no truly geocentric corporations in 
being at the present time, but Perlmutter believes that by
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the end of this century the world's trade will be dominated 
by three hundred corporations of this type. He cited such 
corporations as Nestles, Unilever and Shell to have
come close^ to being geocentric in their employment poli­
cies, but all of these corporations at the present time are 
in the last resort dominated by the interest of their primary 
shareholders who are highly concentrated and not spread 
evenly over the areas of the world in which these corpora­
tions engage in their activities. They are also at the top 
managed in terms of cultural style and to a large extent 
in ethnic composition by persons drawn from the countries 
in which the parent organisation had their origin and are 
located.
Perlmutter is convinced that technological, economic, 
political and social factors will bring a progressive 
transition from ethnocentric and polycentric corporations 
to geocentric corporation's?^ In the long run, Perlmutter 
may be correct, but in the immediate future there are 
substantial obstacles to the development of truly geo- 
centric corporations.
At the present time the countries in which multi­
national corporations have their legal headquarters and 
majority shareholders would be extremely reluctant to 
agree to a transfer of the ultimate control of these 
corporations' activities elsewhere# . ^
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Moreover, there are technical reasons why multi­
national corporations are becoming in certain respects more 
not less centralised in their decision-making. The 
development of modern communications (the aeroplane, telex 
and telephone) has made it possible for the head office to 
exercise a more immediate and direct control over subsidi­
aries and the men on the spot. The computer î 'as, at the 
same time, provided the rationale for centralised decisions, 
since it increasingly enables a central board to manage its 
total resources in the most efficient way. These develop­
ments suggest that while the corporation of the future may 
be geocentric in the sense that its trading and staff may 
be increasingly international, its capital and its critical 
decisions are likely to remain under highly centralised 
control, and political pressures bearing on the present 
corporation. In fact, in Sierra Leone, what seemed to 
happen is the reverse of Perlmutter's order of progression. 
There, the geocentric stage becomes the second stage and 
polycentric the last of development. In the Sierra 
Leonean setting, foreign-owned companies have tended to be 
more ethnocentric in their employment policies than geo­
centric. However, the degree to which a corporation can 
either be geo- or ethno-centrics would depend on the extent 
of its activities, i.e. local or international. For 
example, Lebanese and Indian companies locally registered 
with head offices in Sierra Leone have tended to be more or 
wholly ethnocentric, while the European and American
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controlled firms, because of their trans-national activities 
in Africa, have tended to be both ethnocentric and geo­
centric, eg. the Standard Bank, a subsidiary of the British 
Chartered Groups of Banks with head office in London, has 
branches in all former British territories in Africa. In 
West Africa, its regional head office is in Lagos, Nigeria. 
The same thing is also true of the Barclays Bank D.C.O., and 
the oil companies such as Shell, B.P., Texaco, Mobil,., etc.
Polycentric, on the other hand, is the desired stage 
of all African governments for all foreign-owned companies 
to operate. The policy objectives of any private sector 
Africanisation is to bring, where possible, all foreign- 
owned firms under local management control, to conform to 
local economic policies - indigenisation of ownership, 
control and management (see Introduction above).
In similar terms, Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers
observed three types of management recruitment processes
analogous to Perlmutter's ethnocentric, polycentric and
geocentric types: Patrimonial, political and professional
37management.^
Kerr, et al. described patrimonial management to be 
one in which ownership, major policy making positions and 
significant proportion of other top jobs in the hierarchy 
are held by members of an extended family. The effective 
decision-making authority is concentrated in the family, 
the goals of the enterprise are oriented towards the 
interest of the family, and its aspirations. Most Indians
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and Lebanese-owned enterprises are managed in this way.
Professional management, like geocentric on the other 
hand, is the enterprise management in which major policy­
making positions and nearly all other positions in the 
hierarchy are held by persons on the basis of claimed or 
demonstrated technical qualifications.. In professional 
management, technical ability, experience, education, know­
ledge of the orgainisation, and ability to impress people 
who make decisions are more important than family or 
political connections. Most transnational firms practice 
this form of management recruitment procedures.
Finally, political management is less common, and like 
patrimonial management, the chances for survival are slim 
in modern industrial societies. Political management exists 
where ownership, major policy-making, and key administrative 
posts are held by persons on the basis of party political 
affiliation and loyalties. Access is thus dominated by 
political considerations and the orientations and interest 
of management are coloured throughout by political goals. 
However, just as patrimonial management may hire profes­
sionals to work under its direction, so political management 
may enlist the services of professionally trained managers 
and technicians. A good example (already cited in Part I) 
is the case of Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation and the 
Port Authority, both have contract expatriate management.
Using both Perlmutter and Kerr, et al. classifications, 
one can examine some of the influences of cultural factors
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on recruitment practices and procedures of private sector 
foreign employers, in Sierra Leone.
The essential characteristics of the ethnocentric 
corporation's managerial philosophy is that it prefers to 
employ as managers of its subsidiary companies nationals of 
the home country. For instance, British companies operat­
ing in Sierra Leone prefer to employ British nationals in 
the more responsible management positions and also the 
French (see Table 3*5 below). The reasoning behind this 
preference is that the manager of the subsidiary company 
should possess a certain knowledge and experience which can 
only be acquired by first working in the headquarters of 
the organisation, a belief that home-recruited staff are 
more to be trusted and will be more efficient than staff 
recruited from the host country, the highly-skilled staff 
required are more easily found in the home country.
COMPANY, 197 5. 
Position (Grade) Total Afr. Exn.
Management 10 1 9Grade lA senior staff 3 - 3Grade IB senior staff 20 3 17Grade II senior staff 46 11 35Grade III senior staff 87 52 35Grade IV senior staff 65 .6.5 .
TOTAL 231 132 99
Source: Collected from the Personnel Office of the company.
The extent to which foreign companies, particularly 
American and European based companies, operate in Sierra 
Leone, hold these views has been revealed by Tables
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3.5 above and 3*8 below, and the 1965 manpower survey which 
put the size of expatriate employment in the private sector 
at 1,221 (Table 3*1)» the majority of them were United King­
dom nationals; virtually all of them were employed in key 
management positions (see Table 3*8 below). Since the cost 
of employing an expatriate has been estimated to be sub­
stantially greater than the cost of employing a locally 
recruited manager (see Tables 3*3A, B and C above), it is 
clear that overseas-based trans-national companies regard 
their home-recruited managers as considerably superior. For 
example, in an interview with the managing director of one 
of the mining operations in Sierra Leone (U.K. based) on 
the recruitment policies of his company, among other things, 
he said that there were certain jobs which could not be seen 
as being localised in the foreseeable future. Those jobs he 
defined as "jobs of a highly specialised nature requiring 
considerable experience, not at present available in Sierra 
Leone.
However, the managing director pointed out that his 
company was making all efforts to bring in as many Sierra 
Leonean nationals into senior staff cadre as could be 
possible but that it would take some time before complete 
Africanisation of different positions can be achieved. He 
further said, "With regard to the recruitment of Sierra 
Leoneans in the company, cognizance must be taken of the 
fact that they must not block the way for young Sierra 
Leoneans training overseas under the auspices of the company.
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and who are expected to return in a few years time, as 
these men," he said, "have been earmarked for filling the 
positions now held by their expatriate counterparts."
Looking at the list of both expatriate and African 
senior personnel (summarised in Table 3*5 above), it was 
observed that one clear principle which went throughout the 
list was the fact that the African personnel were under­
represented in the first three categories of senior grades. 
The list revealed that all the posts but one in the manage­
ment positions were held by expatriates. The managing 
director was asked to comment on why it was so.
In his reply, the managing director said, "I am not 
aware of any Sierra Leonean qualified and capable enough to 
undertake jobs specified in the first three categories such 
as jobs in the superindent cadre, eg. being mines superin­
tendent, hill superintendent or plant instructor, to name a 
few. There," he continued, "are some of the difficulties 
which we have been facing for quite a long time in the 
recruitment of Sierra Leoneans to these positions."
In any case, he ended by saying that Sierra Leoneans 
were receiving the necessary training in various fields of 
operations in the company, some of whom have been earmarked 
for promotions or appointments to those positions in due 
course.
In addition, the managing director gave an outline of 
the company's employment procedures. He said that when a 
vacancy occurred, the first step taken by the company was to
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consult the training schemes provided under that particular 
post. If no Sierra Leonean was currently in training for 
the post; the head office in London is informed of the
vacancy and at the same time told that no local person was
available for recruitment. Continuing, the managing 
director stated that this was followed by the request and 
particularly for the necessary advertisement in the press 
both in Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom. He admitted, 
however, that the company had not insisted in the past upon 
finding locally qualified people. Very little advertisement 
was being done in Sierra Leone before resorting to adver­
tisement in the United Kingdom.
The use of staff from head office as managers is wide­
spread among the commercial banks and enterprises in Sierra 
Leone. Among the former, the reasons often given for 
applying for additional expatriate quotas were to relieve 
an expatriate senior manager or branch manager going on
leave to the United Kingdom or to replace an expatriate
39whose tour of office has expired, etc.
With regard to the Indian and Lebanese enterprises, 
a more apposite description of their employment policy is 
the patrimonial type. They usually start as family business 
which requires some degree of personal commitment. Although 
some of them have grown locally to the sizes of the multi­
national corporations to justify their ethnocentric or 
patrimonial employment practices.
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On the other hand, the multinational or trans-national 
corporation with a polycentric type of organisation is 
willing to employ managers recruited locally. It accepts 
this situation in the belief that local managers will be 
more capable of understanding the local situation; they 
will not be an alien element and come into conflict with 
other staff or the environment in which they work. These 
factors, it is assumed, will make them more efficient than 
outsiders. Behind these assumptions, however, may well lie 
the fact that the transnational corporation has bought a 
going concern, rather than created a new enterprise. Where 
a multi-national corporation buys in either to extend the 
market for its own product, to obtain control \ ̂ f a rival, 
to secure technical knowledge, or simply to participate in 
a successful business that is vulnerable to a take-over, 
and it leaves a substantial element of local capital hold­
ing, it is likely to leave a considerable degree of manage­
ment .
It sometimes happened, however, that foreign-owned 
firms become dissatisfied with the performance and profit­
ability of their subsidiary under local management. They then 
might seek to improve the performance of the subsidiary 
by shifting from a polycentric situation to an ethnocentric 
situation or something close to it. This was also true of 
the Sierra Leone government-owned corporations. Two of them 
have been de-Africanised after they had been fully African- 
ised, owing to the inability of its local management to run 
them profitably (see Chapter 2.7 above).
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However, with regard to a situation where a multi­
national company, having adopted a polycentric employment 
policy and then reverted to ethnocentric, the case of the 
Aureal Tobacco Company in Sierra Leone comes into mind. The 
Aureal Tobacco Company is one of the subsidiaries of British 
American Tobacco-twith head office in London-)- in Africa. It 
started manufacturing cigarrettes in I96O with I6 expatriate 
personnel. In October 1978, during the field work of this 
study, the company was visited. The employment position of 
the company was:
Work force 419
Management staff, African 17
Senior non-management staff 51
Expatriate staff _^
TOTAL 4 ^






Before that time, the posts of Factory Manager and
Financial Controller had been fully Africanised. Both posts
were held by Sierra Leonean nationals. Within a few
years of these appointments the company started losing money
and in the factory ciga/rette pilfering became rampant. It
was reported that the factory manager was associated with a theft
scandal (not connected with the company). When C.I.D.
personnel were sent to search his house, a hundred cases of
ciga/rettes were found. The factory manager was arrested
and charged, subsequently convicted. He lost his job. Both
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the factory manager and the financial controller lost their 
jobs and were replaced not by other Africans but by European 
expatriates from the head office in London.
Finally, the geocentric employment practices of trans­
national corporations is examined. Perlmutter believed 
that as multinational corporations reach a certain size and 
scale of operation, and they begin to take on the charac­
teristics of the geocentric organisation, they are faced 
with problems of creating a corporate culture which is 
appropriate to their role as geocentric corporations. This 
means that they have to weld together teams of managers who 
have been educated in different national environments. Mr. 
Vansina, at the University of Louvain, has recently demon­
strated that managers from different cultural backgrounds
have different perceptions of the attributes that effective
40managers should possess. He has also pointed out that the 
differences are likely to have some influence on the pattern 
of promotions within the multi-national corporations, though he
was not yet in a position to demonstrate to significance,' *
in this respect,;^ the stereotypes held by the ethnic groups who 
,were in a position to determine career development in 
multi=national corporations. Some of the characteristics 
of the geocentric organisation were to' be found in each of 
the multinational companies already referred to as operating 
in Sierra Leone, namely Shell, Texaco, B.P. oil companies, 
the others being British American Tobacco, Barclays Bank, 
the Standard Bank. Within these, the major cultural
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influence is still that of the parent organisation's base. 
The dominant national groups have a natural reluctance to 
appoint from outside for the reasons that emerged from 
Vanina's work and also for the simple technical reason that 
recruitments at the bottom are mainly in the headquarters. 
Since promotions from within are regarded as an essential 
feature of large-scale corporations, this has tended to 
maintain the strength of the dominant national groups.
In a paper presented to a conference organized by the 
British Institute of Management, Max Gloor, Director,
Nestle Alimentana, S.A., discussed this aspect of his 
company. He agreed that there was a certain predominance 
of Swiss nationals in executive positions without monopo­
lising these anywhere to any extent. "Nevertheless, he 
added, we have in each case, and at all times, done what we 
thought is in the best interests of the company. Adapting 
itself to the local scene has generally been facilitated 
by the type of man appointed and it is this factor more 
than any other which has determined the recruitment policies 
for overseas m a n a g e r s . I n  Sierra Leone, the geocentric 
employment policies of the trans-national companies is only 
limited to expatriate personnel. It was a common practice 
among these companies to transfer an expatriate employee of 
a multinational company from Sierra Leone to Kenya or Kenya 
to Sierra Leone. For example, the case of the Aureol 
Tobacco Company (subsidiary of the British American 
Tobacco) cited earlier was one where both the Leaf Adviser
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and the Technical Instructor (British) were previously
working for the British American Tobacco subsidiary in East
Africa with Nairobi as regional headquarters and were .
transferred to Sierra Leone. The curious thing was, why
not East African employees? The fact is, among their
African employees, the geocentric employment practice does
not seem to apply as far as the present day is concerned.
In the colonial period, before the advent of the "economic 
42nationalism" among African states, there used to exist a
geocentric movement among the African personnel of some
transnational companies such as the United Africa Company
(UAC), Shell, B.P., Mobil , Standard Bank of West Africa,
but this ceased to be the practice as each country is
economically pursuing an independent policy requiring a more
local control of the employment policies of these companies.
For example, at present, instead of the United African
Company Ltd. or Standard Bank of West Africa, as they used
to be, there are now United Africa Company (S.L.) Ltd., the
Standard Bank (S.L.) Ltd., (Ghana) Ltd., (Nigeria) Ltd.,
etc. Each of them is deemed to be autonomous in its
employment policies. But the preference to employ people
43from the "mother country" remained.
In summary, an attempt has been made to examine the 
employment policies and practices of foreign-owned firms 
operating in Sierra Leone, within a theoretical framework. 
However, it must be noted that the type of employment policy 
pursued by individual companies or groups of companies is a
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function of many variables».political, economic, sociologi­
cal, etc. For example, an Indian or Lebanese-owned firm 
may tend to pursue ethnocentric/patrimonial employment 
practices, while among the European and American-based 
enterprises, the tendency to pursue a more ethnocentric/ 
professional or geocentric management recruitment policy is 
stronger than in the Asian and Lebanese-owned enterprises. 
But the government policy objective of Africanisation is to 
make all foreign-owned firms, where practicable, adopt a 
polycentric recruitment policy.
3.4 The Size and Dimension of Expatriate Employment in the
Private Sector.
The Manpower Survey Report of 1964 put the number of 
expatriates employed in the private sector of Sierra Leone 
economy at 1,221 (see Tables 3.1a and b above). The 
majority of them were employed in the professional, techni­
cal, managerial and administrative grades of their indivi­
dual organisations (see Table 3.1b). That was l6 years ago. 
How many were they in 1978 when the field work for this 
study was undertaken?
It is difficult to ascertain the number of expatriates 
currently employed in the private sector of Sierra Leone, 
for the government itself has no accurate information on the 
exact number of expatriates either employed or in residence 
in Sierra Leone.Foreign embassies were of some assis­
tance, but they generally do not have complete records of
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their nationals employed in Sierra Leone, only those on 
technical assistance, and therefore, were able to make only 
a rough estimate of the number likely to be employed in the 
private sector.
Based on what government data is available, together with 
the figures obtained from the embassies and the individual 
employers annual returns, a cautious estimate of the number 
of expatriates employed in the private sector is in the range ' 
of 1,500 to 2,500 but probably closer to the lower range. A 
brochure prepared by the Sierra Leone External Telecommunica­
tions (SLET) put the figure at 2,500 "mainly British nation­
als".^^ This figure does not include the self-employed, Leb­
anese, non-Sierra Leonean teachers (who numbered in 1977/78, 
484), missionaries, doctors, nor expatriate personnel on tech­
nical assistance to the Sierra Leone Government. But of these 
only 1,588 were employed in established enterprises in the 
country and even then only 896 were employed in supervisory 
and above positions (Table 3 .8 ).The rest were mainly employed 
on short term contracts by the companies of foreign contract­
ing companies such as the German Road Construction Comp­
any, ABU. Total employment of both Sierra Leoneans and ex-
46patriates in the modern sector, was estimated at the end of 
1975 to be in the order of 101,000 and the total work force 
was about 1,040,000.^^ This means that only 10 per cent of the 
total labour force is engaged in wage employment and 2.4 per 
cent of that are non-Africans.
The largest concentration of expatriates is in Freetown 
with lesser concentration in the mining enclaves of Yengewa, 
Tongofield, Mokamji, Gbangbatoke, and before 1975, Marampa.
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The majority of the expatriates were employed in local sub­
sidiaries of companies with head offices in Europe or America 
(see Section 3*3 above). They may be hired on contract spe­
cifically to work in the Sierra Leone subsidiary or they may 
be seconded by the head office for a tour of duty in Sierra
h oLeone. Lebanese nationals tend to be either self-employed 
or associated with family operations and are largely engaged 
in commercial activities, although recently, an increasing num­
ber have been going into manufacturing and construction.
The pattern of expatriate employment in the private sec­
tor in Sierra Leone did not at first seem drastically different 
from that of expatriate employment in neighbouring West African 
(English speaking) countries, except perhaps that there were 
more of them in Sierra Leone than Ghana or Nigeria (relative 
to population), and that they filled a wider range of posts.
A closer analysis of the expatriate employment structure (in­
dicated in Table 3«l) since independence in I96I reflects the 
relative shortage of certain skills in the economy and the 
recruitment policies and practices of private sector employers. 
Commercial firms and mining and construction still have a high­
er absolute number of foreign employees than any other sector 
of the economy, a total which continued to rise as late as 1978 
(see Table 3*6 below). And while expatriate personnel in the 
manufacturing industry fell by 50 per cent, between 1964 and 
1978, the mining operations continue to employ a sizeable num­
ber of expatriates in a wider range of jobs than any other 
industry - from director to skilled worker (see Table 4.2 
below).
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INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR -
1964-1978. 
Industry (ISIC) 1964 1978 fo Change
Division 0-Agriculture, Forestry
47and Fishing 100 112.7ti 1-Mining and Quarrying 150 348 132.0I 2/3-Manufacturing 82 40 -51.0I 4-Building & Construction 173 300 73 .4I 5-Electricity, gas & water 30 20 -33.36-Commerce 346 500 44.5I 7-Transport & Communication 220 180 -18.1I 8-Services, banking, etc. 173 100 -42.1
TOTAL 1221 1588
Source 1 For 1964 - Manpower Report 1964, Table II; for 1978- collected from individual 
work, 1978/79.
employers during field
From the table, between 1964 and 1978 there has been an 
increase in the overall expatriate employment from 1221 in 
1964 to 1588 in 1978, an increase of 367, representing 30 
per cent for the period, an average annual growth of I .87 
per cent.
The 112.7 per cent increase in expatriate employment 
in the agricultural industry since 1964 reflects the 
government's policy towards the development of agro-based 
industries such as the fruit canning, sugar cane refinery, 
large-scale commercial plantations, and also the fishing 
industry.
Since 1964, the increase in expatriate employment in 
the mining industry is due to the opening of two new mining 
operations - the Sierra Leone Ores and Metals Company (Swiss 
owned), the Sierra Rutile (American owned), and also the
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impending opening of new deposits of bauxite at Port Loko 
District, etc. The commercial sector has rather little 
increase in expatriate employment. The reason is due to 
the government's indigenisation policy of ownership, as 
well as control and manpower (see the Introduction above), 
which restricts foreigners in certain commercial activities.
The other sector that has had a big increase in the 
number of expatriate employment is the construction 
industry. It has nearly doubled its share of expatriate 
personnel from 173 in 1964 to 300 in 1978. The increase in 
expatriate employment in this industry is due to government 
policies on new roads, new public buildings, new schools, 
improvements in the rural infrastructure, and also the 
private sector activities.
On the other hand, the decline in expatriate employment 
in the manufacturing industry is most noticeable between 
1964 and 1978, the number of expatriates employed in this 
sector has dropped from 82 in 1964 to 40 in 1978. This was 
due to two factors. The first is the government's change 
of policy from post-independent emphasis on industrialisa­
tion to more agro-based industries; the second is the 
Africanisation policy. Similar reasons also explained why changes 
in the service sector, particularly in banking, insurance 
and the accounting firms occui^d. It is clear from Table 3.6 that 
even after 20 years of Africanisation policy in Sierra 
Leone, there still exists the view that Sierra Leone cannot 
provide all the skilled manpower it needs. Indeed, the
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demand for expatriate personnel was greater in 1978 than 
it was at independence. Perhaps the crucial issue is not 
whether expatriates are needed, for even the most developed 
of capitalist countries seem to need the stimulus of some 
imported employees, but how these expatriates are deployed. 
In other words, in what occupational categories are they 
employed, where are they and what do they do. For example, 
one firm or industry may have fewer expatriates than 
another, but these expatriates may play a more pervasive 
and controlling role in the organisation to the exclusion 
of their Sierra Leonean counterparts. Similarly, a firm 
may reduce the number of its expatriate employees but at 
the same time the overall role of these expatriates may 
remain the same if responsibility is not transferred to 
their Sierra Leonean colleagues. In other words, expatri­
ate intensiveness is a function of positions and not mere 
numbers. Take for instance Table 3*8a and b as one example. 
The occupational distribution of expatriates revealed that 
in Group 'O' the professional, technical and related 
workers, there are more Sierra Leoneans in that group, in 
numberical terms, than expatriates, 791 Sierra Leoneans 
against 655 expatriates. But when the group is broken 
down into various professional components,
the expatriates became predominant.
Another reason why one should not rely on the use of 
numbers of expatriates or the ratio of expatriates to the 
total work force (see Table 3*7 below) as a measure of
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responsiveness to Africanisation policy (Chapter 4 below) 
is that the number of expatriates a company or firm employs 
is a function of a variety of autonomous factors - including 
the technology involved, the length of time the industry 
has been established, the type of manpower skills required 
(Chapter 5)» and the available supply of those skills 
(Chapter 5)* Because these factors affect the need for 
expatriates, they must be taken into consideration in making 
judgements concerning the role of expatriates and the 
record of Africanisation. Take as an example the following 
Table 3*7 which shows the ratios of expatriate employees to 
total work force in seven selected foreign-owned companies. 
Three are mining companies, three manufacturing and one a 
banking firm.
TABLE 3.7 RATIO OF EXPATRIATE EMPLOYEES TO TOTAL WORK







National Diamond Mining Company 3,500 250 1 14
Sierra Rutile 800 35 1 23Sieromco 1,000 30 1 33Aureal Tobacco Company 419 5 1 84Sierra Leone Breweries 300 3 1 100National Confectionary Company 400 25 1 16Barclay Bank 492 9 1 47
Source: Collected from the Employment Division of the
Ministry of Labour, Freetown, 1978.
From Table 3.7 above, the National Diamond Mining 
Company has the highest ratio of expatriates to total 
workforce of l:l4, followed by National Confectionary Company 
Is 16, and Sierra Rutile 1:23 and Sierromco 1:33 in the indus­
try. The reason is that mining
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operations are usually capital intensive with high tech­
nology. In the absence of skilled local manpower (parti­
cularly when these companies are located in remote parts of 
the country) expatriates were employed to fill the gap.
The two manufacturing companies, the Aureal Tobacco, 
and the Sierra Leone Breweries have the lowest ratios of 
expatriates to work force (with the exception of NATCO),
1 % 84 and 1:100 respectively; followed by the Commercial 
Bank with a ratio of 1:4?. In each case, as was stated 
earlier, the number of expatriates employed in a company is 
determined by the nature of the business and the level of 
technology.
During the field work for this study, it was found 
that the ratio of expatriates to total employees tended to 
understate the significance of expatriates in each firm 
which has a large labour force of skilled and semi-skilled 
workers. In these firms there are few expatriates compared 
to the total number of African employees (although the 
absolute number of expatriates may be high), but in many 
cases these expatriates hold all or nearly all management 
positions (see Table 3*5 above). Such firms could be 
termed unresponsive to Africanisation.
In other industries where companies have smaller 
numbers of employees or where a greater proportion of 
employees are technically skilled or administrative 
personnel, as in the mining companies, the ratio of 
expatriates to total employees
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tends to be higher (Table 3»7)« Yet in many cases, these 
companies will have a greater degree of Sierra Leonean 
participation at management level. In spite of the higher 
ratios, these companies are more responsive to Africanisa­
tion than those with lower ratios.
To appreciate the respective roles of expatriates and 
Sierra Leoneans in the private sector, it is necessary to 
look at the type of positions within the firm they occupy 
in particular to answer three main questions.
First, what was the distribution of expatriates 
according to managerial and supervisory functions? Second, 
what proportion of management positions at various levels 
were held by expatriates and by Sierra Leoneans? And third, 
what qualifications were required of both expatriates and 
Sierra Leoneans before they could fill a management position?
Disaggregated data on the occupational distribution of 
expatriate/African personnel and their educational qualifi­
cations were difficult to obtain by an individual researcher. 
However, with the help of the occupational and educational 
qualifications, classifications used by the Central 
Statistics Office in the 1974 population census, an 
employment and qualifications profile of expatriate and 
African personnel was constructed. For the industrial 
classifications, the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) is used. The keys for Tables 3*8a 
and 3*8b are given as Appendix III.
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Both Table 3 .8 (a) and (b) show a functional and industrial 
distribution of expatriates and African employees in mana­
gerial and supervisory grades in the private sector in 
Sierra Leone. Categories 01 and 02 represent the grades 
of managing directors, general managers, divisional 
managers and their assistants. In actual fact the real 
managerial cadre are covered in categories 01-09 and 10-18 
covered the supervisory grades (see key in Appendix III), in 
manpower terms, it constitutes the mid-level - the technical 
- intermediate.
From the tables, it could be seen that the expatriates 
are most preponderant in the managerial and technical 
grades 01-04 and 14-15» In category 01, there are 173 
expatriate personnel against 62 Africans in the same 
category. Of the total employment in this, the expatriates 
constitute 73*6 per cent of and the Africans 26.4 per cent, 
with a replacement ratio of 0.35»
The Africans:were most represented in the non-technical 
supervisory grades (10-13 and 16-I8), the clerical grades, 
while the expatriates have the lion's share of all the 
technical supervisory grades (14-15)» Private sector 
employers defended their policies of employing expatriates 
in supervisory grades on the grounds of educational and 
skills differentials between expatriates and their African 
counterparts. Expatriates remain in supervisory posts
because of difficulties in the existing training facilities 
in the country made their employment indispensable. There
— 249—
is a particularly high proportion of expatriate skilled 
labour in new industries which have immediate need for 
specialists who cannot be readily trained on the spot.^^ 
Where the expatriates remained in the junior technical 
posts (17-18) they were usually classified as skilled 
worker as distinct from the senior skilled African workers 
trained on the job. There was in general a wide gulf in 
educational standards between expatriate and Africans in 
these grades (14-18) as a large number of the African 
workers were entirely without formal education (see Table 
3.9 below).
In both the highest and lowest categories in the 
employment structure of the private sector, the pattern was 
one typical of West African countries Wnich rely on 
expatriate capital and personnel for the former with a 
largely unskilled or semi-skilled local labour force 
constituting the latter (see Table 3*8). There are still 
many more foreign employers (mainly Europeans) than 
Africans employing six or more employees, for while there 
are thousands of Africans involved in petty trade (by the 
road-side) and business throughout the country, few of them 
have any declared or regular employees. Expatriates retain 
a near-monopoly of executive and managerial posts (OI-O9 ) 
and remain significant even among other levels of white 
collar workers. In Sierra Leone, the pattern in middle- 
level employment is rather different from that of Ghana and 
Nigeria, for a substantial number of expatriates are
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employed in the lower categories, including junior assis­
tants in accounts, sales and credit control. In 1976 
category 18, the lowest category, contained 35 expatriates 
and 100 Africans.
3.5 The Pace of Africanisation.
Like the recruitment policies of foreign-owned firms 
(discussed in Section 3*3 above), the pace of Africanisation 
of the private sector varied from company to company, and 
from employer to employer depending on the nationality of 
the employer and the status of the enterprise. For example, 
in Table 3*9 below, the relatively low level of Africani­
sation by Indian firms may be explained by the tendency of 
these firms to start as family enterprises which provide 
employment and financial support for.an extended family in 
India or Lebanon (in the case of the Lebanese). In a small 
firm of this type, there is little incentive to employ 
persons of different culture or ethnic group at the 
executive level, because to do so will reduce the amount 
of income to be distributed among the members of the family 
and decrease job opportunities for the family. For the 
European and American based firms, the economic goal is 
simply to produce at a satisfactory level of profits for 
the shareholders and re-investment capital to cover growth 
and depreciation using the most productive method available 
to meet these goals.
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Sierra Leone Development Co. 231 132 99Aureal Tobacco Co. 22 17 5SIERROMCO 29 8 21Barclays Bank D.Co. 56 47 9Sierra Rutile 55 24 31Standard Bank S.L. Ltd. 43 34 9United African Co. S.L. Ltd. 60 45 15
Indian-Owned Firms
New Indian Insurance 4 - 4
NATCO 25 3 22Chaurai Chemicals 30 6 24
J.T. Chamrai Ltd. 25 5 20K. Challarau Ltd. 12 4 8
Choithram and Sons Ltd. 50 40 10
Source I Annual Employment Returns to the Ministry of Labour 
; 1978.
There are, however, some independent factors which have 
increased the rate of Africanisation at a slow but steady 
pace. Expatriate personnel, even though considered more 
efficient and reliable by employers and managers, are much 
more expensive. Not only are salary levels for expatriate 
personnel generally higher in developing countries than in 
advanced countries (see Table 3»3a» b and c and Table 3*4), 
but it is often necessary to pay personnel some form of 
"inducements bonus," to persuade them to accept service 
abroad. In addition to these higher direct payments, 
employers are frequently forced to provide all sorts of 
fringe benefits for the expatriate staff which are either
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not necessary in the case of local employees, whether in 
advanced or developing countries. As one expatriate employer 
admitted during an interview with him:
Naturally, I would prefer to employ Africans 
to replace Europeans because the former costs 
so much less to maintain. Three month's leave 
with pay every year is not obligatory and does 
not have to look after the problems of getting 
them settled in Sierra Leone, being concerned 
about their adaptability and introduction to 
the social milieu.
The effects of these fringe benefits is to raise the 
cost of labour to about double the direct cost, although 
the actual ratio will depend upon conditions in the country 
of employment. For example, the cost of expatriate skilled 
labour is higher in the Zambian copper mines than in the 
Sierra Leone diamond mines. Table 3.10 below compares such 
costs.
TABLE 3.10 AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGES OF TWO MINING OPERATIONS 
IN ZAMBIA AND SIERRA LEONE FOR THE YEARS 1971 
-1975 FOR THEIR EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL (CON­
VERTED INTO POUNDS STERLING).
£ = 0.77 £ - 2 leons (1973)
Year Zambian Copper Sierra Leone Diamond
1971 £5.994.45 £4,182.001972 7 .227.99 4 ,954.00
1973 8 ,650.18 5.630.001974 9 ,992.29 6,887.00
1975 9 ,997.68 . 6,949.00Sources Zambia Copper from Africanisation,
Nationalisation and Equality, Table 
7.5 Annual Average Earnings in Zambian
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Copper Mines by Phillip Daniel, 1970, p.
152; for Sierra Leone, Annual Returns to 
_________the Income Tax Department, 1975.________
Given the higher basic wage paid to expatriates than
to local staff (see Table 3«3)i the total labour cost of
expatriates was from two to three times as high. Thus,
provided local personnel could approach the productivity
of expatriates, the policy of Africanisation could be
expected to have a beneficial effect on a firm's profits
and loss accounts. More usually, there could not be a one-
for-one replacement of expatriates by Africans, at least
initially, because of the lack of experience among the
latter. To the extent that the replacement ratio tended
towards the labour-cost ratio, the inducement to Africanisé
was r e d u c e d . O t h e r  things being equal, the rate at which
Africanisation proceeded could be expected to accelerate
once the initial inertia had been overcome.
In addition, there were a number of other factors which
favoured the employment of local personnel, though the
strength of these varied considerably according to the
nature of both the firms operations and the actual job
concerned. For example, in jobs which were concerned with
sales promotion or personnel administration, it was often
found that the local employees' familiarity with the
country's people and institutions gave them an advantage
over expatriates in this type of work (see Table 3*8
above). For the same reason, firms often found it politic
to retain local professionals in advisory capacities
even when there was little demand for their professional
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services - for the sake of the business connections which
54they bring with them.
Given the benefits which private sector employers 
stood to gain from a policy of Africanisation, the question 
to be answered is why its implementation has proved to be 
so tardy. The conventional answer to this question points 
to the insufficient supply of suitable personnel in the 
country. This was clearly an important factor but does not 
seem to be the whole story since it omits at least one of 
the important factors operating on the demand side.
First, the supply side - there were still not enough 
well trained Africans to replace all Europeans, especially 
those high-level managerial or professional posts (see 
Table 3 .8 ). The problem therefore was not entirely to be 
viewed from costs-benefits analysis. It was a problem of 
replacement of foreign personnel by Sierra Leonean personnel. 
If the basic premise is accepted, that is the maintenance 
in fact of current level of efficiency, then the local 
replacements must be comparable in quality to the displaced 
expatriate personnel. In other words, strictly speaking, 
the problem here is one of displacements of skills. Quality 
in this connection is determined essentially and fundamen­
tally by two things: the first is the basic education and
training of people, and the second is by experience. It 
would appear that in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa, 
attention in the past had been focussed more on the second, 
that is to say, experience, and basic education and training,
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particularly in the case of the local recruits, had been 
relatively neglected or rather, the attitude to it had been 
one of indifference. This is amply demonstrated in Table 
3 .11 a and b below. Some 506 out of 896 expatriate manage­
ment and supervisory personnel in the firms included in the 
study, and 56? of the 904 Africans, have no background 
educational qualifications beyond school certificate or the 
equivalent and in several cases below that level. Specula- 
tively, the reasons for this may be manifold. They may vary 
from a rationalisation in order to perpetuate the colonial 
system to the lack of institutions locally for gaining the 
specific type of education and training or the lack of 
incentives for emphasising the importance for such job 
opportunities of the specific type of education and training 
or they may be due to stereotypes in social attitudes which 
in fact discourage such types of activities, or they may be 
due to the discouragement by existing expatriate management, 
itself because of self-preservation, or of its own lack of 
understanding of the problem.
The problem of replacement itself must be seen in a 
dynamic light. In the first place, there was-the replacement 
of existing foreign personnel. Then there was the replace­
ment of personnel which might be the result of normal retire­
ment or the appearance of incidental gaps and so on. There was 
also the necessity to project future demand. Thus, if 
expansion takes place and provision is not made to meet 
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"become necessary to satisfy the demand for increased
54management by reverting to the employment of expatriates.
Thus, replacement without projection of demand may lead to 
a reversal of the move to Africanisé. If future demand 
exceeds future supply, the supply can only be satisfied by 
the use of expatriates or the development and expansion 
will be embarassed or checkmated. Hence replacement in a 
dynamic sense would embrace not only the demand for 
immediate replacement but also the future expansion of 
demand. This requires projection of future demand which 
are directly linked up with expected growth rate in 
businesses and development plans.(Table 5«17)«
In Table 3.8a above, the total number of expatriates 
in the private sector employment was 896. If complete African­
isation' was the immediate objective, then it meant
the 896 expatriates need to be replaced with 
Africans, If the government views on this are held to be 
serious, then expatriate personnel need to be replaced 
in the first stage. The horizontal subtotals in Table 
3 .8 above provides the numbers which were required in each 
category to effect displacement. These indicated quite 
clearly that categories 01 and 02 totalling 312 were crucial 
Indeed, these were .the groups which.were founded on management 
education and training distributed over by on-the-job- 
training in each category or group of businesses or indus­
try. Categories 03-O5 were essentially professional 
accountants and 06 were engineers. Categories l4 and 15 were
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inflated by the security services and a number of middle 
technical and engineering personnel in the mining industry, 
mainly. There was no reason given why the special security 
services of these mining companies could not be’fully Af- 
ricanised.by then and so ease the unemployment problems 
among Africans. Some of these categories had to be combed 
fine (particularly in the 10 to 18 categories which were 
melanges) so as to differentiate the engineers from the 
accountants and indeed engineers of various categories - 
mechanical, civil, mining and electrical. Here, however, 
one has a first approximation of the dimension of the 
problem of Africanising the private sector employment.
This does not take account of growth. The indication seemed 
to be that the business community assumed an annual growth 
rate of the order of 10 per cent. If this was correct, the 
policy must also provide allowances - particularly in 
planning training - for such increase. Otherwise, not only would 
the policy itself be frustrated but the progress of 
the economy would be retarded.
Table 3.8(a) above compared to 3.8(b) gives an easy 
feeling that the solution of the problem presented in the 
latter is a simple one. From the overall point of view 
the divergence in number is slight and therefore it would 
seem the solution would be to move the Africans already 
occupying these places into the places of the expatriates 
and so on. This is a vain illusion. Many of the Sierra 
Leoneans in these categories had only .  ̂ been
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promoted and others were’nearing their retirement. Con­
sidering the past recruitment policies of businesses 
(Section 3*3) several of these Sierra Leoneans had already 
reached their limit. They have entered these categories 
practically only through on-the-job training without the 
requisite educational and professional background.
However, it has been earlier noted that the shortage of 
qualified personnel was not the only factor involved in 
Africanisation. The advantages enjoyed by these expatriates 
while working in Sierra Leone or Black Africa in general, 
and their attitudes towards the African workers, 
constituted a formidable obstacle to the pace
of Africanisation.
There are certain obvious personal advantages to 
expatriate employees working in Sierra Leone, especially 
those in the first third of their careers who seek to 
take advantage of the opportunity. Young expatriates look 
upon overseas employment chiefly as a means of advancement. 
Promotion prospects were written into some contracts as 
one of the rewards of service overseas. And for others, 
advancement which could be expected in overseas positions 
with the firm on return to Europe or America. For these 
reasons young expatriates often sought jobs with firms 
which required a certain amount of overseas operations.
The most important attraction in taking a job overseas 
remains, however, not in advancement, but in earning power. 
Salaries are set at approximately 35 to 40 per cent above
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the basic in their home countries (see Table 3«3 above) for 
a given job in order to compensate for the increased cost 
of living and expenses defined as "expatriate costs". And 
since most expatriates saved this increase by purchasing 
only the basic necessities overseas, it can be deposited 
as savings in a bank account in Europe or America. The 
average expatriate salary in the private sector in Sierra 
Leone as at 1978 prices was £6,000 per annum, 
excluding the cost of transportation, children's education 
at home and housing , which are provided by the employer 
for all expatriate contracts.
Among the general advantages of being in Africa 
mentioned by the respondent^,they cited the material 
benefits. Among those who cited the accumulation of savings 
as most significant advantage, all except a few who were 
privately employed, while it was ironically the technical ass­
istants who were traditionally accused by the members of 
the private sector of living in deliberately austere 
circumstances in order to accumulate savings. Another 
major advantage which was mentioned was the availability 
of domestic servants employed by all Europeans (at the 
expense of the company) which would have been beyond the 
means of the majority of the expatriates when resident in 
their respective countries in Europe or America.
These factors contributed to an explanation of why 
many Europeans interviewed considered working conditions 
to be superior in Sierra Leone to those in Europe or
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America. Among the advantages specifically related to 
working conditions which were cited by the expatriate 
respondents were professional advancement and more diversity 
and responsibility on the job. Some expanded on this by 
explaining that in the United Kingdom, for example, they 
were compartmentalised into a small slot of work, whereas 
in Sierra Leone, they had much more varied tasks to perform 
and more freedom and individual initiative in performing 
them. They naturally, therefore, found overseas jobs to 
be much more interesting, more satisfying, and they also 
appreciated the lack of rigidity and strictness in working 
hours. Several also mentioned the relaxed working condi­
tions and easy transportation to and from work as compared 
with the 'frantic' pace of work and travel in their home 
countries' major cities. Life in Sierra Leone for 
expatriate personnel took on a naturally slow pace of its 
own - partly a function of the tropical climate and partly 
reinforced by the traditionally easy rhythm of expatriate 
life in such environment. One of the most distinctive 
advantages of expatriate working conditions was considered 
to be "Senior Staff Club", a European club. Proudfoot and 
Wilson provided a picturesque description of an expatriate 
club in Freetown as follows:
Moreover, it is 'Africanisation' rather than 
independence which threatens their traditional 
social life. After the day's work, with its 
inevitable strain of culture contacts and
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language problems, it was pleasant to withdraw 
into expatriate clubs. These though they 
varied among themselves, were alike being 
exclusive and became both symbols of communal 
unity and agencies of social control.
In these clubs, the atmosphere among expatriate employees 
is cordial. The relationship between an executive and a 
more junior employee was much closer and more amicable 
than would have been the case in Britain. Several 
expatriate employees of the companies visited mentioned 
how the ease of personal contact and European solidarity 
provided a pleasant working atmosphere.
The disadvantages of working in Sierra Leone which 
were mentioned by those expatriates interviewed were in 
particular the heavy responsibility ajid work load they had 
to assume because they felt they were not adequately 
supported by their African colleagues or subordinates. 
Certain of them felt that the Sierra Leoneans were generally 
difficult to work with, others considered that the Sierra 
Leoneans did not work as hard as their European counter­
parts and that they were slow and lacked initiative.
The actual output of African workers, its limitations 
and deficiencies have been analysed in a number of studies. 
On general aptitude, Africans workers showed identical 
scores to European workers, but on practical tests, there 
was a net difference between outputs when the employee was 
permitted to organise his own work. Thus, African labourers
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in routine jobs, or on assembly lines, have exactly the 
same output, given equal conditions, as their European 
counterparts, but in jobs demanding decisions and organisa­
tion the African labourer was less effective. It was also 
found that Africans trained to take over supervisory posts 
in industries from expatriates did not always possess all 
the "non-technical qualities" required to make efficient 
foremen. The appropriate technical skills, knowledge and 
aptitude for promotion were often found among workers who 
lacked more general education or the personal authority and 
adaptability to handle unforeseen and (for them) unprece­
dented difficulties arising in production.-^®
Part of the explanation for the differences in output 
and performance lies in the general problem of transforming 
a peasant or the son of a peasant into a factory or mines 
workshop worker. This transformation from a domestic 
mode of production to factory or workshop modes usually 
requires some degree or stages of commitments which a 
substantial number of African workers have not yet reached
their final stage of adjustment - the third and fourth
. 60 stages.
While the European, on the other hand, often has a 
tradition of industrial experience behind him, where his 
father and even grandfather were familiar with the working 
environment of the factory, the African does not. He is 
usually a first generation employee or labourer, whose 
father and grandfather were peasant farmers or roadside 
hawkers, whose methods of work were often incompatible
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with the new demands made of him. Such factors may 
partially explain why it was found that African skilled 
workers had little desire for advancement in the industrial 
context,®^ an attitude condemned by their European counter­
parts as "I don't care-ism", the words used to describe 
African behaviour at work by some of the expatriates inter­
viewed during the field study.
Generalisation concerning the behaviour of African
workers and officials were abundant throughout among
private sector employers and their expatriate counterparts
as well: their lack of practical knowledge, their inability
to plan ahead, their lack of professional conscientiousness
and their ineptitude in financial matters were felt to
contribute to their generally low level of output. These
were most often expressed in the same phrases (reflecting
6 ?Douglas McGregor's Theory X):
"They are indolent by nature."
"They have no courage."
"They have no taste for work in their blood."
"They don't look further than the work specifi­
cally demanded of them or have the mentality to carry it 
to conclusion."
"They lack initiative and a sense of responsibility."
"They lack a sense of rigour or duty in their 
character."
"They are non=chalant; the time of day has no 
significance to them." ^
The point here to be examined is, however, not the 
truth or otherwise of these assertions, but rather the
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nature of the explanation given for that which is believed 
to be true by expatriates. One such explanation is based 
on the physical and climatic conditions of the working 
environment. A second, relied on a priori sweeping judge­
ments of the racial, national or cultural characteristics 
of all Africans, the corrollary of which was to attribute 
observed behaviour to specific personality characteristics 
which were seen as biologically or culturally determined.
A third, was to associate observed behaviour with a certain 
stage of human and cultural evolution, which it was believed 
could be directly related to the stage of socio-economic 
development of the country itself. The fourth category of 
explanation relied on economic or social factors present 
in the existing situation - that is the inexperience of 
newly trained executives and employees, underemployment, 
owing to redundancy or the lack of appropriate education or 
training at all levels. Another is that the comments say 
more about the speakers than the subjects of the comments.
The tropical climate and poor nutrition are explana­
tions for poor work output which have at least some basis 
for possible verification. While the Sierra Leonean diet 
is considerably better than that of some other peoples in 
the underdeveloped world, it is certainly not as rich in 
vitamin or protein intake as an average European diet. The 
tropical climate seems to have some influence on work out­
put which affects Africans and Europeans alike.
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Those who felt that sub-standard work was culturally 
determined attributed this to such factors as African 
family structure, child-rearing pattern, etc. The causal 
relationship of such beliefs to inferior work output is, 
however, quite difficult to certify.
Other explanations for low African work output could be 
related, perhaps, to a lower standard of demand made on 
Africans in Sierra Leone than, for example, in the equiva­
lent context in Britain. Since expatriates on the job were 
available to pick up where Africans left off, a European 
standard of demand was hardly ever applied.
At the executive level, the preparation of an African em­
ployee was usually done personally by the departing Euro­
pean boss whose place he was supposed to -take. This was an 
unfortunate but inevitable means of achieving this special­
ised preparation, and .̂t was often ‘done in an unfortunate 
atmosphere. Feeling a certain amount of resentment over 
impending departure, the European may find it actually 
rather difficult to explain these functions to his African 
subordinate. The following description of such a situation 
was given by a young Sierra Leonean executive with a medium size 
manufacturing company in Freetown:
My superior had six weeks to prepare me to 
do his work, but he did nothing. On the 
last day.he handed me an enormous dosier and 
said, "Here it is." The actual know-how of 
executive and managerial positions is kept 
a well-guarded secret between Europeans themselves.
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This happens at many levels of employment and training. 
Africans are frequently poorly prepared for the tasks they 
are supposed to perform, and they leam at best on an ad hoc 
basis. In industry:
When top management of a firm decides to 
Africanisé, it must rely on local management 
who must (in turn) rely on expatriate super­
visors. Most expatriate supervisors do not 
have the capacity to provide adequate training 
up to now, they have been absolute masters in 
their own department; they exercised a pater­
nalistic authority over their African staff 
and had powers to dismiss their subordinates.
There was no incentive for expatriate super­
visors to raise the technical abilities of 
their African teams; indeed, the very authority 
of an expatriate supervisor (often of mediocre
ability) rested on the incapacity of his
64African subordinate.
Although this description hardly tallies with the 
impression given by some of the expatriate supervisors 
interviewed in the field study, but it was corroborated 
by a final category of respondents (25) who rejected 
cultural inferiority as the basis of explanation for the 
poor performance of African employees. Among the line
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supervisors (15) interviewed, none mentioned African racial 
inferiority as an explanation for inferior or low work out­
put. Having the most direct contact with African workers 
on the shop floor, they were perhaps in a better position 
than most Europeans to judge deficiencies which they 
attributed to lack of training and adequate preparation for 
the job. Their assessment is particularly interesting 
because it was their position, above all which were threat­
ened with Africanisation; fear or sense of competition with 
African subordinates did not necessarily lead them to the 
prejudice-based stereotypes found among some groups of 
expatriate workers (10) interviewed. In sum, for the time 
being, the advantages enjoyed by expatriates working in 
Africa, and Sierra Leone in particular, and the stereotype 
views they hold of their African counterparts, among many 
others presented obstacles to the success of any Africani­
sation policy (Chapter 4).
So far attention has been concentrated on the strictly 
economic, supply, and psychological aspects of the problem, 
but in discussing this question, considerable prominence was 
generally given to the sociological factors. This was 
especially true when dealing specifically with Africanisa­
tion, since it was often maintained that there are certain 
characteristics of African social organisation and 
personality structure which accentuate the difficulties 
of Africanisation in Africa. It is also worth noting that 
the view that Africans do not easily adapt to the require-
— 269—
merits of an industrial society is held by both Africans 
and Europeans; the former maintain that industrial develop­
ment in Africa will be on uniquely African lines, in order 
to fit in with the African personality; while the latter 
maintain that industrial development will only come about 
at all on condition that African social structure is 
transformed into something near to the European model.
A typical example of the latter point of view - which 
is the relevant one when considering the advancement of 
Africans in foreign-owned enterprises - was given'in a 
booklet on African private enterprise:
In Africa, as in other traditional societies 
the primary obligations are to the family as 
the basic social unit - and the family often 
extends to literally hundreds of people.
These traditional family obligations require 
that African entrepreneurs will provide jobs 
for their relatives; they may also strengthen 
African reluctance to enter partnerships with 
non-members of the family or tribe or to 
entrust outsiders employed in the business 
with important responsibilities.^®
Although these remarks were mainly directed to the question 
of local ownership, they are clearly also relevant to the 
question of advancement of local employees in foreign 
firms. If this view is correct, employers will be 
understandably anxious lest their African workers allow
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family and tribal obligations to override their business 
responsibilities, and hence be reluctant to promote them. 
There is no doubt that this view was strongly held by 
expatriate management, for example, in Sierra Leone during 
the field work for this study an expatriate employer 
commented :
If you employ an African tribesman as personnel 
manager, he will employ all his tribesmen in 
preference to other tribes, regardless of 
their qualification and suitability for the 
job. This is not what we as employers want, 
we want people who can do the job and make a 
profit.®^
Andreski, writing on Africa as a whole, made a similar 
point when he wrote:
An African who has reached the top is expected 
to provide jobs for hundreds of his clansmen. 
Unless he receives a substantial bribe from a 
non-kinsman, he would give all the appointments 
which he controls to his kinsmen. Except in 
cases of more complicated arrangements based 
on bargaining between clans, in consequence 
of which an official may appoint a kinsman of 
a man who has appointed, or will appoint, his 
kinsman in return.®®
The relative importance of bribery as compared with kinship- 
nepotism depends on the extent to which a given set has
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become de-tribalised, as détribalisation involves weakening 
of kin-solidarity and thereby gives more scope to unfettered 
cupidity.
An interesting point here is that bribery and nepotism 
are often combined; a man in the position to decide whom 
to employ will give preference to his kinsmen, but they 
will still have to hand over to him a part of their pay.
The resulting network of social relations will somewhat 
resemble the old African custom of giving presents to the 
head of the clans, the Paramount Chief, etc. and will be 
less ruthlessly necessary then when strangers are involved. 
It will present a fascinating and intricate hybrid of kin- 
solidarity - commercialisation of offices.®^
Yet, there is little evidence that these sociological 
factors are peculiar either to Africa or to the developing 
countries in general. It is interesting to compare the 
above quotation with one from an article on the same
subject but concerned with a different part of the world, 
Latin America;
Despite the varied origins of Latin American 
business ownership . . . there is a recogni­
zable pattern of life deriving in large part 
from the prevailing Iberian background. An 
important element derived from this back­
ground is the strong emphasis on family loyalty 
which often leads to the exclusion of outsiders 
from responsible positions, no matter how much
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they might benefit the family firm. The 
sharp distinction between social friends and 
business friends reinforces this form of 
exclusiveness. This attitude is not conducive 
to the establishment or expansion of employees 
training programmes in the older type of 
enterprises.
It would appear that what is specifically African is 
also specifically Spanish! Certainly, some type of social 
relationships tend to be conducive to the development of 
managerial and entrepreneural talents than do others, but 
there seems to be little merit in becoming involved in 
these indirect and often nebulous hinderances to African 
advancement when there are so many direct barriers to be 
surmounted.
A final, and perhaps a more important sociological 
factor that constituted a potent obstacle to progressive 
Africanisation is the honesty and integrity that is largely 
lacking by these Africans already in senior responsible 
positions in both the public and private sectors in Sierra 
Leone. In Chapter 2, Part 1, and Chapter 3 of this Part 
(II), two cases in the para-statel corporation and one 
case in the private sector were cited. In the first two 
cases, the Sierra Leone Government was forced to .evolve 
into a policy of de-Africanisation, whereby the managements 
of the two corporations were entrusted to contract expatr­
iate managements. In the private sector, the case of the
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Aureol Tobacco Company, the posts of Financial Controller 
and Factory Manager being de-Africanised for reasons 
already explained before.
When Private Sector employers were asked why they were 
reluctant to Africanisé such posts as accountants, financial 
controller, etc. the answers were invariably the same, the main 
complaint they used as an argument against Africanising 
such posts was that of dishonesty. The stories of dishonesty 
and corruption among African employees in responsible pos­
itions varied from petty pilfering to blatant forgeries 
and embezzlement. Employers cited several cases where 
snior African personnel given company money to be deposited 
in the company bank, only to run away with the money; the 
case of a bank cashier who overpaid a customer after 
conniving with the customer to defraud the bank, and later 
on, received part of the money from the customer, etc.
Because of these high incidents of such dishonest 
practices among Africans some levantine businesses would 
like to make the Africanisation of their business conditional 
on the African employed in managerial and supervisory 
capacities being bonded or guaranteed by sureties.
On the face of it, it would seem that what was considered 
wrong was more the recruitment policies of these concerns. 
Indeed, the incidence of such occurences appears to be 
higher with the levantine firms than with European firms 
(see Section 3*2 above). The latter employed a much higher 
quality of Africans on the whole than a Lebanese or Indian
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bus in es sman. An impressionistic view of the crime statis­
tics in Sierra Leone were negatively correlated with the 
level of education of the employee. The higher the level 
of education the less is the likelihood of the occurrence 
of these petty crimes. But when they do occur, heavy sums of 
money were always involved. However, the higher the educa­
tion of an individual is the higher the social value in the 
community and the greater the stake in losing that value 
because the deeper is the self-regarding sentiment involved. 
Consequently, the higher the educational attainment of the 
employee, the more responsible the latter becomes and the 
greater the opportunity cost of losing that status and all 
that goes with it. By recruiting at the appropriate level, 
these companies could insulate themselves from the higher 
incidence of such dishonest practices which is the price 
they have to pay otherwise.
3»6 The Sierra Leonean Successor.
Africanisation has been described as a forced 
succession in the sense that personnel from both races 
have privately questioned the legitimacy of the displace­
ment of white by black, and also in the sense that the new 
incumbent has often been inadequately prepared to take 
over the new position. - The policy to Africanisé the private 
sector has been 'forced' upon private sector employers by 
the political climate of Independence, which demands the 
fulfilment of African aspiration by replacing white
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personnel with Sierra Leonean personnel as quickly as was
71consistent with efficiency.'
The legitimacy of the authority exercised by the whites 
developed from their colour, which over the years had come 
to symbolise in the mind of the African on the one hand 
expertise and on the other brutal and often arbitrary 
d i s c i p l i n e . T h e  social distance which separated the 
races and the unquestioning supremacy of one made it im­
possible for the African to temper white oppression through 
informal social and political pressure. White man's 
authority bore strong elements of 'tradition' and 'charisma' 
which the African, when he takes over, is not able to 
emulate. Though he may try to act like a " m a s s a " , he 
may fail because, for one thing, he does not bear the 
symbol of authority and, for another, unlike his prede­
cessor, he is subject to informal social, economic and 
political pressures from his subordinates. But such 
influences can also work in tie reverse direction, and, as 
it shall be seen, the Sierra Leonean supervisor is able, 
under favourable conditions,to manipulate informal social 
controls to strengthen his position. Nevertheless, the 
crisis of legitimacy brought about by the breakdown of 
traditional and charismatic authority leads the Sierra 
Leonean national to place ever-increasing reliance on 
authority derived from the bureaucratic system.
Unfortunately for the Sierra Leonean successor this 
too is often a diminished version of what was potentially
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available to his predecessor. For the authority exercised 
by the newly appointed or promoted African over his sub­
ordinates derives from the support extended to him by his 
supervisor and other expatriates who control the bureau­
cratic apparatus. Because the expatriate is often 
indifferent, if not resistant, to the success of Africanisa­
tion, the support the African successor receives from above 
is not always the same as his predecessor used to enjoy.
The attitudes of the expatriate can be explained by 
reference to the peculiar circumstances and the history of 
black-white relations during the colonial period in all 
aspects of economic life, the racial prejudice of both the 
African and the expatriate communities, the continuing 
racial stratification within each industry, and the 
transient commitment associated with expatriate status. On 
the other hand, such resistance to change is a common 
phenomenon in industry,' and is also found, for example, 
among civil servants when there is a change of government. 
There is a natural resistance to any succession which is 
seen by the permanent incumbent as threatening their 
interests or demanding adjustment.
Acknowledgeing the inevitability of some resistance 
by expatriates to Africanisation, and assuming that 
efficiency can be maintained only if displacement takes 
place in a systematic and planned manner, the private 
sector employers are required each year to submit a 
progress report on their Africanisation programme to the
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appropriate M i n i s t r y . F o r  the mining companies, to the 
Ministry of Mines. In these programmes are included also 
Africanisation forecasts which are available to the 
government for examination, and considerable pressure is 
applied by top management on the lower levels of management 
to fulfill the predictions. In this way, the companies 
can be assured that progress is being made and can present 
visible evidence of this to the government. On the other 
hand, the very bureaucratic manner in which departments are 
compelled to adhere to Africanisation forecasts, and the 
assumption that without these the department would in fact 
resist Africanisation policy of the company, have given 
rise to manipulation which militates against effective 
Africanisation. When Africanisation is imposed from above, 
whole-hearted co-operation is unlikely to prevail. When 
there is compulsion to satisfy forecasts, then there is a 
danger that Sierra Leonean nationals will be promoted to 
positions for which they are obviously unprepared, with 
the result that new posts may be created for expatriates 
to oversee the new African successor.
The heritage of educational underdevelopment and 
resistance to Africanisation has left the Sierra Leonean 
often unprepared to take over many of the new jobs. The 
consequences of sometimes inadequate training, low level 
of literacy and numeracy and the remorseless implementation 
of Africanisation programmes has been to promote a number 
of Africans above what Lawrence Peters calls their 'level of
- 278-
competence ' . All these factors add up to what is called 
"window-dressing Africanisation".
As a result of expatriate resistence and possibly of 
the African successor's inadequacy, the latter may not be 
accorded, either formally or informally or both, the same 
status as his white predecessor or his white colleagues. He 
may not be invited to the meetings which his predecessor 
attended, or he may not be granted the same powers by his 
supervisor, such as awarding overtime to his subordinates.
In each case his authority over his subordinates is under­
mined and the respect he can command from them is diminished.
It is to be expected in any well prepared Africanisa­
tion scheme that as Africanisation progresses so one level 
of expatriates disappears after the next and that those who 
remain are at the top of the pyramid. In contrast to the 
civil service (Section 1) where the top ranks were 
Africanised at an early stage, in the private sector, 
particularly the mining industry, the accepted view is that 
the absence of technical qualifications and the long 
experience of mining among top-level management would 
endanger production. In addition to the tendency to 
Africanisé only from below, those who prepare the Africani­
sation programmes for their departments have taken great 
pains to ensure that stratification by race invariably 
coincides with the stratification by authority and that no 
expatriate has to take instructions from an African.-
As a result, expatriates were
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never found competing for the favours of a Sierra Leonean 
national; hence they retain their solidarity in opposition 
to the Sierra Leonean and their grip over the bureaucratic 
structure, and apparatus. They were able to decide how much 
authority and power shall be delegated, who shall be 
promoted and how the organisation shall be structured.
To the extent that they are concerned to protect 
hitherto white jobs from being Africanised, those who con­
trolled the departmental organisation can introduce a 
number of barriers. One such barrier is the introduction 
of qualification requirements in excess of the actual 
requirements. This is to be found most commonly in the 
technical field where promotion may be barred to those who
have not the requisite 'diploma' or 'certificate' or the
77number of years of experience.'' Yet, supervising expat­
riates do not have these same qualifications which are 
required of the aspiring Sierra Leonean national (see 
Tables 3.11a and 3*llb above). It is only since Africanisation 
has become a reality that qualifications have become such 
an important criterion for progression within industry.
Apart from the refusal to promote Africans because they 
lack some basic attribute which may have little to do with 
the quality of the job performance, in some instances 
Africans have been held in acting positions for long until 
they have become so frustrated that some left the firms.
Another organisational manipulation which has the same 
consequence is the expansion of the department to include
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a greater number of organisational levels. By bringing 
in 'experts' from overseas with fancy job titles who do 
relatively mundane jobs, so expanding the department, the 
organisational gap between the African and the head of 
department is widened. For example, in one of the mining 
operations in Sierra Leone, there are the posts of 
Managing Director, General Manager, the Personnel Director, 
Personnel Manager, all expatriates, two personnel officers, 
one for administration, and the other for welfare, both 
Africans, i ; .
3 .7 Attitude of the African Successor to the Expatriate.
Brought up in an atmosphere of racial discrimination 
and discovering that, no matter how high he moves, still 
the whites have a monopoly of the control of the industry 
or enterprise, the African becomes an "outcast" among his 
expatriate colleagues. To the Sierra Leonean they are a 
hostile group determined to undermine his performance and 
disgrace him before his subordinates.
The following are some of the comments by senior 
African employees of a major mining company in Sierra 
Leone which has been in operation since 1935* First, an 
assistant supervisor, mining;
The expatriate colleague is listened to by 
higher officials who are also expatriates.
He is treated better, and shown some respect, 
while I am not. He keeps company with higher
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officials outside work (in clubs) but keeps 
himself to himself at work . . . Our 
expatriate colleagues usually move faster than 
Africans . . . because they have patrons in 
higher positions. When I find an expatriate 
colleague or even an African who is less 
qualified than myself getting promoted before 
myself I don’t care how hard I try to feel 
calm and friendly to this fellow, I find I 
can't. So even though I don't think he is 
responsible for the injustice, I group him 
together with the higher supervisors who 
pull him by deliberately throwing away the 
correct promotion procedure and adopting one 
based on rival groupings.
One particularly sensitive area was the training and 
occupational mobility of the expatriate as compared to 
the African. Here is a comment from another senior African 
assistant supervisor, electrical;
For Africans of similar or the same qualifi­
cations as expatriates, training periods on 
the job are far.too excessive. The reason 
given is that we need experience, but then 
if we need this experience why don't the 
expatriates? Some of the expatriates are 
novices right from their technical colleges 
or polytechnics. You ask them why they only
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spend a little time on training and they 
answer you that even the management knows 
that they are on contract and that they cannot 
afford to spend too much time on useless jobs 
so they move up rapidly. You ask them if 
they can do the jobs in the higher ranks 
after not doing so well in the lower ranks.
They tell you that it is no concern of theirs, 
the management knows better.
Some Sierra Leoneans were as well qualified, .some were 
more qualified than other expatriates, and yet they still re­
ceived . inferior treatment. This is interpreted by the 
Africans to mean that management and possibly Government also 
assumed the African product to be inferior to the
expatriate product simply because it is African. Here are 
the views of an African foreman, production:
Our supervisors have made up their mind that 
Africans can't be competent. If you give them 
excellent work they pat you on the shoulder, 
but behind the scenes, they wonder if you 
actually did the work. The African qualifi­
cations are treated with suspect. A Sierra 
Leonean does not necessarily find people in 
the mines - bosses, that is - who recognize 
him as a qualified person. His capability 
is always doubted for reasons of keeping him 
down. An African given the same task to do
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as an expatriate usually does it better and 
in a shorter time, but he is given more work 
to prove himself capable, whereas an expatriate 
is passed as competent and taken to the next 
stage.
Comments from the shift bosses who have obtained promotion 
on the basis of experience rather than qualifications were 
as follows:
There is a lack of trust among whites when 
it comes to Africans in responsible jobs.
They just fear Government action, that's 
why they give us such jobs.
The Africans trained overseas (U.K. mainly) also 
resent the different conditions of service which app]ied to 
him and not to his expatriate colleagues with the same 
qualifications. One of them interviewed has the following 
comments to make:
An African graduate's salary compared to that 
of an expatriate of the same qualifications 
is somewhat between one-third and one half.
The companies defend themselves by saying 
expatriates get allowances which boost their 
salaries, but how can they pay more in 
allowances than in salaries? An African is 
not allowed a loan of any kind. On arrival 
in Sierra Leone from overseas university, an 
African is told, "You have your parents here
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in Sierra Leone, so you can't have a loan!" 
Housing is a problem for African graduates.
If after a long period of waiting he is 
promised a house, the promise is good only 
if no expatriate arrives before the date 
when the African is to get the house.
At the conclusion of the interview this graduate declared; 
My future, like that of many others in my 
position, is at the mercy of the expatriate 
officials as long as I remain on this company. 
There is only one hope. This is to leave the 
company and seek employment in some other 
industry where conditions of service are 
much more attractive, economically, socially 
and with respect to job content. This action 
is not easy to take, for it means changing a 
career, but it can be done even to this extreme 
because the company is really bad at the moment. 
Some people have been contemplating going back 
to study for another course and that way 
getting over the problem of joining some 
other industry as a non-graduate if their 
present qualification is confined to their 
present jobs.
Private sector employers' reasons for favouring their 
expatriate employees are not here being questioned, but 
what is presented here is the African successors' interpre­
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tation of them; that they symptom!ze the assumption of 
African "inferiority". The Government and private sector em­
ployers were faced with the problem of having to recruit 
expatriate labour from other countries to do the same jobs 
as Sierra Leonean nationals, yet paying them rates deter­
mined by the international market and the necessary 
inducements :to work in an independent African state, to 
pay the African incumbents at these same rates would not 
only be expensive but disastrous to the economy as a whole 
(see Tables 3*3«
At the same time one can readily appreciate the 
African graduate's perception of his circumstances and his 
resentment towards the expatriates who controlled his pro­
gress, his job and his status, apparently with the 
acquiescence of his Government under the cloak of non­
government interference in the affairs of the private 
sector, even if at the detriment of its nationals.
It is without any doubt that current Africanisation 
policy is being described as mere 'window-dressing' or 
"token Africanisation" whereby expatriate employers indulge 
in appointing Sierra Leoneans into newly created posts 
rather than formerly expatriate-held positions, or for 
every senior post occupied by an African, a new, more senior 
post is created for an expatriate. As a senior African 
employee of a mining company put it;
Africanisation in our company simply means 
more jobs being done by Africans, but for
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every new job taken up by an African there 
must be a new and better job for an expat­
riate. As an example, now that we have an 
African senior personnel officer, we have 
also an expatriate personnel superintendent.
It has not been necessary to have these people 
before; what now has made it necessary to have 
an expatriate personnel superintendent besides 
the Personnel Manager who is also an expat­
riate?^^
The implication is that expatriate employers wanted to have 
senior African managers but they were unwilling to give up 
any position which carries with it significant power. Such em­
ployers appointed Sierra Leoneans to positions which were 
senior in name only. This type of appointment has been 
most common in respect of such staff positions as Company 
Secretary, Public Relations Officer, Personnel Officer, etc.
In some cases, the company had no such position in the past; 
in others, the position was previously considered to be a 
junior one, and was up-graded to senior status.
It was also claimed that the degree of responsibility 
of some African managers was diluted in one of several 
ways. In some cases, the local manager was.carefully 
supervised by an expatriate. The indigenous manager did 
all the work associated with his position, but there was a 
'check on him'. In other words, a Sierra Leonean is 
appointed to the position but an expatriate is retained as
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an adviser. A case in point is that of the Plantation 
Division of the Sierra Leone Aureale Tobacco Company where 
the post of Leaf Manager was Africanised, but the expatriate 
predecessor was retained as Leaf Adviser (see Page 235» 
Chapter 3)» As an employee of that company commented: 
Fragmentation and creation of new posts, 
quite reasonable expedients in some circum­
stances, is the white man's means of prolong-
O qing his lucrative stay in Sierra Leone.
In another type of situation, a Sierra Leonean was 
appointed to replace a departing expatriate manager, but 
was given only a portion of the duties of his predecessor, 
the other responsibilities were taken over by another 
expatriate manager. Another case in mind is that of the 
Standard Bank Sierra Leone Ltd. Before November, 1978, the 
Chairman of the Bank was an expatriate, as the chief 
executive of the bank; below him was a managing director 
and a general manager. In November 1978, following the 
example of a sister bank, Barclays Bank, the post of 
Chairman was Africanised, but the duties of the chief 
executive of the bank were assumed by the expatriate 
Managing Director. The post of chairman became non­
executive.
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However, on the other hand, private sector employers 
interviewed would reject the charges that they appointed 
'window-dressing' managers. They insisted that it was not 
in their interests to do so and that in the long run such 
actions were self-defeating. In regard to the charge of 
"token Africanisation" the employers argued that growth in 
business has led to a need for new senior management 
positions and that these happened to be the ones for which 
qualified Sierra Leoneans were available. In time. Sierra 
Leoneans would be'appointed to other types of senior 
positions as well. Answering the charge of "diluted" 
management responsibilities, the employers argued that these 
were temporary adaptations necessitated by the
inexperience of the Sierra Leoneans who have been appointed 
to the position. As the Sierra Leonean gained experience, 
such 'check' will no longer be necessary.
To a large extent, the judgement of whether managerial 
appointment is or is not token or window-dressing Africani­
sation comes down to a judgement of the firm's intention: 
whether, the intention of the firm is to have only a "token 
manager" with no real authority and responsibility, so that 
the firm appears to be Africanising "because they just fear 
the Government" or whether what might appear as a 'window- 
dressing' appointment is actually a temporary situation 
designed to assist in the training of the manager in 
question to assume full responsibility.
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Altematively, given the relatively weak social 
constraints on human behaviour within an industrial setting, 
the concept of window-dressing Africanisation presupposes a 
deliberate managerial manipulation to withhold power and 
responsibility from the newly promoted or appointed 
African while the actual decisions mere taken by an expatr­
iate less visibly situated. In this connection, one could 
put up a strong case for regarding the African successor, 
referred to earlier, as being an example of window-dressing. 
However, in the general-case, to validate such an evaluation 
it is necessary to show that the Sierra Leonean concerned 
is indeed unable to exercise that power and responsibility 
should he so desire. The analysis of this section implies 
that some Sierra Leoneans promoted or appointed to high 
positions will not show much interest in taking initiatives, 
assuming responsibilities and exercising decision-making 
powers where this would require considerable self-discipline 
and dedication to the job. Labelling Africanisation as 
'window-dressing' on the one hand, excuses the failures of 
the Sierra Leoneans in high positions and on the other, 
legitimizes a very casual approach to work, indulging in 
the reward without paying the costs or making sacrifices.
Of course, the expatriate is content to see the African 
abdicating his responsibilities and commitments since this 
not only confirms his racial prejudices but also allows him 
to continue to make the decisions in his own interest. At 
the same time this does not necessarily imply that the
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expatriate deliberately attempts to manipulate the organisa­
tion to achieve such an end; the African may well play into 
his hands.
Consequently, it is extremely difficult for a person 
outside the firm to pass judgement on whether "window- 
dressing Africanisation" in a given case is fact or 
appearance. However, this situation illustrates one of the 
problems facing Africanisation enforcement authorities and, 
above all, the Principal Immigration Officer. It also high­
lighted the need to enlist active support for Africanisation 
policy from the business community through their represen­
tative bodies, such as the Sierra Leone Employers Federation, 
the Sierra Leone Chambersof Commerce and Mines respectively.
3.8 Summary and Conclusions.
In this chapter some attempts have been made, first 
to spell out the policy objectives (in the general introduc­
tion to Part II) for the Africanisation of the private 
sector, and its various aspects. Three of these aspects 
were identified - ownership, control, and manpower substi­
tution. The study was concerned with the last two. But 
all three can be used simultaneously, depending on individual 
country's choice of policy priorities. But as a first 
stage of economic development, most African countries have 
tended to start with the last two, and Sierra Leone is not 
an exception to this. Second, chapter three looked at the 
employment policies of foreign-owned firms operating in
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sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa. Section 3*1 provided 
a bird's eye view of the pattern of employment in the 
private sector. It gave a statistical distribution of 
expatriate and African employment into each occupational 
category; and the average annual income of expatriate and 
African employees. Section 3*2 attempted to provide 
theoretical and factual information to support the thesis 
that the employment policies of foreign-owned companies 
created a dual labour market structure segmented between 
expatriates and African employees. The expatriate employees 
occupied the primary sector with higher salaries based on 
the level of pay in their home countries, better conditions 
of service; while their African counterparts occupied the 
secondary sector with relatively lower salaries based on 
local pay Levels and less attractive conditions of service. 
The cause of this segmentation was perceived to be demand 
determined, and not supply-caused.
Section 3*3 looked at the recruitment practices of 
multi-national corporations. Three types of recruitment 
practices were identified: ethnocentric or patrimonial,
polycentric or political, and geocentric or professional.
The choice of any of these depended on the ownership, the 
nationality, the nature and extent of the company's 
operations, and its stage of development and the political 
climate in the host country. For example, Indian and 
Lebanese-owned enterprises had tended to be more patrimonial 
in their recruitment practices than the European or American
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based companies which tended to be a combination of the 
three.
Section 3.4 looked at the size and dimension of 
expatriate employment in the private sector since 1964. 
Between 1964 and 1978» the number of expatriates employed 
in the private sector had increased from 1221 in 1964 to 
1,588 (see Table 3*7)• But the increase was not evenly 
distributed per industry. There were some industries that 
have experienced a decline in expatriate employment and 
others a rise in the absolute number of expatriates 
employed. The biggest increases per sector were in 
agriculture, mining, the construction and building, and 
commerce. At administrative, managerial and executive 
levels, the number of expatriates employed had increased 
from 291 in 1964 to 396 in 1978 (see Table 3*1 and 3*8 
above). From the above tables, it can be categorically 
concluded that the Africanisation policy has had very 
little, if any, effect on the employment of expatriates 
in the managerial grades of the private sector. Between 
1964 and 1978 the number of expatriate personnel employed 
in the private sector as managers, supervisors, etc. has 
increased from 291 in 1964 to 524 in 1978, a net increase 
of 233 representing a percentage increase of 80.4 for the 
whole period. Of course, it may also be argued that in 
the absence of Africanisation policy (Chapter 4), the 
number might have been more, or the increase in the 
expatriate employment in the managerial and supervisory
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grades was due to the establishment of new enterprises 
where the initial requirements for expatriate skills was 
inevitable.
The Africans, on the other hand, had increased their 
share of the top level managerial and supervisory posts in 
the private sector from 125 in 1964 to 325 in 1978, 
representing a net increase of 201 and a percentage increase 
of 160.8 for the period. Of course, the increase in the 
number of Africans employed in the managerial grades was 
due to the Africanisation policy. A complementary factor 
is the low cost of employing an African manager as opposed 
to an expatriate held to check the growth of expatriate 
employment in the non-technical grades.
Section 3*5 (the pace of Africanisation) looked at 
the advantage enjoyed by the expatriate personnel in 
Sierra Leone, and their attitudes towards their African 
counterparts and sociological factors inherent among 
African employees. All these constituted the most formidable 
obstacles which no Government legislation can easily remove. 
As one expatriate senior employee of a mining company 
admitted:
Who would like to forego all these facilities, 
swimming pool, free housing, free education 
for our children, two months leave with pay 
every year, the company pays for all our 
domestic servants and above all - the "sun 
is lovely."
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What the expatriate friend omitted in his list was the "fat" 
salary, the senior staff club where drinks of all sorts were 
sold below cost prices, and the relatively low cost of 
living in Sierra Leone, And above all, the possibility of 
getting employment in his home country might not be bright. 
However, in a life situation what was considered to be an 
inducement for expatriate personnel to work in Sierra Leone 
has turned out to be a disadvantage for the advancement of 
their African counterparts. Stereotype ideas such as 
inferior performance of the African, the low work output 
of an African employee, the uncommitted nature of the 
African to an industrial way of life were all mooted out 
of the unwillingness of the expatriate to forego the near- 
free facilities enjoyed by them under the "African sun".
Under this section were discussed also a detailed 
analysis of the perceived social obstacles to Africanisation 
policy. Modern business enterprise requires personal 
loyalty and commitment from its employees. But such 
loyalty and commitment are in conflict with the African 
employees loyalty and commitment to his family and ethnic 
or tribe to the extent that an African personnel manager 
would give preference in employment to his own family 
member or kinship and tribe at the expense of other tribes 
or kinship.
Another social factor which has tended to withhold 
the progress of Africans in expatriate enterprises is the 
lack of honesty of Africans. Again this dishonesty might
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be the result of family pressure owing to the extended 
family system. These are all contributing factors to the 
expatriate employers' opposition to Africanisation policy.
Sections 3.6 and 3*7 looked at the position of the 
African successor in relation to the power and responsibility 
he enjoyed as compared to his predecessor. It was esta­
blished in this section that while the African is promoted 
to succeed an expatriate predecessor, his power and 
responsibilities were being diluted, and his authority 
undermined. This led to the accusation that the attempt to 
promote Africans in positions of more responsibilities are, 
in fact, 'window-dressing' and 'token Africanisation', 
designed to convince the Government thatthe private sector 
employers are complying with the Government policy of 
Africanisation. However, the truth of such allegations is 
difficult to establish by an outsider. Because what is 
interpreted to be window-dressing Africanisation might be 
intended to be a gradual transfer of responsibility period 
designed to benefit the African incumbent.
The conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis 
and the evidence available are that the Africanisation 
policies to be discussed in Chapter 4 have not succeeded in 
altering the employment practices of foreign-owned firms.
This is reflected in the increase in the number of expatr­
iates employed in the private sector of the Sierra Leone 
economy from 1,221 in 1964 to 2,652 in 1978. The reasons 
for this might be due to the demand side of the Africanisa-
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tion equation. Such as those already discussed in Sections 
3*4, 3*5 and 3*6 above. Or they might be due to the supply 
side of Africanisation equation, the shortage of manpower 
with the right skills to replace expatriates. If the demand 
side is discounted as minor factors, that is, expatriate 
employers are willing to Africanisé if there is available 
manpower supply, then the main obstacle to the progress of 
Africanisation of the private sector employment is supply 
determined. Therefore, the success and failure of 
Africanisation policies will depend essentially upon the 
supply and availability of the manpower in the right number, 
at the right time, in the right place and with the right
O 4balance of technical knowledge and practical skills. (see 
Chapter 5» Part III.) Because any Africanisation policy 
which fails to take the above factors into consideration 
but rely on persuasion, legislative and fiscal measures 
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CHAPTER 4. THE AFRICANISATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THE
NATIONAL POLICY.
4.1 Introduction
In the last chapter a detailed analysis of the 
employment and recruitment policies and practices of 
foreign-owned companies and their responses and attitudes 
towards the Africanisation issues was done. The present 
chapter looks at the efforts of both organized
labour and the government to influence changes in such 
policies and practices since the country became self- 
governing and independent in 196I.
An important aspect of the drive for independence 
in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Black Africa was the 
determination to have greater African control over the 
running of national affairs. As a result, independence 
has been followed by a substantial Africanisation of the 
public service and to a lesser degree, the private sector.
Upon achieving independence all African governments 
found it necessary to give most politically sensitive 
posts to Africans regardless of their qualifications. The 
new governments were also pressed to seek out qualified 
Africans, promote them to advanced positions in the public 
service. There was also a tendency, frequently warranted, 
to review colonial staffing patterns to eliminate unneces­
sary positions and to reduce the qualification requirements 
for some posts in order to increase the opportunities 
available to the Africans, eg. honours degree requirements, 
for example, reduced to ordinary degree for appointment to
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the administrative service. This led to a substantial " 
increase in African staff in the public service, but did not 
completely diminish the need for foreign personnel, since 
many of the newly appointed Africans, because of their lack 
of training and experience, needed foreign advisers while 
they were establishing themselves. The post-colonial 
expansion in government activities has resulted in an 
overall increase in the requirements for foreign personnel, 
although they were of different types from those employed 
under a colonial administration. For example, the technical 
assistance and contract employment has replaced the 
employment of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Servants (see 
Table 2.5 above).
The pressure for Africanisation in the private 
sector did not manifest itself very strongly until after 
independence, but was still of importance. Meeting this 
pressure was more difficult in the private sector than the 
public sector employment. This was due to the fear that 
any such pressure would destroy the confidence of foreign- 
owned firms at a time when it was the declared policy of' 
the government to encourage more foreign investors into the 
country.^ Moreover, government offered a far greater 
attraction to most Africans than private businesses, so 
that the number of educated Africans prepared to work for 
local and foreign-owned firms was limited. However, with 
the attainment of independence the pressure for more 
African participation in the administrative, managerial and
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technical employment in the private sector grew stronger 
from two directions. The first came from the African 
employees or their representatives (the Unions) who 
perceived the employment practices as discriminatory in 
favour of expatriate employees, for example, expatriates 
were better paid and enjoyed better conditions of service 
(see Chapter 3*2 and 3*5 above). The second, complementary 
to the first, came from the government which considered 
such employment practices to be socially, politically and 
economically not in tune with the national aspiration of 
an independent sovereign state. As the pressure for 
Africanisation in the private sector grew, the government 
and labour organisations made this pressure effective by 
the former’s use of administrative, legislative, fiscal 
policies and penalties, while Unions used threat of 
strikes. Under popular pressure, government could not be 
expected to accept the lack of qualified African candidates 
as sufficient reason for inaction on Africanisation. Thus 
foreign firms found it necessary to institute or accelerate 
training programmes of their own to meet the demand of 
African personnel*
Despite increased African participation at all levels of 
employment in the private sector, the expanded economic 
development of the country over the past two decades has 
increased the number of foreign firms in mining, manufac­
turing and construction and has resulted in a net increase 
in the number of expatriates employed in the private
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psector and the economy as a whole (Table 3*8).
This increased demand for foreign personnel was 
commented on in i960 by a leading British weekly publica­
tion:
Estimates of demand for white men in Africa 
cannot be expressed in statistics, just because 
the nature of their work is changing. In 
all Africa, other than the Mediterranean 
countries and South Africa, there were in 
1958 just over one million whites, or rather 
more than one-half of one per cent of the 
total population. If this proportion remains 
steady, there will be two million whites 
mostly in better paid jobs than now in 20 
years time. But the growth of African develop­
ment, under the driving pressure of dynamic 
and competitive African leaders, and the busi­
ness opportunities which will accompany it, 
suggests that there may be many more than 2 
million "top-whites". To get these men and 
women, Africa will have to pay wages that more 
than compare with those obtainable in the 
affluent societies of Europe and America.
The more difficult Africans make life for 
expatriates, the more they will have to pay 
them.^
Rightly so, in the light of the size and level of
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expatriate employment with their share of the national 
income in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa, the 
predictions of the "Economist" were correct.^ Nevertheless, 
the African demand for Africanisation or greater African 
participation in the private sector was not against the 
employment of expatriates in their economies if there were 
any need for them.
On the contrary, African leaders did realize the 
continuing need for foreign skills as the economies of 
their respective countries grew, and the costs of employing 
such personnel. As the former President of Ghana, Kwame 
Nkrumah admitted;
In Ghana, we have had to obtain technical 
knowledge, and skilled supply from better 
equipped sources, and this process will 
continue, until we are able to produce 
sufficient numbers of our own experts.
&Even where the demands are too heavy to 
leave complete supply of best quality people.
In order to secure even the minimum of well 
qualified technicians, we are having to offer 
terms of service which made development for 
us disproportionately costly. Money which 
we could otherwise spend on more basic 
requirements has to go for example into housing 
and other amenities'^
What the pressures from organized labour and the
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govemment's policies for Africanisation were against was 
the employment policies of private sector foreign employers 
which discriminated against local employees in favour of their 
expatriate counterparts in pay and other conditions of 
service, and above all, the continuing employment of 
expatriate personnel to fill in jobs for which there were 
equally qualified Africans with the same work experience, 
available to fill in such posts. As President Stevens 
pointed out:
Sierra Leone would not close its doors to those 
expatriates who had a contribution to make to 
its development. But Africanisation of the 
private sector must proceed as rapidly as 
compatible with the maintenance of standards 
and efficiency.^
4.2 The Response of the Workers.
The ethnocentric or patrimonial employment practices 
of multi-national or forelgn-owned companies, discussed 
in the last chapter,were likely to have a great problem in 
maintaining good industrial relations between their managements 
and their indigenous employees. In the ethnocentric firms, for 
example, any conflict over conditions of employment is 
always in danger of being exacerbated by the cultural gap 
that exists between management and workers. This problem 
is particularly acute when the companies are operating in 
less developed countries expecially if they are former 
colonial territories.
Here again, as with the public sector, it was the 
unfavourable attitudes which tended to come to light.
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though for very different reasons. The relationship 
between an African worker or employee and his white boss 
was potentially or acutely fraught with antagonism which 
was apt to take on a racial form; at the same time, a 
subordinate is not normally in a position to voice his 
opinion publicly. Hence it was only when the tension 
inherent in such a relationship becomes sufficiently 
acute to precipitate an incident that attitudes were given 
overt expression; and even then the expression was mainly 
a collective one, channelled through trade unions.
In order to avoid any misunderstanding it must be 
made quite clear that outbursts of this kind were excep­
tional. On the whole Africans and Europeans got on very 
well together at work, putting up with each other's 
idiosyncracies without complaint. A detailed analysis of 
labour relations during the last ten years of colonial 
rule, some of which were turbulent politically, was carried 
out on the basis of detailed official records. This 
indicated that only about one-tenth of all disputes 
resulted directly from friction between Africans and 
Europeans. The emphasis here is on conflict not because it 
was typical, but because under such circumstances latent 
elements come to the surface and could be observed.
4.21 Two Case Histories.
When disputes involving relations between Africans 
and Europeans as such were examined, several ostensible 
causes could be distinguished. (The word "ostensible" is
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used because the causation of industrial disputes is 
mostly complex.) These include demand concerning Africani­
sation, complaints about discrimination and a few instances 
of actual physical assaults. But the most common issue, 
and also the most instructive one from the present point 
of view, was that of insults (real or imagined) to African 
employees. Two such disputes will be discussed in some 
detail. Both affected large numbers of workers and had 
extensive repercussions on the government's attitudes 
towards the behaviour of expatriate employees to their 
African counterparts.
Case 1. This concerns a strike in a maintenance 
department of a mining operation, following a quarrel to 
which the European superintendent at first attached no 
great importance. As he put it, a maintenance workshop is 
not a kindergarten and incidents happen in all countries 
from time to time and are best ignored. It soon became 
clear, however, that the matter could not be dismissed 
so lightly, and the Union representative was asked to state 
his complaint on behalf of his members. This is summarised 
below.
*rpMr. Amadu Sankoh, ' an African employed in the workshop, 
said that the Chief Workshop Superintendent told the men 
that an important part of one of the engines was missing 
and gave them instructions to look for it. After they had 
searched for some time, Amadu Sankoh himself happened to 
visit another workshop and found the missing part there.
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It had been sent there a few days earlier for repairs by 
Mr. Tom Brown (a European, the central figure in the 
dispute). When the missing part was returned, the men who 
had been searching appeared to be under the impression that 
they had been accused of having stolen the part. There was 
some disagreement about this when Tom Brown intervened and 
told them to get on with their work; it was also alleged 
that he had told them they were acting like small children, 
and moreover, that Mr. Brown had called them "black cats
oand black monkeys". The men resented this attitude and 
referred the matter to the Union and a stoppage of work by 
the Union followed.
Mr. Brown was asked for his version eind whilst 
confirming the first part of the story he denied having 
called the men names, but claimed that he had merely asked 
them what the trouble was and why they had such long faces.
As the controversy developed and became public, a 
newly appointed African Minister in charge of labour 
matters intervened with the management of the company. And 
the management wrote about the result of this intervention 
as follows:
"Following our discussion with the Minister, 
who seemed to consider that Mr. Brown, having 
used the term, 'Why have you got such long 
faces?' was a term of abuse and the management 
had some difficulties in explaining to him 
it was not an unusual term for a European to
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use in addressing a person who appeared to 
be unhappy, and that in no circumstances 
could it be considered as abuse.
"The Works.Committee of the Union, on the 
other hand, maintained that Mr. Brown had 
called them "monkeys and cats". If that 
was so, monkeys and cats never worked 
together with human beings. So while they 
would normally be prepared to consider 
returning to work before negotiations began, 
the peculiar circumstances of the present case 
made that impossible."
It was not clear whether or not the offensive terms 
complained of were actually used on that occasion; a com­
mittee set up to investigate the matter did not publish its 
findings. Two things, however, are established. First, 
there was a previous history of friction between Mr. Brown 
and the workers in his charge; second, the Union leaders 
deliberately siezed on the racial elements of the dispute 
to arouse public sympathy for their campaign against 
European domination of high-level employment in the private 
sector, otherwise they would not have been successful in 
this, but also for the special sensitivity to name-calling 
of the type described and the belief that it did reflect 
the attitudes of whites towards Africans.
Case 2. The scene of the second case was in a public- 
owned enterprise with expatriate management in Freetown,
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and the main figure was a Mr. Paul Edwards, a European 
inspector of works. Some time before the strike, this 
inspector had become embroiled in a quarrel with Alpha 
Kamara, the Union leader, which the latter described as 
follows: knowing that Mr. Paul Edwards was on his first
tour he had always come to him to discuss matters in a 
friendly manner, but one day he made a suggestion on which 
Paul Edwards replied that he was talking rubbish. Offence 
was taken and an acrimonious argument ensued.
Shortly afterwards, a strike was called to support a 
demand that Paul Edwards should be dismissed and be sent 
home. The main complaint against him, expressed in a Union 
resolution, was that:
"From Paul Edwards' behaviour from day to 
day, we have discovered that he has not the 
least respect for the African."
Violence occurred, but it is important to note that this 
was not exclusively directed at whites, but also against 
the Africans considered to be collaborators. Thus, workers 
attempted to manhandle an African personnel officer and to 
over-turn an African accountant's car. A large number of 
men crowded into the (European) district engineer's office, 
creating a disturbance; they shouted abusive terms at this 
official, spat on the floor and threatened the clerical 
staff with violence if they did not leave their work; to 
add to the weight of their persuasion they removed all the 
clerks' chairs.
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Messages were posted upon the walls of the work yards 
such as: "Away with unscrupulous expatriates", "Mr.
Edwards, your doings are above the workers’ satisfaction, 
go to your country now or fly", "Workers strike, we hate 
fooling". "Sierra Leone of today is not of yesterday."
The sequence of events in this case is perfectly 
clear. The Union leader, having adopted a protective and 
advisory role towards a relatively inexperienced European 
employee in the sense of being new to the country - had 
been rebuffed; the rebuff might have been unintentional that 
led to the use of the term "rubbish", but what matters was 
the way it was interpreted. In the nationalist press the 
terms of abuse alleged to have been used by Mr. Edwards 
came to be greatly enlarged. The reaction of the Union 
leader sparked off a good deal of latent aggression 
engendered by the heightened feelings of economic nation­
alism and xenophobia. For a fuller understanding of these 
factors, the social aspects of the relationship between 
white employers or supervisors or managers and African 
workers have to be considered.
It might be added that the final settlement of this 
dispute was made more difficult than it might have been by 
one of the Europeans concerned in the negotiations with the 
Union leaders. He was one of the old school who "knew the 
Africans" after many years on the West Coast of Africa and 
was not going to put up with any nonsense. Needless to say, 
this sort of approach did not get him very far for "Sierra
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11Leone of today is not as of yesterday."
In conclusion, it is important to realize that the 
European manager in charge of African employees occupied a 
dual role in the multi-national corporation. One of his 
roles is purely functional: he is an employer, or more
often a supervisor, whose aim by virtue of his role is to 
get the most out of the people working under him. This 
means that his interests are opposed to those of the 
workers, who wish to make a living without sacrificing too 
much effort and leisure. The other role is precisely that 
of a European, a foreigner belonging to a different ethnic 
group which in the past had monopolised positions of 
authority so that both roles came to be fused in the minds 
of the African employees. Various attitudes can be 
accounted for in this way.
A high proportion of Europeans were engaged in office 
work as managers and administrators, and even in Western 
countries, the managerial and administrative functions that 
have to be performed at a desk are not readily understood 
by the workers. In a country where a high percentage of 
the workers are illiterates, this was held far more strongly; 
it was widely held that Europeans got fat salaries for 
doing precious little, merely because they were Europeans, 
and it may be added that this view was by no means confined 
to illiterates as may be illustrated by a statement made in 
the House of Representatives:
Do Hon. Members often see any European engineers
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of the Post and Telecommunications Department
out in the town repairing switchboards or
anything like telephones? (Some Hon. Members -
No.) The only engineer I know is the cable
engineer who goes round with Africans. He
knows his work at his finger tips. Others
12sit down in the offices and drink tea.
This feeling was exacerbated by the vast gap between 
the remuneration of European expatriates in charge and that 
of their African subordinates (see Table 3*3 above); this 
applied not only to labourers, but even to clerks, and their 
counterparts in comparable positions. The ratio between the 
earnings of expatriates to senior African employees, 
intermediate African employees, and the daily rated African 
employees for the year 1975 as demonstrated in Table 3*4 
above is as follows; 3*5*1» 12.6:1, and 20.4:1 respectively. 
It was not uncommon for a clerk who handled the t rein sport 
claims of his expatriate European boss to find that these 
exceeded his own monthly remuneration. There are, of course, 
good reasons why qualified men in Sierra Leone or West 
Africa should be well paid; and apart from the expatriation 
allowances, an African in a senior post receives exactly the 
same as their European counterparts. Nevertheless, a 
disparity of this order is irksome, especially in a period 
when prices are rising and in a society where the claims of 
the extended family make it very hard to get ends to meet.
The above examples are indicative of the new economic
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nationalism expressed in industrial actions. This was 
meant to draw the attention of the government, the media, 
and the general public that all was not well in the private 
sector employment. The African workers wanted to partici­
pate in the decision-making processes of the foreign firms 
above clerical and supervisory levels. But the employment 
practices of foreign employers did not give them the scope 
for advancement above the level of c l e r k s . A s  Michael 
Crowder put it:
The young European assistant is placed in each 
department in turn, until he is familiar with 
all sides of the business, while his African 
counterpart lives and dies a clerk, a book­
keeper, store clerk and custom clerk.
It was against the background of African lack of 
opportunities for advancement "in European commercial 
companies" that led in 1958 to the appointment of Professor 
Cox-George to investigate the possibilities of African 
participation in the commerce of Sierra Leone. In his 
report Professor Cox-G^eorge expressed the views that:
One of the essential conditions which must 
be imposed on entry of any new expatriate 
business in the country is that it must be 
required to have at least an African deputy 
general manager, an African manager in each 
established branch who should be given every 
facility to gain experience in every aspect 
of the business.
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Although the views of Professor Cox-George formed the 
basis of later Africanisation policies of the private 
sector in Sierra Leone, they were not at first accepted by 
the Government of the day for the following reasons: first,
they were contrary to the government's "open door economic 
policy" designed to attract foreign investors into the 
country; and it was thought that no foreign investor would 
like to be told how to run his business or whom to appoint or 
promote as "deputy general manager or branch manager", etc.
It was declared policy of the government to intervene as 
little as possible with foreign enterprises as long as their 
activities were not inimical to the interest of the country. 
This is reflected in the then Prime Minister's statement 
on the issue of nationalisation of foreign enterprises:
"The government wishes to make it clear that 
it has no intention either now or in the future 
of nationalising any form of commercial mining 
or industrial undertaking. If, however, new 
and unforeseen circumstances should lead to 
any change in this policy, government hereby 
acknowledges its obligations to pay fair com­
pensation, in every case of nationalisation, 
and in the event of disagreement between itself 
and the parties concerned on v^at constitutes 
reasonable compensation in a given case, 
hereby states its willingness to refer the 
matter to arbitration by some mutually agreed 
international body.
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Secondly, Cox-George proposals were too radical to be
accepted by the Prime Minister whose stand on the Africani-
17sation of the public sector was rather cautious. ' This 
precisely explained the government's stand on the issue of 
Africanisation in both the public and private sectors. The 
fact is. Sierra Leone became independent in 1961 without a 
single manufacturing industry and only two mining companies. 
To impose pre-conditions on prospective foreign investors 
was seen to be self-defeating. Moreover, when there was a 
scarcity of skilled and experienced manpower in the country 
(see Table 2.4). In fact, the government viewed the 
Africanisation of the private sector from a manpower 
development standpoint and not just a programme for the 
replacement of expatriate personnel in private sector 
employment. As this was evidenced in a later agreement 
signed between the government of Sierra Leone and the Swiss- 
based multi-national Alusuisse Company Ltd. for the exploita­
tion of the deposits of bauxite in the Port Loko District 
in 1978. Among other things, the agreement stated that "the 
company should use its best endeavour to provide capable 
and skilled personnel for the operation of the mine and 
where possible, preference should be given at all levels of 
operation to adequately qualified Sierra Leonean citizens 
who, in the opinion of the company, are competent to 
perform and discharge the duties or functions of the office 
or employment to be filled as and when they were available.
In furtherance of these objectives, the agreement
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further provides that:
The company shall within its resources and 
needs provide for the training of Sierra 
Leoneans designed to qualify them for operat­
ing technical, administrative, managerial 
and supervisory positions in the company.
The company shall submit to the Ministry of 
Mines, annually, a report of the training 
programmes and their results and future 
objectives. The company shall ensure that 
the higher echelons of the management as well 
as of the technical services shall be occupied 
by Sierra Leoneans within a reasonable period 
of time.^^
During a period of growing unemployment among primary 
and secondary school leavers it would have been a grave 
omission if nothing was said about the employment of 
unskilled labour in such an agreement. For this reason 
Claus IX further provides that;
The company shall not import unskilled labour 
except in the event that local manpower supply 
proves inadequate for its needs and on such 
an event the company undertakes to import only 
such unskilled foreign labour as shall be 
acceptable to the Minister of Mines. The 
Government agrees, subject to the provisions 
of the Non-Citizens (Registration, Immigration 
and Expulsion) Act, No. 6, 1967.^̂
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From the tone of the above section of the agreement,
it leaves no doubt to the reader that the government was
not unaware of both the social and economic consequences
of pursuing a vigorous and unilateral Africanisation policy,
as Professor Cox-George seemed to have suggested in his
21report (20 years earlier). Of course, by the same token,
it can be argued that the government had given too much to
the company the major decisions on Africanisation; and that .
it was only paying lip service to Africanisation policies. The
agreement, in short, was one-sided. However, it must not
be forgotten that the closure of another mining company
which has been operating in the country since 1930, three
years earlier (1975)» left the government in a weaker
bargaining position to dictate terms, particularly when the
reasons for the closure of the company were not unconnected
with the government's earlier attempt to acquire a 51 per
cent controlling share of the company (1970) and its
22Africanisation attempts also. .. After all. Africanisation 
policies must be seen from a utilitarian viewpoint - the 
greatest benefits to the greatest number of unskilled 
labour and not to the small number of educated Africans 
employed in the private sector.
4.3 The Socio-Economic Motivations. .
From the above discussion two extreme views of 
Africanisation emerged: those which wanted a more vigorous
Africanisation policy to be pursued, and those which wanted
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the cautious approach. Between these plethora of moderation 
and extremism hung the pendulum of Sierra Leone's Africani­
sation policy. In both cases, the motivation is social as 
well as economic. A judicious Africanisation policy 
would, therefore, accrue the following advantages to both 
the country and the Sierra Leonean employed in the 
expatriate businesses and, perhaps, to the employers 
themselves.
Firstly, an equitable Africanisation policy would 
reduce the wages gaps between the high-level, intermediate 
and unskilled labour in the private sector demonstrated in 
Table 3*3 above. This is based on the assumption that an 
African replacing an expatriate would only be entitled to 
the expatriate pay less the expatriation allowances. But 
the evidence available in both the public and the private 
sectors does not seem to support this assumption. What 
seems to happen is that an African succeeding an expatriate 
will always want to enjoy the total benefits accorded to 
that office. The emotive reasoning is that why should 
an African successor to an expatriate post be denied the 
same benefits which his predecessor "whiteman" used to 
enjoy. Invariably, such arguments always stand. To ignore 
it by an expatriate employer is seen as an act of racial 
discrimination. For example, it is the policy of all 
foreign enterprises in Sierra Leone to provide free accom­
modation for all their expatriate personnel at the company 
expense. This is an important item of cost in the company 
accounts which might be removed or reduced in the event of
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Africanisation. But this has not been the case; an African 
promoted or appointed to the same level as his expatriate 
counterpart would receive a rent subsidy or allowance even 
if he lives in his own home or house. The income gap 
remained. One result of this has been that as other semi­
skilled and skilled African cadres emerged, they sought the 
elevated European wages standard as a matter of right, 
irrespective of the ability and experience of the newly 
trained African worker to perform at the same level as his 
European counterpart. Another result has been the growing 
inflationary pressure by the unskilled workers to close the 
gap now that their African compatriots have scaled the 
heights and have achieved or are close to achieving the 
higher levels of the wages and benefits structure.
These two drives have greatly complicated the 
Africanisation policy, particularly in the private sector, 
and have augmented costs markedly and perhaps prohibitively. 
Tinker and Hoogvelt's case study on the closure of the 
Sierra Leone Development Company in 1975 provides an 
example; they have this to say about the effect of 
Africanisation on the company's wage bill:
The much higher total wage bill in this last 
period is a consequence of the government's 
insistence on Sierra Leonisation v^ich not 
only swelled the number of Sierra Leoneans 
in the ranks of the ten times better paid 
jobs previously only held by expatriates.
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also increased the number of such jobs. By
the time of its closure, Delco employed some
218 supervisory salaried staff of whom l64
were Sierra Leoneans earning an average
salary of £3»04l per annum. In 1974 this
black salaried contigent received a total
income of £422,320, not much below the total
wage bill of £513,215 paid to the 2,317 black
manual labourers. This Sierra Leonisation
programme which presented a very heavy cost
to thie company's operations was not in fact
justified when viewed from a purely commercial 
23perspective.
Secondly, a judicious Africanisation policy would 
perhaps have an effect on the income of nationals. To the 
extent that the indigenous staff successfully replaced 
expatriates, the share of the national income that flows 
to the indigenous population increases. Unfortunately, 
there are no official figures at the aggregate level in 
Sierra Leone indicating the proportion of national income 
paid to expatriates as profits, interest, wages or salaries. 
But at plant or company level, there is no doubt that 
expatriates share of the wages bill is inversely propor­
tional to their size in the work force. For example.
Table 4.1 shows the annual return of a mining company to 
the Ministry of Mines for the period 1964 to 1978.
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TABLE 4.1 Expatriates* share of total pay bill in a 

















1964 2,925 124 4.2 £891,480 £369,317 41.4
1965 3,078 119 3 .8 1,013,569 417,699 41.21966 3.218 112 3 .4 1,038,764 387,438 37.3196? 2,513 100 3 .9 928,079 357,398 38 .5
1968 2,594 100 3 .8 1,027,651 393.194 38.2
1969 2,691 101 3 .7 1,154,203 397,192 34 .4
1970 3,028 98 3 .2 1,295,809 418,172 32 .2
1971 3,042 97 3 .1 1,363,178 425,302 31 .2
1972 2,889 97 3 .3 1,440,264 480,503 33.3
1973 2,714 89 3 .2 1,517,835 500,813 33.1
1974 2,626 65 2.4 1,594,013 440,777 27.8
1975 2,643 63 2 .3 1,697,410 437,620 26.1
Source: Company annual returns to the Ministry of Mines,
Freetown. __
From the above table, it can be seen that the 
expatriates' percentage share of the total pay bill 
(Column 5) declines as their number in the work force 
declined, viz. in 1964 with 124 expatriates employed in this 
company,(4.2# of work force) their share of the total pay 
bill was correspondingly high - 41.4#. In 1975» with a 49 
per cent fall in the number of expatriates employed in this 
company (which might be the result of Africanisation policy) 
their share of the total pay bill had also declined from 
41.2 per cent in 1964 to 26.1 per cent in 1975* By the 
same token, the African share of the total pay bill had 
increased from 48.8 per cent in 1964 (100 - 41.28#) to 73*9 
per cent in 1975 (100 - 26.1#). Of course, the fact still 
remained that although the expatriates constituted less 
than 5 per cent of the total work force all throughout the
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period, but their percentage share of the total pay bill 
was disproportionately high.
A third advantage of Africanisation is the employment 
opportunities it provides for the nationals of the country.
No african government could for long tolerate the employment 
of expatriates in jobs for which there are qualified 
nationals. In Nigeria, for example, the Second Five Year 
National Economic and Social Development 1974/75-1978/79 
Plan was very explicit on this point:"
The Government cannot continue to tolerate 
a situation in which high-level Sierra 
Leonean personnel educated and trained at 
great cost'to the nation are denied employ­
ment in their own country by foreign business 
establishments in preference for their own 
nationals.
A fourth advantage from a more rapid Africanisation 
is an acceleration of training. Many managerial and 
technical skills can be acquired only through experience.
The pressure for indigenisation will give more rapid access 
to responsible jobs and thereby hasten the process of 
learning while doing. In addition, employers, knowing that 
they have to put nationals into positions of responsibility 
will be more inclined to give them supplementary training 
opportunities. This accelerated training is a very 
important investment in the productive capacity of the country.
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All these potential advantages will of course vanish 
if the Africanisation is ill conceived or as an expatriate 
employer put it, "if not intelligently executed." The 
Sierra Leone Government is very aware of these limitations. 
An Africanisation policy that would undermine economic 
growth and confidence either by seriously discouraging the 
inflow of capital and skills or by destroying the efficiency 
of existing enterprises would be self-defeating.
A successful Africanisation policy is one which pro­
vides rapidly increasing employment opportunities for 
nationals at all levels of skills and responsibility. Until 
the time comes when the country can be more or less self- 
sufficient in capital and technical and managerial know-how, 
such a policy, when applied to a largely free enterprise 
economy, must recognise that (as the managing director of a 
manufacturing company put it)i
Expatriate firms are in business for profit.
They will expand their business .activities and 
thereby generate more income for your govern­
ment and employment for your nationals only 
so long as the return from our investment 
in your country is at least as high as what 
we can earn in other countries, taking into 
account comparable risks and uncertainties.^^
On the other hand, it is equally important to note that an 
expansion in the activities of expatriate businesses that 
will provide employment for unskilled and semi-skilled
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nationals and income will result to what Glower, et al.
26called "economic growth without development", in that an 
increase in the business activities of foreign firms that 
will induce the need for the employment of expatriate 
skills with limited development of African skills will see 
the fruits go mainly to foreign capital and skills.
However, keeping in mind that foreign enterprises saw 
an element of risk in rapid Africanisation, it is worth 
spelling out the conditions which determine the speed at 
which successful Africanisation can be carried out.
First among these conditions was the availability of 
qualified indigenous manpower to take over jobs which demand 
technical and managerial skills. It would clearly be 
harmful to economic growth and efficiency if Africanisation 
resulted in putting into positions for which they could not 
become competent in a reasonable period of time. In some 
instances, it may be possible to alter job responsibilities 
to fit more closely the qualifications of available per­
sonnel. This is equally true of the public sector. By and 
large, however, an effective Africanisation policy requires 
to be complemented by major manpower training efforts 
(Chapter 4.5).
The second condition which affects the speed of 
successful Africanisation is the availability of domestic 
capital, entrepreneurship and technical know-how. Where 
these elements are in short supply, it is obviously not 
possible for indigenous enterprises alone to generate rapid
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economic growth and employment. Africanisation therefore 
implies a government policy of support to indigenous 
capital formation and development of technical know-how.
A third factor which influences the possible progress 
of Africanisation is the economic opportunities presented by 
the country. A'country which is favoured with natural and 
human resources and has a good infrastructure and which 
therefore presents attractive investment opportunities can 
afford to pursue a much more aggressive Africanisation 
policy than a less privileged country. Whatever risks 
expatriate firms may see in Africanisation tend to be offset 
by other aspects such as political stability, a good 
domestic market, etc. that favour high returns, will be 
willing to do so. It should be expected that countries 
such as Nigeria and Kenya, with a stable political system, 
good infrastructure, for Nigeria - oil, abundant manpower 
resources, and huge domestic market - can afford to pursue 
a vigorous Africanisation policy with little damage to their 
economies.
A fourth condition which is important for a speedy and 
successful Africanisation is strong leadership and executive 
capacity on the part of the government. It is essential 
that the policy be fair but unequivocal, so long as the 
government wishes to attract foreign capital and expertise, 
it is important to maintain the confidence of serious 
foreign investors. Inconsistency and uneven enforcement of 
mild Africanisation laws and government bureaucratic
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inefficiencies which cause delays and uncertainties may be
much more harmful than very tough laws that are fairly and
efficiently enforced. For example, although the Wales
Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of the Immigration
Quota Committee did not find any malpractices among the
committee members, there were irregularities in the granting
27of the expatriate quotas. '
Finally, the fifth sind by no means least factor is the
attitudes of the expatriate employers and managers.
Expatriate employers who have no faith and who can only see
their African employees through colonial eyes are obviously
?8a hindrance to successful Africanisation. The expatriate
employer who can grasp some of the fundamental aspects of
culture in which he operates and knows how to develop local
talent serves his own interest as well as those of the host
29country.
4.4 The National Policv.
We have seen in section 4.2 two instances where 
organized labour attempted to arouse national awareness 
through industrial action against the employment practices 
of their expatriate employers. We have also seen how the 
public, the media and politicians responded to these 
attempts. Under such circumstances an elected government 
could not remain unresponsive and ignore such popular 
action. But unlike the Africanisation of the public sector 
the capacity of the government to intervene in the affairs
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of private sector foreign employers is constrained by two 
factors: the availability of trained and experienced
personnelI and the fear that going too far would destroy 
the confidence of foreign investors. Both of these 
challenges were of equal urgency and can call for conflict­
ing responses.
Fortunately, no real world situations are like zero-sum 
games in which players either win or lose rather than 
sharing victory or defeat. Ways are usually found to 
satisfy at least partially conflicting demands. In Sierra 
Leone, an attempt to resolve the crises as they relate to 
the recruitment and employment practices of expatriate 
employers was to adopt a judicious Africanisation policy 
which could benefit all parties concerned - the country, 
the employees and the employers (see section 4.3 above).
In this respect, the Africanisation policy in the private 
sector can best be summarised as one of cautious Africani­
sation of control and manpower with due regard for growth 
and efficiency. The first progress report of the Second 
National Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79 has again stated
with emphasis that: "Africanisation does not slow down the
30rate of economic growth."^
Another fundamental aspect of Sierra Leone's Africani­
sation policy is the continuation of efforts to attract 
foreign capital and expertise, but to restrict them to areas 
where they were not in competition with Sierra Leoneans.
The Second National Development Plan was 
explicit on this point:
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Foreign investments are still welcome and 
will for a long time be welcome as an impor­
tant component in economic development. In 
fact many business incentives operating the 
country are aimed at encouraging private 
foreign investment in Sierra Leone. What 
the Africanisation policy seeks to do is to 
delimit the areas in which foreign private 
investors will operate.
In retrospect; from the discussion on the employment 
and recruitment practices of foreign-owned firms in Sierra 
Leone (Chapter 3) and elsewhere in Africa, two policy 
implications were deduced. The first was that if expatriate 
employers were discriminating against the Africans in their 
pattern of recruitment on the basis of personal charac­
teristics other than prior formal training or educational 
programmes, then the manpower development programmes 
external to the company are of limited value. The second 
was that the expatriate employers wished to employ Africans 
in senior positions but they lacked the training and 
experience required by those positions. The first is an 
attitudinal problem while the second is a manpower develop­
ment problem. The objective of any effective Africanisation 
policy is to provide solutions to both problems. The former 
is a behaviour problem which may require political remedial 
solutions while the latter is a technical labour supply 
problem which cannot be resolved in the short-run. It is
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therefore expedient to start with the behavioural 
problem while the manpower problem will be the subject of 
Chapter 5* Part III.
In the main, there are two main policies which the 
government may use to effect changes in the recruitment 
and employment practices of expatriate employers. They 
are, through immigration countrol and fiscal policies.
4.4l Immigration Control Laws.
The laws of the majority of countries in Africa have 
specific procedures relating to entry and employment of 
non-national workers who need to obtain authorization 
either in the form of a work permit or identity card. In 
certain countries such as Nigeria a residence permit is 
assimilated to work permit. In others a residence permit 
is assumed to have been given when a non-national worker 
actually applied for employment. There are some countries 
such as Senegal and Zambia where the employers are under 
an obligation to submit regular reports of the number of 
non-nationals employed to the government.
Countries in Africa do not follow the same pattern of 
immigration policies. The only point common to the majority 
of the ex-French countries of Africa is that a special 
department of the Ministry of Labour handles all questions 
relating to the employment of foreigners, while in English- 
speaking countries the jurisdiction is distributed among 
several ministries including Ministries of Trade and
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Industry, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and Interior.
In Sierra Leone the first attempt by the government
to restrict the employment of non-nationals in the private
sector was made by the introduction of the Immigration
Control Ordinance Cap. 86 in 1952. Among other things.
Section 18 of the Ordinance stated that:
The policy of the Government is that there
would be no further economic penetration by
non-nationals of Sierra Leone. A non-national
may enter Sierra Leone and be issued with
employment and occupation permit if his
activities will be beneficial to the country
and if he will supply a need which will not
32otherwise be supplied.^
The main weaknesses of this ordinance were that it 
did not stipulate how many quotas to be allowed to an 
individual expatriate employer; and how long will a work 
permit holder be allowed to stay in the country. Above 
all the Ordinance's definition of what "activities and 
needs" which an expatriate can supply and be of benefit to 
the country was not clear. More particularly, y^en the 
onus for the interpretation of this law rests with one man, 
the Principal Immigration Officer. Furthermore, the 
Ordinance did not provide specific guidelines under which 
the Principal Immigration Officer could base his decisions 
whether to accept or reject an application for work permit.
-337-
Under such circumstances the decision of the Principal 
Immigration Officer became discretionary and perhaps sub­
jective as well.
It was owing to this weakness that between 1952 and 1956 a 
total number of 500 expatriates was recorded to have entered 
the country to take up employment in the private sector. 
However, with some periodical modification in its imple­
mentation machinery, the Ordinance remained as the corner­
stone of the government's Africanisation policy of the 
private sector until well after independence in 1965*
The first modification to the Ordinance was in 1956 
^ e n  the government appointed an ad hoc committee - the 
Immigration Control Committee.The function of the 
committee was purely advisory; it was to advise the 
government on applications for an immigration quota 
referred to it by the Principal Immigration Officer. The 
committee was required after considering all applications 
for quotas to submit its recommendations to the Minister of 
Trade and Industry who would take decisions on behalf of 
the government. In making its recommendations to the 
Minister, the Immigration Control Committee was guided by
the following conditions under which immigration quotas be 
34granted;^
. . . that no quota should be allotted to 
any such firms until it has registered its 
business under the appropriate ordinance; 
that the quota should be for a period of three
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years only, i.e. all entry permits under it 
should be renewed at the end of that period, 
that the quota should be additional to all 
partners, proprietors and employees already 
in the country; and that all leave reliefs 
should be found from the permitted quota; 
and finally that any marginal case in which 
it is not clear to.the Principal Immigration 
Officer whether the firm should be allotted 
a quota or whether the allotted quota should 
be larger or smaller should be referred to 
the Immigration Control Committee.
The directives further emphasised that the above conditions 
should be strictly applied and particularly that entry under 
any quota granted in terms of these conditions must be 
limited to a period of three years.
There are a few important points to note about the 
above development. First, under the 1952 Ordinance, the 
Principal Immigration Officer had the ultimate authority 
to interpret the law, to decide on what "activities of 
expatriate personnel were beneficial to the country", and 
the power to grant or reject an application for work permit 
was removed from him. Second, with the new arrangement the 
final decision whether to approve or reject an application 
for immigration quota lay with the Minister of Trade and 
Industry who in return had to act (though not bound to) on 
the recommendations and advice of the Immigration Control
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Coimnittee. Third, the directives did not spell out the 
kind of skills, qualifications or professional competence 
an expatriate must possess before a work permit be issued 
to such an expatriate. What in fact the directive provided 
was that "the Committee should advise the Minister on 
economic grounds". This was not good enough. The govern­
ment should have been specific on this issue if it was to 
avoid the possibility of disagreement among committee 
members on what constitutes the economic grounds under which 
an application for expatriate quota be granted or rejected. 
If the committee members disagreed on v^at constitutes 
"economic grounds" (as happened in one case), should the 
Minister be bound by the recommendations of the majority of . 
the committee members? The evidence so far available did: 
not seem to support that. Perhaps a case study of a situa­
tion where the Minister accepted a minority recommendation 
is relevant but not illustrative of any malpractice.
Case 3. Argument for and against Africanisation of 
certain Indian firms.
(a) As from 1st January 1961, the Immigration Control 
Committee consisted of the following*
1. Mr. D.G. Maurice - Expatriate Permanent 
Secretary - Trade and Industry - Chairman.
2. Mr. G.S. P^da . - African S.L., Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Mines and 
Labour - member.
3. Mr. C.A. Asgill - Retired Deputy Controller 
of Customs - member.
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(b) On the 13th April, 19&1, the committee considered 
among others the application of Messrs. T. Choithram. The 
applicants had at the time 30 quotas including eight 
directors and wanted six more quotas.
The recommendations of each of the two members present 
and the Minister's as contained in the Minutes were as 
follows *
(i) Mr. Panda considered that the application for six 
more expatriate quota was justified, taking into 
account the impressive increase in the firm's 
turnover and the need for leave reliefs. Moreover, 
their records of public service were good. Therefore 
approval should be given for the whole six.
(ii) Mr. Maurice, the chairman, on the other hand, held 
the view that there was not sufficient evidence of any 
real attempt on the part of this firm to Africanisé, 
and he did not think that a firm's contribution to 
charities, however good, should be the criterion for 
increasing their quota. He would therefore not
- recommend an increase of more than three in this 
case.
(iii) The Minister's decision was as follows* I agree with 
the view of the only member (Mr. Panda) and approve 
that the additional quota of 6 (six) expatriate 
employees be granted to this firm in view of the 
reasons given by Mr. Panda and by the applicants 
themselves. In as much as we would welcome
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Africanisation of expatriate businesses, that reason 
itself cannot alone be a bar to expansion of such 
businesses in case of delay. We should, however, 
endeavour to convince businesses that expansion 
and training of Africans should as best as possible 
go side by side. The possibility of wholly
36Africanising expatriate businesses is very remote.^ 
Few comments need to be made on the decision of the Minister 
of Trade and Industry. His decision to approve six quotas 
for a firm which already had 30 quotas and ruling out the 
impressive argument in favour of Africanisation put up by 
an expatriate member of the Immigration Quota Committee was 
not only out of proportion but also most revealing and a 
downright tricky business. Furthermore, the Minister's 
decision was contrary to the directives of the government 
of vdiich he was a member. What is more revealing about the 
Minister's decisions was his comments and pessimistic view 
on the Africanisation issue, particularly when he was 
politically responsible for the initiation and implementa­
tion of the policy. Of course, no one would deny the fact 
that effective Africanisation depends on the availability 
of trained and experienced manpower but to pronounce it as 
"remote" was rather disturbing and absurd. On the other 
hand, it can equally be argued that the Minister of Trade 
and Industry was also the minister politically responsible 
for the formulation and implementation of the government's 
industrial development policies, which must be seen by
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foreign investors at home and abroad to be fair and 
attractive. Moreover, the Minister made his decision in 
1961, the year of independence when the government was to 
restore and inspire confidence to existing foreign investors 
at home and abroad. As it was stated earlier in this 
section that to pursue a vigorous Africanisation policy in 
order to provide jobs for a few educated nationals at the 
expense of perhaps the vast majority of unskilled and semi­
skilled workers (in the event of closure) employed by these 
firms would not only be economically self-defeating but 
also politically suicidal. It must not also be forgotten that 
the two personalities involved in this case; one was a 
Sierra Leonean, former Commissioner of Labour and then 
Permanent Secretary, and the other a colonial expatriate 
permanent secretary, both advising a Sierra Leonean Minister 
in opposition to each other. The situation was made more 
complex when the firm involved was an Indian-owned one. If 
it were British-owned, perhaps the situation might have 
been different.
The important thing to note about the case is that it 
demonstrates the kind of situation which may arise when the 
government's policy is ill-defined. However, the Immigra­
tion law remained as it stood in 1956 until 1965 vdien a 
more comprehensive legislation was passed. The Non-Citizens 
(Restriction, Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. l4, 1965*
Under this Act, the Immigration Control Committee was 
renamed Commercial Immigration Quota Committee, and its
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membership reconstituted; it now includes four cabinet 
ministers, one of whom, the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
is chairman.
Like the 1956 government directives on immigration 
control, the motivation behind the introduction of the Non- 
Citizens (Restriction, Immigration and Expulsion) Act, as 
contained in a memorandum prepared by the Prime Minister's 
office, was to exercise closer control on immigration so 
that the fullest use of available Sierra Leone manpower and 
expertise be made. This, the memorandum continued, will 
reduce unemployment among the educated nationals.
However, despite these declared policies, the flow of 
expatriate personnel into the country to take up employment 
in the private sector continued. Between 196I and 196? a 
total of 504 expatriate quotas were granted out of a total 
of 84l applications made. Table 4.2 illustrates the 
position.








1961 142 85 57 59.8
1962 138 88 50 63 .7
1963 94 48 46 51.0 .1964 125 91 34 72.8
1965 171 78 93 45 .6
1966 74 42 32 36.7
1967 97 72 25 74.2
Total o4l 504 337 39.9Source* Compiled from the Immigration Quota 
Committee confidential file, I968.
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Perhaps disturbed by the above figures, in 196? the 
Military Government, the National Reformation Council (see 
Chapter 1.2) appointed the Wales Commission with the 
following terms of reference* to investigate whether or 
not any malpractice or irregularity was committed by any 
member of the Immigration Quota Committee during the 
period 1961 to 196?; the nature of such malpractice and 
irregularity, the identity of the persons involved in such 
malpractices and irregularities, and to make recommendations 
for a better and more effective system of granting of 
immigration quotas.
The Wales Commission submitted its report on 28th 
October 1968 but did not find any member of the Immigration 
Quota Committee guilty of malpractice and irregularities 
outside the provisions of either the 1952 Immigration 
Ordinance as modified in 1956 or the Non-Citizens (Restric­
tion, Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. l4 of 1965*
However, with regard to the other terms of reference 
on the effective control of the immigration quota system, 
the Wales Commission found the mechanism for granting 
immigration quotas lax and therefore made the following 
recommendations, all but one of which the government 
accepted. Among those accepted by the government were*
(a) No individual or firm shall be granted any immigration 
quota unless such individual or firm makes the following 
undertakings, (b) Sierra Leoneans will be employed in top 
posts or more responsible positions in the business on the
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approval of the quota applied for, as soon as possible,
(c) Sierra Leoneans will be trained to fill such posts 
within a period not exceeding three years from the date of 
approval of the quota. (d) Steps should be taken to ensure 
that the quota granted to such individual or firm is 
reduced by half at least, within a period of two years, in 
order to make way for suitable Sierra Leoneans where avail­
able. (e) Failure on the part of any individual or firm 
to comply with the undertaking declared in the application 
form after the expiry of the stipulated period for the 
necessary absorption of Sierra Leoneans will render the 
individual or firm concerned liable to the forefeiture of 
the quota in respect of which the undertaking were given.
(f) No expatriate employee shall be brought to Sierra Leone 
on quota granted by the Business Immigration Quota Committee 
unless it has been previously proved to the satisfaction of 
both the Principal Immigration Officer and the Chairman of 
the Quota Committee that he possesses the professional or 
technical or expert knowledge required to do a special job 
for which a Sierra Leonean is available, (g) Finally, the 
Commission recommended a reconstitution of the Immigration 
Quota Committee to include the Minister of Trade and 
Industry - chairm^, with two other ministers (External 
Affairs and Economic Development) and a representative of 
the Chamber of Commerce, two citizens appointed by the 
President, and the Principal Immigration Officer to act as 
secretary.
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Judging from earlier government statements of policy 
objectives on immigration control, it is very difficult to 
see how the recommendations of the Wales Commission could 
make any improvement on the system of immigration quota 
granting, particularly when none of the Wales recommenda­
tions were in any sense different from earlier recommenda­
tions made by Professor Cox-George (ten years earlier), the 
provisions of the Immigration Control Ordinance of 1952, and 
the government directives to the Principal Immigration 
Officer (1956), and the 19&5 Non-Citizens (Restrictions, 
Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. 14. For example, the 
first recommendation which required expatriate firms to 
make an undertaking that they should employ Sierra Leonean 
nationals in more responsible se nior positions is no 
different from the views expressed by Cox-George in his 
report on African participation in the commerce of Sierra 
Leone in 1958. Similarly, the second and third recommenda­
tions - one can hardly see any discernible differences 
between them and the directives of the 1956 which the 
Minister of Trade and Industry quoted earlier (see Case 
study 3)« And finally, one wonders why the Immigration 
Quota Committee had to have cabinet ministers as members 
and the Minister of Trade and Industry as its chairman.
This makes the whole of the immigration control exercise 
look more like a political gimmick than any serious attempt 
to restrict the employment of non-nationals in the private 
sector of the country.
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In the writer's view, the central problem in the 
administration of the quota system lay in the implementa­
tion machinery. While the Immigration Quota Committee takes 
decisions on what quota to approve or reject, the Principal 
Immigration Officer is expected to implement such decisions. 
In implementing its review policy, the Quota Committee 
faces two major problems. First, there is a lack of infor­
mation on which to base its decisions and second, a lack of 
an effective enforcement agency.
To carry out its review policy, the Quota Committee 
should ideally have at its disposal an objective evaluation 
of both the need of each firm for expatriate staff and the 
ability of each firm to decrease the number of its expat­
riate staff without impairing productivity. The latter 
aspect would require accurate and detailed information on 
available indigenous manpower. The quota committee, however, 
did not have sufficient staff to enable it to visit each 
firm to evaluate its needs, nor did it have sufficient 
manpower information. The committee had to rely heavily on 
the information provided by the applicants.
Companies have an understandable interest in preserv­
ing as much freedom as possible in staff recruitment. They 
naturally present their case to suit their interest. In 
order to support their request for more expatriate staff 
firms often tended to overstate, for example, the length of 
time it will take to Africanisé a certain position, the 
education and experience required for the position and the
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adverse consequences of losing a particular expatriate 
staff, and the difficulties they have had in finding a 
suitable Sierra Leonean with necessary qualifications to 
replace an expatriate. For example, from one reputable 
company the story was told of a new Fourah Bay College 
graduate who was interviewed four times for a civil engineer­
ing job to replace an expatriate and was selected and 
appointed but failed to turn up. When traced later on at 
his home his excuse was that the location of the job - only 
80 miles from Freetown - was too far removed from Freetown. 
There are stories galore of these civil engineering 
graduates in other companies refusing on-site assignments 
which the employer claimed are crucial in the training of 
building construction engineers.
Because it is usually unable to evaluate the informa­
tion provided by each firm, the Committee must often rely 
on intuition in making a decision. Where possible, as a 
check on what a firm says, it will also look at what similar 
firms have accomplished in Africanisation to see if they 
have Africanised positions which another firm says it cannot 
because of lack of qualified Sierra Leoneans.
The firms, for their part*, often feel that the Commit­
tee does not recognize their particular needs. They complain 
that quotas are cut in seemingly arbitrary fashion and 
without sufficient understanding on the part of the 
Committee of the qualifications required for certain posi­
tions. In fact, an expatriate employer complained bitterly
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that it was the delay in reviewing their application for 
quotas they resented most. "In the business world", he 
said, "time is money." ended an angry employer who claimed 
that he submitted an application for three expatriate 
quotas and it has taken four months without hearing from 
the Principal Immigration Officer.
Perhaps a more important factor that has affected the 
effectiveness of the Immigration Committee in the past was 
its lack of ultimate power to enforce its decisions on 
expatriate quota issues. In the past, an expatriate 
employer who felt dissatisfied with the decisions of the 
quota committee could appeal to the Prime Minister or 
President for redress. In one or more occasions the Prime 
Minister had over-ruled the decision of the Committee. A 
case in view was that of the Sierra Leone Entertainment 
Company Limited.
In August 23, 1965* the Sierra Leone Entertainment 
Company Limited applied for 35 expatriate quotas in order 
to start the business. The Immigration Quota Committee 
approved of 10 quotas and rejected the rest. The Sierra 
Leone Entertainment Company were not satisfied with the 
decision of the Committee and petitioned the Prime Minister. 
Their petition letter reads*
"Sierra Leone Entertainment Co. Ltd.
(1) "Dear Sir,
"The Directors of the above company wish to appeal 
against the recent decision of the Commercial Immigration
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Quota Committee who granted an Immigration Quota for only 
ten personnel as against their application for thirty-five.
"The facts which we wish to submit to your understanding 
judgment are as follows*-
"1. It will be impossible to run the casino with a 
staff of ten skilled operators.






Bar and Catering Managers 
TOTAL 35
"There will be four roulette tables and four blackjack 
tables. The croupiers and dealers must alternate at thirty 
minute intervals and therefore four operators are necessary 
for each roulette table and three for each blackjack table.
"3. The Commercial Immigration Quota Committee con­
sidered that Sierra Leoneans should be trained at the outset 
to perform these duties.
"Although Sierra Leoneans will be trained from the 
outset the profession is highly skilled and takes up to 
three years of training to acquire the necessary degree of 
proficiency. It is planned that expatriate croupiers and 
dealers will eventually be replaced by Sierra Leoneans but 
a premature change-over would result in considerable losses 
to the company.
"We would like to point out that one of the staff has 
twenty years experience of teaching the profession in Las
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Vegas and the company intends to operate a training scheme 
for Sierra Leoneans.
"We hope that this request will be favourably received, 





The decision of the Prime Minister was conveyed to the 
Commercial Immigration Quota Committee in a Minute written 
by the Secretary to the Prime Minister who was the Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Mines, Lands and Labour and a member 
of the previous Immigration Control Committee (see Case 3 
above). The Minutes read*
(2) "From* The Secretary to the Prime Minister.
"To* The Principal Immigration Officer.
"Sierra Leone Entertainment Company Ltd.
"Application for Immigration Quota.
"The above company has petitioned the Honourable the 
Prime Minister in a letter No. 23l/Sec/"FT/J.M.0. dated 23 
August, 1965t a photostat copy of which I attach, and I am 
directed to convey approval of the Prime Minister of the 
thirty-five expatriates required to start the company in 
Sierra Leone.
"2. Since an undertaking is given by the company that 
Sierra Leoneans will be trained from the outset this quota 
will be reviewed after two years to ascertain whether in
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fact such training has taken place among Sierra Leoneans.
"G.S. Panda 
"Secretary to the 
"Prime Minister."
A month later, following his Minutes of approval of the 35 
quotas to the Immigration Quota Committee, the Secretary to 
the Prime Minister sent another minute to the Committee which 
reads as follows:
(3) "I am directed by the Honourable Prime Minister to 
instruct you (the Immigration Quota Committee) that as from 
now henceforth the above Committee should be required to 
submit their recommendations to me since, under the Act 
(1965)» I have responsibility for controlling immigration 
in this country. It should also be let known that any 
person whose application for quota has been turned down is 
allowed to appeal to me within seven days of the notifica­
tion of the decision of the Committee.
"(Sgd) G.S. Panda.
"Secretary to the Prime Minister. 
"22nd September, 1965*”
This last Minute from the Secretary to the Prime Minis­
ter, claiming final responsibility for granting expatriate 
immigration quotas provoked a response from one member of 
the Quota Committee, who felt that it was an affront to 
the integrity of the Committee which was composed of cabinet 
ministers, to have its decisions over-ruled by a civil 
servant and receive instructions from him.
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His protest letter to the Honourable the Prime Minister 
reads:
(4) "Dear Prime Minister,
"I have to refer to letter reference No. Conf. 0PM.511/ 
5/ 1(26) of 22nd September, 1965» addressed to the Commercial 
Immigration Committee by your Secretary (copy-enclos^) *
"(2) I have the following comments to make:- 
"1. In accepting membership of this Committee, I was 
under the impression that it was a cabinet committee whose 
direct responsibility was to you as Prime Minister. Quite 
naturally, it was generally accepted that the Committee's 
decisions were in the nature of recommendations which only 
you as Prime Minister could over-rule. As you will see from 
the letter of your Secretary, however» he is claiming in 
plain terms that a Committee which consists of cabinet 
ministers is directly responsible to him, a civil servant, 
and that he has powers to overrule a cabinet committee so 
constituted.
"2. This raises a grave issue of administration in 
this country which in any view ought without delay to be 
clarified.
"3' The matter in my view is made the more serious by 
the fact that on at least two occas ions where the Committee 
has decided on what it considered the national interest to 
reject applications for entry into this country of non­
technical foreign workers (35 in one case), the Secretary to 
the Prime Minister has without any consultation with the
-354-
Committee taken upon himself to write to the Secretary of 
the Committee in your name overruling the Committee's. This 
has naturally caused me grave concern especially at a time 
when your open and declared policy has been, wherever 
possible, to check the inflow of foreigners into trades and 
professions which could well be carried on by Sierra Leone 
nationals.
"4. I therefore propose, subject to your ruling, not 
to attend future meetings of this Committee until our 
position vis-a-vis the Secretary to the Prime Minister is 
clarified.
"5* To continue to do so would in view of the 
Secretary's letter amount to abdicating the legal position 
and authority of a cabinet minister in favour of a civil 




"(Sgd) K.I. Kai Samba
"Hon. Minister of Agriculture
"and Natural Resources.
"4th November, 1965."
The response from the Prime Minister to the Honourable 
Minister's protest letter was directed not to him, but to 
the Commercial Immigration Quota Committee. It reads:
(5) "I am directed by the Honourable Prime Minister to 
instruct you that as from now henceforth the above Committee
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should be required to submit their recommendations to him, 
since under the Act, he has responsibility for controlling 
immigration in this country. It should also be let known 
that any person whose application for quota has been turned 
down is allowed an appeal to the Prime Minister within 
seven days of the notification of the decision of the 
Committee.
"(Sgd) G.S. Panda,
"Secretary to the 
"Prime Minister.
"5th November, 1965*
The only difference between this correspondence and 
the previous one (No. 3) wa» the change in pronouns - from 
"me" to "him". The rest of the content of the Memorandum 
remained unaltered; and so the powers of the Commercial 
Immigration Quota Committee remained weakened and under­
mined. Under such circumstances, demonstrated by this case 
study,it was extremely very difficult to exercise effective 
control over the employment of non-nationals in the private 
sector, notwithstanding any such policies and recommenda­
tions. The crux of the matter is the implementation 
machinery.
However, despite these implementation problems created 
by the. structure of decision-making and the enforcement 
agency of the immigration laws, the search for a more last­
ing solution continued. Within 12 months of submission of 
the Wales Report, the Minister of Finance appointed a
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committee on the Africanisation of commerce and industry 
under the chairmanship of Professor Cox-George in June, 
1969»^^ Under its terms of reference, the committee was 
required first, to examine the Africanisation programmes 
and policies of all major companies and firms operating in 
Sierra Leone; second, in association with the companies or 
firms concerned, to work out a programme aimed at training 
Sierra Leoneans to assume managerial and professional 
positions in each company or firm; third, to keep Sierra 
Leonean students abroad informed of employment opportunities 
at home in the field of commerce and industry; fourth, to 
review existing programmes of Africanisation of every 
company or firm; fifth, to submit proposals to the govern­
ment in the light of information received under these and 
how best the Africanisation programme in commerce and 
industry can be accelerated; sixth, to call upon the com­
panies or firms to submit periodic returns showing the 
strength of their expatriate staff (the responses of 
expatriate employers to this request is fully discussed in 
Chapter 3*5); and finally, seventhj to submit its proposals 
to the government not later than six months from the date 
of its appointment (16/6/6 9).^^ However, the Committee did 
not submit its final report until 1973» four years after 
its date of appointment.
In its final report to the government, the Committee 
on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry made 26 proposals 
which, they thought, if accepted and implemented by the
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govemment could go a long way to solve the expatriate 
immigration problem. In the light of its terms of reference 
these proposals can be grouped and summarised under three 
main headings. First, these proposals called for more 
stringent conditions to be imposed as pre-conditions for 
allowing foreign investors to enter Sierra Leone and 
establish businesses. For instance, the second proposal of 
the Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry 
suggested among other things that:
(i) A necessary pre-condition for the establishment of
new industries by foreign concerns and for granting of
development certificates should be that the companies
accept and agree before hand to provide opportunities for
training Sierra Leoneans for responsible positions in them
41and in all aspects of the business of such industries.
(ii) That the deputy-general manager of such a company 
must be Sierra Leonean and must have facilities for manage­
ment training to the topmost level open to him or her.
One can hardly see any marked difference between the 
above proposals of the Committee on Africanisation of 
Commerce and Industry, and those put foreward by the Wales 
Commission in 1968, the provisions of the Non-Citizens 
(Restriction, Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. 14, 1965, 
and the 1952 Government Directives on the Immigration Ordi­
nance 1946, Cep. 86, and above all the views expressed 
earlier by the chairman in his report on African.* 
participation in the commerce of Sierra Leone, 1958 (see
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page 319 above). In fact, the proposals of the Committee 
under this category merely reflect the thinking of its 
chairman - Professor Cox-George who had been very consistent 
in his stand on the call for the Africanisation of commerce 
and industry.
The second category of proposals concerned with the 
establishment of enforcement agencies or institutions. For 
example, the Committee recommended the establishment of 
two commissions, one on immigration with a secretariat 
which would review the implementation of the government's 
immigration policy regularly twice a year in order to 
ensure strict execution of that policy; and the second on 
Africanisation which would function as the new Africanisation 
Authority with a secretariat too. This second category of 
proposals reflected the terms of reference (third and 
sixth) which required the Committee to keep Sierra Leone 
students abroad informed of the existence of job opportu­
nities in the private sector and which also required all 
companies or firms to submit periodical reports on the 
level of their expatriate staff. The problems associated 
with these proposals if accepted are the creation of new 
control bureaucratic structures which would result jji . 
unnecessary delay and perhaps more malpractices of the kind 
described in the last case study (4), will.lower the morale of 
the business community for further investment.
The third group of proposals concerned with the 
manpower aspect of Africanisation. These proposals were
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based on the Committee's realization that effective 
implementation of immigration policies depends largely 
on the availability of qualified and experienced manpower 
resources. The Committee, therefore, made the following 
recommendations:
(i) that the resources of the local Institute of 
Management, the University of Sierra Leone, the business 
and industrial community and of the government should be 
brought together to give strength, stimulus and direction 
to the development of business and management studies at 
all levels;
(ii) a body comprising all these interests should
advise the appropriate authorities on the development
42programmes of management education and training;
(iii) and finally, the Committee recommended that 
the government should consider the advisability of consul­
tation with Ghana and Nigeria and the professional
organisations in Sierra Leone for the purpose of establish-
43ing a West African professional accounting qualifications.
The proposals of the Cox-George Committee on Africani­
sation of Commerce and Industry are good and far reaching 
like previous recommendations. But the willingness and 
ability of the government to accept and implement them was 
another matter. The interesting question is, was the 
setting up of the Committee on Africanisation of Commerce 
and Industry necessary within one year of the submission of 
the Wales Commission Report? This is more so when the
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44government accepted all but one of the recommendations 
of the Wales Commission in the first place, and in the 
second place, from the standpoint that some of the 
recommendations made by both the Wales Commission and the 
Cox-George Committee, with the exception of the Committee's 
proposals on the establishment of enforcement agencies and 
those on manpower were identical. Previous discussion on 
the immigration quota system indicated that the Minister of 
Trade and Industry in conjunction with the Principal 
Immigration Officer was responsible for the administration 
of the system. The second question is, why did the Minister 
of Finance take over the responsibility to appoint the 
Committee on Africanisation while under the Non-Citizens 
(Registration, Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. 14, 1965 
the responsibility is given to the Minister of Trade and 
Industry?
Answers to these questions difficult to get''from
official sources, despite the attempts made to interview
officials in both Ministries - Finance and Trade and
Industry. This was partly because, since the appointment
of the Cox-George Committee on the Africanisation of
Commerce and Industry in June 1969 to 1978, there has been
no less than six finance ministers and seven trade and
4 5industry ministers, and partly because civil servants 
interviewed were unwilling to give any information relating 
to the immigration control issue. However, from the 
unofficial sources, the following reasons were not
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unconnected with why the government considered it necessary 
to appoint the second committee immediately after the Wales 
Commission Report: that the Wales Commission was appointed
under a military government which the civilian government 
considered to be unconstitutional.^^ That the Wales 
Commission Report did not go far enough to provide lasting 
solutions to the immigration control problem in the country.
A possible answer to the second question is that, 
unlike the Trade and Industry Minister who saw the 
Africanisation of the private sector from a purely social 
viewpoint, i.e. providing employment for the few educated 
Africans, the Minister of Finance saw the Africanisation 
policy from an economic standpoint. The adverse effect of 
expatriate employment on the country's balance of payment 
and foreign exchange (see Chapter 2.2 and section 4.3 above).
However, even if the above reasons were the underlying 
factors behind the appointment of the National Committee on 
Africanisation of Commerce and Industry by the then Minister 
of Finance, the government did not accept all its recommen­
dations. For instance, the government did not accept the 
proposals on the establishment of commissions of immigration 
and Africanisation with secretariats. Perhaps the reason 
why the government did not accept these categories of 
proposals was that the Committee was not explicit on whether 
the Commission on Immigration Control should also have its 
own secretariat or continue to use its existing facilities - 
the Principal Immigration Officer. In any event, if these
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proposals had been accepted by the government, they would 
have created a bureaucratic structure with resulting effect 
of delay and thus aggravate the fear often expressed by the 
business community (see page 349 above). If, for example, 
the government had accepted the proposals on the establish­
ment of the two commissions, it could have meant that the 
Commission on Immigration Control could only grant expat­
riate quotas to the applicants after it has received 
clearance from the Commission for Africanisation. This 
would have been time consuming for a businessman who regards 
"time as money”. Added to this is the possibility of con­
flict between the two bodies. This mi^t manifest itself 
ina situation where both commissions differ on what each 
considers to be the national interest in the granting or 
rejection of immigration quotas (see Case 3)«
Another reason, perhaps, of greater importance than the 
previous ones is why the government did not accept the 
proposals on the establishment of the two commissions was 
the financial costs involved. The costs of office accom­
modation, staffing, etc. would have been substantial to the
government, which was already spending a third of its
46revenue on personal emolument alone.
However, in the nature of things, the government has 
accepted the first and third categories of the National 
Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry's 
proposals under the administration of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry and the Principal Immigration Officer. The
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Minister of Trade and Industry remained chairmein of the 
Immigration Quota Committee and the Principal Immigration 
Officer as its Secretary, and the rest of the membership 
also remained as it was before. Under these circumstances 
one cannot avoid making perhaps sweeping conclusions that 
the appointment of these commissions one after another was 
nothing more than a public relations exercise designed to 
convince the public that the government was making efforts 
or seemed to be making efforts to restrict the employment 
of non-nationals in the private sector. This.is because 
from the available data the employment of expatriates in 
the private sector was on the increase. Between 1968 and 
1978, out of a total of 895 expatriate quotas applied for,
601 were approved, representing 6 7 .2 per cent of the total 
against 59*9 per cent in I96I-67 (see Table 4.2 abôve.) This 
is also reflected in the following table.
TABLE 4 .3 Expatriate Quota Approved Between 1968 and 1978.
Number
Applied Number Number %Year For Approved Rejected Approve<
1968 80 60 20 75.0
1969 70 52 18 74.3
1970 95 70 25 73-7 ■
1971 264 171 93 64.8
1972 49 33 16 67 .0
1973 44 24 20 5 4 .5
1974 47 28 19 59 .6
1975 93 63 30 67 .7
1976 46 36 10 78.0
1977 54 39 15 72 .0
1978 33 25 8 75.6ToÿAL «95 601 274 6 7 .2Source 1 Collected from the Immigration Quota
Confidential Minute! File, Ministry
of Trade and Industry, Freetown,
1978.
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In summary, it may be said categorically that the use 
of the immigration quota system as an instrument of the 
government's Africanisation policies had not been very 
successful in so far as its effect on the size and level of 
expatriate employment in the private sector. Between 1961 
and 196? (Table 4.2), the number of expatriate quotas 
granted by respective Immigration Control Committees was 
504 representing 59*9 per cent of the total quotas (841) 
applied for by expatriate employers. And between I968 and 
1971I despite the recommendations and proposals of the 
Wales Commission's Report (1968), a further 509 quotas were 
applied for, of which 353 were granted. However, subsequent 
to the National Committee on the Africanisation of Commerce 
and Industry's recommendations (1973), and the fiscal con­
trols discussed below, there was a dramatic fall-off in
applications, for between 1972 and 1978, but with the
47exception of 1975, applications never exceeded 54. The 
ratio of approval to applications, however, hardly changed, 
as Table 4.3 shows.
4.42 The Fiscal Policy.
Disillusioned perhaps with what seemed to be an 
apparent failure of its Africanisation policy through the 
use of immigration control mechanisms, the government 
decided to adopt (in addition to its immigration controls)» 
the use of fiscal policy. In 1972, by an Act of Parliament, 
the Sierra Leone Government introduced a payroll tax levy 
of £200 on each expatriate employed by private sector
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employers. The rationale behind thé use of fiscal policy 
as an instrument of Africanisation policies is based on the 
assumption that a tax levy on the expatriate payroll will 
increase the cost of the expatriate to the employer.
48Consequently, he would prefer to employ local labour.
But the evidence available so far does not seem to 
support that. From the annual revenue the Government 
collect, it shows that the fiscal policy, though intended 
to act as a deterrent to expatriate employment in the 
private sector as its primary objective, also has a 
secondary effect, the raising of Government revenue (see 
Table 4.4 below).
Tax - 1973/74-1978/79 (£1 - Le2).








Source: Government Annual Estimate of Revenue and
Expenditures 1978/79.
From the above table it appears that the revenue produced 
from the quotas granted became a significant source of 
income to the Government, and it might be thought that 
revenue raising could encourage the granting of more quotas, 
not fewer. But who benefits from such a tax?
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The fact is, with the exception of the mining companies 
which are export-oriented with world market competition, the 
majority of foreign-owned firms enjoyed monopoly positions 
in Sierra Leone. Besides being the sole manufacturers of 
certain commodities, they also enjoy the protection of the 
government from foreign competition. Moreover, some of them 
are regarded as import-substitutes. Some even enjoy a five- 
year tax-free h o l i d a y . T o  levy a tax on their expatriate 
employees' payroll will, of course, increase costs to the 
employer, but being in monopoly positions they will pass the 
cost to the consumer without the effect of reducing the 
number of expatriates employed, nor even the profits of the 
company. Besides, a tax levy on expatriate employees payroll 
can also be treated by the employer either as a production 
cost or trading expense which is recoverable from the com­
pany's turnover and thus reduces the company's taxable profit 
to the government. What the Government gains in tax in one 
way is lost in another. Sierra Leoneans lose because job 
opportunities are reduced, while the consumer loses if he has 
to bear part of the additional cost of the expatriate to the 
employer in the form of increased prices.
4.5 Criticism of Current Policies.
The foregoing analysis has important implications for 
current Africanisation policies. It is possible to group 
current policies into quantitative controls, general and 
specific, and controls which alter relative prices, again 
general and specific.
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There are two significant kinds of quantitative controls 
to achieve increased African employment which have been 
popular* One is immigration policies which restrict the 
number of foreigners entering the country to work. Restric­
tions are placed either through licensing schemes or through 
explicit quotas. These restrictions are usually industry- 
specific. Although such immigration restrictions on the 
inflow of foreign personnel have been most popular devices, 
there have also been recommendations that there be laws 
stipulating that the Africans must be employed in certain 
jobs within a specified period of time as long as they were 
judged "qualified".A system of work permits has also been 
recommended.-^^ Such permits would be good for a specific 
period of time and subject to renewal as the law specifies; 
for example, as soon as qualified nationals become available 
for certain posts the work permit of expatriates holding 
these posts will not be renewed.
Immigration restrictions and renewable work permits or 
quotas are subject to several weaknesses. They do not 
ensure that of the potential expatriates willing and able to 
work within the country the most productive ones actually 
come in. In this regard, policies which involve auctioning 
work permits to foreigners and which allow such permits to 
be freely transferable will not be subject to this short­
coming.
In addition, immigration restrictions and work permits 
do not ensure that foreigners actually go where they are most
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valuable to the economy, unless such policies are company or 
industry-specific. Even if transferable work permits are 
auctioned to foreigners, if the foreigners once they enter 
are free to work wherever they choose, this shortcoming can 
still exist.
Furthermore, immigration restrictions and work permits 
do not ensure that the employment of Africans actually 
increases when expatriate employment is decreased. Indeed, 
not only is it possible for the number of Africans not to 
alter as the number of expatriates falls, but it is also 
possible for their number to actually decrease.
In view of the above, it would appear that a policy of 
auctioning entry or work permits to foreigners would be 
similar in its effects to the fiscal policy outlined above. 
This would have been so had it not been for the fact that 
such auctioning policies impinge disadvantageously on those 
with high discount rates. Hence, small expatriate firms 
such as Lebanese or Indian family businesses or individual 
employers with limited access to capital markets are at a 
disadvantage in bidding for work permits. Instead of lump 
sum payments work permits can be sold strictly oh rental 
basis. This would remove the capital advantage. But an 
efficient policy involving work permits would involve 
transfer of work permits. This would soon engender a market 
for buying and selling permits, tying up valuable resources 
and allowing some lucky or prescient dealer to reap the 
"profit", at the expense of the government and nationals.
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Such consideration makes a policy involving auctioning 
transferable work permits or entry rights less attractive 
than a policy involving a constant percentage tax on wages 
of expatriate employees.
To return to the main argument, immigration restric­
tions and work peimits, especially when they do not involve 
auctioning, are administratively complex and conducive to 
irregularities (see Cases 3 and 4 above). Generally, as in 
Sierra Leone, some individual or group of individuals such 
as the Principal Immigration Officer, the Minister of Trade 
and Industry, or the Immigration Quota Committee, etc. must 
decide on the basis of ill-defined criteria whether an 
individual who has applied for an entry visa (usually the 
firm employing the individual will forward or make the 
application) is to be granted the permit. It is not 
difficult to see that the decision-making process involved 
can become quite complex and somevdiat arbitrary and that 
the opportunities for bribery and corruption are enormous.
To forestall such opportunities, it has been suggested^ 
that immigration quotas be granted on the basis of clear, 
well-publicised criteria. This no doubt would help although 
it would not completely eliminate corruption and arbitrary 
decisions (see Cases 3 and 4 above).
Before 1972, policies which increase relative cost of 
expatriate employee to induce Africanisation of employment 
had been non-existent. This makes the Sierra Leone so-called 
payroll tax introduced in 1972^^ particularly interesting.
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It is really a unit tax imposed on a factor of production 
(labour), and is a specific sum placed on the employment of 
any expatriate irrespective of his earnings or position in 
the organisation. This tax has serious disadvantages as 
compared with a percentage of income tax. In particular, 
such a tax will not be more effective in discouraging 
employment of the highly-paid. If the problem of Africanisa­
tion is most serious in the top posts, then a policy which 
fails to discriminate between high and low salary expatriates 
is less desirable than one that does so, for it makes it no 
more expensive to recruit a managing director than a clerk. 
Furthermore, a percentage tax may promote greater efficiency 
in the utilization of different categories of foreign 
employees. However, the social cost of getting rid of any 
given number of expatriates or of preventing the entiy of 
any given number of foreign employees, may be higher in the 
percentage tax case than in the per unit tax case. In 
addition to these considerations, the Sierra Leone payroll . 
tax is an 'incomplete* policy in the sense that it does not 
ensure that African employment increases at the sa^e time 
that expatriate employment decreases. On a similar point,- 
T.M. Yusufu has expressed the following opinion:
The immediate employment impact of such policies, 
is, however, highly debatable, particularly as 
it leads to a large-scale repatriation of capital. 
Indeed the replacement of highly-skilled personnel 
could easily have the initial effect not only of
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reducing the level of economic activity but 
also the level of employment.
A similar tone of caution is also discernable in the 
analysis of a group of economists working at the University 
College, Nairobi in 1968. They stressed that the cost of 
diverting Kenyans from new, growth-created jobs into 
'replacement jobs' where they could make no net addition to 
national product be seriously considered. Furthermore, they 
estimated that the diversion of each such Kenyan would on 
average mean sacrificing about U.S. S6,000 worth of potential 
output, They added:
Perhaps even more significantly, as each 
high-level person (employer or senior expat­
riate employee) on the average creates jobs 
for ten others besides himself, each high- 
level job not filled as a result of diverting 
a qualified Kenyan to replacement also means 
about ten additional unskilled or semi­
skilled workers being deprived of the
57chances of earning wage income.^'
Thus, while there may be good argument for a well 
planned and phased reduction in the number of non-nationals 
in employment, properly related to manpower requirements 
(Chapter 5 below), and replacement possibilities, hasty and 
drastic measures may have a reversible effect on the objec­
tives of the policies of Africanisation in the private 
sector.
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4.6 Summary and Conclusions.
In the above chapter, some attempts have been made to 
discuss in greater depth the responses of both organized 
African labour and the government to. the recruitment and 
employment policies of foreign-owned firms operating in 
Sierra Leone. Organized labour saw the employment policies 
of foreign employers as discriminatory. To them, the 
apparent preponderance of expatriates in all top jobs with 
high pay, better conditions of service, represented the 
colonial mentality of the white man towards the African,
"the beast of burden" who must only be paid just sufficient 
to keep him living, could no longer be tolerated in an 
independent sovereign nation. The workers responded in the 
form of industrial action strikes. The purpose of this was 
to draw the attention of the public, the media, intellectuals 
(like Professor Cox-George), and the politicians (section 
4.2). The government could not remain indifferent under 
such popular pressures. It responded. Implicit in its 
responses were the socio-economic motivations (4.3). The 
social and economic motives for Africanisation were based on 
the assumption that a successful replacement of expatriates 
by African personnel would have a beneficial spread effect 
to the society through the acquisition of skills and 
increased income and will also effect the country's balance 
of payment and foreign exchange position.
To achieve these objectives the government adopted two 
policy measures: immigration control, and the use of fiscal
policy. Under the Immigration Control policy (4.4(1)),
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legislation which restricted the employment of non-nationals 
in the private sector were passed. Under these legislations 
the machinery for the implementation of these laws was 
created, such as the Immigration Control Committee, the 
Office of the Principal Immigration Officer, etc. with the 
Minister of Trade and Industry as the final decision taker 
on all immigration quota issues. To ensure the proper 
application and implementation of such laws, a Commission 
of Inquiry, and committees were appointed to suggest ways and 
means by which such policies could effectively be implemented. 
Invariably, the recommendations and proposals of such 
commission and committee reports were accepted by the 
government but to implement them successfully was another 
matter.
In addition to the immigration control policies was 
the fiscal policy. This policy introduced in 1972 imposed 
a tax levy on expatriate payroll. It was hoped that by so 
doing it would alter the relative cost of expatriate 
employees in favour of their African counterparts, but this 
was not realised.
In any event, it is clear that the success of all these 
policies discussed above depended upon the increased supply 
of suitably qualified nationals to replace non-nationals, 
and that these could not be pursued as ends in themselves 
without regard to their possible effects on other objectives, 
in particular economic growth and the growth of employment.
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Africanisation and Manpower Requirements:- PART THREE: 
Education and Manpower Supply.
INTRODUCTION
Economists have tended in the past to underrate the 
role of manpower resources in the economic development of 
the third world countries and concentrated too much on the 
inability of these countries to accumulate capital.^ Only 
recently have they come to consider manpower resources with 
the respect that the subject undoubtedly deserves in the 
development equation. Indeed, as always, the pendulum has 
swung to the other extreme: it is already fashionable and
part of the new 'orthodoxy' to underplay the role of capital 
and to explain underdevelopment essentially in terms of the 
limitations imposed by inadequate manpower resources.
By the same token, the African policy makers have come 
to realize that, as part of the process of both economic 
and political decolonisation, the progress and success of 
Africanisation policies in both the public and private 
sectors depend essentially upon the supply and availability 
of local manpower resources, in the right number, at the 
right time, in the right place and with the right balance 
of technical knowledge and practical skills.^ This is 
because, as Seltzer pointed out:
Any Africanisation policy that necessitates 
or can only be maintained by external recruit­
ments is not only self-defeating in the sense
— 381—
of failing to accomplish its basic objectives,
but it's also wasteful of available resources -
external recruitments tend to be more costly
4than the utilization of present personnel.
Since independence in I961, successive governments 
(military or civilian) in Sierra Leone have indicated their 
awareness that to be successful, Africanisation policy must 
be complemented by sound manpower development policies _ 
designed to improve the manpower situation in the country. 
For example, the First Ten Years National Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1962/63-1972/73)-^ recognized the 
government's responsibility to take steps to meeting the 
increased demand for qualified manpower in the future. One 
of the priorities of the Plan was:
The production of high- and intermediate- 
levels of manpower (especially in science 
and technology) to satisfy the requirements 
of the public and the private sector establish­
ments such that the majority of the expatriate 
personnel in industry and commerce would be 
replaced by Sierra Leonean nationals.
In another place the plan states:
Official policy is committed to reducing the 
extreme reliance on expatriate manpower, and 
to relating through increased training efforts 
and expansion of educational facilities, the 
supply of high- and intermediate levels of
- 382-
manpower to the needs of the economy in
*7general and the industry in particular.
It was against this background that in 1964 the 
Sierra Leone government with the aid of the British 
Ministry of Overseas Development Administration, appointed 
Robert Brown to conduct a survey on the manpower situation 
in Sierra Leone, with the following terms of reference:
To report on the manpower requirements of 
the civil service, commerce and industry; 
for administrative, professional, technical 
and clerical staff with recommendations for 
training facilities both locally and abroad; 
and to relate such requirements to the
gcountry's ability to meet the cost.
The results of the survey are illustrated in Tables 5*1 
and 5»2 below, the occupational and industrial distribution 
of high- and intermediate-level manpower. The survey 
consisted of a questionnaire mailed to every governmental 
agency and private firms employing six or more workers.
The questionee was requested to report present, inter­
mediate, and high-level manpower employment (administrative, 
managerial, professional, technical and clerical staff) and 
to estimate manpower requirements for 1969. The returns 
were then tabulated and submitted to the government as an 
estimate of manpower needs for 1969. No attempts were made 
to check individual estimates within a given industry 
against one another or against independent estimates of
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future demands for the final product of the firms in 
question. The report merely concluded that existing stock 
of intermediate and high level manpower would have to 
increase by 10 per cent per year until 1969»
The importance of the survey for this study lies not in 
its crude estimation of future manpower needs but its 
findings concerning the distribution of skills among the 
existing labour force and between government and private 
employment. The survey shows that out of an estimated 
60,000 workers, only 12,570 could be classified as inter­
mediate or high-level manpower (see Tables 5*1 and 5*2).
Of the 12,570, one-quarter were teachers at all levels of 
education and one-third were clerical workers. Because of 
the large number of teachers and clerical workers employed 
by the government, over 65 per cent of the enumerated 
employees were engaged by the government. (The projections 
of the survey estimated that this percentage will rise to 
70 per cent in 1969») The survey also revealed that 15 per 
cent of the workers surveyed were expatriates holding key 
positions in both the public and the private sectors. For 
example, 57 of the 77 lecturers at Forah Bay College were 
expatriates, 75 per cent of the 267 architects, engineers 
and surveyers were expatriates (Table 5.2 above), (the 
percentage increases to 87 per cent if the public sector 
is excluded); 24 per cent of the 38 chemists were 
expatriates, and 7I per cent of the 194 directors and 
managers in the private sector were expatriates (60 per 
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The ability of both the private sector and the public 
sector to import foreign specialists for key positions 
suggests that manpower deficiencies at the highest levels 
may be minimal. The acute shortage of manpower, as indicated 
by the annual reports of the various ministries, is at a 
sub-professional, technical level; for example, agricultural 
assistants, mechanics, electricians, nurses, laboratory 
technicians, etc. For example, the Railway Department 
stated in its annual report for 1963/64 that:
It became increasingly clear during the year 
that an increasingly large percentage of 
failures were due to inadequate attention 
to routine maintenance procedures. In 
common with many other countries of the world. 
Sierra Leone has to face new technical and 
staff problems created by diésélisation and, 
until such time as local staff of the right 
calibre can be thoroughly trained in theory 
and practice of diesel engine maintenance, 
it will be sessential to enlist outside assis­
tance to obtain the full benefit of diéséli­
sation.^
The Electricity Corporation reported in 1964/65 that: 
there are still many men who require constant 
supervision, and there is still a serious 
shortage of men capable of locating faults 
on the increasing number of machines and 
apparatus being installed.
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Additional examples of reported manpower deficiencies 
will be cited in later chapters, but enough has been said 
here to indicate the types of shortages encountered which 
has tended to restrict and retard the capacity of the 
Sierra Leone Government to implement its policy of Africani­
sation of both the private and public sector employments 
since its inception. Thus, in Parts I and II of this study, 
some attempts have been made to establish the case for the 
manpower demand aspect of Africanisation of both the public 
and private sectors' employments in Sierra Leone, with 
references to other African states with similar colonial 
experiences. Part I looked at the Africanisation of the 
public service while Part II discussed that of the private 
sector. In both cases, the government and private sector 
employers had wanted to Africanisé, but they claimed that 
their willingness to do so was constrained by the absence of 
enough people with the right qualifications and experience 
to replace existing expatriates and to fill new vacancies as 
they occurred. Part III of this study will therefore 
consider the manpower supply side of the Africanisation 
equation. It will look at the various approaches to 
manpower planning such as the rate of return in investment 
in education, the cost-benefit approach to manpower planning, 
the manpower supply-requirements, etc., and then the policy 
implications of such approaches for the policy makers.
—388 —
CHAPTER 5 THE MANPOWER SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS.
-389“
5.1 Introduction.
At independence, African countries had four common
features of their manpower situation: firstly, most
professional and senior administrative positions in the
economy were held by non-nationals (see Tables 1.4 and 3*8).
Secondly, the public sector not only accounted for about
half of all wage employment but also employed a very large
proportion, perhaps three-quarters or more of high-level
manpower (defined as those whose jobs normally require a
11university degree or its equivalent). Thirdly, while 
there was a shortage of high level manpower in many fields, 
on the whole the shortage was 'long term' rather than 
immediate. But the shortage of middle-level manpower (those 
with a secondary school education and/or with a post 
secondary school technical and vocational training) was 
already acute and may well continue to be acute for some 
years to come (Table 5*17 below). Lastly, the possession 
of school certificate neatly divided the population into 
two groups: the educated few with good opportunities of
present employment, and the vast majority of the semi­
skilled whose employment was stagnant or falling, whose 
prospects of advancement were minimal and who were 
increasingly confined to self-employment in agriculture and 
petty commercial activities.
These factors have several implications for manpower 
planning and development policies. The existence and 
availability of expatriate manpower at the high levels at 
the time of independence meant that the immediate manpower
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12shortage was that of qualified persons, and was therefore 
political rather than economic. Its degree of scarcity was 
as much a function of the speed with which African govern­
ments would wish to Africanize senior posts in the economy, 
as of the rate of growth of output which they propose to 
achieve.
It follows that if Africanisation would receive a high
political priority as well as demographic wastage, it would
absorb a large proportion of the prospective output of the
educational system over the next ten to fifteen years. This
procedure was undoubtedly expensive as it was devoted to
replacement of scarce resources which would otherwise be
used for growth; but it simplified the technical task of
manpower planning, as replacement needs can be forecast with
greater degree of confidence than needs arising from the
13projected growht of the economy. ^
The simultaneous existence of manpower shortage at 
the high-level skills and the surpluses of other grades of 
labour is not unique to Sierra Leone. Harbison and Myers 
found it common in all developing c o u n t r i e s . I n  Sierra 
Leone it is more acutely felt Owing to the fact that the 
output of the educational system has been expanding faster 
than employment opportunities for school leavers^^ (see 
Table 5*18)* It is not suggested that aggregate wage 
employment would have grown faster or unemployment slower 
if education has grown less. On the contrary, schools have 
acted as weirs postponing and regulating the entry of
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youngsters into the labour market. In recent years, however, 
the output of secondary school education has reached a level 
(Table 5*18) that is now not only sufficient to fill many labour 
market vacancies which were previously taken by youngsters with 
primary school education, but has also enabled middle-level 
training institutions (primary school teacher training 
colleges, technical and vocational institutes) to raise 
their sights and demand school certificate or general 
certificate of education at 'O' level as a condition of 
entry. It may not be far off the mark to suggest that 
besides acting as a feeder of secondary schools, the princi­
pal function of the recent expansion of primary education 
has been to ensure that seekers after urban jobs enter the 
labour market somewhat later and somewhat better educated 
than otherwise would have done. In such circumstances, it 
would appear profitable to examine ways in which education 
could contribute to creating new opportunities for the 
advancement of not only this 'surplus' but the mass of the 
population.
However, concurrent with the educated unemployed, 
there exists critical shortage of specific types of manpower 
mainly in the technical fields. Moreover, these shortages 
are regarded as "bottlenecks" in both the progress of 
Africanisation (Table 3*8) and the development of Sierra 
Leone's economy, and in the opinion of some planners, 
wherever a country confronts a few bottlenecks it should 
concentrate a major proportion of its efforts on removing 
the bottlenecks.
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This will involve in the main 'manpower requirements' 
approach to educational planning, the fundamental axiom of 
which is that lack of qualified manpower constitutes a 
bottleneck. Although this section of the study does not 
attempt to contribute to the general debate on the merits 
and limitations of the manpower requirements approach which 
in the opinion of Jolly and Colclough, has for many years 
dominated the literature on the economies of education, it 
is nevertheless important to briefly discuss the manpower 
planning approaches in relation to education and economic 
development.
The current interest in the economic aspect of education 
stems partly from the increased burden of educational 
expenditure on government budget (in Sierra Leone more than 
25 per cent of total government revenue is spent on educa­
tion in 1978/79 financial year), and partly from the belief 
of economists and educators that returns to investment in 
human capital are very high and education is more important 
than capital accumulation as an engine of economic growth, 
accounting for a large unexplained part of its so-called 
"residual factor".Salary differentials benefiting 
high-level manpower and educated persons seemed to support 
this concept (see 5* 5)*
The literature on education and manpower may broadly 
be divided into two schools of thoughts. On the one hand 
are the writers who try to integrate education into the 
general body of economic theory as a factor of production
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analogous to physical capital. They ask such questions
as: Has education in the past contributed significantly to
economic growth? Can one define and measure the stock of
education embodied in the labour force? Can one define and
calculate the average and marginal rate of return on this 
18stock?
The second school of thought takes it for granted that 
education and training are pre-conditions of economic pro­
gress that as economies grow large and more complex, so will 
their demand for human skills and that most of these skills 
can be provided efficiently through education and training. 
Manpower planners attempt to calculate on certain assumptions 
about the level of and composition of future economic 
activity, and other recent social and political variables - 
the demand for manpower classified by occupations (Table 5*1) 
to convert this classification of demand by occupation into 
demand by educational attainment and to devise plans and
policies aimed at equating projected demands and probably 
19supplies. ^
Several attempts have been made to quantify the 
contribution of education to economic growth. The methods 
used to obtain these results has often been referred to as 
the 'residual factor approach. The essence of this 
approach is to compare an increase in imputa of labour and 
capital with the expansion of gross national product over a 
long period. In various studies, it was found that the 
increase in imports was small in comparison with G.N.P.
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growth and so it was assumed that the improvement in produc­
tion was due to the 'residual factor' often defined as 
"education".
Several economists, led by Schultz, Auckrust, Solow
and Denison, have estimated that a sizeable proportion
(ranging from 20-90 per cent) of the growth rate over a
given period was due to the educational level of the labour 
20force. Solow estimated that 97*5 per cent of growth in
the United States of America between 1900 and I96O could be
21attributed to the residual factor. Aukrast claimed about
60 per cent for a similar period (1900-1955) In Norway, and 
22Schultz attributed 83 per cent of growth in the U.S.A.
23between 1910 and 1945 to the residual factor. Denison's 
result was much less than the others, being 43 per cent.
His later study of Western Europe attributed a smaller 
share of increased output to the residual factor:- 13 per
24cent for the United Kingdom and only 6 per cent for France.
25The residual factor has many imperfections. Much of
the controversy centres on its assumption (namely that the
residual factor is education) or the use of guesstimates
and its attempts to explain growth in terms of simple 
? 6variables, moreover, as Schultz admitted, ignores the
issue about the efficiency and productivity of the internal
27operations of education. Balogh and Streeten ' have strongly 
argued that failure to take account of these reasons that 
the approach has little value for developing countries. 
Nevertheless, despite its limitations, it has been applied 
in Greece^^ and Chile.
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The large amounts of resources devoted to education 
and the belief that education is an important cause of 
economic growth has resulted in the creation of educational 
plans in most developing countries.
5.2 Approaches to Educational Planning.
If one restricts himself to the planning methods
available, he would find that economists and educationalists
have a wide range of choice in the selection of a method
31or criterion for educational planning. The Tinbergen^ 
method is an economic approach to planning education which 
relies on input-output analysis. The manpower requirement 
approach may be described as an attempt to devise required 
educational output from a set of economic projections. The 
rate of return approach, relying on cost-benefits techniques, 
is set apart from the others by its explicit attempt to 
measure both economic benefits and the cost of schooling.
Logically, all of them are different ways of attempting 
to assess the 'returns'; the manpower approach accepts 
meeting skills requirements as a satisfactory approximation 
to measuring returns. Tinbergen indicates the percentage of 
government expenditure to be spent on education to maximize 
returns on this form of investment as opposed to any other. 
But basically, there is no way of avoiding a 'cost-benefit' 
approach to educational planning. The Government should 
invest where the yield is highest and only in education if 
the results show greater measurable economic benefit per 
unit of cost. The
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manpower and Tinbergen's approaches are complementary to
this fundamental approach and not substitutes.
In attempting to measure the return to investment in
education one is often confronted with the so-called
controversy over whether education is an investment or 
32consumer good.^ In the author's opinion, this is not the 
real problem since it is a fact that education is both a 
'capital' and a 'consumer good' as are certain other forms 
of investments. The real problem in measuring the direct 
or indirect return to education is the lack of adequate 
data and techniques with which to measure these returns.
As Mark Blaug says;
We cannot measure private consumption benefits 
of education without more knowledge of house­
hold behaviour and so we cannot measure the 
social consumption benefits of education
without more knowledge of collective 
33behaviour.
But by measuring the investment components, "we could come
34close to the final answer."
Econometric is another approach to educational plan­
ning which was developed by a group of economists in the 
Netherlands principally Tinbergen, Bos and C o r r e a . T h e i r  
model is concerned with establishing the necessary educa­
tional conditions to sustain a given rate of growth of 
output.
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In contrast to those who apply cost-benefit analysis 
to education, the econometric approach views the problem of
o ̂planning education as one of adapting education to growth.
It tries to relate the stock of educated people and the flow
of students at different levels directly to national output
of goods and services without using manpower forecasts in
order to show how the structure of education should change
with different growth rates of the economy.
Their methods have been subjected to considerable 
37criticism,^' primarily on the basis that their planning 
models assume that a given level of output requires a fixed 
volume of manpower with a fixed amount of education and 
training. Clearly, in the case of manpower output, a given 
output could be produced with a small number of highly
38trained workers or a large number of less trained workers.
The choice of technology would determine the choice between 
more educated/training and less employment, or less educated/ 
training and more employment. Their approach also ignores 
the immense difficulties of classifying occupations by 
educational attainment.Finally, while this concern with 
volume of education as opposed to the composition of 
education tells us something about aggregates, it tells us 
nothing about the different kinds of education and how to 
design an educational system in any detail. For although 
Tinbergen set out to ask;
"What structure of education system is needed 
in order to let the economy grow at a given
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rate and how does it change with that growth 
rate?"
40he failed to answer his own question. This approach may 
be considered to have some value in developed countries 
because they have the requisite time series on output per 
man cross-classified by sector, occupation and educational 
qualifications. However, its value is less certain for a 
developing country like Sierra Leone because it focusses on 
a mere quantitative expansion of what in many cases is 
inappropriate to the system of education.
The rate of return approach - rather than attempting 
to estimate the level of schooling required by a particular 
pattern of economic growth, practitioners of the rate-of- 
retum approach seek to estimate the social profitability 
of particular types of schooling expenditures.
Thus, unlike the Tinbergen approach, this rate of 
returns approach is concerned with the question of efficient 
allocation of resources among competing uses. The rate of 
return or cost-benefit analysis should not be confused with 
the 'personal income approach'. In default of a theoretically 
perfect cost-benefit approach one has to make do with 
various approximations of which the income approach is one. 
This assumes that differences in income are close approxima­
tions to differences in individual contribution to G.N.P. 
and differences in earnings are the result of differences in 
educational background. By combining these assumptions, a 
rough measure of the contribution to total social product of
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additional years of education of various types can be ob­
tained. The measurement of benefits at individual level,
let alone from the community's aspects, introduces all sorts 
42of problems. The two major defects of this approach are 
that:
(a) income is not a perfect measure of contribution to
total output. For example, there are many 'imperfect markets'
for labour especially in developing countries. This is a
crucial argument and much is made of it by critics of this 
43approach; ^
(b) differences in income do not only reflect differences 
in educational background but in social privileges and 
perhaps intelligence.
In short, it ignores the social, institutional and political 
factors which influence wages and incomes and so a simple 
correlation between education and income would prove nothing. 
Nevertheless, efforts have been made to measure returns to 
investment in education from income differentials in the 
U.S.A., India and M e x i c o . M a n y  of the limitations apply 
not to the 'rate of returns' approach as such but the less 
ambitious income differentials approach. This attempts to 
improve the technique of the income approach whose problems 
are all conceptually soluble, have contributed to a more 
refined cost-benefits analysis.
Another method of educational planning is the social 
demand approach. This method of planning, although rarely 
advocated by academics, is for political reasons still
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adopted in some developing countries, particularly in Africa. 
It is an attempt to estimate changes in the demand by various 
groups of people for different types of education by 
extrapolational expansion is then geared to that demand. It 
ignores conditions on the labour market since the deducation 
system would meet the demand of students rather than that of 
industry. Consequently, bottlenecks (mentioned earlier) and 
surplus would probably arise in different sectors of the 
labour market.
Finally, perhaps, the manpower requirement approach. 
This approach to educational planning may be described as aji 
attempt to derive required educational outputs from a set of 
economic growth targets. Basically, this approach rests on 
forecasts of future demand for qualified manpower to support 
the sorts of economy envisaged by an economic development 
plan (Table 5*1)• These forecasts are then converted into 
educational requirements on the basis of which the educa­
tional system is then structured.
This approach is based on the assumption that the main 
link of education with economic development is through the 
knowledge and skills it produces in*the labour force. It 
implies that if the educational system produces qualified 
people in the right number and places, the major part of the 
economic and social contribution of educational planning is 
achieved. It recognized, of course, that the educational 
system must provide also for those not in the labour force, 
but it regards projections of manpower needs as basic to 
educational planning.
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Notwithstanding the fact that the manpower-requirement 
approach is the leading method employed throughout the world 
for integrating educational and economic planning, it has 
serious deficiencies. Some of the criticisms against this 
approach are particularly damaging to the extent that one 
must question its effectiveness, especially since this is the 
approach adopted in Sierra L e o n e . T h e  major criticisms 
which are in general applicable to the manpower requirement 
approach irrespective of the different types of manpower 
forecasting techniques used, and particularly relevant in 
developing countries.
First, there is the question of the time lag. It will 
be the future pattern of manpower that must guide today's 
educational decisions since there is a time lag between 
taking the decision to construct new schools and providing 
the requisite manpower. The time perspective required by 
education as a whole is 15-20 years, though it is possible 
to influence the supply in the pipeline over shorter periods. 
On this side, one could therefore conclude that there is a 
necessity for long-term forecasts of manpower. But in the 
context of an undeveloped country is this possible? Forecast 
of manpower needs is rarely reliable beyond 3-5 years. Yet, 
this critical assumption of long-term forecasting has not 
been questioned by manpower forecasters. Some advocates of 
manpower forecasting settle for a 'general guide' to future 
manpower requirements. But a margin of error in predicting 
manpower initially will be greatly widened in 10-15 years.
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Some manpower planners argued for 'broad guidelines',^^
others for detailed plans. It is more difficult to make .
estimates of individual industrial sectors than of the
47overall economy, ' but it is essential for manpower planners
to have such details. However, there is often in developing
countries a shortage of statistical information on which to
base such estimates. Manpower forecasts need to be very
detailed especially if they are to be useful to educational
planners. At the lower end of the occupational scale
(unskilled workers) accuracy is not necessary for there is
almost complete transferability among jobs or at least in
regard to necessary educational qualifications. At the
higher levels where such mobility is difficult greater
precision is required.
Manpower forecasts inevitably calculate the educational
distribution of the labour force in the target year from
observations of the past trends. But should planners accept
the existing connection between occupation and education and
project that into the future?
The relationship between occupation and specific
educational qualifications is very far from being clearly
established and yet it is the most important link in the
whole manpower approach. The translation of employment
projections into educational groupings present enormous 
48problems.
The educational components of different occupations 
changes with technological progress. In addition, a changing
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technology will alter the ways in which goods and services 
are produced. The input mix of factors of production will 
almost certainly change. Unfortunately, most manpower 
forecasters assume a fixed relationship between input of 
educated workers and output of industry or economy. This 
assumption of a fixed and constant labour input-output ratio 
is a fundamental weakness since it ignores the many different 
techniques of production, the combination of inputs and the 
possibility of substitution between factors. For example, 
the use of more automation could well reduce the labour 
required. So what type of future demand pattern does the 
manpower planner take into consideration?
Most manpower forecasts are linked to planned produc­
tion programmes of national plans. This is sound if the 
plan is adhered to but if, as so often happens, the plan is 
revised because of political changes or otherwise, the man­
power plan is dangerously upset. On the other hand, manpower 
plans can be hampered by the lack of any overall policy for 
economic development.
The occupational needs of an economy are not the whole 
of society's needs for education. The manpower planners have 
been accused unjustly of ignoring other cultural, political 
and social goals. Few would wish to convey the impression 
that economic development is the sole objective of education. 
But whatever may be said of the cultural importance and 
values of education, it would hardly perform its social 
function if it did not serve economic development to the 
fullest possible extent.
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Furthermore, as Schultz questions: Is the distinction
between 'cultural' and economic so sharp?
"Implicit in this distinction is a dichotomy 
which separates culture from economy, or the art 
of living viewed as culture from the practice 
of earning a living which is excluded from 
culture. A general and comprehensive concept 
of culture does not exclude the consumption 
and production activities on which so much 
of economic analysis concentrates. How people 
earn their living is in general an integral
ixQpart of culture."
On a more fundamental point, the manpower approach 
assumes that skills requirements are a proper basis for 
determining the amount and pattern of investment in the 
educational system. But it tells little about whether the 
skills can be better supplied by on-the-job training or 
formal education and nothing about the relative costs and 
returns of formal schooling versus on-the-job training for 
particular jobs.
Finally, to quote a major critic of the manpower 
approach:
The cost of producing the educated manpower 
do not determine the outcome of manpower 
forecasts . . not only are the cost of edu­
cation ignored as critical variable in the 
manpower requirements approach but also.
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are the wages and salaries of educated people.
In fact, prices are simply left out of account 
altogether.
The many different manpower forecasting techniques also
present major difficulties,^^ but they do not concern us
52here. The advocates of manpower planning ■ have in some
instances presented their cases with either unqualified
enthusiasm or marked reservations. Vaizey and Harbison are
guilty of contradictions and false assumptions; Fames and
Hollister conceded that some aspects of manpower forecasting
53are meaningless.^^ O'Drmougher after comparing the views
of Vaizey, Hollister and Debeauvais concluded that " . . .
among those that have bean active in this area for some time,
the role and usefulness of manpower forecasts are still
54matters of belief rather than of knowledge.^
For example, Vaizey's main argument for advocating
manpower planning is that it will partly solve the problem
55of the intellectual unemployment.-^-^ Cash, on the other 
hand, argues that one of the consequences of over-investment 
in education resulting from manpower planning would be the 
problem of the educated unemployed.
This catalogue of the problems facing manpower plana 
is not so great as to invalidate manpower forecasts alto­
gether. Manpower planning may be the 'bastard' child of 
economics,but as Streeten maintained, "for less developed 
countries, manpower planning approach has very considerable 
merits. When 'bottlenecks' do not exist as in many developed
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countries, then the usefulness of such an exercise is 
considerably lessened and the need to consider other 
criteria for educational provision is more important. 
Furthermore, in Fames' view, "so long as one grants that 
manpower considerations are one of the elements which ought 
to influence educational decisions, then all such decisions 
. . . involve manpower forecasts. The question is not 
whether forecasts are to be made, but the extent to which 
they are going to be as systematic as possible . . .  If 
allocation of resources to education were governed entirely 
by market forces . . . centralised decisions would disappear. 
Since this is not the case, government must assume responsi­
bility of forecasting. Educational planning cannot get 
away from the need to make ex-ante estimates of the likely 
future change in the demand for skilled manpower projections.
Here one encounters the crux of the matter; it is not 
the need to forecast that is the real problem but the dura­
tion of the forecast. As Blaug pointed out:
If long-term forecasts are really as subject 
to error as Fames himself admits, it is 
difficult to see how they can be justified; 
the fact that all educational decisions have 
manpower implications makes errors more serious 
not less . . . the question is not whether to 
forecast inaccurately as much as ten to 
fifteen years ahead of being accurate; so 
the issue seems to reduce to a case of long­
term versus medium-term forecasting.^^
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It is arguable, however, that in the final analysis no 
approach is defensible on rational grounds except cost- 
benefits analysis because there can be no rational justifi­
cation for expending investment in education unless it will 
bring more benefits for a given cost than any other 
investments. To quote Cash,
"Education should be expanded only if the 
yield justifies the investment."
Few would disagree with this fundamental rule of resources 
allocation in education. But the lack of sufficient data 
on personal earnings, cross-classified by age and education, 
make it difficult to apply the rate-of-return approach to
educational planning in Sierra Leone and perhaps in other
6lAfrican states, as Smyth and Bennet found. Nevertheless, 
despite these difficulties they were able to calculate the 
social rate of return to four levels of education. It did 
enable them to conclude:
Until more is known about the return from 
investment in education and the return from 
other public investments, crucial decisions 
about the allocation of resources between edu­
cation and alternative growth inducing 
activities must continue to be based on 
political customary philosophical criteria 
and related only haphazardly to the economic 
end of the policy.
—^0 8—
Similarly, the manpower-requirement approach has its 
limitations. Smyth and Bennet concluded that "unless the 
manpower approach to educational planning in its present 
form is re-examined, using a more rigorous analysis of just 
what are the returns on investment in education, there is a 
real danger that a country may be pursuing an education 
policy which may not be relevant to its manpower needs.
It is in this respect that the rest of this chapter is 
intended to examine, through the use of the cost-benefits 
and manpower-requirements approaches. Sierra Leone's post­
independent policies in the light of the country's manpower 
situation.
5.3 Cost of Education and Manpower Planning.
In the absence of reliable data, the application of 
cost-benefit techniques to evaluate educational investment 
in Sierra Leone is difficult. However, there is no doubt 
that such evaluation would be extremely useful for manpower 
planning policy purposes.
Sierra Leone, like many other developing countries, 
has recognized the importance of manpower resources as a 
powerful factor of economic development. In 1963i the total 
attendance at the nation's educational institutions was found 
to be 111,000 by the population c e n s u s . I n  1978» roughly 
268,230 students were enrolled in the various institutions 
of l e a r n i n g . T h e  total government recurrent expenditure 
on education increased from approximately Le 53 Million
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(£26.5 million) in 1963/64 to Le 215 million (£107.5 million)
67
in 1977/7 8.^^ At present, approximately 26.2 per cent of
total government current revenue is allocated to education.
One characteristic of educational expenditure in 
Sierra Leone should be emphasized. It relates to the 
differences in the amount spent per head on primary, 
secondary and university education (see Table 5*3)* With 
the enrolments and expenditure of 1977/78, the annual central 
government expenditure per student at primary, secondary and 
university levels are illustrated in Table 5*3 below.
TABLE 5.3 Central Government Expenditure on Education 1977-
1978.
Level of Total Exp. Enrol- Exp. Per 
_______Education_______in Le ment Student__________
' 1 -__________ 2__________2__________4__________
Primary Le 7,439,228 182,100 Le 40.85
Secondary 6,558,166 42,500 154.30
University 4,215,331 1,780 Le 1,280.00
Sources: Estimate of Revenue and Expenditure and
Development Estimates 1977/78; for Col. 2 
__________and Col. 3, Sierra Leone's Education 1978
As the level of education rises, some differences in expense 
per head are justifiable. But can differences as enormous as 
these be justified? The cost-benefit technique may provide 
an answer.
5.31 Cost-Benefit Approach.
In carrying out a cost-benefit analysis of Sierra 
Leone's educational system, it is possible to quantify only
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the direct benefits - the incremental earnings of persons 
with a certain level of education. These are calculated on 
the basis of income data from two sources. First, to obtain 
income streams for individuals with primary, secondary/ 
technical or university education, the Sierra Leone govern­
ment's salary scales are a d o p t e d . T h e  same thing also 
applied to the salaries of teachers with varying qualifica­
tions. These are largely in conformity with civil service 
scales (see Appendix V). To obtain the lifetime income 
profile of those without any education, a second source of 
information is also used - the household surveys conducted 
by the Central Statistics Office throughout the country 
over the years 196? to 1969 .̂ ^ From these surveys information 
is available on average annual incomes earned in different 
occupations. In all, 34 occupations are catalogued. The 
level of education required to perform successfully in each 
occupation has to be determined to convert the educational 
classification into an economic one. Without such a 
conversion, it will not be possible to compare the average 
annual incomes at different levels of educational attainment. 
For Sierra Leone, there are no data available about the 
existing educational attainment in different job clusters or 
occupations. Consequently, the correlation of occupational 
groups into educational requirements is largely based on 
personal judgement. In Table 5*4 below an attempted 
conversion is set out.
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The average median incomes determined from the 
Household Surveys and the civil service scales of the 
government are presented in Table 5*5 below. The median 
income of the uneducated is derived from the Household 
Survey data. The median incomes at the other levels of 
educational attainments are derived from the Sierra Leone 
civil service scales. With the help of Table 5*4 above and 
the household surveys income data, the pre-1970/?l average 
annual incomes at primary, secondary/technical and university
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education levels work out at Le398«00, Le545*00 and Lei,260.00 
























Source: Computed from Household Surveys and Civil Service 
Salary Scales.
average income on the basis of the Household Surveys is 
quite in conformity with the civil service scales for the 
secondary, technical and university levels, the surveys 
yield a much smaller average income. In fact, the discre­
pancy between the two increases as the level of education 
rises. The difficulty of specifying the educational 
requirements for some of the occupational groupings was a 
major cause of this discrepancy. Many occupations tenta­
tively deemed to require secondary and/or university 
education (Table 5*4) really refer to job titles and not to 
the nature of the job. For example, the class "government 
administrators" would include personnel at various stages of 
the aministrative ladder, some of whom may require university 
education while others have only secondary or primary 
education (see 2.?). The same is true for occupational 
group "directors, managers, non-government" since it will
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include managerial personnel at all levels and in all types 
of business - private, proprietorship, partnership and 
established companies (see Tables 3.8a and b and 3.11a and b). 
On the other hand, at lower levels of education the occupa­
tional groupings relate more to the nature of the job and 
hence it is easier to specify the educational qualifications 
required to get into them. Thus, the lifetime income stream 
of the uneducated alone is derived from the Household
Surveys. For the income profiles at other levels of educa-
70tion one has to depend upon the civil service scales. ■
Since Household Surveys permit the calculation of only 
the average income for those without any education, certain 
assumptions are adopted to construct the lifetime income 
profiles of such persons. First, a person is expected to 
work for 30 y e a r s T h e  computed post-1970/71 average income 
of Le 292.00 is attributed to the l4th year of work, and to 
obtain incomes prior to and subsequent to the l4th year, a 
compound rate of growth of 3 per cent per annum is assumed 
to prevail throughout the person's working life.^^ The 
lifetime income profiles for persons without any education 
and those with primary, secondary/technical and university 
education are presented in Table 5*5 above. On the basis of " 
the civil service scales, persons with university education 
are found to reach the top of the scales in the l?th year of 
service; those with secondary/technical education in the 
20th year of service; and those with primary education in 
the 28th year of service. These lifetime income streams are
—4l 4“
TABLE 5.6 Lifetime Income Profiles by Level of Education
Year
(Leones per year). 
No Ed. Pri. Ed. Sec./Tec. Ed. Univ.
0 197 243 697 1,4361 203 257 627 1,5252 209 270 653 1,613
3 215 284 686 1,8774 222 297 713 1,966
5 229 311 726 2,0546 236 324 739 2,091
7 243 338 752 2,2638 251 351 785 2,349
9 259 365 818 2,43510 267 378 851 2,53411 275 392 884 2,63212 283 412 924 2,731
13 292 432 964 2,82914 301 452 1003 2,927
15 310 473 1043 3,026
16 319 493 1071 3,026
17 329 513 1082 3,02618 339 527 1109 3,02619 349 554 1159 _ 3,02620 359 568 1159 3,02621 370- 581 1159 3,02622 381 594 1159 3,026
23 392 607 1159 3,02624 404 620 1159 3,026
25 4l6 634 1159 3,026
26 429 660 1159 3,026
27 442 686 1159 3,02628 442 686 1159 3,026
29 469 686 1159 3,026
Source: tC.S.O. Household Surveys 1967-1970, Freetown.
used to quantify the social benefits in the calculations on 
investment in education at various levels.
With respect to the measurement of costs at the 
primary, secondary and university levels, the major portion 
of the direct operating costs is borne by the central 
government. The central government's expenditure per student 
in primary schools, secondary schools and institutions of
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higher learning can be easily calculated from the government
budgets and the total enrolment at the various levels of
the education system (see Table 5*3)• In Sierra Leone, there
are a few denominational schools at the primary level and a
great many at the secondary level. These schools obtained
private funds in addition to assistance from the central
government grants estimated to be Le 25*00 per student at
primary. Le 113*00 at secondary and Le 1,924.00 at higher
73education l e v e l . T h e s e  are likely to be slight over­
estimates of the direct operating costs because not all the 
annual government grants and private donations are used for 
current expenditure: a part is expended on capital goods
as well. However, this over-estimation is expected to be 
largely offset by the failure to include capital costs. It 
has not been possible to obtain capital resources costs per 
student since complete data on the assets of educational 
institutions are not available. The net result, however, 
may not be much distorted.
In addition, associated with the education of students 
in institutions of higher learning and those in forms IV 
and V of secondary schools, there are the opportunity costs 
of earnings foregone. The minimum entry age at the primary 
is 5+ years in Sierra Leone. Thus, a student is 12+ years 
old when he or she completes primary education and 15+ years 
old when Form III is attained. The assumption that the 
opportunity cost of the earnings foregone begins to be 
incurred in form IV implies a minimum age of 15 for entering 
the job market and this appears to be reasonable.
-4l6-
The miscellaneous costs of education by students or
their parents include expenditure on tuition fees, books,
stationery, uniforms and travel. Fees are charged at all
levels of the education system. In primary education a
yearly tuition fee is Le 3,00 for classes I and II, Le 4.00
for classes III to VI and Le 6.00 for class V I I . I n
secondary schools, the annual tuition fee is Le 21.00 per
student. In addition to fees, primary and secondary school
students or their parents have to meet costs every year for
books, stationery, uniforms and travel which, in the
absence of relevant data, are put at Le 10.00 and Le 25*00
respectively* Fees are also charged for university education
averaging annually Le 1000.00 per student. But in most
cases, these are covered by scholarships awarded to students
by the central government. These scholarships also covered
the various miscellaneous costs of education such as
expenditure on books, stationery, registration and student
union charges. For example, in 1976-77, scholarship grants
to students at the University of Sierra Leone and the
teachers' colleges totalled Le l.l4 million, averaging
Le 4l6.00 per student. These grants are already included in
the annual direct operating costs at the higher education
level of Le 1,924.00 per student. It was on the basis of
these benefits and costs magnitudes that the evaluation of
education programmes at various levels was undertaken by the
7 5Education Review Committ ee. The social internal rate of 
return on investment in primary, secondary and university
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education were 20 per cent, 22 per cent and 9*5 per cent 
respectively in 1971/72. In Table 5*7 below, the internal 
rates of return on investment in education are presented for 
Kenya, Uganda, India and Sierra Leone.
TABLE 5.7 Internal Rates of Return in Education: Inter­
national Comparison.
Country_________________Pri. Ed. Sec. Ed. Uniy. Ed.
Kenya (1968) 22 24 9
Uganda (1965) 66 22 12
India (1966) 17 l6 13
Sierra Leone (1971/72) 20 22 9-5 (Table 5.6)
Source: Cost-benefit Analysis in Education, a Case Study
of Kenya; World Bank staff; occasional Papers 
_________No. 14, I.B.R.D. 1972, p. 9 4 . _________
The rates of return obtained in the above example are 
similar to those for some other developing countries. The 
ranking of the educational ladder is also identical in 
various countries. The calculations and analysis reported 
so far have significant implications for the planning of 
the education system of Sierra.Leone and the supply of 
manpower. The lifetime earning profile (Table 5*6) illus­
trates that individual earnings in Sierra Leone are princi­
pally related to the educational attainment of individuals 
rather than for work actually done. The effect of this on 
the manpower supply of all categories will be seen in the 
next section - the manpower-requirement approach (see Table 
5.18).
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5.3 (2 ) The Requirement and Supply of Trained Personnel.
Manpower planning techniques involve the estimation of 
ruture manpower requirements and supply and the determination 
of areas of critical shortage. Making forecasts about 
manpower needs in a developing country which depends largely 
on foreign investment for its economic development programmes 
is a risky venture. Such forecasts are extremely unreliable 
even when copious data are available. In the absence of all 
necessary data and information, one should inevitably be 
forced to substitute judgement and 'educated guesses' for 
hard facts. Personal judgements, especially when they refer 
to the future, are patently fallible. Hence projections of 
manpower needs and supply should be interpreted as giving a 
broad trend rather than exact numbers (see Tables 5*1 and 
5-2).
There are several methods of making projections of 
future manpower needs. One is to make use of past trends 
for projecting future requirements. But for Sierra Leone, 
like many other developing countries, it is not possible to 
get past data to construct an adequate time series for the 
country. The use of more sophisticated techniques, like 
that opted in the OECD Mediterranean Regional Project 
(MRP),*̂  ̂has to be rejected because of the inadequacy of the 
available data in Sierra Leone. Consequently a simple 
disaggregative approach is adopted in this study. This 
approach is discussed in relation to the projection of 
Sierra Leone's manpower requirements for the years 1975 to
—4l9—
1979. The word 'requirement' is used instead of demand in
order to avoid the problem of wage structure and labour
absorption associated with the latter concept. In other
words, the requirements are worked out without any specific
reference to the price of different types of manpower. In
respect of Sierra Leone, this is an important qualification
since there are some grounds for believing that wage pricing
77arrangements need examination.'' Furthermore, filling 
'requirements' in the public service - the largest employer 
of high and middle-level and teaching manpower - may be 
restricted by the size of the government's current budget.
It should also be noted that the present requirement fore­
casts are conditional upon a set of assumptions about the 
structure and rate of growth of the Sierra Leone economy 
set out in the National Development Plan 1974/75 to 1978/79*^^
The requirements and supply projections presented in 
this section are divided into three groups:
i. High-level - positions normally considered to 
require completion of secondary education and four or more 
years of university education or its equivalent.
ii. Middle-level - positions normally considered to 
require less than four years of university education such as 
Agricultural Certificate training and technical/vocational 
education the entry requirements for which may or may not
be the completion of secondary education with General 
Certificate of Education passes at four 'O' levels.
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iii. Primary and secondary school teachers who are 
separated from the high- and middle-level grouping for two 
reasons. First, although they might normally be considered 
middle-level manpower, most secondary school teachers are 
university graduates which would qualify them as high-level 
manpower. Second, unlike many middle-level manpower 
positions.which are sometimes filled by persons with on-the- 
job training in lieu of specific school-based education, 
teaching is generally thought to require some kind of pre­
service training such as the post-graduate diploma course in 
education. High Teachers Certificate course, etc.
The starting point of the method adopted for project­
ing high and middle-level manpower needs is the distribution 
of the working population by various industry groups or 
sectors in the economy. The estimates of the 1974 and 1979 
work force distribution by sectors are available in the Plan 
document^^ and are reproduced in Columns 1 and 2 of Table
qq5*8. The estimate of the sectoral distribution of high- 
and middle-level manpower in 1974 are represented in Columns 
3 and 4 in Table 5*8 below. The estimates are based on the 
data available in the population census of 1963 and the 
Household Surveys conducted by the Central Statistics Office 
in 1967-1970. The census provides a classification of the 
working population by occupation and sector of employment 
based on the International Standard classification of 
occupations and Standard Industrial classifications (ISCO 
and ISIC). In all, eight occupations and eight sectors are
-421-
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distinguished in the census tabulation (Table 5*9 below).
The Household Surveys permit computations of educational
81attainment in each occupation. The professional, tech­
nical, administrative, managerial and clerical occupations 
are intensive in the use of high- and middle-level manpower. 
The secondary/technical/vocational and university education 
requirements of various sectors are determined by multi­
plying the sector-occupation matrix (Table 5*9 below) by 
the occupation-éducation matrix (Table 5*10 below).
These sectoral high- and middle-level educated manpower 
requirements per thousand of total employment in each 
sector are presented in Table 5*11.
By multiplying these by the corresponding sectoral 
working population (in thousands) Column 3, 4, 5 and 6 of 
Table 5*8 are derived. The new recruitments for high- 
and middle-level manpower over the years 1975 to 1979 are 
given by the difference between Columns 5 and 3 and 6 and 4.
The replacement requirements caused by the Africanisa­
tion policies, death or retirement of the members of the 
present stock of educated manpower (Columns 3 and 4, Table 
5.8) should be added to the new recruitments. An attrition 
rate of I .50 per cent per year for all high- and middle- 
level manpower is used for this purpose. The estimated 
replacement needs for the period 1975 to 1979 are recorded 
in Columns 9 and 10, Table 5*8.
The total requirements for high- and middle-level 
manpower is calculated in the above manner are expected to
-423-
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nical & 415 .4 198.8
1 Administrative, 
Managerial, etc. 487.2 166.1
2 Clerical Workers 755.7 33.3
3 Sales Workers 79.6 0 .6
4 Farmers, Fishermen 
and Miners 9 .9 0.0
5 Transport, . Communications 119.7 18.1
6 Craft and Labourers 135.4 7 .4
7/8 Services and Recreation 231.8 0 .0
Source: Computed from the I963 census result.




0 Agriculture 0.153 10.7
1 Mining 2.584 33.3
%/3 Manufacturing 8.463 143.1
4 Construction 14.476 171.4
5 Electricity & Water 19.563 199.9
6 Commerce 3.565 107.4
7 Transport, Communications 21.004 181.5
8 Public Administration 75.446 195.7
be approximately 1,230. and 12,305 respectively. Of the 
total high-level manpower requirements of 1,230, some 66O 
or 56 per cent are expected to be employed in the public
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service and otherwise. This sector share of the middle- 
level manpower requirements is about 23 per cent. The 
other important sector in order of their high-level manpower 
needs are transport, storage and communications (l4 per 
cent); manufacturing (13 per cent); construction (11 per 
cent); commerce (6 per cent); and finally, agriculture (1.5 
per cent). On the basis of the middle-level manpower needs, 
the various important sectors are: manufacturing (23 per ce
cent); commerce (18 per cent); construction (13 per cent); 
transport, storage and communications (12 per cent) and 
agriculture (11 per cent). Since no expansion of the 
electricity, water and sanitary services sector is planned 
and employment in mining is expected to decline, these 
sectors do not figure prominently in the high and middle- 
level manpower requirements between 1975 and 1979*
The requirements for primary and secondary school 
teachers are based on projected school enrolments which are 
presented in Tables 5*12 and 5* 13* These projections were 
not based upon any "optimal" rate of growth but were derived 
from past trends in rate of progression, that is, the 
proportion of pupils in Class I vho proceed to Class II 
and so on up the education ladder, and the trends in growth 
of enrolment in Class I. During the 1960s enrolment in 
Class I grew at 4.8 per cent per annum (much more slowly 
than the total primary enrolment growth of 7*7 per cent).
In the last part, of the decade, the increase in the first 
year enrolment averaged only about 1 per cent per annum.
-426-
On the assumption that enrolment in Class I will return to 
an average annual increase of 4 per cent, the total primary 
enrolment can be expected to grow at about 5 per cent, per 
annum during the planned period. The projected primary 
enrolments are shown in Table 5*12.
The secondary school enrolment patterns presented in 
Table 5*13 are based on an implied rate of enrolment growth 
of 5*9 per cent per annum for the 1957 to 1979 period. At 
present, the proportion of primary school pupils in Class 
VII who proceed to Form 1 the following year is found to be 
approximately 58 per cent. For the purpose of projections, 
it is assumed that roughly the same percentage of Class VII 
pupils will find places in secondary schools the following 
year. The progression rates from one form to the next are 
assumed to be those currently obtained in the various 
secondary schools. The computation necessary to derive the 
teacher requirements are shown in Table 5»14 and 5•15»
Thus, the primary and secondary school teacher requirements 
over the five-year plan period are 2,920 and 1,195 
respectively.
The first step in estimating the supply of high/ 
middle-level manpower and teachers is to obtain the 
projected enrolments at the University of Sierra Leone, the 
various teacher training colleges, the School of Nursing, 
and the technical and commercial institutes in the country. 
Outputs from these institutions can then be based upon 
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proportion of graduates who are Sierra Leoneans. These 
hypotheses are summarised in Table 5'23~ Being derived 
from very limited enrolment progression data, these may 
contain some error. The supply figures are calculated one 
year ahead of manpower requirements to allow for a lag 
between graduation and job placement.
The projected enrolment in the university, teacher 
colleges and technical institutions are taken from the 
National Development Plan and were obtained from the 
Principals of various colleges and institutions. These 
enrolment projections are presented in Table 5*l6.
Graduates from Fourah Bay College in the Faculty of 
Arts, Social Studies and Pure and Applied Sciences belong 
to the high-level manpower class. Successful candidates 
from the Department of Education are classified as secondary 
school teachers. Njala University College comprises two 
faculties - those of agriculture and education. Graduates 
of the Faculty of Agriculture are included in high-level 
manpower, those of the Faculty of Education are assumed to 
augment the supply of secondary school teachers. From the 
various teacher-training institutions, the candidates 
obtaining the Higher Teachers Certificate are included in 
the supply of secondary school teachers; the Certificate 
holders are assumed to constitute the supply of primary 
school teachers. All those who pass through the technical 
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With the help of the completion rates, the percentage 
of Sierra Leoneans in various institutions and the duration 
of different education programmes, the supply of high- and 
middle-level manpower and secondary school and primary
Opschool teachers over the plan period can be calculated.
The Sierra Leoneans returning from study abroad should be 
added to the indigenous supply of high-level manpower. At 
present, there are approximately 1,200 Sierra Leonean 
students,and it is assumed that this number will remain 
fairly constant over the next five years. Some of these 
students will be secondary school leavers; others will be 
graduates from the University of Sierra Leone seeking 
advanced degrees abroad. In calculating the high-level 
manpower supply it is assumed that the net inflow of 
persons returning from gtudy abroad will average 30 graduates 
per year during the 1975 to 1979 plan period.
Finally, the high-level supply figures are net of Sierra 
Leonean graduates from the University who go on to the 
Department of Education for a one-year diploma course.
These graduates are consequently shown under the Supply of 
high-level teachers.
The supply projections for the 1974-75 to 1978-79 plan 
period are presented in Table 5*17 below. For the sake 
of comparison, the requirements of educated manpower are 
reproduced in Column 2 of this table. The absolute 
shortfalls (requirement - supply) are shown in Column 3 and 
the supply/requirement percentage is presented in Column 4.
TABLE 5.17 Projected Post-Secondary-Trained Personnel:
Requirement and Supply, 1975-1979.
Short­ Supp./
Manpower Category Requirement Supply falls Req. #
High-Level
(1) Sciences 431 254 167 59.0(2) Non-sciences 715 508 267 71 .0
(3) Agriculture 86 70 16 81.4TOTALS 1,232 837 390 68.0
Middle-Level
Sciences & Non-sciences 11,029 6,047 4,982 55.0
Agriculture 1.178 1.130 48 96.0
TOTALS 12,207 7,177 5,030 59.0
Teachers
Primary 2,920 2,616 304 90.0
Secondary 1,195 996 199 83.0TOTALS 4 .115 3,612 503 86.5
GRAND TOTALS 17.554 11,626 5,923 71 .0
Source: Computed from previous tables above.
Demands on the education system to fill needs for 
post-secondary trained personnel will be lower than total 
requirements, since a proportion of requirements is expected 
to be filled by upgrading of persons already employed. It 
is assumed that 95 per cent of high-level jobs will be 
filled by university graduates; the remaining 5 per cent 
consisting of primarily high-level management which must be 
filled either by expatriate personnel or with local people 
with job experience. At the middle-level, a large propor­
tion will be filled by upgrading of personnel. It is 
estimated, although somewhat arbitrarily, that 70 per cent 
of middle-level positions should be filled by persons with 
some prior training. For teachers, it is assumed that all 
new teachers should have some pre-service training.
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The Table 5*17 above illustrates high- and middle- 
level manpower and teachers requirements and supply by 
major fields of studyy sciences, non-sciences, agriculture, 
and primary and secondary teaching. The implications of 
these figures, particularly for the Africanisation policies 
are discussed more fully in Section 5*4. In brief, the 
output of high-level manpower varies by categories. In the 
sciences projected requirements for high-level manpower 
exceeded the projected supply by 167, representing a supply 
shortfall of 4l per cent. This is particularly important 
in that the majority of non-nationals employed in both 
public and private sectors fall under this category (see 
Tables 5*1 and 5*2). In the non-sciences, the requirement/ 
supply shortfall is only 29 per cent. This reflects 
students’ greater preference for art subjects as demon­
strated in Table 5*16 above. The area of most critical 
shortage is middle-level. Where supply is estimated to 
reach only 59 per cent of requirements. In the private 
sector, this is the area where most expatriate personnel 
are engaged (see Table 3«8a). The supply of teachers for 
both primary and secondary schools in relation to require­
ments seems to fall short of only 12 per cent. The total 
supply of post-secondary trained manpower for the period 
1975-1979 is 11,626 or about 7I per cent of requirements.
The lack of data on skilled and semi-skilled manpower 
requirements should not draw attention away from the 
importance of this skill-level for modem sector growth and
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r e p l a c e m e n t G i v e n  the fact that the middle- 
level manpower personnel required will be . considerably 
higher than that for high-level manpower (Table 
Yet, enrolment at the University of Sierra Leone for the 
years 1972 through 1977 exceeded that of technical and 
vocational training institutions put together; implying 
the likelihood that the manpower shortage could be most 
severe at the skilled-level (where expatriates are most 
preponderantly employed in the private sector) for some 
years to come. This is the situation which Dr. Jim Funna 
might have seen when he commented:
It is easy to find a graduate civil entineer
in Sierra Leone, but less easy to find some-
8 4one who can mend a typewriter. ^
5.4 Factors affecting the supply of skilled manpower.
The explanation for the above undesirable anomalous 
state of the Sierra Leone employment market can be found in 
the salary and wage structure, the education system of the 
country and status considerations in the society, all 
inherited from the colonial period.
1. Wages and salary structure.
The wages and salaries paid for high-level manpower 
relative to middle-level, semi-skilled and unskilled wages 
or the level of alternative incomes earnings opportunities 
in Sierra Leone were determined by what was needed to 
attract expatriates from abroad than local market conditions. 
In the post-independence period, the levels of wages for 
high-level positions in the public service were maintained
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even when expatriates were replaced by Sierra Leoneans.
Since the public sector is by far the largest employer of
high-level manpower in Sierra Leone, these peculiarities
of the wage structures have had very important effects on
the supply of skilled manpower. Far from serving to provide
a set of proper incentives for the growth of a rational
spectrum of skills, the system has had serious adverse
effects. First, because of the great salary or wage
differentials between high- and middle-level jobs (see
Table 5*5 and 5*6 above), it has proved very difficult to
encourage bright and brilliant students to enter middle-
level careers, since with a very little more effort and
training they can hope to move into the "stratosphere of
high-level salaries".Secondly, the salaries for high-
level manpower soak up a large part of the budget in the 
87public service. ' This feature of the wage structure has 
created a negative feedback to the educational system. The 
whole question of what determines wage eind salary structures 
in developing countries is difficult and complex. It is 
clear and well documented that the labour market systems
ooin Black Africa are highly imperfect. The relative 
earnings of different jobs seem not to reflect the major 
priorities of development and may even attract people away 
from occupations in which their skills are most needed.
Wages and salaries are determined largely by political, 
institutional or other factors which may have very little 
or no relevance to the economic realities of the economy.
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One of the most striking characteristics of the structure 
of wages and salaries in Sierra Leone, however, is the 
degree to which earnings of workers are influenced by the 
level of their educational attainment (Table 5*5)•
In 1977» the average earnings of Sierra Leoneans with
degrees were about four times those of a skilled worker
with a secondary education, seven times as great as those
of unskilled workers with a primary school education and
nine times greater than an uneducated rural worker's wage
(Tables 5*5 and 5*6). These differentials are not high by
standards elsewhere in Africa. Yet, comparative figures
for Europeans countries (not those noted for egalitarian
policies) reveal average earnings at the highest level of
education which, for all age groups, are not greater than
five times those of workers at the lowest levels of 
90education.^
The question which needs to be answered is, why has 
this inherited wage and salary structure persisted in the 
face of the growing demand for skilled- middle-level 
manpower relative to high-level manpower? First, the high 
incomes earned in Sierra Leone tend to have a dispropor­
tionate amount of political and economic control and they 
have no vested interest in changing the structure. Second, 
there has been a continued reliance on expatriate labour 
particularly in the private sector of the economy. Wages 
paid to attract them have served as "pace setters" in the
91economy which has served to preserve the inherited structure.
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A third explanation is the built-in inertia in any 
wage structure. Such pervasive continuation of existing
wages structures under certain conditions has been noted by
Ulman:
Some excess-supply situation may not connote 
the presence of unstable wage relationships 
whether or not they are associated with factor 
or product substitution. Thus, under equilibrium 
in the broader sense, things in the relative 
rates of compensation may not constitute a 
necessary condition for changes in relative 
employment and in wages structure . . . however 
. . . given the stimulous of exceptionally 
large changes . . .  in conditions of demand or 
supply the forces of competition might be 
expected to prevail, and changes in wage 
structure could then discharge an important 
allocational function.
The existence of the first condition outlined by 
Ulman. has been labelled the "job vacancy hypothesis".
Whether the job vacancy thesis or the Competitive theory as 
applied in Sierra Leone during the time of the study can 
be established by testing for the correlation between wage 
earnings and the type of employment. According to the job 
vacancy hypothesis: ''given changes in patterns of employment 
may not 'require' changes in the existing wage structure; 
if the relevant wages are maintained at excess-supply
—^^0—
levels, labour may move from low to high-wage sections
i* 94solely in response to increases in job vacancies.
Conversely, the competitive model,"associates any changes 
in the sectoral distribution of employment caused by 
changes in conditions of either demand or supply - with 
either a decline or an increase in relative wages (except 
where changes in demand and supply are simultaneous, equal 
and in the same direction)."
To substantiate the job vacancy thesis, where labour 
flows to high-wage industries, one would expect to find 
positive and significant correlation between the original 
levels of earnings and changes in employment. Confirmation 
of the competitive theory would be suggested by a positive 
arid significant correlation coefficient between the per 
centage or absolute changes in earnings and the per centage 
or absolute change in employment.
Central to this thesis of institutional intervention 
in the labour market, in the form of inherited wage 
structure persisting over time, is the stability of the 
occupational wage structure. It remains stable in the 
sense that relative differences in the wage paid to differ­
ent occupational categories remain fairly constant even if 
the wage levels are shifting upwards.
The salary/wage structure described above, which is 
also typical of that in each of the new independent 
African states, points to many problems related to the 
theme of this study. Where salaries and wages are so closely
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linked to the level of education and certification, the 
possibility of payment by education rather than by job 
(still less by performance) becomes operational. This 
phenomenon is often formalised in the public service where 
salaries in many posts are explicitly linked to levels of 
formal education. In this situation, rapidly expanding 
school outputs can cause average earnings to rise without 
any change in the existing wage and salary structure (App. V). 
Thus, one of the limiting factors on the extent to which 
the primary school teaching service can be upgraded in 
Sierra Leone is the high cost of employing people with 
five, as opposed to two or three, years of post-secondary 
education as primary school teachers.
Similar effects can be seen in the private sector, 
where the high salary costs will probably involve some 
slowing down in employment growth as educated employment 
e x p a n d s . O n c e  such salary differences are established, 
they usually remained entrenched. Any such trend is 
accentuated in cases where training is largely given or 
financed by employers. Here, there are financial incentives 
to push as many of the costs as possible onto the formal 
education system, and the economic and scarcity rent 
chargeable by workers with five years as opposed to two 
years post-secondary education is given justification 
in so far as the employer saves the extra training costs 
he would otherwise incur if the less educated man had been 
recruited.
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The problem is, however, that this bias in the. labour 
market often has much greater implications. The returns 
to higher levels of education at once accelerate the social 
pressures for increased continuation rates from primary- 
through secondary school, and from there on to the univer­
sity. And those same returns may even justify such
expansion in the eyes of some economists who see salaries
97as just rewards for higher productivity. ' The increased
outputs imply in turn that educational hiring standards
will be raised - employers, to protect the standard of their
recruits begin to look to the university rather than to the
secondary/technical schools and vocational training
institutions, which feeds again the pressures from students
to stay on at school longer.
To say that the net result of this process is the
existence of a middle-level manpower gap and an over-supply
of high-level manpower is not enough. Educational expansion
becomes an expensive way of producing an elite who continue
to be privileged by post-school financial rewards. The
system gives expectation of comfort and riches to the lucky
few and vain desires for the same in the frustrated majority.
On this interpretation, education becomes a source of social
division and unrest, a system which most who join have to
leave as failures, which increases the awareness of what
has not been gained rather than of ydiat has, and which
vocational skills only be most indirect and circuitous 
98process.^
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The above arguement would not be so powerful if 
differences of education among workers in the same occupa­
tion were strongly limited with productivity differentials. 
But the evidence suggests that this is not the case. In 
Sierra Leone, for instance, there is a significant differ­
ence between the private rate of return to increased amount 
of formal education and training. Even though in many 
skilled occupations such as engineering, dentistry, medical 
etc. training and education are alternatives as preparation 
for job entry, the latter has much stronger positive 
effects upon future earnings than the former. The most 
likely explanation for this is that the salary structure 
has been distorted by the market imperfection* that 
historical and institutional bias in favour of formal 
education causes earning differences and productivity 
differentials with occupational groups are not highly 
correlated.
2. The Education System.
The education system of Sierra Leone is patterned
after that of the United Kingdom. Historically its
principal function was the production of a small elite to
serve the colonial system and to support the metropolitan 
99culture. The programme was largely of an academic and 
literary nature leading to administration or priesthood 
and to positions in the public sector or missionary work. 
Thus, it produced a white collar elite culturally distant 
from the rural masses of the p o p u l a t i o n . W i t h  the coming
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of independence in 1961, the objectives of education were
broadened and the system was seen as a means to promote
economic development through the expansion of educational
opportunities throughout the country. However, since the
basic characteristics of the system have remained largely
unchanged, the outcome in terms of student attitudes and
expectations is similar to that of previous decades.
Education is still viewed largely as an entree to public
101administration and urban society.
The 1970 Government White Paper on education made a 
broad outline of the functions of the education system as* 
child-care, character training, preparation for citizenship; 
development of scholastic aptitudes; and of course certifi­
cation and selection for eventual entry into the world of
102work. The last, that is the occupational selection
function - the continual shifting of students to successive 
rungs of the educational ladder - has come to dominate the 
other functions of education in Sierra Leone. The explana­
tion is found partly in the origins and evolution of Sierra 
Leone's education system, particularly in the post­
independence drive to provide highly trained personnel to 
replace the colonial expatriate personnel both in the 
public service and in private sector employment; to meet 
the need for the rapidly expanding network of government 
services; and partly to fulfil the commitment to the ideal 
of self-development for all. The latter was espoused 
without reference to the future needs of the economy, and
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the limited resources available to realise that ideal. The 
result has been an upward thrust throughout all levels of 
schooling. This has subordinated the whole system to the 
interests of the small minority of children who actually 
reach upper secondary and higher levels of education and 
neglected the vast majority who barely complete the primary 
cycle (see Tables 5*10 and 5«H above).
The primary school grades do, of course, serve to 
create a certain number of literate, numerate school- 
leavers; but in practice, their principle concern seems to 
be to prepare students for secondary education. What was 
intended to be the primary school leaving examination 
became known as first, the Common Entrance Examination. 
Later the title was changed to the secondary school common 
entrance examination, and then the Selective Entrance 
examination. Since two-thirds of the products of primary 
schools do not proceed to secondary education, there is 
little relationship between the objectives of primary 
schooling and the needs of most School-leavers who, in 
effect, start working at the age of 12 or 13»
Pupils and their parents understandably view schooling 
mainly as an avenue to the better-paid and otherwise more 
desirable occupations, eg., the law, medicine, etc. It is 
seen as an escape route from agriculture and the blue- 
collar occupations. The curriculum, the examination 
system, and the attitudes of teachers clearly imply that 
the central function of primary schooling is to prepare
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students for higher education, after which the escape from
103the traditional or informal sectors is guaranteed.  ̂ No 
wonder then that every attempt to "ruralise" the curriculum 
of primary schools, or to make the content of primary 
education more directly relevant to rural environments, is 
vigorously opposed by pupils and parents. To decry this 
opposition would be merely to close one's eyes to the 
"upward push" that has now been firmly built into the 
educational system. There is nothing uniquely Sierra 
Leonean in this situation: in one degree or another, the
"upward push" characterises education in almost all the 
new independent African states.
The problem is not confined to primary education. 
Secondary level education too ought to be treated as 
terminal preparation for middle-level employment because 
fewer than 5 per cent of secondary students will continue 
to the tertiary level of the educational system, (see 
Tables 5*13 and 5*14 above). Here again, the emphasis is 
on selection for higher education. This selection bias 
implies a constant pre-occupation with examinations, a 
premium on rote memorising, a dulling of initiative, and 
the extinction in all but very exceptional children of the 
pleasures of learning for its own sake. Furthermore, when 
the selection process lends to one set of schools for those 
judged to be potential candidates for entry into higher 
education, and terminal "vocational" schools for those 
judged to be incapable of attaining high grades in the
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general Certificate of Education, or School Certificate, 
the result is neither good academic nor good vocational 
education. No pupil who can get into the academic stream 
chooses the vocational one, and those forced into vocational 
stream by the rationing of places then seek indirect routes 
to higher education via admission to technical institutes 
at the upper secondary and tertiary level. They concen­
trate on the academic subjects in a nominally vocational 
curriculum, and the schools are under constant pressure to 
expand these subjects at the expense of the vocational 
ones. Thus what one gets are pseudo-vocational streams, 
which are in fact extremely expensive and scholastically 
inferior academic streams. At the same time the avowedly 
academic streams become bookish and examinâtion-oriented, 
because any suggestion of "shop courses" or "practical 
project" in the academic stream is resisted by students as 
being irrelevant to higher grades in the School Certificate 
examinations. The Brown Manpower Survey results showed 
that private sector employers in Sierra Leone were dis­
satisfied with the vocational content of both the technical 
institutes and trade centres and prefer the product of their 
own on-the-job training programmes; in addition, nearly 
half of the surveyed students who proceeded to the tertiary 
level expressed the view that their secondary school pre­
paration was unsatisfactory - a view which was shared by 
the tertiary institutions which had admitted them.
—4 4 8 —
The writer heard frequent criticism of the balance of 
subjects in various streams at the secondary level, 
particularly in vocational streams, coupled with the often- 
expressed view that all would be well if only more pupils 
chose the vocational stream rather than the academic.. Some 
of this criticism derives from a misconception of what 
schools can accomplish in terms of vocational preparation. 
Given the changes that are constantly taking place in the 
labour market requirements, a school that prepared students 
to take up specific occupations would, in fact, risk 
preparing many students for the wrong occupation. If, 
instead, it emphasised general preparation for the world 
of work, the relevance of its training to subsequent 
occupations would be likely to be tenuous.
There remains, in any case, the intractable problem 
of selection in an "upward push" situation in which almost 
every secondary school pupil tries to stay in the stream 
leading to the tertiary level. Quite apart from pupil 
motivation and preference, the diagnostic problem is 
formidable. Experience round the world shows that there 
is no perfect selection system which can distinguish, at 
the secondary entrance level, those most fitted eventually 
to benefit from the small number of places available in 
higher education.
If the "upward push" is partly responsible for 
thwarting all plans to broaden vocational and technical 
education, it is also mainly responsible for the continuing
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expansion of the numbers proceeding from primary to secon­
dary levels in expectation of finding employment in the 
urban sector, non-farm activities. The expectation is 
already quite unrealistic for many pupils and will become 
increasingly so. The output of secondary schools has been 
growing at 11 per cent annually since independence and 28 
per cent annually in the last decade. This is about five 
times the rate of growth in modem sector employment in 
recent years. Table 5«l8a and b below shows the number of 
candidates who passed in certain number of subjects in the 
General Certificate of Education at Ordinary and Advanced 
Levels examination between 1964-1978.
Year
Level 1964-1978.
Number of Total Candidates Passes 4+ 5+
% of Passes 
to Total
1964 874 189 101 21.6
1965 931 271 163 29.1
1966 1.347 261 149 9 .5
1967 1,960 295 160 15.0
1968 1,983 294 154 14.7
1969 2,236 316 157 14.1
1970 , 2,043 276 151 13.5
1971/72 2,659 375 178 14.1
1972/73 4, 200 590 367 14.0
1973/74 4,760 670 4l8 14.0
1974/75 4,790 670 386 14.0
1975/76 5,010 700 337 13.9
1976/77 5,820 810 400 13.9
1977/78 6,330 890 427 14.0
Source: Computed from the West African Examination Council
Office, Freetown, 1978.
An aggregation of the above figures (Table 5*l8a) shows 
that during the fourteen years 1964-1977/78, 6,607 candi­
dates passed the General Certificate of Education at 'O'
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TABLE 5.18b General Certificate of Education at Advanced
Level Results 1964-1977/78. -
FORM VI
Year No. 'of Candidates Passes with 2+ % of Total
1964 167 72 43.1
1965 152 74 48.71966 105 59 56.2
1967 122 42 3 4 .4
1968 147 46 31.3
1969 197 95 48.2
1970 212 99 46.1
1971/72 182 98 53.8
1972/73 175 95 52.2
1973/74 300 160 53.3
1974/75 380 210 52.3
1975/76 430 230 53 .5
1976/77 430 230 53 .5
1977/78 450 240 53 .5
Source; Collected from the West African Examination Council 
Office, Freetown Branch, 1978.
level in four or more subjects (3* 548 with five or more 
subjects). This makes for 14.3 per cent of the total 
number of students (44,943) enrolled in Form V at the end 
of proceeding years 1964-1977/78. However, the minimum 
entry requirement for each of the colleges of the University 
of Sierra Leone is at least 5 O.C.E. 'O' levels including 
English language, which renders the majority of the school 
leavers unsuitable for admission to the colleges. Some 
would seek admission to teachers' colleges as second best, 
and the rest would either opt to go to technical and 
vocational institutes or seek employment as clerks, shop 
assistants, messengers, etc.^^^
There are analogous problems of relevance at the. 
tertiary level. The first lies in the proportion of
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university students studying subjects that are unrelated to 
the needs of the economy. As one private expatriate emplo­
yer bluntly pointed out:
The education system of your country put 
out people who don't want to do dirty work.
They want to sit in offices with air con­
ditioning. We employers need people who 
can do the job and teach other people how 
to do it. That required the possession of 
both the technical knowledge and skills which 
your system of education could not give to 
.your people.
Support for these views is contained in both the 
preponderance of expatriate personnel in mid-level technical 
jobs in the private sector (see Table 3.8) and the propor­
tion of students for degree courses in arts and general 
sciences to total students enrolment at the University of 
Sierra Leone (Table 5*16)* Approximately two-thirds of the 
students study arts, economics and education, while very 
few study agriculture and engineering skills which have 
long been in short supply. Once again, however, the fault 
does not lie with the student for the following reasons: 
firstly, in the past the emphasis has been to produce 
graduates with the liberal arts in order to replace the 
colonial expatriates in the administrative service. This 
is illustrated in the Fourah Bay College's expansion 
programme which lay more emphasis on "the development of
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107philosophy, classics and theology". The second reason
is that some students having failed to qualify for courses 
such as medicine (for overseas scholarships) and engineering 
opt as second best for arts, economics and general degrees 
in science courses.
Perhaps the most obvious set of problems that have 
characterised the Sierra Leone graduate labour market is 
that created by the mis-match between the outflow of stu­
dents from the education system and the employment demand 
for certain skills. The reason is that at independence, 
expatriate labour was most predominant, particularly in 
senior positions in both the public and private sectors of 
the economy. The solution to the problem was seen in teims 
of creating a cadre of personnel with the same education and 
training as that possessed by expatriates doing the jobs in 
question. The recommendation of the Committee on Africani­
sation of the public service was explicit in this when it 
stated:
There shall be no lowering of the qualifica­
tions and other standards prescribed for 
appointment to the "Senior Service". The 
efficiency of the Civil Service should be 
regarded as the governing consideration in 
this and all other respects.
This tendency was reinforced by employers in the 
private sector who demanded that certain levels of educa­
tion were absolutely necessary for appointment to various 
kinds of jobs and by the government whose schemes of service
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adopted the same or similar educational requirements for 
entry as for the colonial civil service. Very rapidly the 
view became entrenched that the education system created 
the required skills. The problem of producing sufficient 
local manpower was simply a question of expanding educa­
tional facilities to produce enough Africans with school 
certificates (see Table 5*18 above) and university degrees 
in order to Africanisé existing jobs and meet the annual 
requirements of the economy for growth and replacement owing 
to demographic factors. This is reflected in the tremendous 
increase in the output of university graduates from the 
University of Sierra Leone from 19 in 196O to 4l0 in 1977*
TABLE 5.19 The Output of Graduates from the University of
Source:
Sierra Leone from 1966-1979.
Year P.B.C. N.U.C. Total % Increase
i960 19 - 19 100.0
1966 50 29 79 315.7
1967 75 27 102 29.1
1968 69 74 143 40.2
1969 80 67 147 2.7
1970 90 71 161 9 .5
1971 95 84 ' 179 10.0
1972 100 84 184 3 .3
1973 150 . 89 255 . 3 8 .5 .
1974 170 105 286 13.7
1975 200 116 375 31 .1
1976 225 175 400 6 .6
1977 230 180 410 2 .5
1978 220 160 380 -5*0
1979 223 130 353 -7 .1TOTAL 1,977 1,391 3 ,454 175.1
Ayerage l4l 99 246.7 12. 5
two colleges published in the Sierra Leone Goyem- 
ment Gazzette.
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Table 5'19 is intended to illustrate the aggregate output 
of university graduates in response to the post-independent 
demand for high-level manpower. Between 1966 and 1979, a 
total of 3 ,4 5 4 high-level manpower has been produced by the 
two constituent colleges of the University of Sierra Leone 
(Fourah Bay College and the Njala University College). The
output from overseas institutions is not known, but a 
'guesstimate' would put it at an annual average of 30* This
includes doctors, lawyers and other professionals which the
University of Sierra Leone could not train due to lack of 
facilities and the cost of training such people at home,
(see Table 5*19 above.) But inspite of this increase, which 
stands at an average of 246.7 per annum representing an 
annual growth rate of 12.5 per cent, and the projected 
shortfall in the supply of all categories of manpower (see 
Table 5»17), there are still in Sierra Leone a total of 
2,500 expatriate personnel employed in the economy. The 
majority of them are employed in the middle-level grades, 
i.e. the technical grades (see Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 
above), while at the same time, the country is experiencing 
an increasing unemployment among its educated manpower, 
most acute among school leavers.
Two conclusions follow* first, it appears that the 
post-independent expansion in education has not always 
produced the right mix of skills. For example, if the 
figures in Table 5*19 above are disaggregated into output 
per course of study or discipline in each year, the picture
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will be that more than 50 per cent are arts graduates, the 
next 20 per cent is in economics, 10 per cent in general 
degree courses in sciences, 10 per cent in agricultural 
education and the rest in engineering and allied fields.
In 1978, for instance, the total output of graduates by the 
University of Sierra Leone was 380 (see Table 5«19)« Of 
these, 180 were arts graduates - 58 with post-graduate 
Diploma in Education (90 per cent of them are arts graduates 
of the previous year 1977), 18 with Bachelor of Engineering 
degrees, 53 in pure and applied science, etc.^^^ Second, 
that those which are surplus to the needs of the economy 
cannot easily be absorbed elsewhere in the economy. It is 
against this paradox of shortage in the midst of surplus 
that the folly of the education system lies. The next 
section would seek to suggest some solutions.
The question which one is bound to ask is, given the 
nature of the manpower problems and its perceived causes 
discussed above, and also given the present size and level 
of expatriate employment (Table 3»8a) in Sierra Leone as at 
1978, what are the policy implications of the cost- 
benefits, private rates of return, and the manpower- 
requirement approaches discussed above in investment in 
education for the supply of high- and middle-level manpower, 
particularly the latter where expatriates appeared to be 
most predominant in the private sector of Sierra Leone?
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5.5 The Policy Implications.
The cost-benefit, rates of return and manpower- 
requirement approaches to investment in education have 
identical policy implications. But opinions are divided on 
the choice of policies. Both the nature and expansion of 
primary education has bean criticised for two main reasons. 
First, it is said to be too academic and literary, not 
preparing the child for the real environment in which he 
will live. Second, since there is no "manpower" requirement 
for more primary school leavers in the wage-paid sector - 
indeed, there is a likelihood that further expansion might 
be regarded as both costly to the state and frustrating to 
the individual. These criticisms, however, in their 
current form do not get to the root of the matter or 
provide any really helpful standpoint for assessing future 
policy. There is certainly a belief that more educated men 
and women are needed at the secondary/technical and higher 
level education, as the present need for foreigners at 
these levels witnesses. Since the present pattern of 
university education is small and expensive in its output, 
the tendency is to think of down-grading the university in 
quality, increasing its output and changing its content 
toward more applied studies, especially in science sind 
technology. This could certainly seem to be a way to get 
the worst of both worlds - a large number of less qualified 
graduates who will expect just as high rewards and disdain 
the work of a technician.
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However, in the light of the previous analysis on the 
nature of the manpower situation in Sierra Leone, the 
following are some policy choices considered appropriate 
to the manpower situation.
5.51 Policy Choices.
1. Diversion of resources from higher education to 
middle and lower-level education.
Since primary and secondary/technical education are 
found to be socially more profitable than higher education, 
and the greatest relative shortage is expected to occur at 
the middle-level manpower (see Tables 5*7 and 5»17), it is 
evident that future educational policy in Sierra Leone 
should place greater emphasis on the development of the 
middle-level and lower levels of the educational ladder. 
Furthermore, the prevailing rates of return at the various 
levels of the educational system can be expected to hold 
beyond marginal increases in investments because the 
manpower projection techniques anticipate shortages at all 
levels (see Table 5«17)* More funds can be made available 
for primary and secondary/technical education by diverting 
resources from higher education. Of course, it can be 
argued that a 9*5 per cent rate of return on higher educa­
tion is not unimpressive, especially when one bears in mind 
that it is the lower limit of the true social rate of 
return on investment at this level. But a reliable assess­
ment of resources likely to be available for education
—4^8—
sector suggests that no option, other than diversion of 
funds from higher to lower levels of education, may be 
open.
The government current expenditure on education has 
grown rapidly over the past decade with an average rate of 
increase of 10 per cent per annum in constant 197.0-71 
prices. It constituted about 22 per cent of current 
revenue and 25 per cent of current expenditure in 1976/77 * 
This represents a considerable increase over its 1963-64 
share of 15 and 18 per cent current revenue and expenditure 
respectively. The current education expenditure was 2.3 
per cent of GDP in 1963-64 and rose to 3 » 1 per cent in 
1977/7 8. It is highly unlikely that substantially more 
than 28 per cent of the government current revenue will be 
devoted to education in the coming years. If one assumes 
that the G.D.P. will increase at an average annual rate of
5 .5  per cent and that some 26 per cent of the current 
revenue will be devoted to education, the total resources 
available for education will approximately be Le 88 million 
over thé 1974/75-1978/79 plan period with enrolment in 
educational institutions at the level projected above (see 
Tables 5*12, 5*13» 5*l4, 5*15 and 5*16); this resources 
constraint implies the pegging of unit cost at all levels 
of the educational system. No expansion or improvement at 
the middle- or lower levels of the educational pyramid will 
be possible unless more resources can be made available from 
the upper level.
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An expansion of primary education can be supported not 
only on economic grounds (20 per cent rate of return) but 
on socio-political grounds as well. Even with the attain­
ment of the primary enrolment projections in the plan (4 
per cent per annum in the years 1975 onwards) substantially 
less than one-half of the 5-11 year olds of the population 
will be in schools. The need for improving the quality of 
education in the primary and secondary schools is no less 
acute than the need for increasing the enrolments. Çln the 
bases of repeaters and dropouts data provided by the Planning 
Unit of the Ministry of Education it has been estimated that 
at the secondary school level some 50.9 students years are
required to produce one secondary school leaver with four
111or more 'O' level passes. Undoubtedly, the social and
family environment in which a student has to live is partly
responsible for this. But the conditions of schools such
as over-crowding, poor housing, also leave a lot to be
desired. In 1973/74, only 55 per cent of primary school
112teachers were qualified. As the various teachers
colleges increase the supply of qualified teachers, the per­
centage of these in the total stock of teachers will
113increase but so also will the salary bill. Thus, the
expansion and improvement of primary, secondary and techni­
cal education will require substantial resources which may 
have to be found from elsewhere in the education sector 
itself.
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Perhaps the diversion of resources from the higher to 
middle-level of education might be accomplished without any 
reduction in the university output, but even at the 
university level no surplus is forecast over the planned 
period. A reduction in the total intake of resources 
without a corresponding decrease in the student output 
will thus require efforts to rationalise expenditures at 
the University of Sierra Leone and its constituent colleges, 
particularly the cost of administration which stood at 
Le 541,210 in 1972/73 Education Budget (see Table 5*20).
The need to reduce the unit cost of higher education is also 
imperative. The ratio of social unit cost in higher 
education to that in primary education is in the neighbour­
hood of 66 for Sierra Leone. For some developed countries
(New Zealand, the United States of America and the U.K.) the 
114ratio is 1?.6. Moreover, if one considers only the cost 
to the central gov m  ent, the ratio for Sierra Leone rises 
to over 120.
5.5(2) Reform of Salary and Wage Structure.
In his article "Human Resources Development Planning 
in Modernising Economies" Harbison pointed out among other 
things that I
In the strategy of human resources develop­
ment, the puip)ose of building incentives is 
to encourage men and women to prepare for 
and engage in the kind of productive activity 
which is needed for accelerated growth. To 
accomplish this, the compensation of an
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individual should be related to the importance 
of his job in the modernising society. It 
should not depend upon his level of formal 
education, the number of degrees held, family 
status, or political connections, and the 
relative importance of jobs should be based 
not on traditions or heritage for colonial 
regimes, but on assessment of the manpower 
needs of the country for a period of 20 years.
What Harbison seemed to have omitted in his prescrip­
tions is the question of who determines the value of each 
job and what criteria should be used. Perhaps a nationwide job 
evaluation could be an answer. However, he went on to cite 
examples which politically and economically attractive and 
sensible, but practically not feasible. For example,
Herbison suggested that if agricultural officers or village 
workers are desperately needed in rural areas to carry 
forward a programme of development in agriculture, their 
pay and status position may have to exceed that of profes­
sionally trained people who have desk job in the cities.
If technicians with limited education can perform work 
normally assigned to an engineer, he should receive the 
same pay and perquisites as the engineer on that job. If 
science and mathematics teachers are urgently needed (as is 
the case in Sierra Leone), in secondary schools, their 
reward should be higher than those of other less urgently 
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perhaps higher also than professionally trained people in 
some other less essential activities. If technicians, 
nurses, and foremen are in very short supply (as is also the 
case in Sierra Leone), their rates of pay may need to he 
higher than those of some university graduates holding 
down administrative jobs for which many persons could 
qualify. In some cases, medical technicians or the 
agricultural assistant who is willing to live in the bush 
deserves to be compensated as much as the doctor or the 
agronomist who insists on living in the city.^^^ And the 
manager of an enterprise who may have had only a limited 
secondary education should be entitled to higher compensa­
tion than the university graduates who are his subordinates. 
Admittedly, pay alone may not be a sufficient incentive for 
choosing a job as Herbison seemdd to have suggested. The 
status of occupation and social attitudes are of equal 
if not greater importance; but a rise in relative pay in 
itself may contribute to the raising of the status level of 
a job.
. Large financial outlays for education are unlikely to 
produce the kind of manpower needed if the appropriate 
incentives are lacking. In Sierra Leone, like other 
African countries, any university degree is looked upon by 
the holder almost as a right to employment in the govern­
ment service. Thus, if one is admitted to a university and 
completes the requirements for a degree, he may thereby 
have gained tenure in the higher paid ranks of government
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employees. He is also strongly motivated to prefer work 
in the larger urban areas. The idea that a university 
education is a "permanent escape from the bush" is wide­
spread in Sierra Leone. The reason for the critical 
shortage of technicians of all kinds is not the lack of 
places and facilities in technical and vocational insti­
tutions, but rather the reluctance of students to go into 
11 Rthem. Obviously, in the minds of young people, the
employment opportunities are not as attractive in agri­
culture as in some other fields which are less vital for 
the country's development. For the same reasons, technical 
education, particularly at the intermediate level, has had 
little appeal in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa. For 
example, the Ashby Report* Post-school Certificate
and Higher Education in Nigeria pointed out*
The literary tradition and the university 
degree have become indelible symbols of pres­
tige in Nigeria; by contrast, technology, 
agriculture and other practical subjects, 
particularly at the sub-professional level, 
have not won esteem.
It is argued most strongly that situations of this 
kind will not be corrected by the building of more 
educational institutions. They will be changed only when 
the system of rewards and status in the society are changed 
and the initiative in making changes must come from the 
government itself in the form of a complete revision of the 
entire system of compensation of government employees.
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120Robinson Hollister suggested four ways which might be 
applied by the government to reduce the effects of 
distortions in the wage structure on the supply of skilled- 
level manpower*
(1) A downward revision of the upper salary scales in 
the public sector;
(2) A major increase in the supply of high-level 
manpower in order to break the dominance of the public 
sector in the skilled-manpower market;
(3) The control of the distribution of high-level 
manpower; and
(4) The revision of the requirements for high-level 
manpower, by means of extensive job analysis.
First, the downward revision of upper salary scales 
in the public sector - this can be done by direct action 
to establish a more equitable, narrower differential 
between skills levels would obviously be the most rational 
move. However, there are two major obstacles to this* 
first, it seems highly unlikely that political pressures 
against such a move could be overcome since the highest- 
level civil servants who would lose most are the very 
persons who would have to plan and implement such a move* 
Second, many Africans countries require rather large numbers 
of expatriate personnel in high-level positions, and it 
would be very difficult to pay them the high salaries 
necessary to attract them while at the same time paying 
their African counterparts generally reduced salaries (even
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if the differential is made up of various expatriation 
allowances or fringe benefits,this does not disguise the 
fact that the African officials are being paid less).
Thirdly, an increase in the supply of high-level 
manpower - Hollister argues that the salary structure pro­
blem will be solved by the natural increase in the supply of 
high-level manpower; that this increase will be large 
enough to meet the requirements in the public service and 
provides an excess supply for the use of the private sector, 
so that the dominance of the public sector in this part of 
the employment market, and hence the dominance of its 
distorted wages scales, could be broken. However, this 
development does not seem very likely. In the first place, 
the short-term cost of producing a large amount of high- 
level manpower have already been shown to be very high. The 
scope for further expansion of this sector is therefore 
limited. Moreover, even in the cases where supply is 
expanding rapidly, the possibility of breaking the dominance 
of the public sector would seem remote, for unless it is 
carefully controlled, the public sector will tend to respond 
to the increasing supply by increasing its requirements. 
Finally, even if large increases in the supply of high-level 
manpower eventually successful in inundating the market and 
thereby cutting the tie to the distorted public sector wage 
structure as Hollister suggested, this will be an extremely 
expensive procedure in the short-run.
—̂ 67“
The third solution Hollister suggested was a control 
of the distribution of high-level manpower where the wage 
system fails to perform its proper distributive function 
adequately; the usual alternative is to resort to direct 
control. It seems likely that the method used to alleviate 
the effects of the wage structure on the high-level manpower 
problem will be the establishment of some degree of control.
. Allocative controls can be set up.in varying degrees 
at various points of the system. The most obvious point 
is at the source of supply, namely in the education and 
training system. This can take the form of manipulation 
of the scholarship system by the Ministry of Education, to , 
encourage movement towards careers in which the greatest 
shortages are foreseen (middle-level manpower), lump sum 
payments to influence career choice or direct allocation 
of students to particular education or training institu­
tions. Also, allocative controls can be established 
at the point of entry into the employment market. Requests 
from various public sector agencies for skilled manpower 
can be funneled through a single agency which can keep 
close control on the number of new entrants taken up by the 
public sector and reduce competitive bidding among various 
agencies in the sector. Moreover, the controls at the 
point of entry into the employment market can be such as to 
favour private sector employers. Finally, controls can 
be established over the distribution of all high-level 
manpower. They may be limited to the public sector or
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extended to the private sector as well. In the public 
sector they can be used to inhibit the expansion of 
recruitment for high-level manpower and prevent the escala­
tion of average salaries that result from competitive 
bidding within the sector. Controls in the private sector 
can be particularly important as regards the use of 
expatriate immigration quota system (see Chapter 4 above), 
and for ensuring the adequate development of training 
schemes in the sector.
The temptation to establish direct control is great, 
but past experience in Sierra Leone with the use of such
instruments in areas besides manpower has not been success- 
121ful. It proves very difficult to keep control of
mechanism efficient and flexible enough to respond to the
122dynamics of the economy. So although this method,
suggested by Hollister, is the most likely to be used, it
would be wise to regard it as a last resort to be applied
only when other options have been clearly ruled out and to
be strictly limited to the point where the desired result
can be produced with the minimum of control machinery. As
Bhagwati put it* "Controls create privilege instead of
123equality, lead to corruption, bribery, etc."
The fourth solution suggested by Hollister is job 
analysis. For him, the revision of the requirements for 
high-level manpower by means of extensive job analysis "is 
a course of action that recommends itself" regardless of 
the wage structure problems or the other measures taken to
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solve these problems. Job analysis can be of direct 
benefit in the public sector by achieving a more efficient 
use of manpower, by the allocation of less qualified assis­
tant to lowly tasks previously carried out by highly 
qualified employees and the breaking up of high-skill 
tasks into components that can be performed by groups of 
less skilled individuals. This type of analysis is very 
time-consuming and sometimes politically difficult to 
implement because of resentment from the workers directly 
affected by such a move. However, if implemented, it could 
lead to considerable savings in high-level manpower.
Another way in which Hollister suggested job analysis 
can help is by breaking the tie between salary levels and 
educational qualifications which typifies many of the 
present civil service scales in Sierra Leone and elsewhere 
in Africa. Determining salaries in accordance with the 
responsibilities of the job rather than the educational 
attainments of the employees will reduce the upward drift 
of salaries that, under the present system, accompanies 
the natural growth in average educational qualifications 
in the public service as a whole. But like the first 
solution the reaction to such measures will come from the 
top civil servants who would stand to lose most. It will 
therefore be regarded as retrograde and both politically
and administratively unworkable.
1 ?4Mark Blaug lent support to Hollister's first 
suggestion. He too advocated for a narrowing of the skill
—4yO“
differentials as "a more potent indirect means of reducing 
the attractiveness of the upper secondary and higher 
education in the labour m a r k e t . T h i s  call for narrow- ■ 
ing differentials is most difficult to implement for 
reasons already given above. For example, the Inter­
national Labour Organisation (ILO) Mission to Kenya Report 
made a number of suggestions for reducing the private 
returns to education. The Kenyan report suggested that 
entry points on the public service pay scales should be 
reduced by 25 per cent for a five year period, after which 
entry points should no longer be determined in terms of 
formal education. This suggestion was not accepted by the 
Kenyan government. Nevertheless, the government of Kenya 
did accept the principle of working towards a narrowing of 
skills differentials in the years a h e a d . T h u s ,  in the 
words of Harbison:
A primary condition for solution of all man­
power problems, whether they be critical skill 
bottlenecks in the modern sector or mounting 
labour surplus throughout the nation, is the 
building of appropriate pay systems. Lacking 
this, massive expenditure on training and 
education will contribute little to accelerate 
development. The notion that there is a 
direct relationship between the development 
of education (the residual factor) and economic 
growth can be misleading and planners should be 
wary of accepting it without careful scrutiny.
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5.53 Make the Education System More Relevant.
The first two policy implications discussed above 
advocated the transfer of resources from the production of 
more high-level manpower to the more middle-level manpower 
where the manpower requirements for Africanisation are 
greater. The first suggested a reduction in government 
expenditure on higher education and increases in its 
expenditure on primary and secondary and technical 
education, because it is socially more profitable to do so. 
The second advocated a rather more subtle and indirect way 
through the reform of salary and wages structures whereby 
an individual's earning power will not be determined by 
his or her level of formal educational attainment alone 
but on his contribution to development of the country and 
the value society attaches to his job. This, it is hoped, 
will help to reduce the attractiveness of higher education.
However, both of them do not guarantee the provision 
of the relevant education system which the country needs 
for the supply of manpower appropriate to the needs of both 
public and private sector employers.
President Julius K. Nyerere's booklet "Education for 
129Self-Reliance"  ̂is an important document* important not 
only for Tanzania, but for all countries considering 
educational development in agriculturally based societies.
■ Briefly, the thesis is that schools have a dual role 
in the regeneration of society. First, there is the social 
role; through education pupils leam attitudes appropriate
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for a socialist society in a rural economy. Education "has 
to foster the social goals of living together and working 
together for the common good . . . Our education must 
therefore inculcate a sense of commitment to the total 
community and help the pupils to accept the values appro­
priate to our kind of future, not those appropriate to our 
colonial past."^^^ This social role applies at all levels 
of the education system - primary, secondary and university - 
but it is crucially important at the secondary and university 
levels because of the patent danger that the students in the 
post-primary education will become alienated from the rural 
community from which they come. It is here that the dangers 
of elitism are strongest.
Second, there is the vocational role, particularly in 
the primary school. The majority of those children who go 
to school will be educated only at this level. They should 
leam those vocational skills which will prepare them for 
their roles as better farmers in a predominantly agricultural 
society. Through the development of appropriate skills at 
school, the farmer of the future will be able to contribute 
substantially to the improvement of agriculture which is at 
the heart of economic improvement through "self-reliance".
Each of these roles, the social and vocational, has 
implications for the other. "But although these aspects 
are in some ways separate, they are also inter-locked. One 
cannot integrate the pupils and students into the future
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society simply by theoretical teaching however well designed
it is. Neither can the society fully benefit from an
education system which is thoroughly integrated into local
life but does not teach people the basic skills - for
example, of literacy and arithmetic, or which fails to
131excite in them a curiosity about ideas." The social 
role of the school bears upon the attitude toward agri­
culture and the recognition of its importance for the 
country, the community and the village. On the other 
hand, the vocational role of the school bears upon the 
social role because without a consequent improvement in 
agriculture and the emergence of the "good life" in rural 
society, there is a danger that the social vision will 
become a mockery.
Since the majority of expatriate personnel employed 
in both public and private sectors employments are mainly 
engaged in the technical fields (Table 4.?), and the 
anticipated shortage is also greatest at this level of 
economic activities (about 3,000, see Table 5*i?)» it is 
with this second aspect, the vocational/technical role of 
the education system that policy proposals must be made.
While recognising the many economically and socially 
valuable aspects of Sierra Leone's education as the system 
stands, one would wish to propose a package programme of 
reform which it is believed will enable the system to 
serve its declared aims and objectives better. Basically, 
the proposals are designed to reduce the "upward push" for
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higher education which is no longer justified either by 
economic demand or social justice, and to diminish the 
emphasis on examination results as the be-all and end all 
of education. Specifically, the policy proposals are 
intended to reduce the education system's pre-occupation 
with professional high-level manpower and to focus 
attention instead on sub-professional and technical man­
power that bears relevance to the needs of both the public 
and private sectors employers; in other words, "Education 
For Self-Reliance" and not on the continuing reliance on 
expatriate labour.
5.531 Education for the Terminal Student.
In spite of the rapid growth of enrolment at all 
sectors of the education system in Sierra Leone, perhaps 
as many as 60 per cent of those who start their primary 
education dod not complete it. For example, from Table 
5'12 above, of the 38,164 children who started primary 
school (class I) in 1970/71» only 26,260 were able to 
reach Class VII after seven yearé of primary education in
1976 /77' That represented a completion rate of 68 per
132cent. Of those who did, less than half went to secondary
Thus, for the great majority, primary education is the only 
formal schooling they will ever receive. The same applies 
mutatis mutandis for all subsequent stages; they are 
terminal points for the majority of students enrolled in 
them (see Tables 5.13 and 5.l8a and b). It is true that 
there are vocational and technical alternatives to general
”4? 5“
secondary schooling after Form III, but in the majority of 
cases these absorbed only a small minority of post-primary 
students and this situation is unlikely to alter signifi­
cantly in the near future for two main reasons already 
discussed in the last sub-section.
While each level of education is terminal for the 
majority of those who started, it is generally agreed that 
each educational cycle is dominated by the needs of the 
minority, i.e. those who continue their education. Public 
examination^ at the end of each stage are selective tests 
for the coveted next stage, and these have a persuasive 
influence on what is taught and how. In short, the "need" 
of the next level dominates the one below. The whole 
educational system can thus be seen as one long preparation 
for the university and hence is irrelevant to the needs of 
the majority who will never get that far.
How serious is this charge? This depends on whether
one thinks that terminal students need to be taught
different things - and perhaps in different ways - from
those who will continue their education further. Tanzania
has taken this problem very seriously and has tackled it
more systematically than perhaps any other African country.
Unfortunately, it is too early to evaluate this experiment
in "education for self-reliance" which has stirred up some
134instructive but inconclusive controversy.
In Sierra Leone, the Education Review Committee has 
recommended that primary education should focus on the needs
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of the majority who will have to find their livelihood in
the rural areas. But serious queries still remain. Philip
Forster shows convincingly that school forms, growing cash
crops for profit, are more likely than not to be educationally
counter-productive; if the primary school does its job
properly in equiping students with basic literacy, numeracy,
and some grasp of scientific method, it will have no time
13 5for vocational instruction in agriculture. While the
issue is still open, one would wish to offer four points 
for discussion.
(i) The success or failure of this basic education 
experiment will turn on the relevance and applicability of 
the syllabus as a whole and not on the explicit self- 
reliance activities.
(ii) Despite worsening employment prospects for 
secondary school leavers, most primary school students aim 
to be admitted to a secondary school. Therefore, if any 
new primary syllabus is to secure the support of teachers, 
students and their parents, the secondary school selection 
examinations must measure - and reward - the same qualities 
and attainment that the primary syllabus is designed to 
promote. As Forster says, "If it is not in the examination, 
students won't bother with it."^^^
(iii) Even if most students leave their primary 
school full of the spirit of innovation, they cannot 
become independent decision-makers until many years later.
Their chances of applying their knowledge and skills
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will depend mainly on the understanding and support they 
receive from their parents. Consequently, in communities 
still largely illiterate, programmes of adult education are 
likely to raise the social productivity of primary education 
in addition to any direct value they possess.
(iv) Those who leave school seek not an escape from 
rural life as such, but from the prospect of earning no more 
than a bare subsistence income. They can see that even the 
most unskilled urban wage employee earns more than the 
average farmer.
Rural primary education will become 'relevant and 
functional' not by teaching youngsters how to run farms and 
grow particular crops, but by showing them and their 
parents that small farmers and entrepreneurs who experiment 
can also earn more than semi-skilled urban wage-eamers.
The experience of the Japanese agricultural revolution in 
the late eighteenth century may be relevant. This was based 
not on agricultural education as such, but on the simul­
taneous improvement by rural craftsmen and peasant farmers 
of tools, seeds and methods of cultivation. While no single 
innovation was striking in itself, the process became
cummulative as news of improved and more profitable farming
138practices spread. Nevertheless, the presence of a large
number of Chinese expatriates in Sierra Leone in the 
agricultural sector as technicians at the experimental farm 
level justified the call for the introduction of vocational 
education at the primary education l e v e l . T o  quote the
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words of an expatriate employer in Freetown, Sierra Leone, 
when he was asked about the level at which Africanisation 
should start:
If Sierra Leone is to benefit from her 
Africanisation policy, it is my considered 
belief that it must start from foreman level. 
That is. Africanisation must start from below 
and not from the top as your government seem 
to suggest.
By the same token, if the government call for the
return to the land or the Green Revolution is to be
successful, it must be done by Sierra Leonean technicians
and not by Chinese, Ko resin and United States Peace Corps
technicians. This requires that Sierra Leone
produce technically competent Sierra Leonean nationals.
In the words of Chandrakant:
It is imperative for all developing countries
to train and develop their own indigenous
personnel as competent technicians. Because,
in the final analysis, the pace and direction
of the economic progress of developing
countries will largely depend upon how far
l4lthey solve their technician problem.
In a similar tone, Maclennan, C.B.E^ expressed his views 
that:
The shortage of trained technicians in develop­
ing countries has retarded their pace of
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industrialisation, and that future economic 
and social progress will depend on the 
quality and quantity of technicians they 
produce.
Sierra Leone was not unaware of the importance of 
technically qualified manpower in her policies of Africani­
sation and economic development. Since independence in 
1961, tremendous efforts have been made to increase the 
supply of technically competent manpower, but this has not 
been matched with the requirements of both public and 
private sector employers as is demonstrated in Table 5•17»
Two things therefore need to be discussed about this 
segment of the educational system which we take to embrace 
all forms of specialised training below the level of 
university. The first is to argue the necessity of a 
complete review of the training facilities available. The 
second is to draw attention to the basic problem of rele­
vance and psychological problems which at present inhibit 
the development of vocational training in most fields.
Unlike primary and secondary education and teacher 
training, vocational training is not concluded under the 
auspices of a single government ministry. At least three 
ministries have major commitments - the Ministry of 
Education through its technical institutes in Freetown and 
Kenema and its trade centres Kissy and Magbaraka (see 
Table 5*21 below); the Ministry of Health for the training 
of nurses, dispensers, and health inspectors; and the
-480-
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources for the 
training of agricultural instructors, etc. But every 
ministry has assumed responsibilities in this field: each
conducts training programmes, each despatches personnel 
overseas for study, each either has or would like to have 
on its establishment a training officer.
Nor is vocational training confined to government 
departments. There are other employers in the private 
sector which have instituted training programmes in their 
companies, particularly in the mining industry. Other firms 
co-operate with the technical institutes in apprenticeship 
schemes. There are a few private institutions which provide 
specialised training, for example, the Y.W.C.A. vocational 
institute.
The significance of these various institutions and 
agencies is, of course, uneven; the Freetown Technical 
Institute with 490 full time and 780 part-time students in 
a considerable variety of courses can hardly be compared 
with Magbarata Trade Centre with 144 full time students 
(see Table 5*21 below). But it is important for those who 
must plan the educational development of Sierra Leone during 
the next ten or twenty years to know precisely what 
facilities are available. If funds are limited - and it is 
known that they will continue to be so - then duplication 
must be avoided and existing facilities utilised to the 
full.
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Fifteen years ago, it could have been argued that the 
inhibiting factor in vocational training was the dearth of 
facilities. No doubt the present facilities as demon­
strated by the above table (5»21) need to be improved and 
expanded. But in 1978» it can hardly be claimed that the 
opportunities were not available for sound training in 
almost every field. The expansion of vocational training 
during the last two decades has been quite as remarkable 
as the expansion in primary and secondary education.
No, the real problem is the relevance and quality of 
training provided by the institutions. There is an impor­
tant problem of designing relevant curricula for post 
primary level vocational education. It is tempting and 
dangerous to assume that vocational and technical education 
alone is the answer and that it necessarily leads to better 
employment or earnings opportunities which now are enjoyed 
by expatriate employees (Table 3*8). There are three 
factors involved; numbers, content and selection.
1. Numbers. As the majority of African primary 
school leavers are over 14 years of age, they are old 
enough to receive vocational education. One controversial 
definition of 'relevance' might be that post-primary 
education should equip all students with specific occupa­
tional skills distributed in numbers in which they are 
going to be required in the years of their graduation. 
Unfortunately, our knowledge of the present educational 
distribution of the labour force in Sierra Leone is
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fragmentary and usually 3-3 years out of date. Even short­
term forecasts of manpower requirements created by growth 
and replacements (Table 5*8) needs in any specific occupa­
tion (Table 5'1) and probably subject to margin of error of 
+ 30 per cent.^^^ No African country has yet derived a 
system of monitoring the correctness of its manpower 
projections, analysing the discrepancies, and providing 
feedback to those concerned. If reasonably accurate 
forecasts of even short-term trends in occupational 
demands are as yet unattainable, is it not /reckless to 
gear the whole educational system to their fulfilment? If 
the most one can hope for is to predict the demand for 
'industrial, commercial, agricultural skills, etc.' with 
a tolerable degree of accuracy, it is unwise to disaggregate 
the projections any further, and the pre-employment 
education provided should be no more specialised than the 
forecast (see Tables 3*1» 3*2 and 5*17)•
2. Contents. The uncertainty about future occupa­
tional demands is matched by the relative ignorance of the 
qualities and attainment employers want, which training 
institutions to develop and which they cannot do better 
themselves. Philip Forster has shown for Ghana that:
If we define vocational skills as those that 
lead to remunerative employment, then most 
ostensibly, vocational education has turned 
out to be dysfunctional.
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In Sierra Leone, despite the apparent shortages of 
technically trained manpower given the very small number 
of vocational and technical school graduates each year (70), 
there are indications that many graduates, particularly 
those in industrial training, have difficulties in finding 
employment. This is due primarily to a short-coming common 
to many training programmes: instructions are overtly
theoretical both at vocational/technical training institu­
tions and vocational streams of secondary schools; students 
receive almost no practical training. There is very little 
liason between employers and training institutions regard­
ing curricula or job placement, and few of the teaching 
staff have had experience in commerce and industry. The 
quality of students is also below average since vocational 
and technical education is viewed by students and parents 
and teachers as second rate education. The low prestige 
awarded to technical education is reflected in the number 
of students enrolled in technical institution compared 
to those enrolled in secondary schools (see Tables 5»13 and 
5-21); and in the government current budget, less than 2 
per cent of education expenditure is allocated to technical 
education (see Table 5*20).
On the other hand, until the education explosion of 
the last 20 years, academic education has paid off.
Whereas, the technical education shows few signs of 
delivery even equal benefits.
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The conclusion which should be drawn is that the 
public educational system should offer a combination of 
pure and applied range of sciences thus opening a wide 
range of occupational options to students. Vocational 
education of a specific-job kind is best provided under the 
sponsorship and general supervision of employers. This is 
■'because, as Harbison pointed out:
The essential function of formal education 
is to prepare people for training rather than 
to train people for particular occupations.
In other words, the principal output of for­
mal education should be educated 'trainable* 
people. Like a photographic film, the capaci­
ties of epeople are developed after exposure 
to productive activity. Pre-employment 
education, as in the coating of the film, 
determines the future sensitivity of man for 
understanding and continuous learning. In 
this three phase strategy of human resources 
development, therefore, the right incentive 
and proper arrangement for in-service training 
are necessary if formal pre-employment educa­
tion is to contribute effectively to
l4‘5accelerated growth. . _
The most appropriate task for the government is to 
prod all private sector employers into making their own 
manpower plans and providing for themselves what they 
conceive to be their training needs.
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The Nigerian experiment of setting up an Industrial 
Training Fund (ITF) on the British Industrial Training 
Board lines, deserves close attention. It functions is to 
plan and cater for the needs of related group of firms who, 
on their own, have been unable or unwilling to run such 
training schemes. This Fund in Nigeria is centrally 
controlled by a body appointed by the federal government.
In Sierra Leone, on similar lines to those in Britain 
and Nigeria, the National Committee on the Africanisation 
of Commerce and Industry recommended the establishment of 
industrial training boards, but this was not realised. The 
reason is an earlier experiment by the four mining companies 
to pool their resources together under a single training 
institution failed. The failure was due to the
relevance of the technical courses offered by the institu­
tion to the needs of the individual members. The fact is, 
the four major mining companies were subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations with head offices in Britain, 
Switzerland and the United States of America. While the 
method of mining was basically the same, there was a tendency 
for them to incline towards machinery and equipment 
favoured by their source countries. Thus, the Swiss- 
oriented company favours German or Continental machinery and 
equipment, the British-oriented favour British machinery, 
etc. This renders a unified in-service technical training 
unworkable. Under such circumstances it might conceivably 
be the best approach for the government to enter into
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agreement with individual firms as a pre-condition to 
provide technical training for its middle-level manpower 
personnel.
3 . Selection. It has been argued that a narrowly 
defined vocational approach may well diminish the relevance 
or pay-off of secondary school education. So long as 
there continue to be separate vocational, technical and 
academic institutions and so long as the last of these is 
the sole avenue to further education and the majority of 
well-paid jobs, this will cream off the top of the ability 
range, leaving the less capable student for the first two. 
Even those employers looking for technical aptitude will 
either give preference to the supposedly bright student 
from the academic stream (and then pay for his training) 
or resolve to use expatriate employees on the grounds of 
his inability to find suitably qualified local candidates 
(while many with an expensive vocational education will 
fail to gain employment). Such a waste of resources can 
be avoided only if one accepts that students choose the 
education which holds out the best earning prospects and 
which gives them appropriate incentives to respond to.
Similar considerations apply to the question of 
relevance in the design of university courses. Some of 
these, especially in the faculties of agriculture and 
engineering, are already ostensibly vocational in their 
objectives. Most of the others are not, and the criteria 
by which they judge themselves have more to do with the
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"scholarly publications in Overseas Journal" of the 5 per 
cent of the students who go on to post-graduate work, than 
with contribution to society of the 95 per cent who find 
employment in commerce, industry and government services.
It is, of course, legitimate to argue that university also 
has other functions which are only remotely connected with 
any vocational objective - for example, as critics of the 
society in which they live. But the problem of resources 
allocation cannot be avoided. When the cost of a university 
degree is 4 times the G.N.P. per capita (see Table 5*20), 
how much of its resources should a poor country like Sierra 
Leone (where the G.N.P. per capita is less than £300) 
devote to a form of education that is frankly non-vocational 
in its objectives? Some, undoubtedly, but should it be as 
much as it is now?
In a survey recently administered in the country only 
about a quarter of the final year undergraduates inter­
viewed in the non-professional faculties said that they had 
chosen their university course because of its relevance to 
a career they were hoping to pursue. Is this satisfactory? 
Not long ago a mission from the Manpower Division of the 
World Bank visited Sierra Leone. While in the country, 
they asked the heads of departments of non-professional 
faculties the following questions; For what occupation or 
group of occupations (excluding teaching) is a degree in 
your subject a better preparation than a degree in any 
other non-professional subject? The majority said they did
—489“
not know and a significant majority thought the question
1 48irrelevant to their objectives.
Irrelevant though this question might seem to the 
university departmental heads, it is relevant that a 
university in a developing country like Sierra Leone should 
not only concern itself with the production of high-level 
manpower, but also how they are deployed in the economy, and 
how well they do (particularly those with engineering 
qualifications). This can be done by developing a follow-up 
programme designed to obtain feedback from the employers. 
Otherwise, the university will end up producing graduates 
who the employers would not want as is often the case.
This will provide an easy, ready-made excuse to the private 
sector expatriate employers who continue to employ 
expatriate personnel on the pretext that the University of 
Sierra Leone is not producing people suitable for their 
needs. For example, in one of the mining companies visited 
during the field work for this study, the managing director 
(expatriate) complained that as much as he would like to 
speed up the pace of Africanisation* there were not enough 
Sierra Leonean nationals with the technical skills and 
knowledge to replace his expatriate personnel. "Even 
though academically they (expatriates) are less qualified, 
they could do the job; that is what we want.
The writer's views on what type of people the formal 
education system should produce are summed up by the 
exaggerated comment of Mr. Krushchev on the education 
system of Russia when he said:
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We criticised Stalin because he destroyed 
Lenins principles of the school system and 
went back to the classical gymnasium. There 
they prepared girls for marriage and boys 
for taking a stroll. They twirled moustaches 
but still hadn't learnt anything . . .  we 
want people with a deep knowledge of 
technology.
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, we blame our former colonial 
masters for introducing an education system which alienated 
people from their rural melieu and irrelevant to their mode 
of economic activities. Yet, after 20 years of political 
independence, we still cling to the education system 
bequeathed from our former colonial masters. Sierra Leone, 
like Russia of Nikita Krushixhev, wants people with a 
knowledge of science and technology because, as the UNESCO 
Interim Report on Education and Economic Development in 
Sierra Leone pointed out:
Tractors, lorries and ppwer stations may 
improve the output of farmers and workshops 
and contribute to the comfort of living.
But to be useful, they must be operated and 
kept in repair. To operate them and keep 
them in repair requires that they be under­
stood. Understanding requires education.
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5.6 Summaries and Conclusion.
To be successful, Africanisation policy must be 
orchestrated with sound manpower supply policies. This 
is because (as it has already been stated in the intro­
duction to Part Three) any Africanisation policy which 
could only be implemented through contract employment is 
not only self-defeating but it was also wasteful of 
resources. It was on this premise that Part Three of this 
study was based. Its central focus was the manpower supply 
side of Africanisation policy, as the first two parts were 
concerned with the manpower demand side.
The general introduction to Part Three was meant to 
provide a background information on the importance of the 
manpower resources in a country's development process, and 
how respective governments in Sierra Leone responded to 
this. For example, the manpower survey donducted in 19&4 
was indicative of the realisation by the government of the 
importance of manpower resources in its development 
programmes.
Section 5*1» the introduction to Chapter 5» discussed 
how African governments responded to their urgent needs 
for trained and qualified manpower necessitated by their 
post-independent Africanisation policies. The immediate 
response was the production of high-level manpower to 
replace the colonial expatriates and then an overall 
expansion of the education systems. At some stage, this 
expansion had resulted in a labour supply glut particularly
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from the primary and secondary sectors of the education
1 52system, thus threatening unemployment among school leavers.
Hence the need to link investments in education with 
the manpower requirements of the country. Section 5*2 
attempted to synthesize and discuss broadly the various 
views on investment in education and its contribution 
to economic growth - the residual factor. Two schools of 
thought were identified in this connection. The first 
school took education merely as a factor of production 
analogous to the physical capital; and the second looked 
at education and training merely as pre-conditions for 
economic growth (see notes 18 and 19 above). Also discussed 
in this section were the various approaches and their 
limitations to educational and manpower planning. Tinbergen 
or econometric, cost-benefits or rate of return, and the 
manpower-requirements approaches were broadly discussed.
Each of them, perhaps, with the exception of the last two, 
had limited value in solving the manpower problems which 
confronted Sierra Leone at the time of its independence. 
However, an attempt to apply the last two approaches in 
analysing the present manpower situation in Sierra Leone 
was made.
Section 5*3 attempted, with the use of cost-benefits 
or rates of return and manpower-requirements approaches to 
educational planning, to analyse the manpower-supply- 
requirements situation in Sierra Leone. The purpose of the 
former was to establish whether there was a direct correlation
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between the earnings of individuals or groups of individuals 
and the level of their educational attainment (Table 5*5) 
and how this earnings-educational correlation had affected 
the supply of various categories of manpower (Table 
The latter, the manpower-requirement approach tried to 
explain the manpower-suuply-demand equation in terms of 
economic growth and development. In this regard,three 
categories of manpower were classified with different 
educational attainment: high-level (H-L), middle-level
(M-L) and primary and secondary school teachers. In each 
case, it had been established that in spite of increased 
government expenditure in education, the country would 
still experience a manpower shortage of all three categories. 
But the shortage would be most severe at the middle-level 
(Table 5»17) category. The reasons for the shortage at 
this level were attributed to the structure of wage and 
salaries; the education system itself, and the social 
attitudes, etc.
Section 5*^ discussed the policy implications for 
future manpower development policies and attempted to 
suggest solutions. Sub-section 3.4(1) discussed the social 
returns on investment in education which happened to be 
greaj^^ at technical/secondary level than at a university 
level. It was therefore suggested that more resources be 
diverted from higher education to secondary/technical 
education. Sub-section 5.4(1) looked at the causal relation­
ship between the structure of wages and the supply of 
different categories of manpower and suggested a reform
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which would mean that a wage or salary of an individual . 
would not be determined by educational attainment alone. 
The last, Sub-section 5*4(3)» discussed the relevance of 
the present education system of Sierra Leone and the pro­
blems inherent in any possible reforms suggested.
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THAPTRR 6. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS.
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Between the end of World War II and the independence of 
African nations, there was a plethora of studies examining 
the extent and determinants of similarities and contrasts 
between urban and rural life style but little research 
dealing with the income of population living in urban 
centres.^ Similarly, there have been an increasing number 
of books describing both the pattern of success in educa­
tional institutions and occupational aspiration or expecta­
tions of the student population, but few articles analysing
2the actual occupational destinations of school leavers.
By the same token, there have been a few studies 
dealing with the attitudes of the African workers and their 
patterns of associations both within and without their 
places of employment but a dearth of studies investigating 
the contrast in working conditions between the expatriate 
employees and their African counterparts in both the public 
and the private sectors in terms of pay, opportunities for 
advancement, etc. In other words, the employment policies 
of the colonial governments and foreign-owned enterprises, 
and the reactions of organized labour and nationalist move­
ments against such practices has not attracted much atten- 
tion.^ In the public sector, the position is worse. There 
has been no serious discussion beyond newspapers, journal 
articles and official statements on the issues of Africani­
sation. In brief, it looks as if the study of Africanisa­
tion of both public and private sectors has been treated as 
4a taboo.
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The problems presented by the absence of reliable 
published materials and the lack of up-to-date data on the 
field of Africanisation were compounded by the difficulties 
encountered during the empirical field work for the present 
study in Sierra Leone. Both government officials and 
private sector employers were in most cases unwilling to 
disclose or allow the researcher access to information 
about the size of their expatriate employment, the level of 
expatriate employment, their educational and occupational 
qualifications, the types of jobs they do, their salaries 
and expatriation allowances, etc. Even those who did dis­
close some information were in most cases out of date. 
Nevertheless, after many difficulties it has been possible 
to put together the various facets that seemed to the 
researcher to constitute the central themes of the African­
isation of the public and the private sectors. The purpose 
of this concluding chapter is therefore to isolate from the 
study and discuss the main problems that have tended to 
frustrate some of the objectives of Africanisation policies 
enunciated in the 1950s and 196OS for both public and 
private sectors, and then attempt to suggest alternative 
policies for improvement.
6.1 The public sector.
In the public sector, Kirk-Greene^ and Peter Lloyd^ 
respectively observed that in the former British West 
African territories, the Africanisation of the public
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service, particularly the administrative service, by the 
mid 1960s was a matter of history. It was a fait' accompli. 
It was no longer a problem. These observations might have 
been correct if the Africanisation of the public service 
is only viewed from a personnel replacements perspective.
That is, by 19&5 more than 90 per cent of the high-level 
posts in the public service were held by Africans in Ghana, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone. But on the other hand, if the 
Africanisation of the public service is viewed from a social 
change perspective in a dynamic multi-tribal ethnic context, 
the evidence from this study suggests that the Africanisation 
of the public service is still a problem. Perhaps, what has 
changed is the nature of the problem. To relegate it into 
the realm of history is to miss an important point that any 
form of social change creates its own problems. The 
Africanisation of the public service is not an exception to 
this rule. It is therefore wrong to look at the Africanisa­
tion of the public service purely in quantitative terms.
It is not just the simple replacement of non-Africans by 
Africans. It is the process of transforming a colonial 
type of public service into a national public service. It 
implies the gradual elimination of expatriate predominance 
at all levels in the public service and a reassessment of 
the machinery and the procedures to meet new functions and 
circumstances.
As a social change, the Africanisation of the public 
service has created its own problems. Prominent among them
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are politics, tribalism and corruption.. These are the 
triangular tenet of public life in post-colonial Africa. As 
noted in Chapter 1.2, political support and loyalty in 
Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Black Africa is not induced by 
ideological motivation but by tribal or ethnic loyalty and 
material expectations and rewards.
As noted in the concluding section of Chapter Two, the 
pre-independent government's policy on the Africanisation 
of the public service was explicit on the principles of 
merit, seniority and appropriate qualifications as the 
basis of appointments and promotions or transfers in the
npublic service.' But the post-independence struggle for 
employment in the public service between the two main 
tribes, the Temnes and the Mendes (Table 2.10), exploited 
by the rivalry between the two main political parties (each 
with sectional and tribal supports) and a non-tribal 
minority clique - the Creoles, has rendered the merits, 
seniority principles unworkable in an independent Sierra 
Leone. The desire to reward tribal and political party 
supporters and induce more following had come to be more 
important and taken precedence over the merit principles 
and the maintenance of standards and efficiency in the civil 
service.
In certain government departments which became cor­
porations after independence, appointments to these state 
enterprises were based on political patronage and tribal 
considerations. Little or no regard was given to qualifies-
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tions and experience. Even where the person appointed was 
qualified the appointment was made in such circumstances as 
to leave no doubt in the mind of the appointee about the 
relative merits of political acceptability and qualifica­
tion.^
Such appointments have had disastrous effects on the 
objects and operations of the corporations. They became 
instruments of political rather than economic policy (Chap­
ter 2 .7)' One of the commissions that inquired into the 
Produce Marketing Board and other state corporations quoted 
a witness who said that a one-time managing director of the 
corporation was so politically and tribally motivated that 
"he.did not know the difference between the office of the 
corporation and those of his political party.
In the Civil Service, as noted in Chapter 2.9» the 1971
Republic Constitution put the power to appoint persons to
hold or act in any of the following offices: Secretary to
the Vice-Presidents, Secretary to the Prime Minister,
Secretary to the Cabinet, Financial Secretary, all
Provincial Secretaries, all Professional Heads of Government
Departments, etc. including powers to make appointments on
promotion, transfer from one office to another, confirm
appointments and to remove persons from any such office, in
the hands of the President acting on the advice of the Prime 
10Minister. This has put almost the entire senior sector of 
the public service outside the jurisdiction of the Public 
Service Commission and thereby excluded from the principles 
of merit, seniority and qualifications.
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The politicalization of the public service reached its 
peak in 1978 when Sierra Leone became a 'de jure' one-party 
state system of government. It was argued that the 
neutrality of the public Service under a one-party consti­
tution was not necessary since the interest of the party 
and the Civil Service would be identical. It was further 
argued that a public service that identified itself with the 
ideals and policies would implement them effectively. By 
the same reasoning it was also argued that the one-party 
state system would end the tribal and political rivalry for 
high-office appointments in the public service and state 
enterprises, etc. Accordingly, the Ope-Party State 
Constitution of 1978 allowed civil servants to freely 
participate in politics. In addition, it became a condition- 
precedent or subsequent for such persons appointed as 
permanent secretaries, provincial secretaries, professional 
heads of government departments, judges of the law courts, 
ambassadors, etc. to be registered members of the "Recog­
nized Party" - the All Peoples Congress (APC).^^ However, 
civil servants were not allowed to hold any party office due 
to.the demanding nature of their jobs.
The official interpretation of these changes was that 
in the past tribalism and party membership used to be main 
considerations for appointment and promotion.in the public 
service and state enterprises, the one-party state would 
restore the merits, seniority and qualifications, and 
discipline in the Civil Service. The interpretation went 
further:
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This does not mean that the one party would 
throw the Civil Service ethics into the wind; not 
by any means. On the contrary, the Civil servants, 
by identifying themselves with the Recognized 
Party, by participating in politics through exer­
cising their democratic rights should take pains
to ensure that they do nothing which will reflect
13adversely on the public service as a whole. ^
This statement of intentions and objectives justifying 
the introduction of the one-party state system of government 
sounds good on paper and rhetoric. But in substance and 
realization, the evidence from this study (Chapter 2.8) 
showed that the ideals of the Party Constitution in connec­
tion with Civil Service appointments and promotions were 
just political rhetoric. As late as 1979, barely one year 
after the introduction of the One-Party Constitution, 
allegations that appointments and promotions in the senior 
grades of the public service on sectional and tribal 
grounds were still made against the government (Chapter 2.8). 
Thé validity of these allegations has been discussed in 
Chapter 2.8. What is important in the present.discussion 
is the persistence of such allegations one year after the 
introduction of the one-party state with the promises made 
by it. The fact is, as pointed out in Chapter 1.2, 
political parties in Black Africa are a conglomeration of 
diverse tribal, ethnic and sectional interest groups with 
personal, tribal, ethnic and sectional ambitions. In recent
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years, the formation of 'Descendants Associations' as
l4pressure or interest groups at district levels are 
examples of these aspects of sectional interest. Even 
within the same party these interest groups exist and 
consideration for appointments to the cabinet are based on 
a variety of interests and personal loyalty to the leader­
ship. In the same vein, appointments to some posts in the 
public service, such as the Establishment Secretary and the 
Secretary to the President were made to reflect these 
interest groups at a district level. It is therefore 
illusory to hope that the introduction of the one-party 
state would restore the lofty ideals of the pre-independence 
Africanisation policies. In fact, even within the one 
party context, mistrust, suspicions and rivalry exist among 
its most senior members.
B o m  out of these ethnic, tribal and sectional 
struggles for employment in both the Civil Service and 
state corporations is the bastard child of corruption at 
all levels of public life. Some of the people interviewed 
rated bribery and corruption as equal to tribalism as a 
social force destructive of national development in general 
and of the success of the public enterprises and the 
maintenance of standards in the Civil Service in particular. 
A host of the other negative factors discussed in section
6.1 could be said to hang or converge on bribery and 
corruption. Of course, it is not possible to state in 
statistical terms or inferences the magnitude of bribery and
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corruption in public life in Sierra Leone. But personal 
experience and the experiences of people interviewed during 
the field work in Sierra Leone suggest that bribery features 
in employment and staff managment, when initial employment 
and future promotions have to be bought; it features in the 
award of contracts, in the administration of local purchase 
orders (L.P.O.), etc., in public investments, decisions, 
etc.^^ In the state enterprises like the Electricity 
Corporation, Transport Corporation, Port Authority, to name 
the three leaders, the recent Reports of Commissions of 
Inquiries into activities of these enterprises are most 
revealing. In the Civil Service, particularly the adminis­
trative sector, charges that members of the Public Service 
Commission were receiving financial bribes from applicants 
for appointment into the administrative service, that 
administrative officers posted as provincial secretaries 
and district officers have to pay monthly bribes to the 
Establishment Secretary, Secretary to the President, etc. 
if they are to stay in their posts; that to be recommended 
for promotion you have to bribe your Head of the department 
and for promotion, the Establishment Secretary and the 
Secretary to the President, etc. Again, as stated earlier, 
it is equally difficult to establish the substance of these 
charges of briberies and corruptions in the Civil Service. 
But the actual behaviour of these "successors to the 
colonial expatriates" whom Fann'on^^ calls "the nouveau 
riche, the national bourgeoisie", Peter Lloyd^^ calls "the 
new elites of tropical Africa" and Nurkse^^ calls "the
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opinion leaders", as reflected by their life style and high 
consumption patterns relative to their earnings, would 
leave no doubt to anybody that there are substances to these 
charges of bribery and corruption made against these men. 
However, the main concern here is not the existence of such 
practices per se, but how they have tended to frustrate the 
original objectives of public sector Africanisation, such as 
the maintenance of standards, efficiency and good discipline 
and the morale of the public service.
The evidence from this study suggests that the retro­
gression of the ideals of the Africanisation of the public 
sector from the merits, seniority and qualification princi­
ples to tribalism, politics and corruption and bribery has 
affected standards of performance, discipline and attitudes 
towards work in the public sector (Chapter 2.9)*
The idea inherited from the colonial past that 
employment in the public.sector is "White Man' work" is 
held by a large number of Sierra Leoneans. Often this is 
accentuated by political patronage, tribalism and bribery 
and corruption, end the results are quite detrimental to the 
best performance of the public service and the state enter­
prises. "'White-Man' or 'Government' work" makes it possible
for one to be indolent without immediate retribution, for 
discipline to be remote and circuitous, for tenure and pro­
motion to be unaffected by efficiency and productivity.
Even in cases where attempts to apply sanctions for acts of 
indiscipline, political interference always intervened on
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the grounds of unfair victimization (Chapter 2.9 and Table 
2.11). The problem is, as one interviewee in the study 
(2.9) pointed out, ". . it is difficult to enforce discip­
linary measures and to seem equitable when those who 
administer these measures are themselves not disciplined." 
The very act of receiving a bribe from a junior officer for 
promotion or transfer to another department where the 
opportunities for corrupt practices are greater undermines 
the power and authority of the senior officer to exercise 
control over his department. Under these circumstances 
discussed above, the public service as an instrument of 
development is weakened and incompetent to live up to its 
expectations. The question is, what can be done in order 
to reverse this situation within the context of the one- 
party state system of government?
There are no easy solutions to this problem. In the 
state enterprises three examples were cited where the 
government was forced to take retrograde actions of de- 
Africanisation. But it was a stop-go policy in the extreme 
(Chapter 2.?). They are not feasible in the Civil Service; 
to do so will be politically self-defeating and will run 
counter to the objectives of the Africanisation of the 
public sector, discussed in Chapter 2.2. Perhaps the 
establishment of a commission or an ombudsman for public 
complaints to be charged with the responsibility to receive 
and investigate complaints from affected civil servants of 
all grades and the general public on the conduct of the
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public service with respect to the discharge of their duties 
to the public as a whole. Zambia has a similar set-up but 
under the Office of the President who also happens to be 
the leader of the only Zambian political p a r t y . U n d e r  
such conditions the decisions of the commission or ombudsman 
would undoubtedly not be free from political influences. In 
Sierra Leone, to follow the Zambian pattern would automati­
cally put the ombudsman or the commission under the grip of 
the Secretary to the President and thus destroy his 
independence. The other alternative is to set up an 
independent machinery within which the commission for public 
complaints or the ombudsman operates. This will of course 
increase the bureaucratic control structures in the public 
service with the attending problems of staffing, and would 
perhaps become equally corrupt like the Public Service 
Commission and the Immigration Quota Committee (Chapters 
4.4l and 5*4). However, the choice has to be made between 
these two probable evils. Neither of them is strong enough 
to reject the proposal. It is better than not doing any­
thing. At least it will provide a safety valve through 
which dissatisfied civil servants and the general public 
can vent their feelings, even if nothing is seen to be done.
In the state corporations, the Nigerian example is 
worth following. The establishment of a Public Enterprise 
Commission (PEC) as the counterpart of the Public Service 
Commission. It will be responsible for the appointment, 
transfer, and dismissal of senior personnel for all public
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enterprises in the country. The hoard members of each 
enterprise will be left with the other functions of the 
enterprise, excluding the appointment of senior staff.with 
an income above Le 5,000 per annum. The responsibility to 
appoint the Public Enterprise Commission would rest with 
the President, but its chairman must not be a retired civil 
servant as is usually the case with the Public Service 
Commission. The chairman and the other members of the 
commission should be people of high and reputable public 
standing chosen from the business community. However, like 
the proposal for the establishment of the commission or 
ombudsman for public complaints, it will be difficult to 
guarantee that the Public Enterprises Commission will not 
fall into the ills of politics, tribalism and bribery and 
corruption. But in the light of the present position, it 
is worth the risk.
Finally, it must again be noted that even if these 
proposals are accepted and implemented, they are by them­
selves not sufficient to solve the problems discussed above; 
mere institutional changes are not enough. They require 
strong political leadership and the will to change them.
Of course one cannot be definitive on what would happen if 
nothing is done to reverse the situation. But experience in 
Nigeria showed that the 1966 military coups which eventually 
led to the outbreak of the civil war between 196? and 1970 
was the; result of political tribal and sectional discrimina­
tion over employment in the federal public sector. In
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Liberia, the military take-over by Sergent Doe in 1980 was 
attributed to similar problems discussed above. They might 
be of greater magnitude in Liberia than in Sierra Leone, but 
if the present state of indiscipline in the public sector 
continues, the likelihood of a military take-over in Sierra 
Leone cannot be ruled out. Sierra Leone's public service 
was once described as the best to be inherited from the 
colonial rule in Africa in terms of discipline, high-level 
of performance, and the observance of the principles of 
merit, seniority and qualifications. But in the light of 
the evidence presented in this study, this description no 
longer holds true after 20 or more years of Africanisation 
policies. Tribalism, nepotism, ethnic, political and 
sectional interests, and bribery and corruption have taken 
the places of those principles as the basis for appointments 
and promotions in thepublic sector. This explains the older 
generation of public servants nostalgia for the 'good old 
colonial days' when discipline, promotion by merit, 
seniority and experience was the order of the day and not by 
vho knows you. This may also explain why among other 
things private sector expatriate employers are paying lip 
service to Africanisation policies.
6.2 The private sector.
The problems discussed in the last section are the 
aftermath of Africanisation. They are the result of the 
socio-political context within which the public service
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operates in Black Africa. In the private sector the pro­
blems are not the aftermath, they are preventive to Africanisation 
and much more complex and difficult to tackle. The 
employment policies of foreign-owned firms discussed in 
Chapter 3 presented some dilemmas to the Sierra Leone 
Government's Africanisation policies, which might not 
necessarily be solved by references to other African 
countries which have passed through the same process and 
experiences. The presence of expatriate personnel in a firm 
has direct effect on the occupational attainment of African 
workers. It restricts the access of local wage earners to 
managerial functions and hence prevents them from exerting 
any major degree of control over their own economic, 
technical and social future (Chapter 3«5» 3*6 and 3»7)« But 
the presence of expatriates as pointed out in Chapter 3*2 
also seems to lead to the adoption of high wage policy.
Thus, the meaning of the concept of Africanisation in the 
private sector is twofold: it corresponds to an increased
individual occupational mobility regardless of earnings, and 
as such hinges on a distribution of political power; but it 
also implies a more equitable allocation of rewards derived 
from work and this focuses mostly on a redistribution of 
economic power which in this case does not include the 
ownership of capital.
Clearly, the differential stress placed on a redistri­
bution of economic as opposed to political power has 
distinct implications. A first view of Africanisation
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stressed the need to develop African owned business (that 
is, ownership indigenisation - Introduction to Part II), 
and more specifically the need to stimulate intermediate 
types of enterprises designed to erode the tension arising 
from the co-existence of large-scale foreign-run organiza­
tions and traditional oriented commercial and agricultural 
activities. As against this first view of Africanisation, 
a second model recognized implicitly the positive influence 
of bureaucratic multi-national organisations, on national 
integration and economic development, and correspondingly 
aimed merely at increasing the number of African workers 
engaged in managerial and high-level technical activities 
within such organizations.
Although these two models, as pointed out in the 
introduction to Part II of the study, are not mutually 
exclusive; they rely on distinct theoretical constructs. In 
the first perspective, one assumes similarities not only 
between the current situation in Sierra Leone and elsewhere 
in some African countries, and the position of some European 
nations in the last century, but also between the respective 
development patterns. Thus, development is seen as follow­
ing a 'push* model, resulting mainly from forces operating 
within the system itself. Conversely, in the second pers­
pective, one emphasises the implications attached to the 
diffusion of the organizational forms currently prevailing 
in more industrialised societies. Development is thus seen 
as following a 'puli' pattern, and hence as being primarily 
dependent on forces operating outside the local system.
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However, the dilemmas that the Sierra Leone Government 
confronted with respect to the definition and implementation 
of Africanisation policies are not only theoretical but 
political as well. Firstly, the Government must determine 
the extent to which industrialisation may modify the current 
distribution of political and economic power, the develop­
ment of various types of modem enterprises in different 
parts of the country affects not only the distribution of 
active population between urban and rural areas but also the 
level of resources of their respective inhabitants. As 
these changes are associated with the development of tension 
among regions and their inhabitants, the government may be 
tempted to favour the development of small-scale African- 
owned enterprises. But if such a strategy prevents the 
negative effects of social and ethnic differentiation, it 
may also slow down overall economic development and limit 
interaction between the local economy and international 
markets.
Secondly, if the government advocates for industriali­
sation of the country, it must choose among the variety of 
strategies attached to the notion of Africanisation. In 
one perspective what counts is a mere change in the system 
of allocation of the profits accruing to modem activities. 
The government is anxious to facilitate the emergence of 
technically developed enterprises in order to enhance the 
size of the "pie" to be shared. In brief, this particular 
perspective asserts that development comes first and that
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Africanisation, that is an increase in income per capita, is 
the offspring of development and industrialisation. But an 
increase in the size of the pie is not necessarily associated 
with an increase in each one of the shares assigned to 
various social groups. Alternatively, the government might 
feel that a mere redistribution of profits is insufficient 
and that for both economic and political reasons an increas­
ing number of Africans must gain access to top positions 
and managerial roles within the modern foreign-owned enter­
prises. Although this strategy is likely to decrease 
invidious comparisons between expatriates and their African 
counterparts, it is likely to accentuate social differentia­
tion among African workers and hence to enhance the 
possibility of conflict among them (Chapter 4.2).
This study has shown, however, that successive 
governments in Sierra Leone had tended to follow a mixture 
of the three strategies. They intervened quite directly in 
the functioning of the labour market by one or a combination 
of the following; by restricting the employment of 
expatriates through legislation such as the Non-Citizen 
(Registration, Immigration, Expulsion) Act No. 14 of I965 
(Chapter 4.4l) and the Expatriate Payroll Tax Levy Act 1972. 
The government can impose minimum wage standards or by 
virtue of being the biggest employer, make unilateral wage 
increases even if its standards may be lower than the basic 
needs of the wage-earning population. At the same time it 
has shown its commitment to the policy of Africanisation by
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giving preferential fiscal treatment to foreign investors 
who were willing to train their African personnel to perform 
managerial and highly technical functions (Chapter 4.3)»
In sum, the Sierra Leone Government wish to continue 
to import foreign capital and skills especially those in 
short supply but both capital and skills were to be 
restricted to certain areas. They were to be kept out of 
areas where indigenous capital and skills had already 
demonstrated their capacity to meet existing needs and 
growth requirements (Chapter 4.4). In areas of fundamental 
importance to the national economy, foreign capital and 
skills would have to play an increasingly subordinate role. 
Foreign skills were expected to provide services which local 
personnel could not provide.
This study has found general acceptance within the 
expatriate business community of the government's Africani­
sation policy. There is no doubt that much progress has 
been made in recent years in replacing expatriates with 
Sierra Leonean nationals, but mainly in functions which 
have to do with local personnel (3*4). Although it is . 
difficult to measure the degree of responsiveness to 
Africanisation policy by individual firms or companies, it 
is found in this study that there are wide differences in 
responsiveness between industries and between firms within 
the same industry. It depends on the home country, the 
technology of the industry and the ownership of the company. 
For instance, British owned or based enterprises in Sierra
-527-
Leone were more responsive to Africanisation than American 
or French owned, and European and American owned firms were 
more readily responsive to private sector Africanisation 
than Indians or Lebanese owned. Similarly, responsiveness 
to Africanisation is less in family-owned businesses than in 
public-owned enterprises (Chapter 3*4 and Table 3*9) etc.
The functional areas in which the least progress in 
Africanisation has been made is in production, i.e. mining, 
and in general jobs which required technical skills and 
experience (Table 3*8a and 3 •8b). In most industries 
supervisory sind middle-level non-technical jobs have been 
extensively Africanised. Relatively little Africanisation 
has taken place at senior line managerial levels (see 
Tables 3•5» 3*8a and 3*8b).
There are, however, a number of factors or problems 
which this study has found inhibitive to the success of 
Africanisation policies. Some of them are peculiar to the 
Africanisation of the private sector, others are general to 
both sectors. Among those that are general to both sectors 
are politics, tribalism, bribery and corruption and stealing 
were considered by expatriate employers to be among the 
highest inhibiting factors to their responsiveness to 
Africanisation of certain senior management positions, 
particularly those which have to do with financial manage­
ment and perhaps personnel (Chapter 3-5)• These problems 
have already been discussed in the last section (6.1) on the 
public sector. They are part of the supplied determined
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problems which cannot'easily be solved by any Africanisation 
policies however sound they may be. As stated in the last 
section, they are the product of the social setting in 
which the economy operates. But unlike the public service, 
and to some extent the state enterprises, evidence from this 
study suggests that foreign-owned enterprises could not 
afford the luxury of these dysfunctional social ills. As 
some expatriate employers pointed out: "Our employment
policies are based on merits and competence. We employ 
those men and women who could contribute to the overall 
objectives of our enterprises - profits. But not on the 
basis of politics and tribalism, etc."
A second factor considered by all private sector 
employers to be visibly most crucial in the success of 
Africanisation policy is the manpower supply factor. It 
is also a problem common to both sectors. As stated in 
Chapter 5*1, the success of Africanisation policies and 
the rate at which it progresses depends largely on the 
availability of the manpower supply "of the right skill 
mix, of the right number at the right time and in the right 
place" (Chapter 5»l)* But evidence from the study suggests
that there was and still is a manpower supply shortage.
21The Manpower Survey Report of Robert Brown showed that 
Sierra Leone at independence faced four major manpower 
problems which were inhibitive to Africanisation, particu­
larly in the private sector: a scarcity of skilled and 
educated manpower, a surplus of unskilled labour beyond the
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number of wage earning jobs which the economy could 
provide, attitudes which reflected the values of the 
colonial and traditional pasts, an extreme dependence on 
expatriate manpower at most levels of skilled employment in 
the public and in the private sectors (Tables 5*1 and 5*2).
However, since independence in 19&1, the country has 
made particularly tremendous efforts to expand and to 
improve its educational facilities at all levels of the 
educational system - primary, secondary, technical, teacher 
training, and university. Enrolment in each of these 
sectors had more than doubled in the past two decades 
(Chapter 5*3)• But notwithstanding these achievements 
Sierra Leone is still heavily reliant on foreign skills 
and capital for its development programmes in both the 
public and private sectors of the economy. In 1978, it 
was estimated that a total of 2,500 non-Sierra Leonean 
nationals were employed in the- economy. The majority of 
them were deployed as technicians in both sectors; in the 
public sector from rural farm instructor to managing 
director of a Rural Integrated Agricultural Development
ppProgramme, etc; in the private sector, from foreman to 
managing director, etc. (Table 3.8a); in the education 
system, from primary school teacher to university professor 
etc. (Table 2.8). However, the greatest shortage in 
supply-requirements terms relative to other categories 
of manpower is at the mid-level which is the most critical 
for any successful implementation of Africanisation policy 
(Table 5-17).
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Several reasons had been advanced to explain why- 
skilled manpower showed the greatest shortage relative to 
its requirements (Table 5*17)• Among them were* social 
attitudes towards non-white-collar jobs. The education 
system inherited from the colonial period and improved 
after independence did not produce the right manpower mix, 
the emphasis was on academic qualifications other than 
technical, because it was more rewarding to hold an 
academic qualification than a technical one. An implicit 
causal factor in the manpower supply problem is the 
structure of wages developed and inherited from the 
colonial period. Wages skewed towards academic qualifica­
tions instead of being determined by the forces of supply 
and demand in the labour market. They therefore constituted 
a mal-function in the labour market. A third problem akin 
to manpower supply is the manpower development. As it 
has been pointed out in Chapter 5*4, the function 
of formal education is to produce "educated trainable 
p e o p l e " . I t  was also pointed out in Chapter 5*1 that 
the success of Africanisation policy would depend crucially 
on the appropriate training and utilization of local 
skilled manpower. Clearly, one of the areas in which a 
large proportion of the non-nationals employed in the private 
sector (Table 3.8a) are deployed in skilled occupations in 
such activities as the building and construction trades, 
repair services, machine operators, etc. These activities 
are also those most likely to be severely disturbed by an
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unplanned Africanisation policy. While these occupations 
need considerable judgement and skills, their requirements 
in respect of formal education are low, ranging from a 
minimum of three years of secondary education to two or 
three years of post-secondary training.
But experience and evidence from the study showed that 
a properly organized training programmes are expensive and 
often elaborate affairs. In industries vhere the typical 
firm is large (such as in the mining industry), the number 
of firms is small (4) and enjoys a large measure of pro­
tection from foreign competition (i.e., the mining 
or the manufacturing of cigarettes), a firm can mount an 
ambitious training programme without having to worry 
greatly that it will lose sales if it passes on training 
costs to consumers, or having to fear that it will lose 
trained staff to a competitor who did not have to incur 
similar expenses. On the other hand, in industries where 
the number of firms is large, the typical firm is small, 
and competition is keen, few individual firms would care 
to incur substantial training costs (even if they had the 
financial resources for doing so), unless they know that 
their competitors are doing likewise. In any case, such 
a course may have a minimum efficient scale which make 
them too large and costly for any individual firm to , 
contemplate.
Under both circumstances the government has two 
policy options from which to choose:
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The first option and its policy implications has 
already been discussed under Chapter 5*5* However, for 
the purpose of emphasis, two of them need to be re-stated 
here. It requires direct government intervention in the 
labour market to correct the mal-functioning caused by the 
wages and salary system in the country. This it can do 
either of the following ways: (a) being the biggest
employer of all categories of manpower in the country, it 
can break the link between an individual's level of
pheducational attainment and his level of remuneration.
That is, if the country requires the services of a City and 
Guild Certificate holder in plumbing, the country must be 
prepared to pay him more than a university degree holder 
in history whose services are less required by the country. 
This would have the twin objectives of channelling manpower 
resources to those occupations where they are most produc­
tive and required (Chapter 5*5); (b) being the sole 
financier of all educational institutions, the government 
can directly or indirectly control the number of students 
pursuing different courses of studies either through 
selective scholarship awards at home and abroad, by asking 
those who opt to study chosen fields of studies of their 
own to meet the full costs of their education at home as 
well as abroad, or by diverting resources from those areas 
of the education system which showed some signs of over­
production of certain manpower categories and skills. For 
example, if the university sector of the education system
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shows signs of over-production of graduates, resources 
should be transferred from the university to other sectors 
of the education system v\here there are signs of under­
production, eg. technical or teacher education. Of the 
two proposals, it is highly unlikely that the government 
would accept the first for the same reasons already dis­
cussed in Chapter 5»5* Even if it does accept it, it is 
doubtful that it will be implemented by the administrative 
service whose members stand to lose most. With the second 
proposal, the evidence is that the government is moving 
towards it. There have been some conscious efforts to 
plan educational expenditures in line with the manpower 
needs requirements of the economy as a whole. Of 
course, all these proposals, to be accepted and successfully 
implemented, require a very strong political leadership and 
which is believed to be present in a one-party state system 
of government in Sierra Leone.
The second policy option is based on the evidence 
presented in Table 3.11, which shows that the manpower 
needs requirements of some industries are specific to 
those industries. They cannot be met by the policy pro­
posals made above. It is therefore considered prudent for 
the government to enter into discussion with private sector 
employers on an industry-by-industry basis;
(a) to evaluate the success or otherwise of existing 
training schemes, preferably on a cost-benefit basis with 
a view to improving future performances in this field;
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(b) to discuss for each industry or skill group 
whether training programmes are most appropriately mounted 
within each firm, within some firms acting as training 
institutions for the whole industry, within institutions 
of vocational/technical education in Sierra Leone, in West 
Africa or overseas;
(c) to agree on appropriate methods of financing such 
courses which serve several firms with a view to incor­
porating such agreement into appropriate legislation. The 
idea of a training levy on each firm to be disbursed by an 
industry-wide organisation, but it is suspected that in 
the case of some industries, government assistance is 
likely to be necessary.
It is believed that such programmes should be run 
under the control of each industry, with an approjpriately 
strengthened inspectorate of the Ministry of Education to 
approve syllabuses and to see to it that appropriate 
standards are maintained.
A fourth problem which is equally important but largely 
neglected as an inhibiting factor of Africanisation concerns 
the utilization and promotion of already available skilled 
manpower. Evidence from this study seems to suggest that 
the following situations existing in some foreign-owned 
firms I
(a) Sierra Leonean nationals, though willingly 
engaged by firms in junior professional, managerial and 
executive positions, are not being given the chances to
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acquire the knowledge, experience and judgement to fit 
them for promotion to more senior posts; and that firms 
are hoarding capable Sierra Leoneans whom they are not 
putting into good use (Chapter 3«5» 3*6 and 3*7)>
(b) that where Sierra Leonean nationals in junior 
management positions are acquiring the skills and appti- 
tudes needed for promotion, they are nevertheless con­
stantly being passed over in favour of non-nationals 
(Chapter 3.6);
(c) that Sierra Leonean nationals are being both 
hired and promoted, many of them are holding shadow-posts 
with no real power (Chapter 3*7) •
These practices do in fact commonly occur. They 
constitute serious barriers to effective Africanisation of 
high-level posts, and are wasteful of scarce manpower 
resources. It is suggested that the government should 
ascertain the existence and extent of the prevalence of 
such practices in the private sector, and find ways and 
means by which such practices can be discontinued. This 
might not be an easy thing to do, for expatriate employers 
might interpret it to be an industrial police force swooping 
into the ruining of the private sector employment policies. 
But it can be done by either inspection of training 
standards and quality from the Ministry of Education 
suggested earlier, or through Factory Inspectors from the 
Ministry of Labour, etc.
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A fifth problem akin to the last and equally inhibitive 
to effective Africanisation is "Window-dressing Africanisa­
tion." Evidence from this study showed that there is a 
tendency for certain companies to employ retired African 
public servants to enhance the company's interests. In 
some cases, the Africans in the top posts tend to feel 
insecure and become suspicious of their fellow Africans so 
that they prefer to have only non-Africans around them 
for fear that other Africans might take their jobs. This 
is particularly true of Africans who have been put in top 
posts for the purpose of window-dressing Africanisation.
It is therefore suggested that this tendency should be 
checked and stopped by the government by using the same 
method suggested above.
A sixth problem of greater magnitude is that relating 
to family-owned businesses. Numerically, the majority of 
commercial firms in Sierra Leone are small retail businesses 
owned and run by Lebanese and Indian families. Opinions 
varied on the choice of policy on the question of family- 
owned businesses. Some members of the public suggested 
that if such families are prepared to identify themselves 
with the country by taking up Sierra Leonean citizenship 
and by investing their capital in the country, they should 
be permitted to stay. If not, they should not be permitted 
to continue in their present form.
Other members of the public have pointed out that 
Africanisation is going to be very difficult with the
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presence of such a large number of family-owned businesses, 
and such businesses will not find it easy to throw out 
their kith and kin for the sake of Africanisation. It was 
therefore proposed by the same people interviewed that in 
order to solve this problem, the government should set a 
time limit during which all these family businesses should 
become public. However, one would have thought that before 
a time limit is set, the government should first conduct a 
survey of family-owned businesses with a new definition of 
what constitutes a small business. The present official 
definition of a small business is "any business.unit 
employing less than six people for a wage" (see Introduction 
to Part II). New definition based on the following 
parameters; annual turnover, the amount of capital employed 
etc. in the business, would be better indicators, because 
a family business might be employing less than six people 
while its annual sales turnover or the capital invested in 
it, are greater than in a similar family-owned business 
employing six or more paid people. It is therefore suggested 
that only after a new official definition on what consti­
tutes a small family-owned business should a time limit be 
set for such businesses which would no longer be qualified 
as small, be required to declare their businesses public.
Finally, a seventh problem contigent to those discussed 
above, part of which has previously been discussed in 
Chapter 4.4l, is the implementation of the two policies 
discussed in Chapters 4.4 and 4.5* Even if all the
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inhibiting factors to Africanisation discussed above are 
removed, evidence from this study suggests that Sierra 
Leone, like many other African countries, would continue 
to need some expatriate personnel in some fields for a 
number of years to come; that these expatriates will 
continue to be needed despite the very great expansion and 
improvement in the educational facilities.
In fact, some economists pointed out that if the 
Sierra Leonean economy developed as planned, the employment 
opportunities created by economic growth will fully 
absorb all the skilled Sierra Leonean nationals that the 
education system will produce (see Table 5*17), and that 
this alone will lead to rapid Africanisation of the private 
sector of the economy. While this latter assessment may 
appear to be correct on paper, in practice it has not worked 
out that way. Experience shows that the establishment of 
every new industry is always accompanied by new applications 
made to the Inmigration Department for expatriate immigra­
tion quotas for Lebanese, Indian, Europeans or Americans 
who are needed to run the new industry on the pretext that 
no Sierra Leonean national with the requisite qualifications 
and job experience is available, (Tables 4.2, 4.3). Even 
yfh.en recruiting locally for such industries, the investors 
kith and kin (who are always non-Africans) are often given 
the best jobs even where suitable Africans are available.
Thus, in spite of the recent growth of the economy 
and the creation of new job opportunities, that has come
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with it. The employment of Africans particularly in 
managerial and executive positions, has not kept pace 
with increased employment opportunities created by economic 
growth (compare Tables 3«1 and 3*6), This has obviously 
put into question the effectiveness of the Africanisation 
policies that have been pursued so far.
In the light of available evidence discussed in this 
study, should current Africanisation policies be continued 
in spite of their apparent failure to achieve their 
objectives? The answer is not difficult to find but for 
the Government to accept it is another matter. But it 
will serve no useful purpose to continue with the present 
Africanisation policies because evidence from this study 
suggests that they have not only failed to achieve their 
objectives, i.e. increased employment opportunities for 
educated Africans in the private sector, but have also 
been counter-productive. They have, in the past, been 
partly responsible for the closure of foreign-owned 
companies. For example, the closure of the Sierra Leone 
Development Company in 1975 was partly attributed to the 
Government's Africanisation policy (Chapter 1.4, page 43). 
In addition, the implementation machinery of current 
Africanisation policies, particularly the expatriate 
quota system, has proved to be incompetent, ineffective, 
corrupt, and administratively complex and difficult to 
enforce (4.5). With regard to the payroll tax on 
expatriate labour, undoubtedly it will in the short run
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raise Government revenue as Table 4.4 would show. But 
its effectiveness as an instrument of Africanisation is 
difficult to see. In fact, one can categorically conclude 
that the use of Fiscal Policy in Africanisation is nothing 
more than a revenue raising exercise rather than any serious 
attempt to control the employment of expatriates in the 
private sector. Moreover, as a cost item, the payroll 
tax on expatriate labour, per se, does not constitute a 
significant cost item to deter further expatriate employ­
ment in foreign-owned companies. More importantly, the 
majority of foreign companies employing a substantial 
number of expatriate and African personnel are engaged 
in either import-substituting, manufacturing or export- 
oriented mining industries with some degree of Government 
protection from foreign competition for the former 
(Chapter 4.4). An increase in the relative cost of 
expatriate employment will definitely be passed to the 
consumer at home and abroad in the form of higher prices. 
This would have a reversible two-fold effect on the, 
economy; first, domestically, it is inflationary and 
would lead to increased demand for more wages in the 
export sector of the economy; secondly, abroad, it will 
affect the competitiveness of these companies in the 
world market. The net effect of these is a decline in 
employment opportunities for Africans either in the event 
of the closure of a foreign company, or employers would 
resort to labour-substituting devices through the intro­
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duction of capital intensive method of production which 
in fact will only result in increased employment for skilled 
expatriate labour.
And finally, as has already been pointed out in 
Chapter 1.4, the degree to which a government can pursue 
its private sector Africanisation policies without losing 
the confidence of foreign investors depends on the size 
and strength of the economy. Nigeria, it was cited, with 
a prosperous expanding economy could afford to pursue a 
more vigorous Africanisation policy without losing the 
confidence of foreign investors. But Sierra Leone, with 
a small and stagnant economy, cannot even continue with 
its present Africanisation policies without further 
adverse effect on its economy. It will have a pay off 
effect in the overall employment in the country if the 
government abandons its present Africanisation policies 
and replaces it with more persuasion. It is highly 
likely that the government would object to this proposal 
for three main reasons already discussed: first, the
membership of the various Immigration Expatriate Quota 
Committees confers financial and political powers on 
individual members with access to the business community, 
particularly the Minister of Trade and Industry and the 
President who holds ultimate power on the expatriate quota 
issues. Any proposal which seeks to abandon the immigra­
tion control policy as an instrument of Africanisation 
policy will undoubtedly be resisted by the government.
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The three case studies cited in Chapter 4.3 are illustrative 
of the reasons why the government may not accept this pro­
posal. The second is that taxation on expatriate labour 
brings additional revenue to the government's annual budget; 
to discontinue with it means a loss of that item of revenue. 
And the third is that while the government would accept the 
fact that current Africanisation policies have not been 
effective and are open to malpractices, they will argue that 
in the absence of such policies the number of expatriates 
employed in the private sector would have been more. This, 
of course, is true; but who benefits? It is the educated 
few at the expense of the majority of the working popula­
tion. Charles Elliott has found in some independent African 
states that, among other things. Africanisation has 
resulted in more increased employment opportunities for 
high-level manpower than for overall employment in the 
economies of each of these countries.Sierra Leone is 
not an exception to this, and it is the writer's belief 
that Sierra Leone would have more to gain in terms of 
increased employment opportunities for its working popula­
tion if current Africanisation policies were abandoned.
In conclusion, the objectives and scope of this study 
had already been stated in the introduction to this study. 
Throughout this study one theme has persisted; the problem 
of Africanisation and manpower development are closely 
inter-related and of fundamental importance to Sierra Leone 
as well as to other African states with similar colonial
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experlence. Their importance has been underlined by the 
attention paid to them in national development plans, in 
government legislations, decrees, and in policy statements 
by government leaders. But in spite of the importance 
attached to them, and in spite of the great many people 
affected by them, there has been very little success in 
their implementation because there has been a serious lack 
of reliable information in the country on which to base 
policy decisions. This study (notwithstanding the problems 
encountered during the archival and empirical work) has 
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117 per square mile (1978)
Capital:
Freetown (pop. 276 247)
Other main towns:







Presidential, with a national parliament 
Political party:
ARC (the All People's Congress)
Head of State:
HUE. Dr Siaka P. Stevens
Currency:
Leone (EUl = Le 1.28)
GNP:
Le 726.1 million (at current prices) 
1976/77
National income:
Le 590.1 million (at current prices) 
1976/77
Per capita income:
Le 228.6 (GNP level) 1976/77 
Le 259.1 (GDP level) 1976/77
Main products:
Diamonds, bauxite, rice, cocoa, coffee, 
palm kernel products
Foreign trade:
Exports (f.o.b.) Le 147 650 000 (1977) 
Imports (c i.f.) Le 186 218 000 (1976)







Palm kernels 1 379
Education:
Primary: 218 376 pupils (1976/77) 
Secondary & technical: 51 564 pupils 
(1976/77)
Higher education: 2 985 students
(1976/77)
Sierra Leone: 




1977-78 b ud g et(l) 15.5% is earmarked for agriculture
Revenue: Le 143.7 m (US $ 131.6 m); 14.8% for mining and 14.4% for trans
expenditure: Le 139.7 m (US $ 127.9 m)
Development plan ________
The 1975-79 plan covers an outlay of (1) source. European Parliament, directorate
some Le 623 m ($ 689.1 m), of which general for research and documentation. 1978
External trade (1973-76)


























131 384 146 242 129 387 112 000
(2) The exports to the EEC concern principally the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
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APPENDIX II
OSMAN SANKOH. PH.D. STUDENT IN MANPOWER STUDIES 
BATH UNIVERSITY, U.K.
FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE PERMANENT SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF 
EDUCATION: BELOW IS THE PROGRAMME OF FIELD-WORK WHILE THE 































Report to: 1, Ministry of Education
2, Principal, Civil Service Training
College3» Secretary, Recruitment and Training 
4, The Establishment Secretary
Visit 1. Ministry of Education
2. Ministry of Labour
3 . Ministry of Works4. Ministry of Development &
Planning"
5. Ministry of Trade & Industry
6. Ministry of Finance
Immigration Department
Office of the Public Service Commission 
Establishment Secretary's Office
Secretary, Recruitment & Training
1. Produce Marketing Board
2. Road Transport Corporation
Sierra Leone Ports Authority 
Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation
Sierra Leone Railways Department 
Forest Industries - Kenema




13/ 11/78 Week 11 Sierra Leone Development Company
20/ 11/78 Week 12 National Diamond Mining Company 
(Yengema & Tongo)
27/ 11/78 Week 13 Bauxite Mining Company and Rutile 
Manufacturing Sector
4/ 12/78 Week 14 Sierra Leone Breweries
Aureole Tobacco Company
Sierra Leone Distilleries
11/ 12/78 Week 15 National Confectionery CompanyS.L. Palm Kernel Oil Mill
Oxygen Manufacturing Company 
COMMERCIAL HOUSES
18/ 12/78 Week 16 Sierra Leone Oil Refinery
Shell Petroleum Company
1/ 1/79 Week 17 British Petroleum CompanyI «9 Mobil Oil Company 
BANKS - COMMERCIAL
8/1/79 Week 18 Standard Bank, S.L. Ltd.Barclays Bank Ltd.
15/ 1/79 Week 19 Retail Trade
22/ 1/78 Week 20 Progress Report to the Supervisor
29/ 1/79 Week 21 Visit to all Provincial and District Head Quarters
9/ 2/79 Week 22 DATE OF DEPARTURE TO U.K.
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APPENDIX IV- Key for Tables 3.8 and 3.11 
POSTS




Chief Accountant/AcCOuntant/Internal Auditor 05
Engineer/Analyst 06
Personnel Manager 07
Personnel Asst/Personnel Officer 08
Senior Sales Asst/Special Product Asst 09
Sales Asst/Sales Repr./Sales Execut. 10
Salesman/Sales Inspector 111
Asst Engineer/Asst. Accountant/Audit Asst. 12






















Section Ad. (Cash)/Section Ad. (Bills)
Asst Tugmaster/Maritime Foreman/
Engineers Asst/Personnel Supt.









B.A./B.Sc ./B.A. (Econs)/B.Coinm. 01
M.A./M.Sc ./M.A. (Econs) 02




A.M.I. Mech. E./A.M.I.C.E. 0?







D.P.A. Dip. Econs/Dip. Agric/
Dip. Elect. Eng./A.C.S.M. 15
Dip. BKKeeping/Higher Seer. Dip. l6
Cort. BK.Keeping






REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE
\
C IV IL  SERVICE REVISION OF SALARIES— 1ST NOVEM BER, 1978
The conversion tables below are compiled as a result of the salary increase which came into force with 
effect from 1st November, 1978, as follows:—
25% on salaries from Le360 per annum-Le775 per annum subject to a minimum initial salary of Le540 
per annum.
20% on salaries from Le776 per annum to Le3,783 per annum.
15 % on salaries from Le3,784 per annum to Le5,550 per annum.
10% on salaries of Le5,551 and above.
SCALES Le Le Le Le Le
A Lowfr Old 1,795.00 1,904.00 2,016.00 2,346.00 2.458.00
New 2,154.00 2,285.00 2.419.00 2,815.00 2,950.00
Old 2,721.00 2,829.00 2,936.00 3,044.00 3,168.00
New 3,265.00 3,395.00 3,523.00 3,653.00 3,802.00
U pper Old 3,290.00 3,414.00 3,536.00 3,659.00 3,783.00
New 3,948.00 4,097.00 4,243.00 4,391.00 4,540.00
B I Old 1,733.00 1,828.00 1,921.00 2.205.00 2.300.00
New 2,080.00 2.194.00 2,305.00 2,646.00 2,760.00
2 Old 2,394.00 2,489.00 2,599.00 2,645.00 2,753.00
New 2,873.00 2,987.00 3,119.00 3,174.00 3,304.00
3 Old 2,860.00 2,968.00 3,075.00 3,183.00
New 3,432.00 3,562.00 3,690.00 3,820.00
4 Old 3,290.00 3,414.00 3,536.00 3,659.00 3,783.00
New 3,948.00 4,097.00 4,243.00 4,391.00 4,540.00
SCALE C(T) 1-7
C (TECH NICA L) T R A IN IN G G R A DE
Le Le Le Le Le
C(T) Old 1,031.00 1,073.00 1,123.00
New 1.237.00 1,288.00 1,348.00
C(T) I Old 1.254.00 1,304.00 1,339.00 1,353.00 1,386.00
New 1,505.00 1,565.00 1,607.00 1,624.00 1,663.00
2 Old 1,480.00 1,544.00 1,606.00 1,670.00
New 1,776.00 1,853.00 1,927.00 2,004.00
.. 3a Old 1,733.00 1,811.00 1,890.00 1,969.00 2,048.00
? New 2,080.00 2,173.00 2,268.00 2,363.00 2,458.00
3 . Old 1,733.00 1,811.00 1,890.00 2,126.00 2,221.00
. New 2,080.00 2,173.00 2,268.00 2,551.00 2,665.00
4 ! Old %3T?.00 2.410.00 2,504.00 2,599.00
; New 2,778.00 2,892.00 ^005.00 3,TT9m,"
' d Old 2,645.00 2,753.00 2,860.00 --- -
New •3,174.00 3.304.00 3,432.00
6 Old 2.968.00 3,075.00 3,183.00
New 3.562.00 3,690.00 3.820.00
7 Old 3,290.00 3.414.00 3,536.00 3,659.00 3,783.00
New 3,948.00 4.097.00 4,243.00 4,391.00 4.540.00
SCALE C (EXECUTIVE) T R A IN IN G  GRADE
C(B) Old • 990.00 1.031.00 1,073.00
New 1,148.00 1,237.00 1,288.00
1 Old 1,205.00 1,254.00 1,304.00 1,339.00 1,353.00
New 1,446.00 1,505.00 1.565.00 1,607.00 1.624.00
2 Old 1,418.00 1,480.00 1.544.00 1,606.00
New 1,702.00 1,776.00 1,853.00 1,927.C0
3a Old 1,670 00 1.749.00 1,828.00 1.906.00 1,985.00













- 5 5 3 a -
Le Le Le Le Le Le Le
C(E) 3 Old 1.670.00 1.749.00 ■ 1.828.00 2,064.00 2.141.00
New 2.004.00 2.099.00 2,194.00 2.477.00 2,569.00
4 Old 2.221.00 2,315.00 2,409.00 2.504.00 2.599.00
New 2,665.00 2.778.00 2,891.00 3.005.00 3,119.00
5 Old 2,645.00 2,753.00 2,860.00
New 3.174.00 3,304.00 3,432.00
6 Old 2.968.00 3,075.00 3.183.00
New 3,562.00 3,690.00 3,820.00
7 Old 3,290.00 3.414.00 3,536.00 3,659.00 3,783.00
New 3,948.00 4,097.00 4.243.00 4,391.00 4.540.00
M SCALE
Old 3.639.00 3.793.00 3.936.00 4,084.00 4,231.00 4,379.00 4.526.00
New 4,367.00 4,416.00 4.526.00 4,697.00 4.866.00 5,036.00 5.205.(K)
Old 4.674.00 4,822.00 4.969.00 5,117.00
New 5.375.00 5.545.00 5,714.00 5,885.00
N SCALE
1 Old 477.00 504.00 531.00 559.00 585.00 612.00 639.00
New 597.00 630.00 664.00 699.00 731.00 765.00 799.00
Old 667.00 693.00 693.00 710.00 743.00 775.00
New 834.00 869.00 877.00 888.00 929.00 969.00
2 Old 816.00 858.00 899.00 940.00 981.00 1.023.00 1,064.00
New 979.00 1,030.00 1.079.00 1,128.00 1,177.00 1.228.00 1,277.00
Old 1.105.00 1,155.00 1,205.00
New 1,326.00 1.386.00 1.446.00
3 Old 1.254.00 1,304.00 1.339.00 1.353.00 1.386.00 1.449.00
New 1.505.00 1.565.00 1,607.00 1,624.00 1,663.00 1,737.00
4 Old 1,480.00 1.544.00 1,606.00 1,670.00 1,733.00 1.811.00 1.890.00
New 1,776.00 1.853.00 1.927.00 2,004.00 2,080.00 2,173.00 2,268.00
Old 1,969.00 2,048.00
New 2.363.00 2.548.00
5 Old 1,654.00 1,733.00 1,811.00 2.048.00 2,126.00 2.221.00 2,315.00
New- 1.985.00 2.080.00 2,173.00 2,458.00 2,551.00 2,665.00 2,778.00
Old 2,410.00 2,504.00
New 2.892.00 3,005.00
6 Old 2,645.00 2,753.00 2,860.00 2,968.00
New 3,174.00 3,304.00 3.432.00 3,561.00
7 Old 3,075.00 3.183.00 3,290.00
New 3.690.00 3.820.00 3.948.00
8 Old 3,536.00 3.659.00 3,783.00
New 4.243.00 4.391.00 4,540.00
SCALE F 1 Old 504.00 531.00 559.00 612.00 639.00 667.00 693.00
New 630.00 664.00 699.00 765.00 799.00 834.00 869.00
Old 693,00 710.00 743.00
New 877.00 888.00 929.00
SCALE F 2 Old 784.00 825.00 866.00 908.00 949.00 990.00 1,031.00
New 941.00 990.00 1,041.00 1,090.00 1,139.00 1,188.00 1,237.00
Old 1,073.00 1,114.00 1,155.00
New 1,288.00 1,339.00 1,386.00
SCALE F 3 Old 1,205.00 1,254.00 1.304.00 1,339.00 1,353.00 1,386.00
New 1,446.00 1,505.00 1,565.00 1,606.00 1,624.00 1,663.00
SCALE G 1 Old 559.00 585.00 612.00 667.00 693.00 693.00 710.00
New 699.00 731.00 765.00 83-1.00 866.00 877.00 888.00
Old 743.00 775.00
New 929.00 969.00
SCALE G 2 Old 816.00 858.00 890.00 940.00 981.00 1,023.00 1,064.00
New 979.00 1.030.00 1,079.00 1,128.00 1,177.00 1,228.00 .1,277.30
t ld 1,105.00 1,155.00 1,205.00
New 1.326.00 1.386.00 1,446.00
SCALE G 3 Old 1,254.00 1,304.00 1,339.00 1.353.00 1.386.00 1,449.00
New 1,505.00 1.565.00 1,606.00 1.624.00 1,663.00 1,739.00
S C \LE  H 1 Old 432.00 469.00 495.00 523.00 549.00 576.00 603.00




Le Le Le Le Le Le Le
SCALE H 2 Old 680.00 693.00 693.00 701.00 726.00 759.00 804.00
New 850.00 866.00 877.00 876.00 908.00 949.00 965,00
Old 825.00 858.00
New 990.00 1,030.00
SCALE P 1 Old 432.00
New 540.00
P 2 Old 468.00 487.00 504.00 523.00 540.00 567.00 595.00
New 585.00 608.00 630.00 654.00 675.00 712.00 744.00
Old 621.00 648.00
New 776.00 810.00
P 3 Old 680.00 693.00 693.00 710.00 743.00
New 850.00 867.00 877.00 888.00 929.00
P 4 Old 759.00 793.00 825.00 858.00 891.00 924.00
New 949.00 952.50 990.00 1,030.00 1,069,00 1,109.00
P 5 Old 759.00 981.00 1,023.00 1,064.00 1,105.00 1,150.00 1,188.00
New 1,128.00 1,177.00 1,228.00 1,277.00 1,326.00 1,380.00 1,426.00
TR A IN IN G  GRADE
Old 990.00 1,031.00 1,073.00
New 1,188.00 1.237.00 1,288.00
P 6 Old 1,205.00 1,254.00 1,304.00 1,370.00 1,434.00
New 1,446.00 1,505.00 1,565.00 1,644.00 1,721.00
P 7 Old 1,496.00 1,575.00 1,654.00 1,753.00 1,811.00 I 890.00
New 1,795.00 1,890.00 1,985.00 2,104.00 2.173.00 2,268.00
P 8 Old 1,811.00 1,890.00 1,969.00 2,048.00 2,126.00
New 2,17.3.00 2,268.00 2.363.00 2,458.00 2,551.00
SCALE S 1 Old 360.00 370.00 379.00
New 540.09 550.00 559.00
S 2 Old 396.00 415.00 432.00
New 576.00 595.00 612.00
S 3 Old 451.00 468.00 487.00 504.00
New 631.00 648.00 667.00 684.00
S 4 Old 525.00 549.00 576.00 603.00
New 705.00 729.00 756.00 783.00
S 5 Old 631.00 657.00 680.00 693.00
New 811.00 837.00 860.00 869.00
T  1 Old 360.00 360.00 370.00
New 540.00 545.00 550.00
T 2 Old 379.00 396.00 415.00 432.00 451.00 468.00 487.00
New 559.00 576.00 595.00 612.00 631.00 648.00 667.00
CO N TR AC T SALARY SCALES
SCALE
AA Lower Old 1,974.00 2,098.00 2,219.00 2,580.00 2,640.00 2 758.00
New 2,369.00 2,518.00 2,663.00 3,096.00 3,168.00 3,310.00
Old 2,875.00 2,993.00 3,111.00 3,231.00 3,349.00 3,485.00
New 3.450.00 3,592.00 3,733.00 3,877.00 4,019.00 4,182.00
A A Upper Old 3,619.00 3,754.00 3,890.00 3,995.00 3,995.00
New 4,344.00 4,505.00 4,530.00 4,594.09 4.599.00
BA 1 Old 1.906.00 2,011.00 2,114.00 2,425.00 2,530.00
New 2.287.00 2,413.00 2,537.00 2.910.00 3,036.00
BA2 Old 2,570.00 2,673.00 2.790.00 2,909.00 3,026.00 -
New 3,084.09 3,209,00 3,348.00 3,491.00 3,631.00
3 Old 3,146.00 3,265.00 3,383.00 3.500.00
New 3,775.00 3,918.00 4,060.00 4,200.00
4 Old 3,619.00 3,754.00 3,890.00 3.995.00 3,995.00
New 4,343.00 4,505.00 4.530.00 4,594.00 4,599.00
Q T ) A 3 Old 1,906.00 1,993.00 2,079.00 2,339.00 2,444.00
New 2,287.00 2.392.00 2,495.00 2,807.00 2,933.00
4 Old 2,546.00 2,589.00 2,688.00 2,790.00
New 3,055.00 3,107.00 3,226.09 3,348.00
5 Old 2,909.00 3,026.00 3.146.00
New 3,491.00 3,631.00 3.775.00
6 Old 3,265.00 3,383.00 3,500.00
New 3,918.00 4.060.00 4,200.00
7 Old 3,619.00 3,754.00 3.890.00 3,995.00 3,995.00
New 4.343.00 4,505.00 4.5,30.00 4,594.00 4.599.00
E(A) 3 Old 1,838.00 1,924,00 2.011.00 2.271.00 2,358.00
New 2,206.00 2.309.00 2,413.00 2,725.00 2.830.00
4 Old 2,444.00 2.546.00 2,589.00 2,688.00 2.790.00
New 2.933.00 3.055.00 3,107.00 3,226.09 3,348.00
4
5 5 4 a -
<
-
' SCALE Le Le Le Le Le Le Le
5 Old 2,909.00 3,026.00 3,146.00
New 3.491.00 3,631.00 3,775.00
6 Old 3,265.00 3,383.00 3,500.00
% New- 3,918.00 4.060.00 4.200.00
7 Old 3,619.00 3,754.00 3,890.00 3,995.00 3,995.00
New 4.303.00 4.505.00 4,530.00 4.594.00 4,599.00
M A Old 2.758.00 2,875.00 2,993.00 3,111.00 3,231.00 3,349.00 3,485.00
New 3,310.00 3,450.00 3.592.00 3,733.00 3,877.00 4,019.00 4,182.00
Old 3,619.00 3,754.00
New- 4.343.00 4,505.00
Old 3,890.00 3,99100 3,995.00 4,140.00 4,285.00 4,433.00 4,621.00







GROUP HA Old 4,330.00 4,492.00 4,655.00
New 4,980.00 5,166.00 5,353.00
A B C D E* F G
GROUP Old 7,670.00 6,720.00 6,250.00 5,900.00 5,550.00 5,400.00 5,290.00
New 8,437.00 7,392.00 6,875.00 6,490.00 6,383.00 6.210.00 6,084.00
GROUP H Old 3,936.00 4,084.00 4,231.00
New 4,620.00 4,697.00 4.866.00
Old New
Le Le
1. President . .  ..  .. 16,100.00 17,710.00
2. Chief Justice 8,740.00 9,614.00
3. Supreme Court Justices 7,762.00 8,538.0#
4. Justices of Appeal 7,418.00 8,160.00
5. Puisne Judge 6,843.00 7,527.00
6. Chairman, Public Service Commission 6,325.00 6,958.0#
7. Chief Electoral Commissioner ..  5,658.00 6,224.00
8. Vice-President 8,280.00 9,108.00
9. Minister . .  7,245.00 7,970.00
10. Minister of State 6,253.00 6,878.0#
11. Deputy Minister ' 4,608.00 5,299.00
12. Parliamentary Special Assistant 4,608.00 5,299.00
13. Member of Parliament - .. .. 2,550.00 3,060.00
14. Speaker .. 6,555.00 7,211.00
15. Deputy Speaker 3,960.00 4,554.0#
16. Attorney-General 7,245.00 7,970.00
17. Solicitor-General 6,843.00 7,527.00
18. First Parliamentary Counsel 6,525.00 7,178.00
19. Customary Law Officer .. .. ..................  6,525.00 7,178.00
20. Registrar, Law Reports .. .. 6,095.00 6,705.00
21. Registrar, Court of Appeal 5,750.00 6,325.00
22. Chief Commissioner (National Registration) 7,773.00 8.550.00
23. High Commissioner 6,900.00 7,590.00
24. Deputy High Commissioner .. - .. 5,750.00 6,325.00
25. Director of Public Prosecutions .. ..  15,000.00 ‘ 16,500.0#
tS.h No\enthjr. 19~ü.
G ,P. O 'l390/78/!,000/11.78.
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